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Abstract 
 
All Australian jurisdictions provide mechanisms for assessing legal costs. Costs assessment is 
carried out in two circumstances. Clients who are dissatisfied with what their own lawyers have 
charged can have those charges assessed. When a court orders that a losing litigant pay the legal 
costs of the winning litigant those costs too can be assessed. Australian costs assessment 
mechanisms have been inherited from England, and the traditional model of costs assessment is 
an adversarial process operated by the courts. Western Australia has a costs assessment scheme 
that follows that traditional model. In contrast New South Wales abandoned the traditional model 
in 1994, adopting an administrative costs assessment scheme operating separately from the 
courts with practicing lawyers acting as costs assessors and paid as sub contractors to determine 
costs disputes.  
This thesis explores the costs assessment schemes of both jurisdictions. The traditional judicial 
process still used in Western Australia and the ‗reformed‘ administrative process that has been 
introduced in New South Wales are examined separately and in some detail. In particular, the 
thesis considers the various factors that led to the 1994 Reforms in New South Wales and 
investigates whether the Reforms have produced the results that were expected of them. The 
thesis then provides quantitative data from both jurisdictions and evaluates the performance of 
each against the other in the context of a range of different factors including the rates of return on 
disputed bills and the time each system takes to determine disputes.  
As a result of the analysis, the thesis agrees with the New South Wales Reforms that the judicial 
process, where adversarial contest is used to determine the truth about the parties‘ claims, is not 
well suited to disputes that are centred in the reasonableness of legal fees. For that and a range of 
other reasons the thesis concludes that the administrative model of costs assessment as adopted 
in New South Wales is better able to serve the interests of the various stakeholders. Nonetheless, 
the thesis notes that the stakeholders in the New South Wales costs assessment scheme consider 
it deficient and that a recent and thorough review of the scheme has made recommendations that, 
if adopted, will make profound changes to the way that legal costs are assessed in that state. 
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“Our first step in the endeavour to compel law making to take more account and more intelligent 
account of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it must be applied must be 
to make all the agencies of law making completely conscious of what they are doing. The next 
step is to make plain the end and purpose of what they are doing‖1 Roscoe Pound 
Chapter One: Introduction to the thesis 
1.1: Overview 
The function of a parliament is to make law; an Australian state parliament in particular is tasked 
with making laws for ‗peace, order and good government‘.2 Jeremy Bentham wrote that ‗the 
common end of all laws prescribed by the principle of utility is the promotion of the public 
good‘.3 It follows that parliamentarians must have some view of the common good and some 
clear ends in mind when they create laws. Roscoe Pound, comparing legislators with jurists, 
noted that ‗[h]ence the one (the legislator) is prone to attempt far too much and to be careless 
how he carries out the details of what he attempts‘.4 Pound‘s concerns as to the deficiency of 
parliamentarians, that they legislate with too little information and too much in the way of 
expectations, are as valid today as they were at the time he was writing. The relentless political 
cycle creates the potential for legislators who are long on rhetoric and unclear as to the effects of 
the laws they create.
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Bentham, discussing the end a law maker may have in view, wrote that ―[n]ow by end is here not 
meant the eventual end, which is a matter of chance, but the intended end which is a matter of 
                                                 
1
  Ezra Pound, ‗Legislation as a Social Function‘ (1913) 18(6) American Journal of Sociology, 755, 756. 
2 
Constitution Act 1889 (WA) s 2; Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) s5. The wording in the New South Wales Act is 
slightly different, with the parliament having authority to make laws for the ‗peace, welfare and good government‘ 
of the state. 
3 
HLA Hart (ed), Of laws in general from the collected works of Jeremy Bentham (The Athlone Press, 1970), 32. 
Perceptions of the public good change over time, and parliament amends its laws to suit; law reform, driven by 
public opinion and political expediency, is ongoing.   
4 
Pound, above n 1, 755. 
5 
See for instance Chui, Stephen, ‗On the feasibility of unpopular polices under re-election concerns‘ (2002) 68(4) 
Southern Economic Journal, 841, 851-852.  
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design‖.6 Laws do have unintended consequences, and when needed (and where noticed) those 
consequences can be dealt with through law reform. As for the intended consequences, laws may 
not always do what they were meant to do.  
In order to determine whether or not a law has achieved its intended consequences one must first 
identify what the parliament intended. Parliamentary debates usually give clear indication of 
what the legislators intended to achieve with a law, but any attempt to see if the law has 
produced its desired outcome can only be made after the law has operated for some time.   
 1.2: Introduction to the thesis 
This thesis will investigate one particular set of parliamentary reforms, those made to the New 
South Wales legal costs assessment scheme by way of the Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 
(the 1994 Reforms), to see how well the Reforms achieved the ends the New South Wales 
Parliament had in mind at the time of the Reforms. As well as making an attempt to determine if 
the ‗designed ends‘ were achieved, the thesis will look at some of the unintended consequences 
of the Reforms. It will do so in part by comparing the ‗reformed‘ legal costs assessment scheme 
in New South Wales with the ‗unreformed‘ scheme of costs that operates in Western Australia.  
In doing so, this thesis makes the assumption that costs assessment in New South Wales, as it 
existed before the 1994 Reforms, was substantially the same as costs assessment as it is now 
carried out in Western Australia. First however, this introduction will provide a general overview 
of legal costs and some of the issues that pertain to them in order that the two chapters that 
follow, one on costs assessment in Western Australia, and the second on the reformed costs 
assessment scheme as it operates in New South Wales, can be seen in the relevant context. 
1.2.1: The Law of Costs and Costs Assessments 
The law of costs, as practiced in Australia, governs both how lawyers
7
 charge their clients 
(solicitor/client costs)
8
 and how winning litigants recover a portion of those charges from those 
                                                 
6 
Clarence Morris (ed), The Great Legal Philosophers: Selected Readings in Jurisprudence (University of 
Pennsylvania 12th printing 1997)  Chapter One1 Jeremy Bentham The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined, 274, 279 
7
 As a general rule this thesis will the term lawyer when discussing matters that relate to the entire legal profession, 
but will use the words solicitor or practitioner when referring to individual practices or to situations where legal 
work is or was done directly in the employ of clients. 
8
 A more detailed explanation of solicitor/client costs is provided at 1.3.5.1 in this chapter. 
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they have defeated (party/costs).
9
 Lawyers and their clients do fall out over money; losing 
litigants often dispute the quantum of fees they are asked to pay towards the winner‘s costs. All 
Australian jurisdictions provide formal procedures to resolve these disputes. As noted above, 
costs assessment regimes from two Australian jurisdictions, Western Australia and New South 
Wales differ profoundly. The Western Australian regime follows the traditional adversarial 
model that developed from the British system while the New South Wales regime is the product 
of deliberate reform.  
In short, Western Australia has a costs assessment regime that has developed incrementally from 
the body of law that arrived from Britain with the first settlers. Cost assessment in Western 
Australia has always been and remains part of the judicial function of the courts. New South 
Wales abandoned that approach to costs assessment in 1993, and now has a costs assessment 
scheme that is administrative. New South Wales is the only Australian jurisdiction to depart 
substantially from the inherited norm, and it did so as to reform, in order to address a range of 
‗problems‘ that the New South Wales parliament saw as inherent in the traditional system.   
1.2.2: The structure of the thesis 
As noted above, the first part of this thesis, below, provides an introduction to the law of costs. It 
will give a synopsis of the development of that law from its early British antecedents. It will also 
describe and explain the two basic limbs of costs assessment; assessments between lawyers and 
their disgruntled clients, and assessments between litigants who have received costs orders in 
their substantive matters. Having introduced these essential concepts, the first part will then 
provide a full explanation of the scope of the thesis research and will further explain the purpose 
for which the comparisons between the regimes were made.  
The second chapter of the thesis will map costs assessment in Western Australia from the time of 
first settlement up until the present.  
The third chapter of this thesis follows the same format for New South Wales; starting with a 
history of the law up until the 1994 Reforms. The chapter will give an overview of the various 
forces that led up to the Reforms, and will investigate the Reforms by way of analysing the 
                                                 
9
 A more detailed explanation of party/party costs is provided at 1.3.5.2 in this chapter. 
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parliamentary debates that surrounded the passage of the Legal Profession Reform Bill 1993 
(NSW), which created the Reforms. The third chapter then also illustrates the mechanisms of the 
reform and the changes that have occurred within the reformed system since it was introduced. It 
will also provide some in depth analysis of the effects of the Reforms and will provide a detailed 
critique of various issues that have arisen within the reformed costs assessment system. 
The fourth chapter of the thesis is centred in data extracted from the two costs assessment 
regimes. It will make quantitative comparisons between the two systems and will attempt to 
explain the differences that arise between them. It will describe how the data upon which the 
comparisons rely came about. It will set out the data and give the conclusions that flow from it. 
Chapter four will also elaborate on those conclusions and will provide discussion on what they 
mean in relation to the scope and purpose of the thesis. 
The thesis will conclude by furnishing a determination as to whether or not the New South Wales 
Reforms have achieved their ‗designed ends‘. Further, the thesis will conclude that it is the 
unintended consequences of the Reforms that have made them a success despite that fact that 
they have not demonstrably achieved all of the outcomes they were designed to produce. It will 
suggest that both costs assessment regimes have strengths, but will note that for a variety of 
reasons, which it will explain, the New South Wales system of costs assessment is the preferable 
one. It will however argue that the New South Wales system could benefit from the 
reintroduction of scales of costs, despite the fact that the abolition of those scales was a central 
platform of the 1994 Reforms. 
The thesis is followed by annexure that present pertinent, but not necessarily central information 
that helps to set the thesis more fully into the context of the law of costs. The annexure first set 
out, by way of example, how an individual litigant is charged for the costs of his or her legal 
representative. The law of costs is procedural law, and the annexure then set out the various 
procedures that are used to determine disputes as to liability for costs. As the two costs 
assessment regimes are substantially different it will present two separate descriptions of how 
costs are assessed in the two jurisdictions. The annexure are drafted to be stand-alone documents 
that, individually, provide a comprehensive look at a narrow area; collectively they provide the 
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background knowledge that a reader not well versed in the law of costs would require to 
understand the thesis. 
1. 3: The law of costs: a brief history 
In the British system of law, from which Australian law devolves, those who went to law to 
resolve a civil dispute paid the costs of doing so. Early British law forced litigants to stake their 
personal safety in a manner so extreme as to allow an assumption that God would step in and 
allow the innocent party to the dispute to conquer, regardless of the how unlikely that success 
really seemed.
10
 Trial could be by ordeal, or by battle.
11
 The system evolved, and perhaps not 
unsurprisingly, to a system that allowed litigants to put cases up for adjudication by way of hired 
agents.
12
 These hired agents are the antecedent of the modern legal practitioner.
13
 The champion 
hired to put a case through trial by battle, where pointed argument led to final and binding 
determinations, may have lost more than his client. The winner did pay legal fees in the most 
basic way, by paying the contracted fighter his due wages, but considering the consequence of 
losing had he fought himself, may not have grudged the fee. In time however, the battles moved 
to courtrooms, and winners and losers paid fees in money to those who argued, rather than 
fought by force or arms, for them.
14
 The winner won, but was out of pocket for the fees paid.
15
 
The loser lost both cause and costs.
16
 
                                                 
10
 Despite differences between the laws of the various kingdoms that eventually made up the British Empire, and as 
a general rule, litigants in each kingdom risked life and limb. ‗The fundamental rule of the Anglos Norman legal 
system was that disputes had to be settled by personal confrontation between the parties in battle‘. See Harry Kirk, 
Portrait of a Profession: A History of the Solicitor‟s Profession, 1100 to the Present Day (Oyez Publishing Limited, 
1976) 1.  
11
 For a harrowing description of trial by battle in a civil matter see D.Danzinger& J. Gillingham, 1215 The Year of 
the Magna Carta D. Danziger & J. Gillingham, (Hodder & Stoughton 2003)190. 
12
 Kirk, above n 9, 5.  
13
 Ibid, 2-7.  
14
 Ibid, 1-3. 
15
 Kirk, above n 9, 83: 
Money is a constant theme running through the history of the profession. Hardly had attorneys started being paid for 
their services than there were complaints about their avarice, and it would be idle to believe that solicitors in the 
twentieth century are entirely acquitted by the public of giving a high priority to the amount of their fees. Although the 
complaints of lawyers waxing fat at their clients‘ expense started early, there is little likelihood and no evidence that 
they did so. The number of attorneys seeking business, the ease with which the profession could be entered, the size of 
the disputes; these were all factors which must have tended to depress the earnings of individuals. 
16
 While previously the defendant may have also lost his life: see above n 10. 
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This is, of course, no longer the case in either England or Australia.
17
 A complex ‗law of costs‘ 
has arisen whereby courts order the apportionment of legal costs between the litigants. The 
general rule is that the loser pays, though as with all general rules there are a host of 
exceptions.
18
 Further, the law of costs also governs the financial relationship between solicitor 
and client, and adjudicates disputes as to the quantum of legal fees that practitioners charge to 
clients.  
1.3.1: Costs as a creature of statute 
Until the 13
th
 century English litigants could not recover monies spent on the conduct of 
litigation. In 1267, by way of the Wardship Act, the tenant who was successful in litigation 
against distraint became able to recover the costs of the plea as a part of the damages suffered.
19
 
These recoverable costs were narrow, but over time the range of cost recovery for plaintiffs was 
expanded. It took another 264 years for defendants to gain the right to recover costs, with the 
costs conceptualised as damages.
20
 The issue has been controversial ever since. Suffice to say 
that despite ongoing controversy as to methods of charging and the recovery of legal costs, it is 
an area of law that is now firmly seated in statute, regulation, and court rules.
21
 
1.3.2: The law of costs in Australia 
Not long before the time that a defendant became able to recover costs, the English had 
commenced an explosion of conquest and settlement that took their culture to wildly different 
parts of the globe. Where the English settled, so did their law. Australia has cost adjudication 
systems that have evolved from the English model, though over time different Australian 
                                                 
17
  In 2002 a UK pensioner‘s request to have a motoring infringement decided in a trial by combat was refused. See 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1416262/Court-refuses-trial-by-combat.html> 
18
  See for instance Correa v Whittingham (No2) (2013) NSWCA 471. 
19
 Wardship Act, 1267 (UK) 52 Hen. 3 Cap. VI.  See also Re Brickman; Ex parte Pickering (1860) 1 QSCR 14, 15 
(Lutwyche J):  
Costs are a creature of statute. At common law neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was entitled to costs. The Statute 
of Gloucester, 6 Ed. I, c. 1, gave costs to the plaintiff, but to the plaintiff only. The defendant was left without any 
remedy for the expenses to which he had been put, until the passing of the statutes 23 Hen. 8, c. 15, and 4 Jac. 1, c. 3, 
by which it was enacted that, in all cases in which a plaintiff would be entitled to costs if he recovered the defendant 
should have his costs if a verdict be found for him. 
20
 Ibid. 
21 
The common law does still have some play though see Guss v. Veenhuizen (No.2) (1976) 136 CLR 47, 51 where 
three judges of the High Court found that a legal practitioner could recover costs for appearing as a self litigant, 
despite that not generally being the accepted position under interpretations of the various statutes. 
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jurisdictions have developed a range of different solutions to the problems that occur in attempts 
to award costs to successful litigants or to deal with solicitor client disputes.  
As we enter the 21st century, Australian jurisdictions are reversing their slow drift toward 
disparate systems and are embracing model uniform laws in an attempt to standardise the 
practice of law across Australia. In particular, most Australian jurisdictions have adopted the 
provisions of the model Legal Profession Act.
22
 That Act sets out the regime practitioners must 
use in dealing with their clients in relation to costs, and that regime is now common between 
Western Australia and New South Wales. However, the model legislation does not deal with 
apportionment of costs between the parties; that remains the province of the various courts‘ rules 
and regulations. 
1.3.3: Why have a law of costs? 
Most people find law a strange language; a form of English for which they need expensive 
interpreters, whether they like it or not. To a client it might appear that the legal practitioner 
operates from some place of mystery, and to be engaged in taking the simple, making it complex, 
and charging large amounts of money for doing so.
23
 It is often hard to see the value in much of 
what a lawyer does as his or her produce is not concrete and easily measured, and the client 
really needs to trust that there is value for money and honest charging.
24
 Lawyers in turn could 
be accused of having sound financial reasons for keeping the veil of mystery intact; obscure and 
                                                 
22 
The model legislation has been adopted in Western Australia as the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) and in New 
South Wales as the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). While there are some minor substantive differences between 
the two acts, they are largely interchangeable. It is worth noting that the acts are substantially similar in many of the 
costs provisions, but are the source of very different costs assessment regimes. 
23 ‗Moreover, he made his money out of other men‘s misfortunes and disputes and to make matters worse he does so  
not by honest toil as a craftsman did but by pen and paper and the use of his wits‘: Kirk, above n 9, 200.  
24 
Ipp J put it very well in Brown v Talbot and Olivier (1993) 9 WAR 70, 81:  
the client‘s position is fraught with uncertainty; he is susceptible, to a large degree, to the subjective decision of the 
solicitors, and he is dependent on the exigencies of the practice of the solicitors- something about which he knows 
nothing.  
Alexander Forrest, Western Australian Legislative Assembly member for West Kimberley and Mayor of Perth put it 
less eloquently in 1893, ‗if you go to a lawyer it will cost you between £2 and £3 for preparation of the transfer of a 
bit of land that may not be worth £1‘: Western Australia, Parliamentary  Debates, Legislative Assembly, 15 August 
1893, 335 (Alexander Forest). 
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archaic words, while often unnecessary when they appear in legal work, help keep the client 
dependent and willing to pay up.
25
 
It seems that no one has ever really trusted lawyers to do the right thing in terms of charging for 
services,
26
 and the courts have developed and jealously maintained procedural mechanisms to 
ensure that lawyers‘ fees are open to scrutiny and challenge.27 This process, which derives from 
statute and is determined by the Court‘s procedural rules, has, since its inception and until 
recently, been referred to as the taxation of costs.
28
 The Legal Profession Acts of both New 
South Wales and Western Australia now refer to the process as assessment of costs and this 
thesis will adopt that current descriptor throughout.  
1.3.4: The Assessment Process 
There are two basic limbs to the assessment process. The first limb governs assessments between 
lawyers and their own clients (either client/solicitor or solicitor/client costs). The second 
provides the mechanisms for assessments between litigants, where the general rule is that the 
loser pays the winner‘s costs (party/party costs). 
 1.3.4.1: Client/solicitor and solicitor/client costs 
A client who is disgruntled about what he or she is being charged can ask that the court assess 
his or her own solicitor‘s bill.29 When a court does so, the assessed bill replaces the original bill 
as the determinant of what the client (or whoever is liable for the costs) owes to the lawyer in 
                                                 
25
 The one great principle of the English law is to make business for itself. There is no other principle distinctly, 
certainly, and consistently maintained through all its narrow turnings. Viewed by this light it becomes a coherent 
scheme and not the monstrous maze the laity are apt to think it. Let them but once clearly perceive that its grand 
principle is to make business for itself at their expense, and surely they will cease to grumble (Charles Dickens, 
Bleak House, The complete works of Charles Dickens Vol. 18 (P.F. Collier and Son) 608). 
26 ‗The Elizabethan slang name for a highway-man or a footpad was a ―high lawyer‖: Kirk, above n 9, 201. A 
description of how lawyers charge out for their services is provided at Annexure 1.  
27
 Description of the practicalities of the costs assessment process in the Western Australian and New South Wales 
jurisdictions are provided at Annexure 1 and 2. 
28
 For the uninitiated, the word taxation as used in cost adjudication is at best confusing. When sums are removed 
from a bill of costs those sums are described as being ‗taxed off‘. The verb ‗tax‘ derives from the Latin word 
‗taxare‘ which means ―to evaluate, estimate or assess‖ (T.F. Hoad (ed), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English 
Etymology (Oxford University Press, Great Britain 1986) 484).The model legislation has largely, though not 
completely, abandoned the word, and the adjudication of costs is now described as costs assessment. However, the 
various other rules that govern the law of costs continue, for now, to refer to taxation of costs. 
29
 The client may simply refuse to pay, leaving the practitioner to sue for the costs as a debt. Cost assessment will 
usually be a quicker and cheaper way of resolving the dispute. 
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relation to that retainer.
30
 An assessment sought by a client (a client/solicitor assessment) goes to 
the court as a new matter, and is not considered part of the substantive matter to which the 
challenged retainer pertained.
31
 Client/solicitor assessment, wrought as they are with the angst 
that comes from failed professional relationships and the perceived betrayal of trust, are a 
fascinating area of study. When faced with a client/solicitor taxation, even solicitors seem to lose 
that rational objectivity that is the hallmark of a good lawyer.
32
  
In 1993 New South Wales also allowed solicitors (rather than only clients) to have the bills that 
they render to clients assessed when there is a dispute as to quantum. This allows a solicitor to 
have the scheme make an assessment about the costs and to recover on that basis, rather than 
having to chase up the costs by way of proving them as a debt in court. Western Australia 
adopted this innovation by way of the model Legal Profession Act, enacted as the Legal 
Profession Act 2008 (WA). 
 1.3.4.2: Party/party costs 
As stated above, the Australian litigation system generally operates on a ‗loser pays‘ model.33 
However, absent a special costs order, the ‗loser‘ is generally only obliged to pay the winner‘s 
costs on a party/party basis. Party/party costs are usually less than the costs the winning litigant 
has expended as party/party costs are based in (and assessed on) a concept of reasonableness 
rather than in relation to what was actually spent. Persons (or entities) that have a costs order 
made against them and are thus liable for an opponent‘s legal costs can have those costs assessed 
in order to determine the quantum they must pay. The costs order that creates the obligation to 
                                                 
30
 The usual term used to describe this situation in Western Australia is ‗solicitor/client assessment‘.  At the time the 
data for this thesis was collected clients in Western Australia could ask for a costs assessment if there was a dispute, 
the lawyers involved could not. In New South Wales solicitors gained the right to seek assessment of their own bills 
by way of the 1994 Reforms.  This is also now the situation in Western Australia. Both jurisdictions now allow 
practitioners as well as clients to seek assessment. As the data from New South Wales, presented later in this thesis, 
covers assessments initiated by clients and by solicitors the thesis will refer to assessments filed by or on behalf of 
clients as client/solicitor assessments  and will refer to assessments filed by or on behalf of practitioners as 
solicitor/client assessments.   
31
 In Western Australia all client/solicitor and solicitor/client assessments take place in the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia.  In New South Wales all assessments are filed with the Manager Costs Assessment. 
32
 It is the author‘s experience that otherwise sensible practitioners will often allow a client to proceed to assessment 
rather than make a sensible commercial decision to reduce a bill. They will do so as they feel that a request for 
assessment is an affront to their professionalism. See also Annexure 2 n50. 
33
 This model is in no way universal. The United Kingdom uses it, in the United States, litigants mainly bear their 
own costs, regardless of the outcome of the litigation. See for instance John Leubsdorf, ‗Towards a history of the 
American Rule on fee recovery‘, (Winter 1984)  47 Law and Contemporary Problems, 9-36. 
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pay the costs may have been made at any stage during, or at the end of, the substantive litigation, 
but in most cases the costs assessment occurs after the substantive matter has been determined. 
The assessment of these costs is known as party/party assessment.
34
 
In all but one of the Australian jurisdictions party/party bills of costs are assessed against some 
form of statutory scale, regardless of the existence of a solicitor/client costs agreement.
35
 This 
means that losing litigants will not usually have to pay the other party‘s costs as actually 
incurred. Instead, the loser will pay costs as at a rate at or below a fixed ceiling of costs, as 
deemed suitable by the costs assessor doing the assessment. That ceiling rate for any given legal 
service is provided by a costs determination committee as a scale of costs and is usually 
substantially less than the rate a practitioner will have charged for that service. New South Wales 
abolished scales of costs as part of the 1994 Reforms and assessors in that jurisdiction assess 
against their own view as to what are reasonable costs for the legal works in question. 
As a general rule the successful litigant only recovers between 60%-80% of the actual cost of 
litigation.
36
 This means that the successful litigant usually pays the practitioner with conduct of 
the matter substantially more than can be recovered from the loser. The shortfall in recovery is a 
constant source of complaint from clients and the New South Wales Reforms of 1993 were in 
part driven by a desire to see successful litigants more fully indemnified. 
37
 That said, the 
shortfall in recovery is also the basis of a very effective tool that courts have to discourage 
                                                 
34
 In Western Australia party/party costs are assessed in the court where the substantive matter was heard. In New 
South Wales all party/party assessments are filed with the Manager Costs Assessment. 
35
 Subject to costs agreements, which may displace the scales of costs, the scales regulate ‗(a) the taxation of bills of 
law practices; and (b) any other aspect of the costs charged by law practices‘: Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 
280(1). Scales of costs are described more fully at 1.3.6 below. The statutory authority for recovering costs at scales 
in state and territories jurisdictions are as follows: Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) s279(b); Legal Profession Act 
2006 (NT) s314(b); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s316(b); Legal Profession Act 2007 (Tas) s303(b); Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (Vic) s3.4.19(b); Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s42(6)(b). 
36
 This thesis will provide measurements of actual return rates for both the jurisdictions under study. 
37
 Not all jurisdictions consider a high level of costs recovery to be a central issue. Reforms in New Zealand have 
seen the High Court introduce an assessment system where a winning litigant can only recover 66% of what the 
court considers reasonable, regardless of what the litigation has actually cost. This means that the actual percentage 
recovered is likely to be less than 50% of what was expended as costs.  These Reforms, promulgated by the Court 
Rules Committee, were designed to address a range of ‗problems‘ with the previous system, but the Committee does 
not seem to have been unduly concerned with the fact that the Reforms guarantee that a winning litigant is nearly 
always going to be substantially out of pocket on costs. See Justice Geoffrey Venning, ‗Alternatives to Activity 
Based Costing: The New Zealand Approach‘ (Paper presented at the AIJA Annual Conference, Adelaide, 15-17 
September 2006).  
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unnecessary litigation; the indemnity costs order. In certain circumstances a court can order that 
the shortfall be reduced or largely eliminated; more will be said about this below and in Chapter 
Three where the unintended consequences of the 1994 Reforms are explored. 
A full description of how a practitioner charges costs and how the winning litigant recovers those 
costs through a party/party assessment, including a worked example, is provided in the annexure 
to this thesis.  
1.3.5: Costs: the default position 
The assessment process requires that the bills produced be compared to some standard to see if 
the bills are either excessive or unfair. In most Australian jurisdictions the default standard is a 
scale of legal costs.
38
 Most Australian jurisdictions produce and regularly update cost 
determinations, more commonly known as scales of costs, which usually take the form of 
itemised lists of the minutia of legal services and mandate the maximum amounts a lawyer can 
charge for each of those services.
39
 The origins of scales of costs go well back in time, arguably, 
they came about in the decades following
40
 an English Act of Parliament promulgated as  
[a]n Act to reform the multitude of misdemeanours and abuse of some attorneys and 
solicitors, who, by charging excessive fees for their services, and by making other 
unnecessary demands, caused clients to be financially overburdened, whereby legal 
services were being extraordinarily delayed.
41
   
As to how the scales were initially devised, as Western Australia‘s best known costs expert once 
noted, ‗[n]o one knows where the hell it came from‘.42 
                                                 
38
 The authority for recovering costs at scales in each of the state jurisdictions is provided at note 35 above. 
39
  This thesis does not attempt to canvass costs assessment in any of the Australian jurisdictions other than Western 
Australia and New South Wales, but it notes that the different jurisdictions, and especially the Federal jurisdictions, 
have numerous variations from the traditional  system used in Western Australia. An example from a Western 
Australian costs determination and an explanation how the determination is applied on assessment is provided in 
Annexure 2. 
40
 J Ahern, A Weingart and M Johnson, Legal Costs Handbook: A guide to the preparation and taxation of legal 
costs (LBC Information Services, 1995) (ix). 
41
 An Act to reform the multitude of misdemeanours and abuse of some attorneys and solicitors, who, by charging 
excessive fees for their services, and by making other unnecessary demands, caused clients to be financially 
overburdened, whereby legal services were being extraordinarily delayed 1605 (UK) (3 Jas 1. c.7). 
42
 Garnsworth, David, quoted in Grace Meertes ‗Legal Fees: How much should we pay?‘ The West Australian 
(Perth), 3 September 1997, 10.  
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The scales of costs, which are regularly reviewed by statutory bodies charged with that duty, 
provide the default standard as to what it is reasonable for a practitioner to charge.
43
 In those 
jurisdictions, and absent a special costs order, party/party bills that go to an assessment (as 
opposed to being settled between the parties) are assessed against the relevant scale of costs in 
order to determine their reasonable quantum.
44
 The scales of costs also are also the default as to 
what a client should be charged by his or her own solicitor, but solicitors and their clients can 
contract out of that default position by way of costs agreements.  
1.3.6: Contracting out of the default position 
Defaults aside, most legal retainers are subject to costs agreements, wherein the various hourly 
and other rates that a client will be charged are set out.
45
 A costs agreement is a contract of 
engagement between the practitioner and the client, and is subject to all the general common law 
and specific statutory regimes that govern contracts. In addition, costs agreements are governed 
by the Legal Profession Act operating in each jurisdiction. Valid costs agreements displace court 
sanctioned scales of costs, at least in terms of what monies the client must pay to his or her own 
solicitor.
46
  Costs agreements do not however displace scales of costs for party/party 
assessment.
47
 
If the client is dissatisfied with the bill generated under the costs agreement and requests 
assessment the assessing officer then assesses the bill in accordance with the costs agreement, 
                                                 
43
 In Western Australia the Legal Costs Committee has be reconstituted under Division 5 of the Legal Profession Act 
2008 (WA). The Committee, consisting of lawyers and laypeople, is responsible for reviewing cost determination on 
a bi annual basis, and amends them when it considers necessary. For example, the Legal Practitioners (Supreme 
Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2012 (WA), which regulates fees for contentious matters in both the 
District and the Supreme Courts of Western Australia, has been reviewed and replaced in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008 and most recently in 2010. In 1996 the scale hourly rate for a senior practitioner was $270.00, currently 
it is $429.00.  
44
 A court‘s discretion to award costs in party/party matters includes the discretion to award indemnity costs (which 
displace the scale limits) or to make orders lifting the scale limits (see for example Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 
(WA) Order 66). 
45
 In Western Australia s 282 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) allows costs agreements; that section mirrors s 
232 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW).  
46
 Both Western Australia (s 288 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA)) and New South Wales (s 328 of the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (NSW)) have similar criteria that will allow a client to avoid a costs agreement.  The criteria are 
broad, with reasonableness, which is always mostly a matter of fact, being the baseline. An unreasonable costs 
agreement may be set aside and the fees charged under the retainer are governed by the relevant scale of costs.  
Failure to make adequate disclosure as to cost at the inception of the retainer is strong ground for a client to overturn 
a costs agreement.   
47
  A costs agreement may impact on a party/party assessment if there is an indemnity costs order. 
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rather than in accordance with any relevant scale. The client is ultimately responsible for paying 
the solicitor the amount that the assessing officer considers reasonable in relation to both the 
costs agreement and the particular instructions that were given to the solicitor.  
This is the reality in most Australian jurisdiction, and in particular the Western Australian 
jurisdiction.
48
 New South Wales, however, abolished scales of costs in 1993.
49
 The scales were 
abolished for a number of reasons, in part to address the perceived injustice of successful 
litigants being out of pocket for legal costs that they have legitimately incurred. In New South 
Wales costs assessment is, at least in the first instance, no longer part of the judicial process.
50
 
Costs assessment has become an administrative process under the auspices of a statutory body. 
1.4:  The scope of this thesis 
This thesis investigates and compares two differing costs adjudication systems; those of Western 
Australia and New South Wales. It does so from a Western Australian perspective. Western 
Australia has the model that is standard in most jurisdictions; a judicial process that is dependent 
on scales of costs and is adversarial. New South Wales has boldly abandoned costs scales and the 
adversarial system; instead it has adopted an administrative model of costs assessment (the 1994 
Reforms). Research for this thesis in the Western Australian jurisdiction has been restricted to 
costs as ordered and determined in the Western Australian Supreme Court. This limit was in part 
because all solicitor/client costs disputes in the Western Australian jurisdiction are heard in that 
court, and in part for reasons of practical efficiency. The New South Wales costs assessment 
scheme embraces all the state courts, so data from the research conducted there represents a 
wider spread of litigation. However, despite the fact that the lower courts in Western Australia 
deal with costs in the same way as does the Western Australian Supreme Court, findings drawn 
from the Western Australian Supreme Court material may not be valid for lower courts in that 
jurisdiction.  
                                                 
48
  In addition, costs agreements are governed by the various acts that generally govern the legal profession in each 
jurisdiction as follows: Legal Profession Act 2006 (ACT) Division 3.2.5, Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT) Division 
5, Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) Division 5, Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s42(6), Legal Profession Act 2007 
(Tas) ss306-312, Legal Profession Act 2004 (Vic) Division 5. A brief history of costs assessment in Western 
Australia is provided in Chapter Two. 
49
 A brief history of costs assessment in New South Wales is provided in Chapter Three. 
50
 Appeals relating to costs assessments are initially heard as a further administrative process, however there is still a 
right to appeal that review to the District Court (Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) ss284, 285). 
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Any comparison of differing systems is likely to raise the issue of the ‗best‘. To determine a 
‗best‘, one must first determine the stakeholders. Once they are found the real question will be 
‗best for whom?‘. There are at least four separate stakeholder groups in relation to the issue of 
legal costs: the courts, lawyers, clients, and the public in general. Clients are necessarily divided 
into two groups, winners and losers of litigation, where what is the best for one group is likely to 
be worse for the other. A winning client will think it best that he or she regains all the monies 
outlaid as legal costs; a loser will be very keen to pay as small a portion of the victor‘s costs as 
possible. Clients also have a homogenous interest; winner or loser, the system also adjudicates 
the financial relationship between the client and his or her own lawyer, and clients will consider 
a system that keeps a tight rein on what lawyers can charge to be the best. This thesis will not try 
to determine an overall ‗best‘, for the scope of such determination is too large.  
1.5: The purpose of this thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is threefold in that it attempts to answer three questions: 
1.5.1: Did the 1994 Reforms achieve their intended outcomes? 
Firstly, the thesis will consider the main drivers of the New South Wales Reforms and will 
question whether the Reforms functioned as intended to alleviate what its proponents saw as 
central problems with the traditional assessment regime. The purpose of the Reforms is dealt 
with in detail in Chapter Three, however, the parliamentary debates surrounding the Reforms 
continually come back to one key issue, the fact that winners in litigation often found themselves 
significantly out of pocket for legal fees despite the New South Wales being a ‗costs follow the 
event‘ jurisdiction.51 Litigation determines disputes, and the Australian legal system generally 
expects that the loser will pay not only any damages awarded, but his or her opponent‘s costs as 
well.
52
 This is a general principle rather than a firm rule and cost recovery rates vary greatly from 
matter to matter. A reform that addresses this and creates a situation where the winner recovers a 
larger portion of the monies paid to his or her lawyer would appear to make the system fairer; 
both sides of the New South Wales parliament that instituted the 1994 Reforms agreed that this 
                                                 
51
 John Hannaford, introducing the 1994 Reforms, described costs following the event as ―a key component in our 
judicial system‖. New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 28 October 1993, 4645 (The 
Honourable John P Hannaford, Attorney General and Minister for Justice). 
52
 This is a general expectation, there are many instances where costs do not follow the event, exploring them is 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
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was to be a major outcome of the new legislation. Further, the reform agenda was informed by 
the National Competition Policy Review of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) and a view that 
scales of costs were anti-competitive.
53
 The legislators argued that removing scales of costs 
would make those who supplied legal services more genuinely competitive and that through 
better competition the cost of legal works would fall.
54
  
Aligned with the above, the thesis will attempt to ascertain how the reformed system in New 
South Wales compares with the traditional model of costs assessment that operates in Western 
Australia when dealing with disputes between lawyers and their own clients. The thesis will 
attempt to make a finding as to whether lawyers or their clients are more advantaged in one 
system than in the other, with a view to determining if that aspect of the Reforms was successful.  
1.5.2: Which of the two costs assessment regimes provides the most advantages to 
the jurisdiction’s courts? 
Secondly, it will attempt to make some judgment in relation to which of the two schemes works 
for the courts of the jurisdiction as administrative institutions. The system that is best for the 
courts will largely be the system that produces reasonable results in a timely and not overly 
expensive manner. Reasonable, in this context, would mean results that are generally perceived 
as fair, transparent and open to scrutiny.   
1.5.3: What are the unintended benefits of the 1994 Reforms? 
Thirdly, and in a general sense, the thesis will identify incidental benefits that flow from the New 
South Wales Reforms. 
1.6: How will the thesis achieve its purpose? 
In relation to the first of those three purposes, the thesis will present data drawn from costs 
assessments in each jurisdictions and will provide analysis of that data. It will attempt to 
demonstrate whether (and where) the two different costs assessment schemes produce materially 
different outcomes in terms of the quantum of fees payable under assessed bills of costs and in 
                                                 
53
 The National Review did not finish its report until after the 1994 Reforms were instituted, but the review itself 
was taking place in the background to the costs reform. 
54
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 9
th
 November 1993, 4981 (John Fahey, 
Premier). 
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terms of other relevant aspects of the assessment regimes. In relation to the first purpose, 
regarding the agreed goal of increasing the winning litigant‘s cost recovery, this thesis will show 
that the 1994 Reforms have resulted in increasing the amount a winning litigant recovers under a 
costs order. 
Further, in relation to the third purpose, the thesis will investigate some of the possibilities that 
have opened up through the practicalities of the New South Wales system and will argue that 
those practicalities provide unparalleled opportunities to develop deeper knowledge of how well 
our legal system works and what parts of it are more or less effective. 
Lastly, the thesis will argue that the 1994 Reforms, as well as providing some measure of relief 
for winning litigants, have provided clear advantages as compared to the traditional adversarial 
model.   
These things are all important. They are important in the narrow area of costs assessment; in 
Western Australia costs assessment continues to develop slowly and along traditional lines 
without there being a great deal of scrutiny into the effectiveness of the system overall. New 
South Wales has taken a radical departure from the traditional systems in order to address what 
were seen as systemic problems with the way disputes as to costs were determined. Nearly two 
decades later New South Wales has instituted the first thorough investigation into the efficacy of 
that departure by way of the Chief Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme, and that 
review is yet to produce a final report. Having two quite different systems for dealing with the 
same problem, with both of those systems now mature and entrenched, creates an opportunity to 
find out what works and what does not work as well. They are also important in the broader 
sense; if we agree with Pound as to the need to have better informed legislators then 
investigations into the eventual outcomes of reform, and measurements as to how well laws have 
measured up to their designed ends are important tools for good governance. 
The following illustration provides a timeline for the historical development of costs assessment 
in Western Australia and New South Wales, as further described in Chapter Two and Three. 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1: Historical timeline of costs assessment 
Key –  NSW  WA 
1788 English Law and with it costs assessment arrives in NSW 
1824 Supreme Court of New South Wales established 
1829 English Law arrives in WA 
1847 An Act to regulate Attorney‘s Fees (NSW) 
1861 Supreme Court of Western Australia established 
1888 Rules of the Supreme Court WA sets out scales of costs 
1893 Legal Practitioners Act (1893) regulates legal practice in WA 
1898  Legal Practitioners Act (1898) regulates legal practice in NSW 
1971 New Supreme Court Rules culls scales of costs to 28 items in WA 
1984 Responsibility for setting scales of costs shifts from the courts to an expert panel (NSW) 
1987 1898 Act repealed, Legal Profession Act 1987 regulates legal practice in NSW, costs regime unchanged 
1987 Responsibility for setting scales of costs shifts from courts to expert panel (WA) 
1993 NSWLRC report recommends reform of costs assessment regime (NSW) 
1993 The Legal Profession Reform Act passed to amend the Legal Profession Act 1987 and introduces costs 
reform (NSW) 
  
1994 Costs assessment reforms come into effect in NSW, Costs assessment scheme set up as an 
administrative dispute resolution body.  Scales of costs abolished. Contingency fees with uplift 
introduced 
  
WA NSW 
1999 LRCWA completes review of justice system, 
proposes costs reforms 
1998 Costs assessment becomes ‗user pay‘ and costs 
assessors required to give reasons for decision 
2008 Legal Profession Act 2008 Practitioners get 
right to file own bill for assessment. Time for 
requesting assessment enlarged from 30 days to 
one year. Conditional agreements with uplift 
fees allowed 
2002 Civil Liability Act 2002 caps costs for liability 
in tort 
2009 Supreme Court introduces provisional 
assessment 
2004 Legal Profession Act 2004 takes away right to 
charge uplift fee in actions for damages 
  2006 Time to seek assessment of costs enlarged from 
30 days to one year 
  2011 Chief Justice announces major review of the 
costs assessment scheme 
  2013 Draft report from the Chief Justice‘s review 
makes sweeping recommendations for further 
reform 
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Chapter Two: Assessment of costs in Western Australia- A brief 
history 
2.1: Overview 
This thesis compares and contrasts two costs assessment regimes; the adversarial system used 
in Western Australia and the ‗reformed‘ administrative system that was adopted in New 
South Wales in 1993. The Western Australian system, as exists in 2013, is a lineal 
descendant of the adversarial costs assessment system that developed in England.
55
 That 
English system was received in Western Australia with the body of English law that 
accompanied the first white settlers to the nascent colony. This chapter gives historical 
context to the thesis by tracing the evolution of the costs assessment regime within Western 
Australia from the time of colonisation to the present. As will be illustrated, features of the 
current costs assessment regime, such as scales of costs and costs agreements that avoid 
those scales have been a part of the regime since its inception at the time Western Australia 
was colonised. As will be seen below, some of the more recent attempts at reform have 
moved costs assessment in Western Australia, at least in some parts of the jurisdiction, closer 
to the administrative model, but in all costs assessments in Western Australia are still carried 
out much as they always have been.  
2.2: The early years 
The British colonisation of Western Australia was initiated in 1829.
56
 Captain Stirling, the 
colony‘s first Governor, in conjunction with a Legislative Council, was empowered to pass 
laws as necessary for the new colony,
57
 but it was clear that the free settlers of Western 
Australia were subject to English law as current at the time of colonisation.
58
 The first law 
                                                 
55
 A brief history of the development of the law of costs in England was provided in Chapter One. 
56 
Costs reform was an issue in England at that time. In 1828 Lord Brougham gave a speech in
 
parliament 
recorded as ‗A speech on the present state of the law in the country‘ in which he canvassed the problems and 
inequities the then current costs regime created.  A transcript of the speech is available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.hnf6kj.
 
57 
10th Geo, 4th cap. 22 (Western Australia Act 1829 (UK)). 
58 ‗It may be proper to notice that Australia being a Territory acquired by mere rights of occupancy, and not by 
conquest, the King‘s Subjects residing there are, by a general principle of law, entitled to all the Rights and 
Privileges of British Subjects and carry with them the Law of their native country, so far as it is applicable to 
their new situation and circumstances.‘ (An extract from Lord Greville‘s second despatch to Governor Stirling, 
dated 28 April 1831.) This would seem to include the right to have a bill of costs assessed. It is interesting to 
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passed by the Governor of the new colony established a Court of Civil Judicature.
59
 That 
court was given the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Queen‘s Bench, Common Pleas, the 
Exchequer, as well as jurisdiction for probate matters.
60
 Those jurisdictions included the 
power to award legal costs to winning litigants, regardless of whether they were plaintiffs or 
defendants. Failure to pay costs was considered serious; defaulters were not simply 
imprisoned, they were imprisoned and kept at hard labour for up to a month or until all the 
costs they owed were paid.
61
 
A Supreme Court was created by way of an ordinance assented to in 1861.
62
 The jurisdiction, 
powers and assets of the Court of Civil Judicature was transferred to the new court, and the 
Chief Justice was given the power to make rules of court.
63
 In 1863 a Court for Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes was established, although in reality the small colony meant that it was 
the Supreme Court sitting in that guise.
64
 The ordinance that established that court made 
provisions for the assessment of costs.
65
  
Local Courts were established at much the same time.
66
 The newly established Local Court 
regime was alive to the need to limit fees payable to lawyers, and to limit cost recovery.
67
 
                                                                                                                                                       
note that in the same dispatch Lord Grenville noted that the judicial system then existing in New South Wales 
was not an appropriate model for a ‗free‘ colony. 
59
 2 Gul. IV., No. 1, (An Act for Establishing a Court of Civil Judicature 1832). 
60
 Ibid, s 7. 
61 
14 Vict. No. 5, (An Ordinance to Facilitate the Performance of the Duties of Justices of the Peace Out of 
Sessions within the Colony of Western Australia with Respect to Summary Convictions and Orders 1850) s 23. 
62 
24 Vict. No. 15, (An Ordinance to provide for the more effectual administration of justice by establishing a 
Supreme Court) assented 17 June 1861. 
63 
Ibid s 26 made the transfer, s 31 gave the Chief Justice power to make the rules of court. 
64 
27 Vict. No. 19, (An Ordinance to Regulate Divorce and Matrimonial Causes 1863). 
(As noted in the body of this thesis, assessment of costs was known as ‗taxation of costs‘ in Western Australia 
until the model legislation was passed in 2008. For the sake of clarity and consistency this annexure will refer to 
assessment of costs throughout). 
65 
Ibid s 59. The bill of any proctor, attorney, or solicitor, for any fees, charges or disbursements in respect of 
any business transacted in the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial causes, shall, as well as between proctor and 
attorney or solicitor and client, as between party and party be subject to taxation by the Registrar of ‗the 
Supreme Court, and the mode in which any such bill shall be referred for taxation and by whom the costs of 
taxation shall be paid, shall be regulated by the rules and orders to be made under this Ordinance, and the 
certificate of the registrar of the amount at which such bill is taxed shall be subject to the Judge of the Court.‘ 
The right to assessment rested with the client; a practitioner could not file his or her own bill of costs for 
assessment and, if unpaid, had to sue in debt. This remained the position in Western Australia until 2008, see 
discussion at 2.4 and 2.5 below. 
66 
27 Vict. No. 2, (An Ordinance for the Recovery of Small Debts and Demands 1893). Section 2 of that Act 
read as follows: ‗IT shall be lawful for the Governor from time to time, and at any time by proclamation 
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However, even in 1861 the ubiquitous costs agreement allowed lawyers and clients to 
contract out of the restricted scales of costs.
68
 The Attorney General was given the power to 
frame scales of costs for the Local Courts for matters over £20 and until he did so the scales 
of costs of the English County Courts were to apply.
69
 The Ordinance setting up the Local 
Court also allowed for taxation of costs both between party/party
70
 and client/solicitor, with 
client/solicitor assessment being subject to any written costs agreement.
71
 
In 1880 the Supreme Court and the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Proceedings were 
amalgamated.
72
 New rules of court were drafted, and came into effect in 1888, but the old 
rules and procedures remained in force where they were not inconsistent with the new.
73
 If 
damages recovered in the new court were less than £20 in contract or less than £5 in tort, cost 
recovery was restricted to the Local Court Scale.
74
 
                                                                                                                                                       
published in the ―Western Australian Government Gazette,‖ to constitute local courts for the recovery of small 
debts and demands, to be holden at such times and places and within such districts throughout the said Colony 
as may be most fit and convenient, and as may be specified in such proclamation, and likewise by proclamation 
to alter the time or place or manner of holding any such courts, which courts respectively shall be, and are 
hereby declared to be courts of record.‘ 
67 
Ibid s 30. ‗And no attorney shall be entitled to have or recover therefore any sum of money unless the  debt or 
damage claimed shall be more than 40s, or to have or recover more than 10s for his fees and costs, unless the 
debt or damage claimed be more than £5, or more than 15s unless debt or damage claimed be more that £20, 
and in no case where the debt or damage claimed not exceed £20 , shall any fee exceeding £1 3s 6p be allowed 
for employing a barrister as counsel in the case, and the expense of employing a barrister or an attorney either 
by plaintiff or defendant, shall not be allowed on taxation of costs in the case of a plaintiff where less than £5 is 
recovered or in the case of a defendant where less than £5 is claimed, or in any case unless by order of The 
Magistrate.‘ 
68 
27 Vict. No. 19, (An Ordinance to Regulate Divorce and Matrimonial Causes 1863). By way of s 31,  in 
matters of over £20,  the Magistrate had discretion to allow a solicitor to recover more than was allowed under s 
30 if the Magistrate was satisfied ‗by writing under the hand of the client‘ that the client agreed to the extra 
payment.
 
69 
Ibid s 32.
 
70 
Ibid s 33. An oddly worded section whereby ―all costs and charges shall be taxed by The Magistrate…‖. The 
emphasis is mine, as the section seems to disallow agreement as to costs and make taxation mandatory.
 
71 
Ibid s 34. ‗With respect to such proceedings as are last hereinbefore specified, all costs and charges between 
attorney and client shall, on the application either of the attorney or client, but not otherwise, be taxed by the 
Magistrate of the court in which such costs and charges were incurred; and no costs or charges shall be allowed 
on such taxation which are not sanctioned by the scale then in force, unless The Magistrates shall be satisfied 
that the client has agreed in writing to pay them, in which case they may be allowed; and no attorney shall have 
the right to recover from his client any costs or charges in respect of such proceedings, unless they shall have 
been allowed either on such taxation, or on the taxation of the Master of the Supreme Court.‘ 
72 
44 Vict. No. 10, (An Act to make Provision for the Better Administration of Justice in the Supreme Court of 
Western Australia (The Supreme Court Act) 1880). 
 
73 
Ibid s 17.
 
74 
14 Vict. No. 5, (An Ordinance to Facilitate the Performance of the Duties of Justices of the Peace Out of 
Sessions within the Colony of Western Australia with Respect to Summary Convictions and Orders 1850) s 23.
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The Rules of the Supreme Court 1888 (WA) were the recognisable ancestor of the current 
Rules of the Western Australian Supreme Court. Order 61 dealt with costs. Order 61 Rule 31 
set out the general regulations that applied to assessments in the Supreme Court. A bill of 
costs drawn up pursuant to the 1888 Rules would resemble a bill drawn up in 2012 in 
appearance, if not in quantum. By way of Order 61 Rule 31(25) an assessing officer was 
given broad powers, similar to the powers such an officer has today. The assessing officer 
was to allow the costs of procuring counsel‘s opinion as ―in his discretion think just and 
reasonable‖,75 while other costs were to be allowed in accordance with the Scale of Costs set 
out in Appendix N of the rules.
76
  
Court fees on assessment were due at the end of the assessment process, and payable on the 
bill as assessed, though the assessing officer was able to require a deposit of the full amount 
of the fees that may be payable at completion if he so desired. The filing fee was not a set 
component per se, but was fixed at 2 shillings for any bill not exceeding £4 and then an 
additional shilling for every £2 allowed above £4. By comparison, in 2013 there is an 
immutable fixed fee on filing, and then a further fee that is set at roughly 5/8 the fee that was 
charged in 1888.
77
  
 
The Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA) was described through its full title as ‗[a]n Act to 
consolidate and amend the Law relating to the admission of Practitioners in the Supreme 
Court, and to regulate their Conduct and their Remuneration in certain cases‘. The Act 
consolidated previous statutes governing legal practice.
78
 It allowed practitioners to give a 
                                                 
75 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Western Australia 1888 (WA) O 61 r 31(15). 
76 
Appendix N, found at page 343 of the Rules, is entitled ‗Costs‘. There are 174 separate cost items on the 
Scale, with the first, ‗writ of summons for the commencement of any action‘ being allowed at 6s8p. Attendance 
on taxation is also allowed at 6s8p. Where an hourly rate is allowed, it too is allowed at 6s8p. Under the 
Supreme Court (Contentious Business) Cost Determination 2010, the hourly rate for a senior solicitor in 
Western Australia is $429.00.  A Writ of Summons is allowed at 1.5 hours and matters to do with taxation are 
‗such amounts as are reasonable under the circumstances‘.  
77
 For a full description of the current assessment regime, including information on filing fees, see Annexure 2 
of this thesis. 
78 The Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA) s 2 as follows: 24 Vic., No. 15. The Supreme Court Ordinance 
(WA), 1861 (section 16 repealed and ‗and so much of section 31 as relates to the power of the Chief Justice to 
make rules and orders as to the fees and costs of practitioners‘ (amended)). The following acts were also  
repealed: 29 Vic. No. 9, An Ordinance to regulate the admission of Attorneys and Solicitors; 45 Vic., No. 1. An 
Act to regulate the admission in certain cases of Barristers, etc., 50 Vic. No. 31, An Act to amend the Law 
regulating the admission of Barristers, etc. and 53 Vic. No. 6, The Barristers Board Act, 1889. 
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quote to a client rather than charge by way of items on a scale of costs, so long as the 
arrangement was covered by a written costs agreement.
79
 The Court could, on application 
and with a finding that the agreement was unreasonable, set a costs agreement aside and 
assess costs, but the costs of a retainer subject to valid costs agreement could not be 
assessed.
80
   
 
Despite the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA), the procedures of cost adjudication 
continued to be governed by court rules. The Supreme Court Rules of 1888 were displaced 
by the 1909 rules, but the costs assessment process remained the same, despite a change in 
the numbering of the rules that governed the process.
81
 The fee allowed for drafting a Writ of 
Summons was still 6s 8p and the fees charged on assessment remained unchanged.
82
  
 
The scale of costs crept up incrementally, generally in line with the cost of living, until 1951, 
when all increases were repealed and the scale as applied in 1909 was simply doubled.
83
 In 
effect, the Court had allowed for a 100% increase in legal fees over the period of 63 years. 
 
When the Supreme Court Rules were again replaced in 1971, Order 66 governed costs, as it 
does in 2013.
84
 The scale of costs that had appeared as Appendix N of the old rules was 
drastically culled to a list of 28 allowable items, and placed in Schedule 4 of the new rules.
85
 
A Writ of Summons was now to be allowed at up to $40.00.
86
 The new scale had a lower fees 
division, for matters where less than $3000.00 was claimed, and a higher scale for those 
                                                 
79
 Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA) s 29. 
80
 Ibid. The 1893 Act, as passed, governed the legal profession with a mere 53 sections; the current Legal 
Profession Act (2008) has 714 sections. 
81
 O 65 now pertained to costs, rather than O 61, but a scale of costs was still to be found at Appendix N.   
82 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Western Australia 1909 (WA).
 
83 
Western Australia, Government Gazette, No 91, 21 September 1951, 2514. In 1909 the Rules allowed a writ 
of summons at 6s8p. Where work was allowed at an hourly rate that rate was the same at 6s8p.  The 1951 
doubling took the hourly rate to 13s4p. 
 
84 
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (Western Australia, Government Gazette, No 98, 18 November 1971, 
1). 
85 
The scales of costs are no longer part of the Court Rules. Scales of costs are now delegated legislation in their 
own right.
.
See for instance the Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 
(WA) 2010. 
86 
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (Western Australia, Government Gazette, No 98, 18 November 1971, 1).
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above.
87
 In general, the fees allowed were expressed across a range of values, and in 
particular for ‗getting up‘ the fees allowed in the higher division were calculated by reference 
to the amount claimed at trial.
88
 
2.3: The winds of change: The Clarkson Committee 1979-1983 
In April 1979 the Government of Western Australia commissioned an inquiry into the 
reorganisation of the legal profession in Western Australia.
89
 The inquiry, headed by The 
Honourable Gresley Clarkson QC (the Clarkson Committee), had terms of reference that 
required it to investigate scales of cost and the method used to determine them, but was not 
asked to investigate the more fundamental question; whether there should be scales of costs 
at all. 
 
Notwithstanding that, the Law Society of Western Australia made the following submission 
to the inquiry: 
a) That scales of costs prescribed under statute should be dispensed with apart from 
the need to retain some fixed statutory items in litigious costs (such as for issue of 
writ, judgement and execution). 
b) The Society should have the power to prescribe guidelines as to costs, 
c) Any lawyer should be at liberty to charge such amount as he considers 
appropriate (and which is fair and reasonable for the work done) there being no 
obligation to follow the guidelines; and 
d) The client‘s right to have his lawyer‘s bill assessed by an officer of the Court 
should be retained in all circumstances.
90
 
 
Despite expressly stating that the right to have a bill assessed by the court is fundamental, the 
                                                 
87
 The split scale was for work directly related to trials. By the time of the 1976 reprint, the lower scale was for 
matters up to and including $10,000.00.   
88
 Note 80 above, Schedule 4, Item 9 (getting up). In the lower division getting up was allowed at between 
$60.00 and $240.00, while in the higher division getting up was allowed at ―$100.00 to $300.00 for the first 
$3,000.00 plus 4% of the balance to $6,000.00 then 2%. 
89 See ‗Lawyers come under government scrutiny‘, The West Australian (Perth), 4 April 1979, 3. The report 
‗would include the discipline and control of the legal profession , assessment of costs and the best method of 
dealing with complaints  against lawyers‘. 
90 
The Law Society of Western Australia, Submissions to the Committee Inquiring Into the Future Organisation 
of the Legal Profession in Western Australia, June 1980, 91.  
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Law Society did express concern about costs assessors because they were ‗not always close 
to the problems of running a busy private practice‘ and might therefore lack insight into the 
problems and difficulties of costing legal work.
91
 This concern continues to be expressed by 
lawyers on a regular basis, without perhaps any acknowledgement that costs assessors, who 
also preside over a wide range of interlocutory matters, may well know a great deal more 
about what work is reasonably necessary for the successful carriage of litigation than do the 
bulk of lawyers.
92
 
 
The Law Society‘s approach seemed to be based on the view that scales of costs were 
anticompetitive, rather than in any concern that a winning litigant was left out of pocket for a 
portion of his or her legal fees. This seems strange, as scales of costs in themselves do not set 
the minimum rate that a solicitor can charge for his or her work. That said, at that point in 
time charging below the scales of costs could be seen as a breach of professional conduct 
rules,
93
 and had been frowned on by courts.
94
 If the Law Society considered that removing 
scales would mean that the cost of legal services would drop, it did not say so in its 
submission.  
 
The submission did address the issue of cost determination in party/party matters and noted 
that a system where an assessing officer informed himself by reference to Law Society 
guidelines and made a judgment on a quantum meruit basis, rather than by way of set scales, 
would produce no great difficulties.
95
 Implicit in this submission is the notion that a winning 
litigant should recover costs that were reasonably spent in the carriage of the litigation, rather 
than some artificially limited costs set out by the court. This submission ignores the fact that 
                                                 
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Costs assessors in all of the Western Australian courts perform that duty as one of many. In the Magistrates 
Court it is the Clerk of Court who performs the role, in the District and Supreme Courts costs assessment is 
done by the registrars.  
93 
Western Australian Legal Professional Conduct Rule 29 formerly provided: 
A practitioner shall not make a practice of charging less than the fees allowed under the appropriate scale, 
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scales of costs are themselves set as guidelines as to what the reasonable costs of litigation 
should be.
96
  
 
The Clarkson Committee did not adopt the Law Society submissions in making its 
recommendations.
97
 The Clarkson Committee considered that scales of costs should continue 
to govern cost recovery (except between solicitor/client when the solicitor and client have 
contracted out of the scales by way of a costs agreement). However, it recommended that the 
responsibility for producing the scales be taken from the court and given to a statutory body 
to be known as the Legal Costs Committee.
98
 This recommendation was an amelioration for 
both the courts and the legal profession; the judges who were responsible for creating the 
scales were freed from that onerous task, while the profession was to gain substantial 
representation on the Legal Costs Committee and thus have a real say in what they were able 
to charge, under the guise of bringing ‗real world‘ experience to the task of creating the 
scales.  
 
The legislative response to the report was the Acts Amendment (Legal Practitioners, Costs 
and Taxation) Bill 1987. It was read for the first time on Wednesday 21 October 1987, by the 
then Minister for Works and Services, Mr Peter Dowding. He believed that the body set up to 
determine scales of costs ‗should start from first principles to determine what is fair and 
reasonable remuneration having regard to more general considerations‘.99 Some of the 
opposition were scathing about the concept of scales, considering them to be price fixing by a 
profession that considered itself different from all others.
100
 Mr Mensaros, the Liberal 
member for Floreat, also noted that scales were made irrelevant through the existence of 
costs agreements.
101
 Mr Dowding, in response, noted that the courts had always had 
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mechanisms regarding solicitors and costs. He stated that  
[t]here is a good reason. It is the same reason why we have regulation for television 
and radio companies, and hotels. Where the community grants a monopoly to a group 
of people, it is entitled to have some control over the way in which those who possess 
that monopoly operate. 
102
 
His argument seems more than a little naive, as merely setting a floor below which a lawyer 
is discouraged from charging, and above which a successful litigant is prescribed from 
recovering, does not really seem to be much in the way of control.
103
  
 
The Bill was passed and as a result the Supreme Court was relieved of the responsibility for 
setting scales of costs. The scales of costs were now to be set by the Legal Costs Committee, 
a statutory body created by way of section 58M of the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA). 
The Legal Costs Committee was to be chaired by either a judge or a senior practitioner and to 
include two practicing lawyers and three lay members, one of whom was required to be an 
accountant.
104
 This particular reform has survived to this day. The Legal Costs Committee 
was reconstituted under the Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA) when the Legal Practitioners Act 
1893 (WA) was repealed,
105
 and reconstituted again under the Legal Profession Act 2008 
(WA).
106
  
 
The Committee consults widely and sets new scales approximately every two years. The 
current Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) 2012 (WA) scale came 
into effect on 1 November 2012.
107
 The scales set the maximum amounts (absent a special 
costs order) that a successful litigant can recover as costs regardless of what amounts were 
reasonably spent in pursuing the litigation. They also provide the default fees a legal 
practitioner can charge if he or she has not contracted out of the scales by way of a costs 
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agreement with the client.
108
  
2.4: The Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System in Western 
Australia 
In September 1997 the then Attorney General of Western Australia the Honourable Peter 
Foss QC, asked the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia (The LRCWA), to 
review the Criminal and Civil Justice systems
109
 The LRCWA, chaired by Wayne Martin 
QC, as he then was, advertised for submissions in December 1997. In June 1998 it released 
an issues paper and commenced public meetings across the State in an effort to access the 
stakeholder‘s views on the justice system as it then operated.110 The LRCWA received 
submissions from 650 individuals and organisations.
111
 The final report of its findings, 
published in 1999, recommended wide ranging reform and contained 447 recommendations; 
40 related to costs in the civil jurisdiction. Of those 40, 13 were recommendations that 
directly or indirectly related to costs assessment. Those recommendations are dealt with in 
some detail below; firstly with a review of general issues and then with concentrated analysis 
of the issue of uplift fees. 
2.4.1: The LRCWA’s views on costs assessment and related issues 
The LRCWA looked into various issues surrounding costs assessment. One must note the 
particularly jaundiced view of the costs assessment scheme seemingly held by the LRCWA. 
The attitude of the LRCWA appeared to be that costs assessment was a necessary evil which 
they felt ‗should be avoided if at all possible‘.112 Their report quoted von Doussa J of the 
Federal Court who had described costs assessment as, ‗an exercise that cannot be described 
as socially useful‘.113  
                                                 
108
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With respect to the LRCWA, they seem to have taken his Honour out of context,
114
 and while 
a judicial assessment of costs, like all other forms of litigation, should be, without very good 
reason, an avenue left unexplored, it should not be ‗avoided if at all possible‘. A costs dispute 
differs little from most other disputes; one party is demanding money of another, and that 
other party does not agree how much or even if he or she should pay. Such disputes are the 
very purpose of a civil justice system. Further, the fact that in Australia an aggrieved client of 
a legal practitioner can, expeditiously and at a reasonable price, obtain an independent 
judicial (or, as in the case of New South Wales, administrative) decision as to what, in all the 
circumstances, is a reasonable price to pay for the services that practitioner has rendered, is 
an adornment to our legal system.
115
 
2.4.2: The time frame for seeking assessment. 
One proposal before the LRCWA was to enlarge the time within which a client could seek 
assessment of his or her own costs. At that time, a client had 30 days from receipt of the 
practitioner‘s bill to request assessment, once those 30 days had passed the client needed to 
seek an enlargement of time for assessment.
116
 The LRCWA noted that it was  
a rare situation in which a practitioner should even object to a request for an 
extension of time. As it happens most solicitors welcome taxation (assessment) 
because as soon as the bill of costs is signed it takes effect as a judgment of the 
Supreme Court and may be executed upon accordingly
117
.   
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However, the LRCWA did not recommend any change to that time limit in its final report. 
As will be seen below at 2.5.1.1, time limits on seeking assessment were substantially 
enlarged in 2008, and that enlargement has proved problematic. 
2.4.3: Solicitor initiated assessment 
The LRCWA recommended that practitioners be allowed to refer a bill rendered to a client 
for assessment. As noted at 1.3.5.1 above, a practitioner whose client refused to pay (rather 
than seek assessment) had no right to instigate an assessment of that bill on his or her own 
motion. Instead, he or she had to sue in debt, a far more lengthy and expensive process.
118
 As 
already canvassed, the LRCWA recognised that practitioners usually welcomed an 
assessment. In conjunction with that recommendation the LRCWA also considered that a 
court hearing a practitioner‘s suit for fees owed should have the power to refer the bill in 
question for assessment before that court could rule on what was due.
119
 The Parliament of 
Western Australia was slow to follow this recommendation; legal practitioners in Western 
Australia did not gain the right to have their own bills assessed until 2008. It remains to be 
seen if Western Australian practitioners will embrace this right as enthusiastically as did the 
practitioners of New South Wales, where more practitioners access assessment than do 
clients.
120
 
2.4.4: ‘One more such success will ruin me’: reasonable costs recovery for a 
successful litigant 
The gap between what a successful litigant paid his or her own lawyer as legal costs and 
what that litigant then recovered through the court order that awarded them costs from the 
unsuccessful party also received a good deal of attention from the LRCWA. They noted that, 
in part, that gap was part of a conscious policy to restrict litigation.
121
 However, the LRCWA 
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felt that the gap was unfair, and recommended that the gap be narrowed by allowing a wider 
range of file maintenance costs (then not included in the scales of costs) on party/party 
assessments.
122
 It recommended that a principle should be established that a winning litigant 
should recover a ‗fair and reasonable amount for the work that was reasonable required for 
the litigation‘ and that the principle be enshrined either in the court rules or a new costs 
Act.
123
 The LRCWA recognised that the court was alive to this problem and was able, to 
some extent, to alleviate it through the use of indemnity orders. However, in wrestling with 
this issue, the LRCWA put its collective finger on the difficulty of assessing a party/party bill 
that was governed by an indemnity order as follows: 
an order for indemnity costs does not oblige the loser to pay whatever the winner‘s 
solicitors have charged the winner under a time costs agreement. Reasonableness is 
always the touchstone. But how does one define ‗reasonable‘? Is ‗reasonable‘ 
something more than the scale? If reasonable is something more than the scale does 
that make the scale unreasonable and thereby suggest that the scale should be made 
more generous or even done away with?
124
 
The questions raised in the passage above apply more broadly to party/party assessments in 
general. As is initially noted in Chapter One, in New South Wales the second part of that last 
question was answered in the positive, and scales of costs were done away with in 1994. 
After that in New South Wales individual assessors were left to determine ‗reasonableness‘ 
on a case by case basis and from their own experience. The position in Western Australia 
was (and still is) that the scales of costs were a determination of what the reasonable costs of 
litigation were. After 1987 those scales were promulgated by a statutory body that had both 
experience and expertise in determining what legal costs should reasonably be.
125
 The 
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LRCWA noted that the Supreme Court scale was ―generous‖.126 If the ‗touchstone‘ of 
indemnity costs is reasonableness, and ‗generous‘ scales of costs are produced by an expert 
body and to reflect the reasonable costs of litigation, why are indemnity orders needed and 
why is there a gap between what a winning party pays his or her lawyer and what he or she 
receives in accordance with a costs order at all? A litigant is entitled to instruct a practitioner 
to go beyond what is reasonable, and a practitioner is entitled to payment for doing that work. 
It would be unfair to ask a losing litigant to pay for that work through a costs order, and an 
assessor will strike out unreasonable (and thus unfair) costs even in the presence of an 
indemnity order. It may be that the gap, while unfair, does act as a barrier to litigation, and it 
is arguable that in a market driven society even those who receive justice should pay a price 
for it. 
2.4.5: Reducing the burden on the courts 
The LRCWA‘s final report was delivered six years after New South Wales reformed its costs 
assessment regime and moved to a system of specialist costs assessors. The LRCWA noted 
that there were no Western Australian provisions that allowed appointment of costs 
assessors,
127
 and recommended that such provisions be introduced and provided a very brief 
description as to how they could be utilised.
128
 That description, while deficient in detail, was 
in essence a thumbnail sketch of the reformed New South Wales regime in the way it 
envisaged the assessment process.  
Recommendation 138 suggested that appeals from such assessments should be heard by an 
officer of the Supreme Court.
129
 The wording of Recommendation 138 makes clear that such 
costs assessors would be used for disputes between clients and their own practitioners. It 
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appears that the LRCWA did not envisage using costs assessors to determine party/party 
disputes,  
The lack of data on costs assessment in Western Australia also garnered LRCWA attention. 
The final report recommended that all Western Australian courts and tribunals should publish 
data about costs assessment, as was then (and is now) the practice in the Federal Court.
130
 As 
will be seen in Chapter Four, this lack continues to be a feature of the Western Australian 
costs assessment regime. 
In an effort to reduce the need for costs assessment, and the burden assessments placed on 
the justice system, the LRCWA recommended that courts should issue practice directions for 
situations where costs should be awarded in a lump sum, or as such orders are more generally 
known, as fixed costs. As noted above, the Honourable Wayne Martin QC, as he then was, 
chaired the LRCWA over the period of the review, and, as Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, as he is now, he has led a change in court practice where fixed costs are now more 
commonly awarded in the Western Australian Supreme Court. 
2.4.6:  The LRCWA position on contingency and uplift fees. 
Contingency fees are extra fees above normal charges that a legal practitioner can charge his 
or her client if the matter is successful. Such fees are usually levied when payment of all of 
the fees is contingent on the success of the matter.  All the Australian jurisdictions had long 
accepted that contingency fees, in the form of the ‗no win-no fee‘ retainer, were permissible. 
Despite the old common law rule that both maintenance and champerty were forbidden, a no 
win-no fee retainer provided an access to justice for indigent clients who had valid claims but 
no means to pursue them. It was even accepted that practitioners could ‗maintain‘ those 
actions by paying disbursements from their own pockets.
131
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However, the American position, where a practitioner can agree to take a percentage of the 
damages as remuneration for the retainer, was and remains anathema in Australia.
132
 The 
issue before the LRCWA was set in the middle ground, and the question they had to answer 
can be expressed as follows ‗should a practitioner who took on a no win- no fee retainer be 
allowed to charge some extra fee above what he or she would normally charge as 
compensation for the risk of losing the matter and not being paid at all?‘133 As will be 
discussed in Chapter Three, the right to include a premium, or uplift, in a contingency 
retainer had been introduced as part of the 1993 New South Wales Reforms. The United 
Kingdom had adopted limited contingency retainers in 1990.
134
 
This is not a straightforward issue. One of the hallmarks of a good legal practitioner is that he 
or she is professionally independent and thus dispassionate about the matter in which he or 
she is engaged.
135
 A client is, quite understandably, caught up and emotionally engaged in a 
dispute, and as such unable to view the matter with that level of detachment we expect from 
legal practitioners. A practitioner is paid for his or her work, but in part the necessary 
detachment that allows him or her to view the matter dispassionately is strengthened by the 
fact that despite being paid a practitioner traditionally does not have a financial interest in the 
outcome of litigation. Contingency fees change that traditional position. The LRCWA was 
alive to this problem, and noted that if uplift fees were introduced there was a ‗real risk‘ that 
practitioners would become ‗joint venturers‘ with their clients if the practitioners were to be 
paid extra for running a matter successfully.
136
 However, the LRCWA went on to note that 
such a situation already existed with traditional no win-no fee retainers.
137
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The LRCWA noted other problems that could arise with the introduction of uplift fees. In 
particular they noted that while the Commonwealth Attorney General‘s Department was 
―strongly‖ in favour of contingency fees that Department had identified three problems that 
could arise with them.
138
 They were as follows: 
1. The potential for increased litigation; fuelled by 
2. Uplift fees raised on ‗sure bet‘ cases that would have gone ahead in the absence of 
contingency fees; and, 
3. Windfall fees,139 which may result from lawyers charging uplifts when there was no 
risk of losing. 
The Commonwealth Attorney General‘s Department, dealing with this concern as part of its 
Justice Statement (1995),
140
 noted the first of those concerns, a version of the perennial 
‗floodgates‘ argument, but discounted it.141 The Department noted that ‗the increased access 
to the courts that contingency fees may allow will enable people of limited means to use the 
law, quite properly, to protect their rights or to be compensated for harm‘.142 This seems a 
reasonable view of the perceived problem. Despite the fact that in some areas of litigation no 
win-no fee retainers were common, it may be correct to assume that introducing uplift fees 
will result in more litigation. It does seem likely that if uplift fees are used more broadly 
across the different types of litigation lawyers will be more likely to take on matters with a 
strong likelihood of success even if the clients are not in the position to pay upfront or 
monthly fees. However, if uplift fees are only paid in matters where the client is successful, 
and if, as it seems likely, practitioners would only enter such arrangements if they felt the 
case was of strong merit, then it also seems likely that the vast bulk of any extra litigation 
would be litigation where the plaintiff was vindicated and the court found that the plaintiff‘s 
legal rights had been transgressed. Extra litigation comes at an extra cost to society as a 
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whole, but if a reform allows more people to use the justice system successfully to uphold 
their rights then that extra litigation should not be seen as a problem.  
The final two concerns are two sides of the same issue and can prove to be a genuine 
problem. In New South Wales, where contingency retainers with uplift fees were introduced 
in 1993, perceptions of abuse around those two issued led to contingency fees being 
disallowed for damages actions in 2004.
143
 As previously noted, a practitioner would not 
generally enter into a conditional arrangement, with or without uplift fees, if he or she did not 
believe there was a strong chance of success and thus payment for the work he or she has 
done. Conditional fees have always been most prevalent in the area of tort, as it is not 
unusual for a person who has suffered a tortious injury to lack the means with which to seek 
compensation. When a practitioner enters into a no win- no fee conditional retainer with such 
a client, with or without an uplift fee, payment is contingent on success and the practitioner 
can and should define success in the costs agreement that he or she draws up and has signed 
at the beginning of the retainer.
144
 A sensible definition of success, from the perspectives of 
both client and lawyer, and for any matter, would include situations where the matter comes 
to a reasonable settlement, as it is axiomatic that the bulk of litigation does settle before trial. 
This means that, in most instances, a practitioner who included an uplift fee in the retainer 
would collect that uplift fee. In personal injury matters, where quantum rather than liability is 
often the issue, it is even more likely that a retainer will conclude in a way that can be 
described as successful. If the right to add an uplift fee to a conditional costs agreement was 
restricted to no win- no fee retainers there may be some rationale as to why a practitioner 
should, much more often than not, be paid above his or her normal rates. In the preface to its 
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recommendation to introduce such fees the LRCWA appears to consider that contingency 
fees are limited to no win- no fee retainers,
145
 but that is not necessarily the case. 
Practitioners can enter into retainers where only a portion of the costs are conditional.  
The LRCWA did not address recovery of uplift fees on party/party costs assessments, but in 
New South Wales, despite some early uncertainty, a successful litigant did not usually 
recover an uplift fee on a party/party basis.
146
 
The LRCWA was broadly in favour of allowing a retainer where the practitioner could 
charge an ‗uplift‘, and noted that ‗the extra remuneration can quite justifiably be seen as a 
fair reward for taking on the very substantial risk of not being paid at all for a very large 
expenditure of professional time‘.147 However, that view overlooks that fact that general no 
win-no fee retainers had been operating successfully without a uplift fee for some time, as 
practitioners, usually well placed to gauge the merit of claim, did not enter into such retainers 
unless they felt some strong belief in the likelihood of their being successful. It is true that in 
such situations a practitioner was effectively loaning the client money in the form of work 
over the period of the retainer. However, practitioners were entitled to bill those clients on a 
monthly basis and then charge commercial rates of interest on those bills so that on the 
successful completion of the matter the practitioner recovered his or her reasonable fees plus 
interest to cover the opportunity cost of the loaned work. 
The LRCWA recommendation that uplift fees be introduced was not made without some 
strong reservations. In particular, the LRCWA referred to the Justice Advisory Committee: 
Access to Justice (an Action Plan) report, which had been commissioned by the 
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Commonwealth Attorney General and had been published in 1994.
148
 That report had also 
approved of contingency fees but had recommended that they be subject to eight safeguards, 
which can be summarised as follows: 
 Contingency fees should only be allowed if the practitioner believed some was some 
real prospect of success but that the risk of failure and the client having to meet his or 
her own costs was ‗sufficiently significant‘; 
 That such agreements should be in writing and in plain English in a standard form 
developed not by the individual practitioner but by law societies in conjunction with 
relevant consumer bodies; 
 That in entering into such agreements the practitioner should set out his or her usual 
fees and the rationale for including an uplift; 
 ‗Success‘ for the purposes of the uplift fee be clearly defined; 
 Clients be allowed a cooling off period during which they could withdraw from the 
agreement; 
 In addition to the general disclosure regime, contingency agreements should 
expressly inform the client of: 
o  the cooling off period; 
o  the client‘s right to obtain independent legal advice; 
o why legal aid was not available in that particular instance; and, 
o that in the event of failure the client may have to pay the successful party‘s 
costs. 
 The client should be expressly informed that he or she had a right to apply to have 
any agreement set aside for unreasonableness, and; 
 That the general provisions applying to the review of costs agreements also apply to 
conditional agreements and uplift fees.
149
 
The LRCWA recommended uplift fees for all matters other than family and criminal law, 
and that those fees should be used only when ‗all other means of avoiding the use of a 
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contingency fee arrangement have been exhausted; and (that) the client is financially unable 
to conduct the litigation without the use of a contingency fee arrangement‘.150 They also 
recommended that uplift fees be calculated on what the winning litigant recovered from the 
losing litigant by way of a costs order as they argued that allowing an uplift fee on a time 
based costs agreement was a way of further awarding inefficiency and waste.
151
 Further, the 
LRCWA recommended that the safeguards set out in the Access to Justice Report be 
adopted,
152
 and strengthened by a requirement that all retainers including such fees be by 
leave of the court.
153
 The court, when approached for leave, was to consider the individual 
circumstances of the case when assessing the suitable amount to be charged as uplift.
154
 
The contingency fee regime envisaged by the LRCWA was a complete rejection of the 
American system where practitioners could take a percentage of a litigant‘s damages as costs. 
The LRCWA recommended a regime hemmed in by a range of safeguards to ensure that 
practitioners could not abuse the right to charge extra for success. The LRCWA had also 
proposed that a disbursements fund be set up to avoid a situation where practitioners loaned 
money to their clients to cover those costs, as it was felt that such a situation was at odds with 
a practitioner‘s fiduciary duty to their clients.155 The rationale that the LRCWA provided for 
that recommendation
156
 did not include that concern, but did note that a disbursement fund 
would be a beneficial reform even without uplift fees.
157
 
2.4.7:  The fate of the LRCWA recommendations 
Although the LRCWA handed down its final report in 1999, the Western Australian 
Parliament was slow to implement any of its far reaching recommendations. The 2002 
National Competition Policy Review of the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA) 
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recommended that reform to cost adjudication wait until the national approach to such reform 
could be determined and thus followed.
158
 For that reason costs Reforms were put on hold.   
 
The Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA), which repealed the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA) 
and contained sweeping Reforms to the governance of the legal profession merely replicated 
the costs assessment regime as it had existed under the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (WA). 
As is described below, the ‗national approach‘ to reform took place by way of the Legal 
Profession Act 2008 (WA), and as that Act was taken from a model bill it appears that the 
vast amounts of work performed by the LRCWA in relation to legal costs, and the well-
reasoned recommendations for reform that flowed from that work were to some extent 
ignored by Parliament.  
2.5: The 2008 Reforms: towards a national approach to regulation 
The various jurisdictions of the Australian states have been in a slow drift away from any 
uniformity since they were first established.
159
 Each state was a colonial entity before 
Federation; and each colony was essentially self governing. The rules established at the 
formation of each colony incorporated the laws of England, but by the time the colonies 
federated there was already clear differences between the laws of each State, and by and 
large those differences had grown since then. As a simple example, the road rules of Western 
Australia are not identical to the road rules of New South Wales. More to the point, the rules 
that governed the legal profession had also evolved. By the time Australia entered the 21
st
 
century they were substantially different from state to state. 
 
There has long been a call for more uniformity of law across Australia in every sense.
160
 
Many legal professionals now operated across the range of Australian jurisdictions, and it 
seemed ludicrous that an admitted practitioner from Western Australia could not act in New 
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South Wales without first becoming admitted there. Despite the Mutual Recognition Act 
1992 (Cth) such an admission was not a given.
161
 A Western Australian practitioner who 
wished to be admitted in New South Wales was required to do extra coursework, as the 
requirements for admission differed in each state. It was problematic that practitioners who 
practiced across state boundaries had different rights and responsibilities depending on which 
jurisdiction they were operating in, and it was desirable that those rights and responsibilities 
should be standardised across the nation. 
  
In 1994 the Law Council of Australia created a ‗Blueprint for a National Profession‘.162 
Since that time there has been an increasing push for the governance of the profession to be 
standardised in an ‗all Australia‘ system to give consumers of legal services both uniformity 
and certainty. The then Attorney General, Darryl Williams noted that in his view: 
the greatest challenge facing the Australian legal profession is the need to remain 
relevant, flexible and competitive in an increasingly borderless world. To allow the 
profession to embrace change we must deliver a foundation on which it can do so 
unimpeded by jurisdictional barriers.
163
  
 
On 7 August 2003 the Standing Committee of Attorneys General (SCAG) released a 
communiqué announcing that they had agreed on the implementation of model legislation to 
govern the legal profession.
164
 SCAG claimed that the model legislation would ‗bring 
benefits to both legal practitioners and consumers and lift current barriers to the practice of 
law across State and Territory borders‘.165 SCAG provided a list of those benefits. For the 
purposes of this thesis the most relevant benefit provided by the model legislation was that it 
would standardise ‗the requirements for disclosing information on legal costs to clients, and 
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thereby ensuring both clients and practitioners will have the same understanding of their 
rights and obligations regardless of where they live‘.166 It is important to note that what was 
being standardised was the disclosure regime practitioners had to adhere to informing clients 
of their rights and obligations but not the rights and obligations themselves.  
 
The model legislation came before the Western Australian Parliament on 24 October 2007 as 
the Legal Profession Bill 2007 (WA) (the 2007 Bill). Provisions as to costs in the then 
current Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA) were contained in 40 sections; the proposed Bill 
almost doubled that number and contained 75 sections dealing specifically with cost related 
issues. The then Attorney General, Mr J. A. McGinty, when he introduced the Bill, pointed to 
the various Reforms it contained, and in particular, noted that the Bill allowed for the 
introduction of uplift fees in the Western Australian jurisdiction.
167
 The Bill hardly garnered 
the attention of parliament. The lead Opposition speaker noted that ―frankly, we need not 
look at much in this Bill‖.168  
 
The Bill passed by the Legislative Assembly in its original form and sent to the Legislative 
Council in its original form on 21 November 2007. The Legislative Council discussed some 
of the sections relating to costs adjudication at some length, but passed it unamended. The 
Bill was assented to on 27 May 2008 and became law as the Legal Profession Act 2008 
(WA).
169
  
 
Most of the provisions of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) that relate to costs 
adjudication are relatively uncontentious and easily justified. In particular, the profession has 
had more stringent cost disclosure rules imposed upon it; in light of the general public 
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perception that lawyers overcharge this is understandable. As a result of the 2008 Reforms 
practitioners who fail to provide adequate and ongoing disclosure may find themselves 
significantly out of pocket and facing disciplinary proceedings.
170
   
2.5.1: Some particular effects of the 2008 Reforms 
Among the bulk of the provisions, three in particular stand out. Two in particular have a real 
impact on cost adjudication and are discussed below. The third, the introduction of uplift or 
success fees, while not impacting directly on costs assessment, deserves consideration and is 
also dealt with below. 
2.5.1.1: The extended time limit for assessment 
Section 295 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) extends the general time limit on 
applications for assessment of costs out from the 30 days to one year. This was done to 
protect consumers of legal services.
171 However, the result of this change (because of the 
way in which s 295 operates in conjunction with s 293)  may be more far reaching than was 
considered at the time the Bill was drafted.  
 
Section 293 of Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) allows practitioners to issue clients interim 
bills.
172
 Practitioners are able to bill the clients on a monthly basis. Until s 293 came into 
effect, a legal retainer was considered an entire contract, and, pursuant to the doctrine of 
entire contract, no right to bill for fees arose until the contract was complete.
173
 In most 
circumstances a costs agreement between the practitioner and the client displaced the 
doctrine, and allowed for interim billing by way of a contractual term of the costs agreement. 
Interim bills issued in relation to a costs agreement carried a mandated statutory disclosure 
that set out the client‘s right to have the interim bill assessed, and the time limit on the 
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application for assessment was set at 30 days.
174
   
Section 293 provides that interim bills can be assessed ‗either at the time of the interim bill or 
at the time of the final bill, whether or not the interim bill has been paid.‘175 Some litigation, 
and especially complex and expensive litigation, can take a good many years. In practice, this 
may mean that practitioners could be required to have interim bills assessed many years after 
the services have been provided and paid for.
176
  
 
Take this extreme example. One year after a law firm issues the final bill for legal costs 
relating to a complex retainer regarding lengthy litigation; the firm could find itself being 
required to attend on a costs assessment of every bill ever rendered to the client in relation to 
the matter. The bills could run back over a number of years, and have a large (and long gone) 
quantum. Many of the practitioners who performed the earlier works may well have moved 
on. The resources the firm would have to muster to address such an application adequately 
would be enormous, and the cost of failing to address it potentially catastrophic. Even the 
mere threat of being able to request assessment would give clients in such circumstances 
enormous bargaining power when it came time to settle up with the final bill. This is 
especially the case where the taxing officer must allow the costs of the assessment against the 
firm if the overall bill is assessed at less than 85% of the original quantum.
177
 Not only would 
the firm be required to go through this extraordinary process for bills long since paid, but if 
its bill is reduced by over 16% it will have to pay not only its own costs of the assessment but 
also the clients‘. The provisions that allow the possibility of such a scenario were passed for 
consumer protection,
178
 but this cannot have been part of their intended function. It seems 
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likely that the Parliament that so wholeheartedly endorsed them did not give adequate 
consideration to their possible effect. The provisions would benefit from a re-examination, 
and could be effectively amended to achieve a reasonable balance between the rights of 
consumers and the rights of the legal practitioners who serve those consumers. 
2.5.1.2:  Practitioners gain the right to file their own bills for assessment 
Section 297 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) gives the legal practitioner who has 
produced the bill in order to render it to a client the right to apply to have the bill assessed. 
Until this section came into operation costs assessment was a one way street; clients could 
challenge a practitioner‘s bill of costs if they were unhappy with it, and the courts would 
adjudicate by assessing the bill. A lawyer who served a bill on a client and remained unpaid 
had to sue for his or her costs in the same manner one would sue for any other debt. This was 
an expensive and lengthy process that wasted the time of both the practitioner and the courts 
charged with hearing the matter. Sensible practitioners, who regularly advised clients not to 
waste time pursuing less than significant sums through the courts, often heeded their own 
advice and wrote off monies genuinely due them when clients refused to pay.
179
 Now the 
practitioner can apply to have the disputed bill assessed, the court will assess it and the court 
assessment will stand as a judgement that can be immediately enforced.
180
 If the bill is 
allowed at above 85% of the original quantum the client will also have to pay the costs of the 
assessment.
181
  
It is odd to note that s 297 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) does not place a time limit 
on practitioners seeking assessment of their own bills. Perhaps the drafters felt that solicitors 
would act swiftly in such circumstances; perhaps the absence of a time frame is mere 
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inadvertence.
182
 
2.5.1.3:  Uplift fees are introduced in Western Australia 
The third pertinent result of the 2008 Reforms was that Western Australian legal practitioners 
were given the right to charge an uplift if a matter was successful. As noted above, uplift fees 
do not have any direct impact on the assessment of party/party costs as such fees are not 
recoverable on a party/party basis. A winning litigant who has paid an uplift fee will not 
recover that money and is thus out of pocket that amount as well as the amount of the gap 
between his or her base fees and the fees recovered from the other party.  As uplift fees are 
not included in a party/party bill that goes to assessment, and as there is no way for a 
researcher to identify whether or not such a fee was charged on the winning litigant‘s 
retainer, the gap between the amount recorded as recovered on assessment and the bill as 
drawn may not be an accurate reflection of how much the winning litigant has paid above 
what he or she has recovered. 
In allowing this the Western Australian Parliament ignored the safeguards recommended by 
the LRCWA and paid no heed to the issues that had arisen when uplift fees had been allowed 
in New South Wales. As noted above at 2.4.6, the LRCWA, in its 1999 Review of the 
Criminal and Civil Justice System in Western Australia, considered the advantages and 
disadvantages of allowing contingency retainers where the practitioner was able to charge a 
success or uplift fee when a matter was concluded successfully. The LRCWA recommended 
that such arrangements should be allowed, but in doing so it was alive to the fact that uplift 
fees were problematic.
183
 The LRCWA recommendations contained a raft of safeguards and 
limitations to ensure that clients only entered into costs agreements with uplift fees as a 
means of last resort.
184
 Those recommendations were handed down in 1999; eight years later 
when the Western Australian Parliament considered the 2007 Bill those recommendations 
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seem to have been forgotten.
185
 The Model Bill from which the 2007 Bill was taken did 
contain some of the safeguards recommended by the Attorney General‘s Advisory 
Committee and endorsed by the LRCWA, but the Western Australian parliament did not 
appear to have had any of that material in mind when it considered the 2007 Bill. The fact 
that uplift fees had been introduced in New South Wales in 1993
186
 and, because of 
perceptions of abuse, been disallowed in actions for damages in 2004,
187
 does not seem to 
have come to the Western Australian parliament‘s attention.   
The Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) formalised conditional costs agreements as follows: 
‗[a] costs agreement may provide that the payment of some or all of the legal costs is 
conditional on the successful outcome of the matter to which those costs relate‘.188 
Conditional contracts could contain uplift fees,
189
 but the maximum that could be charged as 
an uplift in a litigious matter was set at 25%.
190
 
As is so often with legislation, the devil is in the detail. Traditionally, conditional contracts 
were usually no win- no fee arrangements.
191
 As noted at 2.4.6 above, the rationale for 
allowing an uplift fee was that it was reasonable to allow a practitioner some extra award for 
the risk he or she ran of not being remunerated at all if the client was unsuccessful at trial. 
When conditional retainers were formalised as part of the 1993 Reforms in New South 
Wales, the costs agreements that governed retainers containing an uplift fee had to be 
structured so that all of the practitioner‘s fees were contingent on success.192 Conditional 
agreements in Western Australia, which can contain an uplift fee, allow an uplift fee in 
situations where the practitioner is to receive ‗some or all of the legal costs‘ he or she would 
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normally bill for the matter. It may be that the Supreme Court, viewing such a costs 
agreement, would find it unreasonable, but on the face of the law a practitioner can make 
10% of the fees conditional yet still avail himself or herself of an uplift fee if the matter is 
successful. The Western Australian Parliament, which had access to a wealth of material 
informing it that uplift fees were problematic, seems to have rubber stamped a provision that 
takes the possibilities for abuse beyond anything the various expert bodies that had provided 
that material had considered. The overview in the introduction to this thesis noted Roscoe 
Pound‘s concern that legislators tend ‗to be careless how he carries out the details of what he 
attempts‘;193 the Western Australian Parliament‘s blind introduction of uplift fees seems a 
case in point. 
2.5.2:  One radical reform: Provisional Assessment 
Not all legal reform is driven by parliament. The Supreme Court of Western Australia 
introduced a voluntary system of provisional assessment in January 2009. It did this by way 
of practice direction.
194
 The purpose of the innovation was to ‗reduce the number of bills that 
proceed to assessment and result in a saving of costs for parties‘.
195
 
In essence, bills of costs are filed for assessment in the usual way but the parties can ask for 
provisional assessment.
196
 Alternately, if the assessing officer to whom the bill is assigned 
thinks the bill suitable for provisional assessment, he or she contacts the parties asking if they 
would consent to that process.
197
 If the parties either request or consent to a provisional 
assessment, the assessing officer will assess the bill.
198
 This process does not appear to be 
adversarial, as  
[t]he parties will not appear before the taxing officer and, unless requested by the 
taxing officer, will not be entitled to provide any additional materials to the taxing 
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officer other than if requested by the taxing officer vouchers for disbursements 
[sic].
199
  
The assessing officer provides a notice of provisional assessment but does not provide any 
written decisions to explain the amount he or she arrived at on the assessment.
200
 If either 
party is dissatisfied with the result of the assessment they are not obliged to accept the 
provisional assessment; instead the bill will be assessed by the same assessing officer but in 
the usual adversarial manner.
201
 However, the provisional assessment acts as a form of 
Calderbank offer, and a party who has refused to abide by the provisional assessment ‗may 
be required to pay all or some of the costs of the assessment if the assessment does not result 
in that party achieving an outcome more favourable to that party than was arrived at by the 
provisional assessment‘.202 The practice direction that has created this novel process notes 
that provisional assessment ‗principally to party and party bills drawn pursuant to the 
scale‘.203 However, the direction also notes that the process can, at the discretion of the 
assessing officer, be applied to any other form of bill.
204
 
The idea of an Australian court giving a provisional opinion about a matter before it for 
adjudication is a strange one. Assessment of party/party bills of costs is part of a substantive 
adversarial dispute between parties who are expected to argue the merits of their respective 
cases. A costs assessor who gives a provisional assessment of a bill of costs will do so 
without the benefit of any submissions from the parties and in the absence of any scrutiny as 
to how he or she decides the final amount. Costs assessors in such situations have neither the 
benefit of the adversarial argument that helps clarify amounts charged on bills of costs, nor 
the obligation to explain how they came to a conclusion. A party who is dissatisfied has little 
or no guidance as to why they did not get the expected result.   
Provisional assessment is certainly expedient. It creates what appears to be an administrative 
adjudication in the flow of a judicial process. It is likely to suit the interests of legal 
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practitioners, as many practitioners are neither interested in nor well informed about costs 
assessment. It puts practitioners in a position where they can tell a client that the person who 
will assess the bill has done so and that the best approach is to accept that decision as 
challenging it is fraught with risk. Clients in turn are likely to accept that advice. Provisional 
assessment will certainly lighten the workload of court officers whose roles stretch much 
wider than costs assessment. However, it is of ‗fundamental importance that justice should 
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.‘205 A process 
where a judicial decision maker sits on what is essentially an appeal against his or her own 
decision does not seem to come up to the high standard we are entitled to expect of our 
judicial system.   
2.6: Conclusion 
Adjudication of costs disputes in the Western Australian jurisdiction continues to be 
governed by the various courts‘ procedural rules as well as the Act governing the legal 
profession (currently the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA)). The rules and the Act change 
from time to time, and despite some recent and real reform, the basis of the process remains 
the same as it was when the colony was first founded in 1829. For the most part, the Reforms 
that have occurred have been in the form of unsatisfactory tinkering with the system; they 
have been piecemeal, ill thought out and, despite the fact that the Western Australian 
Parliament has often sought expert advice, often contrary to that advice. Cost assessment 
remains adversarial in nature and is performed by relatively senior court staff in a judicial 
and adversarial process. Attendance at a Western Australian costs assessment is much the 
same now as it always has been, though today‘s practitioner, unlike his or her 1829 
counterpart, is no longer required to wear a wig. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the Western Australian costs assessment regime stands as a 
‗norm‘ in that most of the changes that have occurred in its operations have not altered its 
basic conceptualisation. Costs assessment in Western Australia remains a creature of the 
courts. As will be seen in the following chapter, there are other models of costs assessment. 
Chapter Three of this thesis provides a counterpoint to the Western Australian costs 
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assessment regime. Chapter Four in turn provides the comparisons that are central to this 
thesis.  Chapter Four allows an informed assessment as to whether the longstanding 
conceptualisation of costs assessment, accepted in Western Australia on the grounds that ‗if it 
isn‘t broken don‘t fix it‘ is in reality the best approach to dealing with disputes as to costs.
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Chapter Three: Assessment of costs in New South Wales- A brief 
history 
3.1: Overview 
This chapter will trace the history of legal costs assessment in New South Wales from its 
origins immediately before colonisation in 1788 through to the present. The chapter contains 
five parts, being this overview, three substantive sections that map out the evolution of costs 
assessment in New South Wales and then a conclusion that will provide an evaluation of the 
Reforms that occurred to the costs assessment regime in New South Wales in 1994. Over that 
time period the New South Wales costs assessment regime has moved from its origins as an 
obscure and somewhat hidebound judicial process to the current reality of an accessible 
administrative system that legal consumers and legal practitioners both use to determine costs 
disputes. The three substantive sections will be presented in a chronological flow, but they do 
contain digressions that are necessary in order to explore particular nuances of costs 
assessment at particular times and the various other matters that impinge upon the costs 
assessment regime.  
The first of the three substantive parts of the chapter will give a relatively brief and generally 
mechanical description of the early history of costs assessment in New South Wales. It will 
describe the nature of the framework the British colonisers had provided for a judiciary in 
New South Wales before the first fleet arrived in Sydney. The legislative evolution of the 
costs assessment regime will be tracked up until the sweeping range of Reforms to the 
governance of legal practice that commenced in the 1980s. As will be seen, the costs 
assessment regime changed over those early years, but it was change by way of general 
evolution rather than by any revolution. As the costs of legal services increased over time in 
the way that all costs increased by way of inflation, the costs assessment regime was adapted 
to take those increases into account. The assessment process however remained largely the 
same; a judicial process that was, to the general public, obscure and arcane. 
The second substantive part of the chapter deals with the origins of and motivations behind 
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the New South Wales Legal Profession Reform Bills of 1993 (the Reform Bill).
206
 The 
Reform Bill, passed as the Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 (NSW), made a profound and 
fundamental change to costs assessment in New South Wales. It took costs assessment out of 
the purview of the courts and created a statutory body to oversee an administrative decision 
making process where costs assessments were performed by legal practitioners acting as sub-
contractors rather than court officers.   
This section of the chapter provides the background of the Reform Bill as relates to the 
various reports and papers that informed its creation. It also explores and critiques the 
parliamentary debates that surrounded the passage of the Reform Bill, in part to illustrate 
some of the miscomprehensions that tainted the New South Wales Parliament‘s view of the 
Reforms but also to clarify the intended consequences of the costs Reforms This section of 
the chapter provides analysis of the Parliament‘s expressed expectations of the Reform Bill, 
noting that the language of the debates was often at odds with the realities of the proposed 
Reforms as drafted. It will show that one of the strongest drivers for reform was a belief that 
winning litigants should recover most if not all of their legal costs from the losing party and 
that the then current costs assessment regime was not allowing that to happen.  
As a necessary digression, this part of chapter will also discuss one of the other key effects of 
the Reform Bill, namely the introduction of conditional or contingency contracts where 
practitioners could charge their clients a premium or uplift fee if the client‘s matter was 
successfully concluded. It will argue that, by formalising conditional costs agreements and 
allowing the impost of an uplift fee, the Reforms contained an essential contradiction. It will 
highlight the uncertainties and ambiguities that came with conditional costs agreements and 
point out that if an uplift fee is not recoverable from the unsuccessful litigant on a party/party 
assessment then, despite the parliamentarians‘ clear intent that winning litigants should be 
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more fully indemnified for their costs, in some areas of litigation successful litigants were 
likely to recover less of their costs than they would have done before the Reforms It will also 
highlight the dilemma posed by uplift fees; if they can be recovered from an unsuccessful 
litigant then they will act as a penalty imposed on top of the damages that that unsuccessful 
litigant is obliged to pay. 
The third substantive part of the chapter deals with costs assessment in post reform New 
South Wales. It commences at the date when the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) was 
amended and the traditional judicial approach to costs assessment was abandoned.    
The first part of this section of the chapter will review the 1994 Reforms as at the time they 
came into force. It will then identify some of the teething problems that arose with the 1994 
Reforms and track the various alterations and amendments that have occurred to the 
legislative framework that underpins the New South Wales costs assessment regime since 
then. It will note that conditional costs agreements and uplift fees, explained in some detail in 
the preceding section, proved so problematic that they were eventually disallowed in actions 
for damages. The section will also discuss the tensions that arose from abandoning scales of 
costs as ‗uncompetitive‘ and the perceived need for some sort of benchmark against which 
costs could be assessed.  
Lastly, in conclusion, this chapter will argue that a close look at the Reforms proves the 
statement by Roscoe Pound that was used in the overview of Chapter One of this thesis; that 
‗[h]ence the one (the legislator) is prone to attempt far too much and to be careless how he 
carries out the details of what he attempts‘.207 The chapter will point out that the 1994 
Reforms seem to have been introduced without any realisation that they carried internal 
inconsistencies that would vitiate against their intended outcomes. It will also point out that 
the introduction of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) further undermined the goals of the 
1994 Reforms. Notwithstanding that, this chapter will argue that the 1994 Reforms did 
achieve some of the outcomes the Parliament intended them to achieve, and that on top of 
that they provided other unforeseen benefits. This chapter will argue that good intentions 
(despite poor understandings), a degree of parliamentary bipartisanship and a willingness to 
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continue reform through a cycle of constant feedback and amendment have produced real 
improvements to the costs assessment regime in New South Wales. 
Some key themes will be revisited a number of times over the length of the chapter. It will be 
noted that Reforms to the costs assessment regime have been based on common perceptions 
rather than on any real evidence. Aligned to this, it will be argued that the stated justifications 
for reform and the aspirations about what the Reforms will achieve were often unrealistic. 
For these reasons, the chapter adopts the view that one of the key aspects of the 1994 
Reforms, the abolition of scales of costs, was a mistake. In addition, and while the 1994 
Reforms may seem coherent when viewed on their own, this chapter will argue that when 
they are viewed in the context of other law reform, they lead to inconsistencies that act to 
defeat their stated purpose. In particular, this chapter will argue that the introduction of 
contingency fee retainers and the effects of tort reform have, for at least some areas of legal 
work, destroyed any chance of the 1994 Reforms producing some of their stated objectives.  
The chapter will also note the problems that arise with public perceptions around the question 
often expressed as ‗Quis custodiet ipsos custodes‟ or ‗who will guard the guards 
themselves?‘ As was noted in the introduction to this thesis, the public views legal costs with 
some suspicion, and the New South Wales Parliament has always struggled to find the 
balance between external and self-regulation for the fees lawyers charge. The original 
position was that lawyers and the courts set the standard for what a lawyer could reasonably 
charge, but that position was abandoned in New South Wales in 1984. Ten years later, the 
1994 Reforms, despite being designed to promote competition and drive down legal fees, 
handed that responsibility back to practicing lawyers. As will be seen, if recommendations 
for further reform that are currently being considered are adopted, that position will be 
further entrenched. This thesis argues that if legal fees should be regulated an expert body, 
such as existed in New South Wales between 1984 and 1994, and as currently exists in 
Western Australia, would be far more suited to benchmarking that regulation than are 
practicing lawyers. Further, and regardless of who determines what costs are reasonable, this 
thesis will show that legal practitioners have gained an enormous benefit from the 1994 
Reforms.  
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3.2:  A brief history of costs assessment in New South Wales up until the late 
1970s 
New South Wales was colonised in 1788, 41 years before Western Australia. When the first 
fleet anchored in Botany Bay it bore, as well as a cargo of convicts and their gaolers, the 
corpus of English law. The wherewithal for a civil jurisdiction in the new colony had been 
created before the ships landed, by way of a Charter of Justice proclaimed on 2 April 1787.
208
 
The Charter, which was in the form of letters of patent rather than a statute, noted that: 
sufficient Provision should be made for the recovery of Debts and determining of 
private Causes between party and party in the place aforesaid (being the Eastern 
Coast of New South Wales or someone or other of the Islands adjacent).
209
 
The Charter gave the Governor the power to appoint a Deputy Judge Advocate and six court 
officers.
210
 The Court of Civil Jurisdiction sat in relation to property disputes as well and also 
had the responsibility for adjudicating in relation to disputes over wills and estates.
211
 The 
court was empowered to award costs to successful litigants.
212
 The Charter made no 
reference to the assessment of those costs, but it is clear that legal costs were being awarded 
to civil litigants as early as 1800.
213
 
New Letters Patent revoking the Court of Civil Jurisdiction and constituting the Supreme 
Court of Civil Jurisdiction were issued on 4 February 1814.
214
 That court was in turn 
abolished in 1824 after further Letters Patent were issued on 13 October 1823.
215
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The Supreme Court of New South Wales was created in May 1824.
216
 The original court was 
created through Letters Patent, but the Supreme Court was given statutory footing and its role 
was expanded under a British Act in 1828.
217
  
The Request Court Rules, which pertained to the Supreme Court, set out costs, fees and 
witness expenses at Rule 37.
218
 That rule was repealed, so far as attorney‘s costs were 
concerned, on 1 May 1844 by way of Rule 51, which set out a scale of costs for attorneys 
with the instruction that ‗the proper Officer do tax [assess] and allow all Bills of Costs 
according to such scale...‘.219 
In 1847 the colonial government of New South Wales passed an Act specifically to regulate 
attorney‘s costs (The 1847 Act).220 The prologue of the Act, which came into operation on 2 
October 1847, set out the situation succinctly: 
[w]hereas it is expedient that attorney‘s bills of costs whether for law, equity, 
criminal, conveyancing or any other business transacted by them as such attorneys be 
liable to be taxed (assessed) and that the price of conveyancing be regulated.
221
 
Sections 1-12 of the 1847 Act were substantively similar to the statutory provisions that 
create current assessment regimes, although the language is archaic and the sections are 
verbose and difficult to follow.
222
 Section 2 of the 1847 Act allowed the practitioner to apply 
to have his
223
 own bill of costs assessed.
224
 The person charged with costs could also apply 
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for assessment up until one month after being issued the bill. Costs of the assessment were to 
be paid by the person charged, unless the bill was reduced on assessment by more than 1/6
th. 
If the bill was reduced by more than 1/6
th
 the practitioner was responsible for the costs of 
assessment. 
The Legal Practitioners Act 1898 (the 1898 Act) repealed seven former Acts that dealt with 
procedural matters concerning the legal profession. The 1847 Act was included among the 
repealed Acts, and the provisions relating to Bills of Costs and assessment of costs were 
enacted by Sections 21-39 of the 1898 Act. The 1898 Act did not make any significant 
substantive changes to the assessment regime. The legal profession in New South Wales was 
governed by the 1898 Act up until 1987, and while over those ensuing 89 years a multitude 
of varying amendments were made to the 1898 Act, the costs assessment regime remained 
largely unchanged. Costs assessment was part of the judicial function of the courts and was 
carried out by court officers as one of many tasks they performed. An esoteric creature of the 
courts, the costs assessment regime did not get much attention from parliament and was 
largely unnoticed by the public.
225
   
3.3:  The lead up to and rationale for the New South Wales Reforms 
As noted above, for many years costs assessment, in New South Wales and in all of the 
Australian jurisdictions, was not much in the public eye. Lawyers worked in an area of 
mystery
226
 and from a position of authority; the charges they levied were seen as expensive 
and perhaps inexplicable.
227
 The public had always complained about lawyers, and had 
always suspected them of overcharging.
228
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 Over the middle years of the last century however western society experienced profound 
social change and authority in all its guises became the legitimate target of investigation and 
criticism. Law, and lawyers, were not excluded from this social phenomenon, and 
parliaments in Australia, which had always seen the need to regulate lawyers,
 229
 began to 
look more closely at the legal profession and the monopoly it maintained over legal practice.  
Reforms to the New South Wales costs assessment regime must be viewed in the context of 
the sweeping range of Reforms to the governance of legal practice that commenced in the 
1970s. In 1978 the government of New South Wales requested that the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission (the NSWLRC) review the legal profession. The NSWLRC 
released a comprehensive series of reports, three in 1982 and a fourth in 1984. These reports 
covered the legal profession generally, proposing extensive reform of the way in which the 
legal profession was regulated. The issue of costs was not specifically addressed in the 
reports.  
3.3.1:  Responsibility for providing scales of costs shifted from the courts to an 
expert panel by the Legal Practitioners (Solicitors’ Remuneration) Amendment 
Act 1984 (NSW) 
Regulating solicitors‘ fees became a public issue in New South Wales in 1984 when the New 
South Wales Legislative Assembly disallowed a portion of a scale of costs that fixed 
conveyancing costs because of a perception that the new scale was too generous. Scales of 
costs, the benchmarks against which legal costs were assessed in New South Wales until 
those scales were abolished in 1994, were generally described in the introduction at 1.3.6. 
Creating and updating the various scales of costs had always been one of the functions of the 
New South Wales courts and the courts had performed that function with little notice from 
the public or the parliament.   
The disallowed scale was created by the New South Wales Supreme Court to replace a scale 
produced in 1977, and in some parts it made hefty (up to 40%) increases in costs. As noted 
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above, there was a public backlash and the scale was disallowed by Parliament. Disallowance 
did not mean that the old scale was revived, and a vacuum ensued.
230
 The New South Wales 
parliament decided to shift the responsibility for producing scales of costs away from the 
courts and to an expert panel by way of the Legal Practitioners (Solicitors‟ Remuneration) 
Amendment Act 1984. The amending Act also reinstated the 1977 costs scale 
(retrospectively) until the new panel produced another scale.
231
  
The Honourable Barry Unsworth explained the situation in the second reading speech for the 
amending Bills as follows: 
I speak with the greatest respect, and a good deal of sympathy, for the Chief Justice, 
and for the other members of the committees convened by him from time to time, 
when I say that this system is archaic, disorganised and industrially irresponsible. 
Whatever may have been its value when it was imported from England in 1919, it is 
indefensible now. The system is vulnerable to a great many criticisms It creates a fee-
fixing authority with no industrial base, and a numerical bias towards the profession; 
it gives the authority no guidelines and does not require any consideration of wage-
fixing principles; it does not require notice of the committee having been convened, 
nor does it give any opportunity to make submissions; there are no open hearings; 
there are no regular reviews; no reasons are published. All of these criticisms are 
accounted for in the legislation now proposed.
232
 
The Opposition supported the broad principle of shifting the responsibility for producing 
scales away from the courts and into a more rationalised and transparent body but did note 
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that ‗[o]f all the learned professions the legal profession has been more tied down and more 
limited and restricted in its costing structure than has any other profession.‘233 
The newly constituted Board consisted of one judicial member, one practicing solicitor and 
two members who, not being in practice, had experience in and knowledge of wage fixing 
and economics.
234
 The Board set fees for both contentious and non contentious business.
235
   
The amending Act also allowed practitioners more leeway to advertise their services. Mr 
Unsworth pointed out that the traditional position was anti-competitive, as; 
[w]ithin the conveyancing monopoly, the ban on touting for business goes too far, 
and forbids a solicitor to advertise his willingness to work for less than the scale fees. 
To a large extent, the maxima prescribed thus become minima as well, because a 
solicitor is forbidden to hold himself out as generally charging less than the 
maxima.
236
 
Mr Unsworth‘s comment, although strictly true, was misleading. The maxima were only 
maxima until the solicitor displaced them with a costs agreement. That said, his comment 
illustrates how the scales did act as a floor to legal fees in some areas. This is counter 
intuitive; scales that were generally designed to act as a ceiling on costs were instead being 
used to determine a minimum rate. This was because practitioners usually insisted that their 
clients contract out having their fees governed by the scale rates by way of a costs agreement 
[as discussed in Chapter One at 1.3.7]. This was an issue upon which future reformers would 
seize to argue that scales should be abandoned.  
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It was to be another ten years before scales of costs would be abandoned in New South 
Wales. In the meantime, this 1984 reform created a system that based the scales in studied 
reasonableness. The composition of the Board brought a range of expertise to the task of 
creating the scales and ensured that scales of costs balanced the needs and interests of the 
various legal stakeholders. Scales of costs had become accessible benchmarks for the costs of 
legal services, and costs assessments that used the scales to determine costs disputes were 
assessments based on objectively determined and reasonable fees for legal works. 
Practitioners, however, generally continued to use the scales as a floor from which to 
determine what to charge. 
3.3.2: The Legal Profession Act (1987): general Reforms and a signpost to costs 
reform 
In 1987, and as a result of the reports published by the NSWLRC in the early 1980s, the 
Parliament of New South Wales repealed the Legal Practitioners Act 1898 by way of the 
Legal Profession Act 1987 (the 1987 Act). The 1987Act introduced major Reforms to the 
way the legal profession was structured and governed, but not to the costs assessment regime. 
With some few exceptions the provisions from the 1898 Act relating to assessment of costs 
were merely replicated in Division 5 of the 1987Act.
237
 However, the then Attorney General 
Terrance Sheahan, in his second reading speech for the Bill which became the 1987 Act, 
noted that it was ‗widely acknowledged that present system (of costs assessment) is slow and 
costly‘, and promised that there would be a complete review of the system in the near future 
as he was ‗considering the feasibility of introducing an arbitration system, which would 
enable appropriate cases of disputes over bills of costs to be settled quickly and in a less 
costly manner for all parties involved‘.238 The Attorney General‘s comments pointed to two 
of the perceived problems with the costs assessment regime, namely the time it took to have 
costs assessed and the cost of doing so. Amelioration of those two aspects of the system had 
become an expressed outcome of the impending Reforms  
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The Attorney General foreshadowed a change away from a judicial system of taxation 
towards an administrative arbitrational system.
239
 This was a radical rethinking of how costs 
could be assessed. As noted at 1.2.1 above, costs assessment had always been a part of the 
courts‘ judicial functions in the Australian jurisdictions. In the case of party/party costs 
disputes the assessment was seen as part of the substantive dispute; assessments between 
solicitors and clients were brought before the court as new substantive disputes. As such, 
both types of assessment were carried out in an adversarial manner.
240
  
3.3.3:  The NSWLRC report 1991- 1993 
In November 1991 the NSWLRC was asked to investigate ‗the necessity for implementing 
alternative mechanisms to those presently existing to deal with complaints about the delivery 
of legal services to the public‘.241 They were asked to consult widely, and they did so.242 In 
May 1992 the NSW Commission released Discussion Paper No 26: Scrutiny of the Legal 
Profession. The Discussion Paper was followed by a full report in 1993, and that report found 
that the then current mechanisms for dealing with complaints against legal practitioners were 
inappropriate, as they were ‗promoting the common idea that the legal profession is simply 
―looking after its own‖‘. In particular, there is still a profound gap between what angers 
clients (and others) sufficiently to go to the trouble of complaining, and what lawyers and 
their professional associations see as important enough to merit serious attention, disciplinary 
action or compensation.
243
  
The NSWLRC made 77 recommendations for a sweeping overhaul of disciplinary 
procedures, and although it noted that practitioners‘ remuneration was not in its terms of 
reference, three of those recommendations related to legal costs. The NSWLRC explained 
this digression by noting that ‗disputes about legal fees, costs and disbursements represent a 
significant proportion of the complaints received by the legal professional associations
 
and 
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are the cause of a good deal of the current public disquiet about lawyers‘.244 The NSWLRC 
recommended that the costs disclosure regime be strengthened, that bills of costs should 
contain clear instructions on dispute resolution processes and that ‗the system of taxation of 
costs by the Supreme Court should be replaced by a two phased process of mediation and 
arbitration‘.245 The NSWLRC did not prescribe the detail of the proposed new system, noting 
that an investigation into such a change was already underway and that it expected legislation 
to implement such changes in the near future.
246
 
3.3.4: Government seeks further input as to costs reform (1992-1993) 
While the NSWLRC was taking submissions and formulating its recommendations the 
Attorney General‘s Department was firming up its position on costs reform. The situation, 
described in the debates for the Legal Profession Reform Bill (No 2), was that so many 
reviews had already taken place, in New South Wales and in other jurisdictions, that,  
[a]ll that work having been done, the Attorney decided that there was no need to 
conduct a further review in New South Wales.
247
 Rather, he decided to review the 
results of various inquiries to ascertain those amendments that could be put together 
in this landmark legislation.
248
 
In November 1992 the government of New South Wales released a green paper relating to 
the structure and regulation of the legal profession in general. A range of stakeholders 
responded and in May 1993 the government, after considering the responses, issued a 
statement of policy as to reform of the profession.
249
 As noted above, the statement of 
position, which covered a range of issues including costs reform, had been prepared after 
lengthy consideration of a number of reports on legal systems in a range of jurisdictions 
outside of New South Wales, as well as in consultation with the local profession. As was 
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mooted in the debates for the 1987 Act, the government‘s position on costs reform was that 
the judicial system then in use should be abolished, and scales of costs should have a similar 
fate. Instead, an administrative system of costs adjudication should be created, and to bring 
that about the Legal Profession Reform Bill 1993 was brought before Parliament. This thesis 
now considers that Bill. 
3.3.5:  The Legal Profession Reform Bill 1993: An introduction and overview 
The Attorney General‘s foreshadowed changes to the New South Wales legal costs regime 
were introduced into the Legislative Council on 16 September 1993 by way of the Legal 
Profession Reform Bill 1993 (the Reform Bill)
250
 by the then Minister for Justice and 
Attorney General, the Hon John Hannaford. Originally named the ‗Maintenance and 
Champerty Abolition Bill‘,251 the Reform Bill had a rocky start and it did not survive in its 
original form. Over the course of the initial debates a number of deficiencies were identified. 
The weight of comment, criticism and necessary amendment, from stakeholders as well as 
from the opposition, led the government to withdraw the Bill from the Legislative Council on 
27 October 1993. This inauspicious start to a Bill that was drafted before the NSWLRC could 
finalise its report into the issues the Bill was supposed to address seems a product of 
attempting to create ‗policy on the run‘, despite the Government‘s protestations that it had 
thoroughly canvassed the issues before it designed the Reforms 
Mr Hannaford introduced the Legal Profession Reform Bill (No 2) on that same day.
252
 The 
second Bill maintained the direction of the original Bill, but had 60 ―minor‖ changes, made 
as the result of ―public comment and further consideration‖.253 The Government considered 
that it was easier to start afresh with a ―clean and comprehensive Bill‖ rather than having to 
deal with 60 proposed amendments in Committee,
254
 and the Opposition agreed with that 
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sentiment.
255
 The following discussion will not differentiate between the two versions of the 
Reform Bill except where the differences between them have a direct bearing on costs 
assessment. 
The Honourable Ron Dyer, speaking for the Opposition, was generally in favour of the main 
thrusts of the Bill.
256
 He was, however, very sceptical about any benefits arising from a new 
cost regime.
257
 In particular, he was concerned that instead of a situation where court officers 
assessed bills to the objective standard of a scale of costs, part time costs assessors, who 
continued to work as solicitors, would be assessing bills as against their own subjective 
standards as to what would be ‗fair and reasonable‘ in the circumstances.258 He felt that such 
assessments ―made by those assessors more often than not will be of a substantially higher 
amount than would have been allowed under the existing court scales by a taxing officer.‖259 
Mr Dyer did not address this issue any further at this point, but the obvious question as to 
who would ‗guard the guardians‘ lies beneath his comments. This concern is well founded. 
Assessing officers in the pre reform regime may well have started their careers as legal 
practitioners, but they had moved on to be employees and officers of the court, and as such 
were seen to be impartial between the parties to a dispute. Part time assessors, who continue 
to draw most or a substantial part of their income from their own work as legal practitioners, 
may be seen to have a vested interest in having bills of costs generally allowed at a higher 
rate. Even without impugning the assessors it seems likely that successful litigants ‗fair and 
reasonable‘ costs were likely to be substantially higher than costs that are artificially held to 
the base rate of a scale of costs, even when that scale itself was designed to reflect reasonable 
charges. This seems particularly likely to be so if the assessors are drawn from a profession 
that had generally regarded the scales as minima. As will be seen in the following chapter, 
and as was the intention of the New South Wales Parliament that introduced the Bill, this is 
one of the results that has been effected by the cost Reforms 
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Mr Dyer seemed to confine his concerns to party/party disputes, as the existence of costs 
agreements between solicitor and client effectively meant that solicitor/client disputes were, 
in the absence of special circumstance, to be assessed against the provisions of the costs 
agreement.
260
 At any rate, he felt that solicitor/client disputes were not as important as 
party/party disputes, and pointed to the fact that in 1992 only 46 solicitor/client bills were 
filed with the court for taxation while in the same year 1,851 party/party bills were 
received.
261
 He was concerned that a change to an assessment system would mean that 
unsuccessful litigants would pay a much higher portion of the successful opponent‘s legal 
costs, and that the risk of exposure to such high and undeterminable costs would deter many 
potential litigants from accessing the justice system. In essence, he agreed with the 
government as to the likely outcome of the Reforms in relation to party/party disputes, that 
winning litigants would recover more of their costs, but he disagreed that the outcome would 
be socially beneficial. 
In response, the government, through the Honourable Ms Elizabeth Kirkby, acknowledged 
that there was concern that the Reforms may ‗be a hazard to people of limited resources in 
difficult cases‘ and that it had  
been suggested that the main beneficiaries of the proposal will be not those who are 
presently squeezed out of the civil justice system but the public liability insurer who 
successfully fights off an accident victim and the newspaper proprietor who 
successfully defends a defamation action‘.262  
However, Mr Hannaford remained adamant that: 
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[t]he principle that costs should follow the event is a key component in our judicial 
system. At present it is weakened by the fact that a successful party can be left 
substantially out of pocket by the unfair basis of taxing party-party costs.
263
 
Debate concerning the Bill was robust, though reform of the costs adjudication regime was 
not an issue in contention. In light of problems that arose from the Reforms, and as we shall 
see in the discussion below,
264
 is particularly relevant to note that the Opposition did not 
oppose conditional costs agreements with uplift fees. The Opposition did move three 
amendments, none of which related to costs assessment, but were unsuccessful, they then 
decided not to proceed with any further attempts at amendment but rather to ‗consider its 
position and move other amendments in another place‘.265 The Reform Bill was passed 
through the Legislative Council on 28 October 1993, and moved on to that ‗other place‘; the 
Legislative Assembly. 
The second version of the Reform Bill was introduced into the New South Wales Legislative 
Assembly on 9 November 1993 by way of the Legal Profession Reform Bill (No 2). Mr John 
Fahey, then Premier, read the Reform Bill for the second time.
266
 His speech concentrated on 
the ‗big picture‘ in terms of reform; he did not dwell on the detail of the proposed change 
from a judicial/taxation system of cost adjudication to an administrative assessment system. 
He reported the purpose of the Reform Bill as being to provide ‗a more competitive market 
for legal services‘.267 He explained that the Reform Bill was designed to reform three main 
areas: the structure and regulation of professional practice, the complaints system, and legal 
fees.
268
 Mr Fahey stated that the main problem with legal costs was that they were too 
high.
269
 He noted that the New South Wales Parliament set a scale of costs, but that many 
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lawyers charged above that scale.
270
 He said ‗[t]he scale has in effect become the base rate, 
not an average or common fee.‘271 
Mr Fahey went on to outline the introduction of a fee disclosure regime.
272
 He also pointed 
out that the Reform Bill introduced conditional fees that were to be chargeable if a matter 
was successfully concluded.
273
 Although he did not specifically address the fact that the 
current system of assessment of costs was to be discontinued, he noted that in cost disputes 
fee arrangements could be reviewed by costs assessors that were to appointed by the 
Supreme Court.
274
 He claimed that the Reforms would ‗rationalise anomalies in the fee 
assessment process‘.275  
The Opposition did not agree. It considered the second Reform Bill to be a ―lame duck‖ full 
of ―weak kneed proposals‖ that would do little to regulate the cost of justice.276 The 
opposition had a raft of proposed amendments, though few involved the proposed changes to 
costs assessment. Three of those amendments however related to Schedule 3 of the Reform 
Bill, and were directly related to legal costs or the assessment process. 
One of the proposed amendments concerned client‘s rights and costs disclosure. The Reform 
Bill ensured that clients were to be informed what the costs they would pay to their own 
lawyers were likely to be,
 277
 but it was silent about disclosure of potential liability for 
party/party costs if a matter was unsuccessful. The Opposition‘s amendment would have 
made practitioners disclose an estimate of those costs; the Government rejected that proposal. 
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Mr Fahey considered that attempting to impose such an obligation was ‗entering the realm of 
fantasy - I cannot describe it any other way - where a practitioner will have to gaze into the 
crystal ball and guess what is happening with his opponent‘.278 The Parliament did not 
explore the middle ground, that clients should at least be informed that such a liability was at 
least a possibility, without the practitioner having to estimate its quantum.
279
  
Two of the Opposition‘s further amendments were accepted, namely that disclosure include 
information on the right to receive an itemised bill if the original bill a client received was in 
lump sum form, and that disclosure be ‗in writing and be expressed in clear plain 
language‘.280 
A further proposal for amendment is worth noting. An independent member, John Edward 
Hatton, proposed an amendment that would have introduced ‗indicative costs‘ into the 
Reform Bill.
281
 Indicative costs were to be set by a legal costs committee and would be the 
‗costs the committee considers to be fair and reasonable for the provision of legal 
services‘.282 Practitioners were to disclose those costs when disclosing the costs they 
intended to charge in accordance with their costs agreements, and costs assessors were to 
take indicative costs into account when assessing solicitor/client disputes.
283
 In short, it 
seems that Mr Hatton wished to rename and retain scales of costs.
284
 Mr Hatton‘s amendment 
failed, as neither the government nor the opposition would support. Further discussion of 
benchmark costs is provided below at 3.3.5.1 in conjunction with discussion of the abolition 
of scales of costs in general. 
Despite its initial rhetoric, the Opposition was in generally in support of the Reform Bill; it 
was satisfied the range of issues that costs assessors had to consider when carrying out their 
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work, and supported ‗reasonableness‘ as the touchstone of assessment and described the 
process that costs assessors would go through as ‗evolutionary‘.285 In general, the debates 
over costs related issues fell into line with party political ideology. The governing Liberal 
Party was in favour of a relatively free legal marketplace with minimum constraints on what 
solicitors could charge. It felt that so long as solicitors made genuine disclosure of costs at 
the commencement of matters, free competition and increased levels of efficiency would 
create an open market where prices were held to ‗real‘ levels. The Labor opposition was in 
favour of far more in depth regulation of what it saw as a closed shop and an essentially self 
interested profession. Despite these ideological differences, the debates surrounding the 
introduction of the Reform Bill make it clear that despite some disagreement about the details 
of the Reforms to costs assessment, there was bipartisan support for change and about the 
desired outcome of the changes, namely that winning litigants received a higher level of 
return on party/party assessments. 
In summary, the Reform Bill was to do remove costs assessment from the purview of the 
courts and transform it into an administrative function managed by a standalone body. A 
more detailed investigation of that change, the motivations that lay behind it and the 
expectations that accompanied it are provided below. 
3.3.5.1: The Legal Profession Reform Bill 1993: A move to market forces 
and the abolition of scales of costs to benefit clients. 
The Reform Bill should be viewed in the wider context of general reform in the name of 
stamping out anti-competitive practices. In 1992 the then Prime Minister, Paul Keating, had 
established a National Competition Policy Review,
286
 and the Hilmer Report which flowed 
from that review was released in August 1993.
287
 New South Wales, along with the other 
states, had accepted that its legislation should be reviewed to ‗consider any potentially anti-
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competitive restrictions in legislation and whether they are in the public interest‘.288 The legal 
profession had long been the target of criticism as being essentially a closed shop monopoly, 
and scales of costs were considered by many to be anti-competitive.
289
 
Mr Hannaford‘s second reading speech made it clear that the government viewed the Reform 
Bill as ‗the most significant change to the structure and regulation of the legal profession 
ever undertaken in New South Wales.‘290 Schedule 3 of the Reform Bill would repeal part 11 
of the 1987 Act and institute a new system of setting and reviewing fees.
291
 Mr Hannaford 
claimed that the thrust of that reform was to ‗move away from a system of regulated fees to 
reliance on market forces to set fees with an appropriate safety net to protect consumers‘.292 
One of the many problems that Mr Hannaford saw with the then current system was that 
scales of costs did ―not encourage solicitors towards greater efficiency since there is no way 
that the benefits of extra skill or efficiency can be competitively passed on to the consumer 
through lower fees with the object of obtaining greater market share.‖293 This was a strange 
observation, as lawyers were able to charge less than scale to obtain market share if they 
wished to do so. Mr Hannaford did differentiate between contentious and non contentious 
business in the second reading speech. Contentious business was subject to scales of costs 
that, although designed to be a ceiling, in fact acted as a floor or as base rates. This was 
because solicitors could and usually did enter into costs agreements that allowed them to 
charge above the scale rates. Non contentious business was subject to prescribed fees that 
acted as maxima, but as Mr Hannaford observed, discount fee advertising allowed 
practitioners to charge less and to make it known that they charged less. In essence, and in 
light of the prevailing system of scales of costs at that time in New South Wales, Mr 
Hannaford‘s premise that removing scales would lower costs simply does not make sense. 
Lawyers were already free to charge less than scale costs if they wished to do so. As the 
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scales of costs were designed as a default ‗ceiling‘ for legal costs there was no cogent 
argument as to how removing them would lead to decreased legal costs.  
Nonetheless, despite there being an odd premise to Mr Hannaford‘s arguments, his second 
reading speech made it clear that the government believed that the proposed benefits of 
reform would include increased efficiency and a real drop in the costs of legal services, and 
that those benefits would in part flow from better competition. One of the key reasons that 
competition would increase was that scales of costs would be abolished and lawyers would 
then be able to fix their rates competitively. 
As was noted above, Mr Chris Hatton, an independent member of the New South Wales 
Legislative Assembly, attempted to have an amendment allowing indicative costs inserted 
into the Reform Bill. Indicative or benchmark costs had been subject to some consideration 
over the evolution of the Reforms. In its original form, before it was withdrawn, redrafted 
and reintroduced, the Reform Bill had included provision for benchmark costs. As was 
explained earlier in the introduction to this thesis,
294
 scales of costs had originated in reaction 
to the view that lawyers were unethical in their billing methods. Over time they had evolved 
to become genuine estimates of what it was reasonable to charge for legal works, and had 
provided the limitations on recovering costs on a party/party basis. There was now a view 
that they stifled competition and thus acted to keep legal costs artificially high,
295
 although as 
noted above that view does not stand up to any detailed analysis. If costs assessors were to 
assess against a standard of reasonableness, it seems sensible to ask what guidance they 
should be given, and eminently sensible to provide such guidance through the workings of an 
expert body that was responsible for determining the guidelines. The Liberal government that 
drove the 1994 Reforms had originally included benchmark costs as part of the Reforms, but 
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had abandoned them by the first draft of the Reform Bill. The Honourable John Hannaford, 
then Attorney General, in the second reading speech for the first draft of the Reform Bill 
explained that abandonment as follows:  
First, the Trade Practices Commission indicated that there is a danger that a 
benchmark or default scale would become a basis from which practitioners set their 
fees. For example, if the benchmark fee represents on average a discount of 25 per 
cent, practitioners may start charging on the basis of 25 per cent above the benchmark 
fee. This would effectively retain all of the worst features of a regulated fee system 
and defeat the intention of the legislation to create a competitive market for legal 
services.
296
  
The Premier, Mr John Fahey, disagreed with Mr Hatton‘s amendment; pointing out that such 
an amendment would bring scales of costs back into the Act.
297
 He was firmly of the opinion 
that ‗[i]t is essential, in order to achieve competition, that there be no scale fees.‘298  The 
Opposition seems to have been confused as to how they viewed benchmarks, as over the 
course of the debates surrounding the Reform Bill, they had described benchmark costs as 
‗draconian‘299, ‗ridiculous‘300and, alternately,  a ‗novel and unprecedented concept [that] may 
have been a move in the right direction‘301. However, the Opposition, in line with the 
governing party, rejected Mr Hatton‘s amendment and benchmark costs.  
As indicative or benchmark costs were really scales of costs renamed, and while there may 
have been real problems with the existing scales, it is hard to see that a form of regulation 
that had been extant and functioning for nearly 400 years was novel. Nor is it easy to agree 
with Mr John Turner of the National Party who noted that ‗I am pleased that the benchmark 
fee proposed in the discussion paper has been abandoned. I had great difficulties with that 
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proposal and I made that abundantly clear to the Attorney General. From a practical 
application, having worked as a solicitor in a country firm, I believed it would not work‘.302 
Despite Mr Hatton‘s lone voice in favour of providing costs assessors with some form of 
objective guidance as to what were reasonable costs, it is clear that the abolition of scales of 
costs enjoyed bipartisan support. Scales of costs were viewed as anti-competitive, and 
removing them was stop lawyers from keeping their prices artificially high. Some later views 
on this issue are provided below in the section of this chapter that deals with the 
consequences of the 1994 Reforms 
3.3.5.2: The Legal Profession Reform Bill 1993: changing the process of 
assessment  
Mr Hannaford went on to describe the then current cost adjudication system as follows: 
The taxation process in New South Wales is overly formal, legalistic and complex. 
The name of the process lends itself to considerable confusion. It is unlikely that any 
but the most sophisticated of legal services (sic) understand the term "taxation" in this 
obscure usage. 
The system is also adversarial, requiring an application to the court and often 
representation by a solicitor to seek taxation of costs. The system is unnecessarily 
complex and artificial with court officials spending lengthy periods going through 
piles of documents to determine a ―winner‖ and a ―loser‖ on the issue of what is a fair 
bill for service. The Legal Fees and Costs Board recently drew attention to problems 
with the system of taxation. The board noted that the decision-making process in 
taxation is unnecessarily complex and time consuming. The board also noted that 
taxation is carried out by court officers who often occupy the position of a taxing 
officer in a transitory capacity, have little or no experience in the commercial world 
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of running a legal practice and little or no knowledge of the intricacies of the day-to-
day activities of legal practice.
303
 
Mr Hannaford went on to argue that: 
Clearly, what is needed is a faster, easier and cheaper system of review of bills of 
costs. It may not be possible to achieve this by reform of the taxation process which is 
heavily based on an adversarial approach.
304
 
It is clear that the government believed that the Reforms would provide a beneficial social 
effect of making unsuccessful litigants bear the real costs of the litigation. Mr Hannaford 
described the situation as follows: 
The current system of taxation of party-party costs creates injustice and confusion. It 
means that even though a successful litigant is awarded costs against the other party 
he or she may be out of pocket for a significant amount. This is because party-party 
costs are those ―necessary and proper‖ while solicitor-client costs are ―all costs save 
those which are of an unreasonable amount or have been unreasonably incurred‖. It is 
proposed to abolish this distinction and that, subject to the judicial discretion to vary 
the basis of awarding costs, the criterion for awarding costs should be those 
reasonably incurred. The client would then recover the full costs which he or she is 
required to pay other than any unreasonable costs.
305
 
It seems that many shared Mr Hannaford‘s bleak view of the status quo. He noted that 
current system had been criticised by a number of judges, and quoted the Legal Fees and 
Costs Board as reporting that cost recovery by successful parties to large commercial 
litigation as being in the order of 40% or even less.
306
 He was adamant that the new system 
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as proposed in the Reform Bill would mean that ‗successful litigants should expect to receive 
all the legal costs they have incurred, except in the clear instances where costs in excess of 
that which may be determined as reasonable have been incurred with the express consent of 
the client‘.307 
Mr Hannaford‘s statement above is unambiguous, and sets out one of the key goals for the 
Reforms to the costs assessment scheme. As noted above,
308
 Reforms were expected to 
ensure that winning litigants recovered a higher percentage of the costs of that litigation from 
the losing parties. 
3.3.5.3: The Legal Profession Reform Bill 1993: Uplift fees and the 
rationale for introducing them. 
As noted above, the Reform Bill was styled as the Abolition of Maintenance and Champerty 
Bill. Maintenance described the situation where an otherwise disinterested party provided the 
financial support for litigation,
309
 while champerty described a situation where a lawyer 
provided services in exchange for an interest in the subject matter of litigation.
310
 Both 
situations gave rise to an offence, and either provided the foundation of an action in tort. This 
was problematic, as conditional costs agreements had long been common in some areas of 
legal work, and in particular in personal injury matters, where the condition was often ‗no 
win- no fee‘. Despite the strong social utility of such arrangements, and although ‗no win-no 
fee‘ retainers were accepted as legitimate, practitioners offering them were ‗maintaining‘ 
litigation and did, in a real sense, have an ‗interest‘ in the outcome of the litigation. Such 
practitioners were not receiving American style contingency payments based in a percentage 
of the damages received, but an argument that a practitioner who will only be paid if 
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damages are awarded (or a settlement is reached) does not have a financial interest in the 
outcome of the matter hinges on a very fine semantic point.
311
 
The Reform Bill sought to do away with the two offences and to discontinue them as causes 
of action in tort.
312
 Instead, it prescribed the ways in which a practitioner could charge for 
legal fees, with an allowance for a method of charging that fell within the definition of 
champerty. The Reform Bill allowed conditional costs agreements that included ‗uplift‘ fees. 
Under the Reforms, practitioners were to be given the right to charge a success fee of up to 
25% (the uplift) above their normal rates. In essence, and despite the way in which the 
Reform Bill was described, the effect of the reform was to allow and formalise a form of 
champerty, as it gave lawyers the right to have a direct financial interest in the outcome of 
litigation.
313
 Mr Hannaford explained that: 
New sections 186 to 189 provide for conditional costs agreements. Conditional fees 
provide for payment of the legal practitioner only when the client is successful. 
Conditional fees will not involve profit sharing, where the lawyer receives a fee 
proportionate to the result. In this regard the arrangements permitted under this 
proposal are clearly different to contingency fee arrangements which exist in the 
United States whereby the lawyer may receive a proportion of the amount of money 
awarded by the court. Conditional costs arrangements arise where a lawyer and client 
agree that the lawyer's fee will be paid only if the client is successful. 
Under such an agreement, there may be a premium on the agreed fee to take account 
of the risk involved, but the fee must not vary according to the benefit received by the 
client. The premium allowable may be up to 25 per cent of the reasonable fee 
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disclosed in the costs agreement. What constitutes the successful outcome must also 
be agreed by the parties and included as part of the conditional costs agreement.
314
 
One of Mr Hannaford‘s colleagues, Ms Elizabeth Kirkby, justified conditional fees as 
follows: 
These conditional fee agreements will help to align lawyer-client interests. Only cases 
with a likelihood of success will go ahead. They will allow plaintiffs with limited 
financial resources to have their cases dealt with. Restrictions on profit-sharing will 
curb the disadvantages of contingency fees, such as the temptation to deceive the 
courts and pervert the legal system, the incentive to increase spurious litigation, and 
potential conflicts between lawyer and client where the financial interests of the 
lawyer become paramount.
315
 
3.3.5.4: Criticism of the rationale for conditional costs agreements 
containing uplift fees 
Ms Kirkby‘s justification deserves some analysis.  
Her first statement, claiming that conditional fees will help align lawyer-client interests, is 
problematic. Lawyers stand as a fiduciary to their clients;
316
 and in carrying forward their 
client‘s litigation it should not be necessary to pay them extra to align their interests. At the 
most basic level her argument seems to be that if lawyers will get more for ‗winning‘ 
litigation than for losing it they will be more interested in winning. The statement can be 
contrasted with an observation from the National Competition Policy Review of the Legal 
Profession Act 1987, released some years after the Reforms had been instituted, where it was 
noted that “such agreements create a conflict of interest between the financial interests of a 
lawyer in the outcome of litigation and their duties to the court‖.317 Of these two views on 
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how a practitioner‘s interests may be affected by a conditional costs agreement, the second 
seems the most cogent. 
Ms Kirkby‘s second statement, a remarkably broad observation as to the effect of conditional 
contracts, does not really seem to make any sense. In the narrowest way, practitioners would 
not be likely to defer payment in a matter with little likelihood of success, if payment was 
going to be conditional on being successful. However, practitioners would have been very 
unlikely to take on cases that were not likely to succeed without payment up front before the 
success fee was introduced; practitioners had always been able to take on ‗pay as you go‘ 
matters even if there was little likelihood of success and the Reforms did not alter this. 
Ms Kirkby‘s third observation is less problematic. It may be that the ability to charge an 
uplift fee will encourage practitioners to act in matters without monies in trust, so that 
‗plaintiffs with limited financial resources‘ may be more likely to have their matters progress. 
However, practitioners would only be likely to take on such cases if there was a fairly strong 
chance of success. In such instances practitioners have always been able to accept payment at 
the end of the matter, and in some areas of practice that approach has always been 
common.
318
 An agreed uplift fee would help cover the opportunity costs of waiting until the 
end of a matter for payment, but practitioners had already been able to charge more to cover 
such costs by way of an ordinary costs agreement, as costs agreements displaced scales of 
costs. Further, an uplift fee charged against a matter where the damages recovered were not 
substantial could result in the bulk of the litigant‘s award going to the solicitor as the uplift 
fee. A conditional costs agreement with an uplift fee may be beneficial for practitioners 
representing impecunious litigants with strong cases involving substantial amounts of money, 
but that is not a justification for introducing such fees across the wide range of litigation. 
Such litigants would have been likely to get their day in court in any event; they were now to 
be charged up to 25% more for having done so. 
The last part of Ms Kirkby‘s statement is not a justification for introducing conditional costs 
agreements with uplift fees. Rather it is recognition that allowing a practitioner to have an 
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interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as is done in the United States, can be very 
problematic. Although she stated that the Reforms would ‗curb the disadvantages of 
contingency fees, such as the temptation to deceive the courts and pervert the legal 
system‘319, it seems she must have meant that they would do so because they did not 
introduce the American system, rather than that the Reforms did not themselves give 
practitioners a financial interest in the outcome of the retainer. It may be that ‗restrictions on 
profit sharing‘ are a good thing, but the 1994 Reforms did not really provide further such 
restrictions than were already in place, rather, as noted above, they recognised a form of 
retainer that had long been common (no win-no fee), and then added a right to charge what 
was essentially a bonus on top of the regular fees (the uplift). As noted above, the 1994 
Reforms made profit sharing professional misconduct rather than a general offence or cause 
of action.
320
 The most that can be said about Ms Kirkby‘s final statement in support of 
conditional costs agreements with uplift fees is that it can be seen as an admission that 
although a form of maintenance was now going to be recognised, and lawyers were going to 
have a direct financial interest in the outcome of litigation, at least the situation was not 
going to be the way it was in the United States. 
The reality of conditional agreements with uplift clauses is that they created a significant 
costs increase for any client subject to one who was successful in litigation. Uplift fees are 
very good for legal practitioners, who get paid extra for the same amounts of work they were 
often previously willing to do for less. If conditional contracts are not carefully monitored 
they allow a practitioner to charge a premium even in cases where there is little likelihood of 
losing. As will be seen below, that proved to be the situation in post reform New South 
Wales.   
3.3.5.5: Party/party costs recovery of conditional fees under the 1994 
Reforms 
In light of Mr Hannaford‘s unambiguous statement that winning litigants should recover ‗all‘ 
of their reasonable costs,  introducing conditional fees that allow an uplift charge seems 
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immensely problematic, unless of course the winning litigant was also able to recover that 
uplift charge on party/party assessment. The Reform Bill, and the subsequent Reform Act, 
was silent as to recovering the uplift fee from the losing litigant. However, it would seem 
unjust to ask that losing litigants pay what is, from their perspective, a penalty cost for 
losing.
321
 Nonetheless, it is arguable that the 1994 Reforms allowed a winning litigant to 
recover that fee if it had been reasonable to charge it. After all, reasonableness was the 
touchstone of assessment, and the clear intention of the parliament was that monies expended 
reasonably should be recovered.  
The second reading speech given by Mr John Fahey, then Premier of New South Wales, 
when he introduced the second version of the Reform Bill to the Legislative Assembly, 
further illustrates that the reformers seem not to have properly considered this issue when 
drafting the Reforms He stated that:  
In some circumstances, a conditional fee may be paid to the lawyer if the client is 
successful. Conditional fees must conform with certain principles; for example, they 
must not be varied in proportion to the benefit won by the client. The Government is 
wary of the pitfalls of the American system of contingency fees and so will limit 
conditional fees to no more than 25 per cent of the total fee. The Government's 
Reforms will also ensure that courts award all reasonable costs. This will largely 
eliminate the gap between costs available for award by the courts and the actual fees 
charged by lawyers, a gap which often results in the payment of substantial fees by 
successful litigants.
322
 
The Parliament never addressed the issue of who would ultimately be responsible for the 
uplift fee directly in any of the debates pertaining to the Reform Bill.  
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Mr Fahey‘s speech above catches the absurdity of trying to rationalise counteracting Reforms 
In the space of a few words he says firstly that a conditional fee may be paid to the lawyer if 
the client is successful,
323
 and then he notes that courts will award all reasonable costs and 
that the Reforms ‗will largely eliminate the gap between costs available for award by the 
courts and the actual fees charged by lawyers, a gap which often results in the payment of 
substantial fees by successful litigants‘.324 Reading this, it would seem that the parliament 
thought it was reasonable for a lawyer to be paid extra if the matter he or she was litigating 
ended in success for the client.  Unless the client can recover this reasonably incurred cost 
from the losing litigant, every situation where there was a conditional costs agreement with 
an uplift fee, there would be the ‗gap between the costs available for award by the courts and 
the actual fees charged by the lawyers‘, the very situation Mr Hannaford so deplored .  
Despite Mr Fahey‘s assurances as to ‗reducing the gap‘, introducing uplift fees must always 
act to ensure that a winning litigant is out of pocket for, at the very least for the amount of the 
uplift, if those fees were not recoverable. As will be seen in the portion of this chapter that 
explores the consequences of the 1994 Reforms, uplift fees proved to be seriously 
problematic. 
3.4:  The Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 is enacted   
The Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 (No.87 of 1993), received assent on 29 November 
1993. It was an Act designed to: 
―amend the Legal Profession Act 1987 in relation to the structure, regulation and 
discipline of the legal profession, the making and handling of complaints about legal 
practitioners and the regulation of legal fees and other costs; and for other 
purposes.‖325 
Schedule 3 of the Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 (NSW) (the 1993 Reform Act) set out 
the amendments to the 1987 Act. Those amendments to the 1987 Act came into effect on 
July 1 1994. 
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The means of costs adjudication in New South Wales was profoundly changed; costs 
assessment was no longer a judicial function; instead an administrative system of costs 
assessment was instituted and the courts were relieved of that burden. Scales of costs, extant 
in all Australian jurisdictions since the earliest days of the colonies, were gone. New South 
Wales entered a brave new world of cost dispute adjudication. 
3.4.1: A new Part 11 for the 1987 Act 
The 1993 Reform Act repealed and replaced Part 11 of the 1987 Act (which had dealt with 
legal costs and costs assessment) in its entirety. 
The first division of the new Part 11 contained definitions and set out the clients‘ basic rights 
in relation to costs and costs assessments. The first division also allowed conditional costs 
agreements, where the client could be charged an uplift or success fee if the practitioner was 
able to conclude the matter successfully.
326
 Uplift fees were discussed above
327
 and the centre 
of that discussion is an argument that while uplift fees may have some social utility; they 
come with immense capacity for abuse. Uplift fees for litigation work had a short lifespan in 
New South Wales; their demise is discussed at below. 
The second division of the new Part 11 set out a robust disclosure regime. A solicitor or 
barrister who failed to provide timely and proper disclosure as to costs at the time he or she 
entered into a retainer was unable to recover costs from his or her client until those costs 
were assessed under the scheme.
328
 Further, while failure to provide proper disclosure was 
not in itself a breach of the Act, it could be unsatisfactory professional conduct or even 
professional misconduct.
329
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With the exception of the definitions provided in Division 1, the first three divisions of the 
new Part 11 dealt with the relationship between legal practitioners and their clients. They 
provided reform and clarification of the rights and responsibilities that existed between the 
two. The rest of the new Part 11 introduced more overarching reform which moved out from 
the legal practitioner/ own client relationship to the costs assessment process itself. 
Divisions 4 and 5 of the new Part 11 dealt with interest on costs, security for costs, the form 
and delivery of bills of costs and cost fixed by regulation. These matters are generally outside 
the scope of this work and are therefore not discussed.
330
 
Division 6 of the new Part 11 set out the procedural details of the new costs assessment 
scheme. This division provided the core of the Reforms to costs assessment. 
As noted above, prior to the Reforms party/party costs assessment was usually done in the 
court or tribunal where the costs orders were made. The assessment was part of the 
substantive matter to which the costs orders pertained. Solicitor/client assessments, on the 
other hand, had always been considered as a separate substantive matter and had been dealt 
with in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. This was true regardless of how those 
disputed costs arose, so long as they arose in the New South Wales jurisdiction. 
Under the new regime nearly all
331
 assessments of party/party costs arising from matters in 
either the courts or tribunals of New South Wales, and all assessments of costs between 
practitioners and their own clients were now to be performed by the newly created costs 
assessment authority. Cost assessment was no longer to be part of the judicial process and 
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was now to be dealt with by an administrative body governed by principles of administrative 
law.  
Division 6 set out the time limits for applications for the various forms of assessment, and the 
methods by which assessment could be accessed. An application for assessment was filed 
with the Manager, Cost Assessment.
332
 The Manager, Cost Assessment did not himself or 
herself decide on the validity of the application, that decision was made later in the process 
by the costs assessor.
333
 
On receipt of an application the Manager, Cost Assessment was required to give notice of the 
application to the other party to the assessment and to inform both parties of any mediation 
process that might be available.
334
 If the Manager, Costs Assessment considered that 
mediation may be successful he or she was required to defer the assessment until mediation 
had taken place.
335
  
If there was no prospect of a successful mediation, or if there was mediation and no 
agreement was reached, the Manager, Cost Assessment sent the application and the relevant 
documents on to a costs assessor.
336
  
The assessor‘s initial task was to determine whether the costs were eligible for assessment. If 
the application was pursuant to party/party costs this would not usually have been a live 
issue. However, in many of the disputes between a practitioner and his or her own client, a 
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costs agreement would have been the basis of the retainer from which the costs arose, and in 
some circumstances that would mean that a client‘s application for assessment might be 
invalid.  
3.4.1.1: Dealing with invalid costs agreements; default in disclosure 
A provision in Division One of the new Part 11 stated that a client who entered into a valid 
costs agreement where there had been proper costs disclosure was not entitled to have his or 
her costs assessed under the new scheme.
337
 However, costs agreements were governed by 
Division Three of the new Part 11 and that division specifically disallowed contracting out of 
the costs assessment scheme by way of a term in a costs agreement.
338
 At first glance this 
seems at odds with the provision in Division One. However, if the client argued that the costs 
dispute was as to something other than the actual quantum of costs charged, or the rate those 
costs were charged at, then the assessor could assess the costs but at the rate set out in the 
agreement. The amendments were silent on what those other matters might be, but the 
section that allowed assessment in such circumstances did not apply to situations where there 
agreement was tainted by some ‗inequality‘ or where there had been insufficient 
disclosure.
339
 
If a client argued that the costs agreement was in some way tainted by an ‗inequality‘ as set 
out in Division 6, or by a lack of proper disclosure, the client could apply for assessment and 
the costs assessor could determine either (or both) of those things as a threshold question.
340
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If the costs assessor felt that the costs agreement was, in all the circumstances, unjust then he 
or she could assess the costs despite the costs agreement.
341
 
The division provided a wide range of matters an assessor had to take into account when 
determining if a costs agreement was or was not just.
342
 If proper disclosure was lacking, or if 
the costs agreement itself was tainted by unreasonableness, the assessor could assess the 
costs without reference to the costs agreement. If the costs assessor considered that a 
practitioner had engaged in charging grossly excessive costs or had deliberately 
misrepresented costs, the assessor was required to refer the matter to the Legal Services 
Commissioner.
343
  
The amended Act was oddly silent on how the costs assessor was to view the costs agreement 
in such situations. It did not say that the offending section of the agreement (or the agreement 
itself) fell away or was to be ignored, but perhaps by necessary implication such a situation 
left a costs assessor to come to an assessment that was reasonable in all the circumstances. 
Despite some confusion in how the 1993 amendments set out the relationship between costs 
agreements and costs assessments as between practitioners and their own clients, the overall 
thrust seemed clear. Clients who had been properly informed about costs and who had 
entered into costs agreements that were not unjust were to be held to those agreements so far 
as works that had been reasonable to carry out and that had been carried out in a reasonable 
way. If the client alleged that any works had been unreasonable, or carried out unreasonably 
the costs assessor could address that contention and make an adjustment to the costs if he or 
she supported it. If, however, there was a more fundamental problem with the agreement; it 
was unjust or if costs disclosure had been inadequate, then the agreement fell away. This 
seems at some levels problematic. What was an assessor to do where the costs had not been 
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properly disclosed, or there had been some inequality that tainted the agreement, yet the costs 
themselves as set out in the agreement were in all other ways reasonable? This dilemma 
would not have arisen if scales of costs had been retained in some form, as had been 
originally intended.
344
 Assessors in such circumstances had to fall back on their own idea of 
what the reasonable costs should be in that particular set of circumstances. 
If, however, the costs agreement was sound, the assessor could only assess the costs if the 
dispute was about something other than the actual rate charged.
345
 In such instances, any 
assessment had to be made at the rate set out in the costs agreement.
346
 In determining this 
and any other matter the costs assessor was not bound by the laws of evidence and could 
inform himself or herself as he or she saw fit.
347
 
If the assessor determined that there should be a costs assessment he or she could, if he or she 
so required, send out a notice to the party that was claiming the costs (who may or may not 
be the party asking for the assessment) requiring delivery of further and better particulars 
relating to the disputed costs.
348
 The assessor was then required to give both the parties an 
opportunity to give written submission as to any or all of the issues that arose.
349
 Cost 
assessors had a duty of confidentiality in regard of materials they received when performing 
assessments and could be fined if they breached that duty.
350
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349
 Ibid s 208(1) (a).  
350 Ibid s 208T. Despite being appointed from the ranks of practicing lawyers and barristers, assessors were not 
officers of the court while performing assessments and no retainer existed between them and the costs applicant. 
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3.4.1.2: Performing the assessment 
The sixth division set out those things the assessor had to consider when making a costs 
assessment, and also provided a list of those things that the assessor may consider in 
determining what costs were ‗fair and reasonable‘.351 In essence, the costs assessor in the 
new administrative system was to consider much the same things that costs assessors in 
judicial assessment regimes have always had to consider, whether it had been fair and 
reasonable to do the work the costs related to, whether the work was fairly and reasonably 
done and, in the absence of a valid costs agreement, whether the amounts charged for that 
work were fairly and reasonably done.
352
  
Subdivision 3 of Division 6 related to party/party costs only. Those costs were the costs the 
losing party had to pay towards the winning party‘s costs pursuant to an order of at court or a 
tribunal. As scales of costs had been repealed as a part of the Reforms, the assessor no longer 
had any benchmark to give guidance, and limitations, as to what could be recovered by the 
winning litigant towards his or her legal costs. However the underlying principles of 
assessment remained as they always had been; fairness and reasonableness remain the 
touchstone of costs assessment. The assessor, who had the relevant file which recorded the 
work being charged for, and submission from the parties that set out the reasons for the 
dispute as to the costs, had to determine if it had been fair and reasonable to do the work 
being charged to the loser and if the charges levied for the work were themselves fair and 
reasonable.
353
 Subdivision 3 gave a thorough but non exhaustive list of what the assessor was 
to take into consideration in making those determinations.
354
 In party/party assessment the 
costs assessor was not usually entitled to consider any costs agreement that governed the 
winning litigant‘s relationship with his or her own lawyer when determining how much costs 
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 Ibid ss 208A, s208B.   
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 An administrative costs assessor in New South Wales considers much the same things when determining the 
reasonableness of costs as does a the judicial costs assessor in the Western Australian jurisdiction. The 
measures of what is fair and reasonable are wide but sensible. Fairness and reasonableness will always depend 
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 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 363. 
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 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) ss 208F(1), 208G, as inserted by Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 
(NSW) sch 3(1). 
92 
 
the losing litigant had to pay.
355
 However, if the court or tribunal had made an order for 
indemnity costs then the assessor was to have regard to the actual costs the winning litigant 
had paid.
356
 
Although the basis for the discretionary decisions that made up the assessment remained 
much the same as it had been before the Reforms, one key difference was that the parties 
were no longer required to appear in person for the assessment. As noted above, the costs 
assessor had wide powers to call for supporting documents and the parties had the right to 
make written submissions. The costs assessor also had the solicitor‘s file that contained the 
record of the works claimed under the bill of costs. However, the assessment was done at a 
time and a place (which would as often as not be the law practice where the practitioner was 
otherwise engaged) convenient to himself or herself. The previous costs regime, where the 
parties or their legal representatives had to make an appearance in an adversarial process and 
where clients had to have an assessment heard in the Supreme Court if they wished to 
challenge their own solicitor‘s bills, was much less accessible. However, in a situation where 
the parties made personal appearances each deduction that an assessor made could be 
individually argued and the reason for the assessor‘s deduction would be relatively clear; 
under the new regime the assessor, and administrative decision maker, had no duty to give 
reasons to explain the finalised assessment.
357
 
The costs assessor also determined the costs of the assessment process and had a broad 
discretion to determine who paid those costs, and could order payment on a proportional 
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 Ibid s 208I. As is noted above, the Parliament that introduced the 1994 Reforms did not envisage losing 
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 See for instance May v Hullah & NRMA Ltd & Anor (Unreported, Supreme Court of New South Wales, 
Greenwood M, 22 October 1996), where Greenwood M noted that there was no common law rule that an 
administrative decision maker had to give reasons for decision and that the Act did not create any such duty. 
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basis between the parties.
358
 Costs of the process were narrowly defined to include the filing 
fees and the cost charged for the assessor‘s services. The costs assessor could not award the 
costs of preparation, which may well have included the costs of specialist costs practitioners 
so those costs were borne by that parties regardless of the outcome of the assessment.
359
 
Those costs were to be paid to the proper officer of the Supreme Court, being in this case the 
Manager of the costs assessment scheme.
360
 Those monies were in turn paid to the Law 
Society which paid them on to the Statutory Interest Account.
361
 
Once the assessor had worked through the file and decided which costs would be upheld and 
which would be assessed off and had come to a final figure, he or she issued each of the 
parties with a certificate setting out what he or she had determined the costs should be.
362
 The 
party who was receiving costs, be it the winning litigant or the practitioner whose bill had 
been challenged, had the benefit of the assessment and was owed costs, the certificate could 
be registered in a competent court as a judgment and could be executed as such.
363
 
Alternately, if the costs had been paid and the assessment resulted in the payee having to 
return some part of those costs to the payer, that amount was recoverable as a debt in a court 
of competent jurisdiction.
364
 This seems an odd difference of approach as there is no obvious 
reason why a party who had overpaid should be in a position that was materially worse, in 
that he or she had a more costly and time consuming remedy, than did a party who had not 
been paid.  
                                                 
358
Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 208(4), as inserted by Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 (NSW) sch 
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 This was problematic, if the losing and therefore paying litigant challenged the winning litigant‘s bill, and 
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3.4.1.3: Appeals against a costs assessment 
A party who was dissatisfied with an assessment had two avenues of appeal. The first, where 
there was an allegation that the assessor had made an error of law, was to the Supreme Court 
and was by right.
365
 The Court, hearing such an appeal and finding for the appellant, could 
replace the assessor‘s determination with its own.366 The Court also had the power to send 
the matter back to an assessor for a new determination, and if it awarded that remedy the 
appellant was entitled to the equivalent of a de novo hearing and could bring fresh 
evidence.
367
 The second, which was by leave, mirrored the old appeal routes. Appeals 
relating to party/party determinations were made to the court or tribunal that had heard the 
substantive matter while appeals relating to solicitor client determinations were to the 
Supreme Court.
368
 In either instance the parties were entitled to bring fresh evidence.
369
 If a 
party appealed a determination the costs assessor, or the court, could suspend the 
determination for the duration of the appeal.
370
 However, the assessor could discontinue his 
or her suspension, and the court could discontinue a suspension imposed by either an 
assessor or by itself.
371
   
Despite the two avenues of appeal a costs assessor‘s decision remained an exercise of 
discretion, and such decisions are always difficult to challenge. As noted above, assessors 
were not required to give reasons and that made identifying an error upon which to found an 
appeal very difficult.
372
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 Ms Susan Pattison, a New South Wales costs practitioner, addressing the Standing Committee on Law and 
Justice in Proceedings of the Seminar on the Motor Accidents Scheme (Legal Costs)1997 commented that,  
the existing assessment procedure is opaque. By that I mean that you do not get any written reasons back, any 
marked bills, or any real feedback as to why a certain amount was found to be fair and reasonable by the Assessor, 
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Evidence to the Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Legislative Council, Sydney, 4 June 1997, 57 (Susan 
Pattison). Ms Pattison‘s cogent submission to that proceeding is explored further below. 
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The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was given the power to appoint and dismiss costs 
assessors.
373
 To be appointed, an applicant must have been admitted as a barrister or solicitor 
for at least five years.
374
 The appointment was for a fixed term of not more than three years, 
but assessors could be re-appointed.
375
 Assessors generally remained in practice and did 
assessments on a part time basis. While acting as assessors they were not officers of the 
court, rather it appears that they were contractors engaged by the manager of the costs 
assessment scheme.
376
 Assessors could be dismissed for a range of obvious reasons, such as 
being convicted of a criminal offence or losing mental capacity, and they could resign from 
the position.
377
 Assessors were to be paid at an hourly rate that Bar Council and the Law 
Society were to establish.
378
  
The 1994 Reforms were commendably thorough and any new regime, no matter how much 
attention to detail its creators have given it, is bound to have teething problems. New laws 
come into operation, operational difficulties arise, and the laws are amended to deal with 
those difficulties. By the time the Reforms came into operation on July 1 1994 a Manager 
Costs Assessment had been appointed, costs assessors had been retained, largely from the 
ranks of senior practitioners, and a registry with a small administrative staff had been created 
within the Supreme Court of New South Wales. It was only once the new form of assessment 
commenced that problems inherent in the Reforms became visible.  
3.5: Amendments; teething problems with the 1994 Reforms 
The implementation of any legislation that institutes large scale reform is likely to be 
problematic. Despite the best efforts of the drafters who codified the Reforms, minor issues 
will have been forgotten or miscalculated. Some of the consequences that flow from the 
Reforms will be unforeseen and may well be problematic. The Parliament of New South 
Wales was well aware that this would be the case, and had included a mandatory review 
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clause in the 1994 Reforms
379
 The Attorney General‘s Department was to undertake the 
review ‗as soon as possible after the period of four years from the date of assent‘380 and was 
to ascertain ‗whether the policy objectives of the Act remain[ed] valid whether the Act 
remains appropriate for securing those objectives‘.381 
The first amendments to the reformed Act occurred even before the mandated review and 
were contained in Schedule 2 of the Legal Profession Amendment Bill 1996, (the 1996 Bill) 
which went on to become the Legal Profession Amendment Act 1996 No 95 (the 1996 
Amendments). The 1996 Bill was introduced and read for the second time on 1 May 1996.  
The Honourable Paul Whelan, then Minister for Police, gave the second reading speech, 
where he noted that while ‗on the whole the Reforms seem to have worked well, practical 
experience of the administration of the new legislative provisions has thrown up some areas 
in which further refinement or clarification is required.‘382 
The bulk of the 1996 Amendments dealt with matters outside the scope of this thesis, but in 
relation to costs and costs assessment the 1996 Amendments sought to remove some 
ambiguities in the original Reforms and to expand some of the costs assessor‘s powers. 
The 1996 Amendments also clarified and broadened the areas where scales of costs were still 
to be applied; they confirmed that the costs legal services retained in relation to probate work 
were still subject to regulation, and provided for fixed costs for various procedural works.
383
 
They also rationalised attempts to ensure that disputes amenable to mediation did not come 
before the assessors by requiring applicants to include a statement in their applications 
attesting to the fact that there was little likelihood of a mediated settlement to the dispute.
384
 
The Manager, Cost Assessment was also given the power to recall an application from an 
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 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 196, as amended by Legal Profession Amendment Act 1996 (NSW) sch 
2 [2]. 
384
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application should go to mediation rather than assessment. That section was repealed as part of the 1996 
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assessor on his or her own motion;
385
 previously an assessor could return an application but 
the Manager, Cost Assessment did not have the power to recall applications. 
Cost assessors were given expanded powers to seek relevant documents, so that they could 
demand documents from people who were not parties to the assessment and they could 
produce those documents to the parties so that they would have an opportunity to comment 
on them.
386
 If a practitioner failed to comply with such a notice the costs assessor could 
report that failure, or the failure to comply with any other duty arising from Part 11 of the 
1987 Act to the Legal Services Commissioner.
387
 The costs assessors were also given 
protection from liability for any act done in good faith for the purposes of carrying out their 
duties under the 1987 Act.
388
 
The 1996 Amendments also made provision for costs assessors to include the costs of a party 
to an application in their determinations.
389
 As noted above, under the original Reforms 
assessors could only make provision for the costs of the assessment and not for the costs a 
party incurred in preparing for and dealing with the assessment process. This brought the 
assessment process more closely into line with the pre amendment procedures where costs 
assessors were able to award parties their own costs in a cost dispute. Those costs could be 
substantial and allowing the successful applicant (or respondent if the costs assessment 
process did not result in the applicant receiving a substantial discount on the original and 
disputed quantum of costs) was conceptually in line with the general thrust of allowing a 
winning litigant to recover a higher percentage of his or her costs. 
Finally, at least in terms of costs assessment, the 1996 Amendments expanded the remedies 
available to a court that heard an appeal on the merits of a costs assessment to bring them 
into line with the remedies that were available to the Supreme Court hearing an appeal based 
in an alleged error of law.
390
 The 1996 Amendments did not address the more fundamental 
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problem with appeals; that because assessors did not give reasons it was difficult for a 
dissatisfied party to find the substance with which to bring an appeal. 
From a consumer‘s point of view it would appear that the main outcome from the 1996 
Amendments was that they allowed assessors to use their discretion to award a party to the 
process the reasonable costs of the entire exercise, rather than just the filing fee and the costs 
of the assessors‘ services. The rest of the amendments were, not dealt with specifically in this 
thesis, were sensible fine tuning of the new costs assessment regime. 
3.6: A pause for reflection 
By 1997, the 1994 Reforms, as amended in 1996, had been in effect for long enough for the 
legal profession to have come to terms with the profound change to the costs assessment 
regime. Legal costs were still an issue, and on 4 June 1997 the Standing Committee on Law 
& Justice, Proceedings of the Seminar on the Motor Accidents Scheme (Legal Costs) (the 
1997 MVA proceedings) was released. As will be discussed more generally below, a view 
had arisen that there was a crisis in terms of tortious liability and skyrocketing insurance 
premiums. One view of this ‗crisis‘ was that it was driven by avaricious lawyers. The MVA 
proceedings looked into the way legal costs were being charged in relation to the regulated 
proceedings under the Motor Accidents Scheme and the New South Wales compulsory third 
party insurance regime.
391
 The Committee charged with carrying out those investigations was 
to ‗obtain such expert advice as may be necessary to assist the Committee with its inquiry‘392 
and in doing so it sought the views of some of the people who had the most exposure to the 
1994 Reforms. The various people who addressed the Committee included Mr John 
Hannaford, the liberal politician who had been one of the drivers of the 1994 Reforms, as 
well as the head of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Legal 
Services Commissioner, the President of the Law Society, and Ms Susan Pattison, a 
prominent
393
 cost consultant.
394
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The 1997 MVA proceedings were specific to a particular area of litigation. Notwithstanding 
that they are a good source of informed comment on the 1994 Reforms and the impact they 
had on the costs and provision of legal services in a general sense. The observations of the 
various participants provide a good starting point for discussion of two of the issues raised in 
the commentary on the debates surrounding the 1994 Reforms as provided above, namely the 
abolition of scales of costs and the introduction of contingency fees. For that reason the 
views of the various participants, and commentary on those views, are provided in some 
detail below. 
3.6.1: Discussion on the removal of scales of costs 
As noted at 3.3.1 above, scales of costs had originally been set by the New South Wales 
courts. That longstanding practice changed when the 1987 Act created the Legal Fees and 
Costs Board. The reason for that change, explained more fully at 3.3.1 above, was to ensure 
broad input into the creation of scales of costs. In short, it was to ensure that the sums 
allowed for costs via the scales were reasonable sums; reasonable in that they had been 
created after informed investigation into the costs of providing the legal services.  
One of the reasons that scales were considered problematic was that ‗[t]he scale has in effect 
become the base rate, not an average or common fee.‘395 To put this in context, it is important 
to understand that scale rates were set as maxima. The amount set for any given item in the 
scale was the most (absent a special costs order) that a winning litigant could recover for that 
item. However, practitioners had long been able to contract out of the scale rates in their 
dealings with their own clients, and they usually did so, except in some discrete areas of 
practice where scale fees could not be displaced.
396
 This meant that although the scale rate 
was generally more than the client would recover on a party/party assessment it was often 
less than what he or she had been charged for the legal services. 
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This is the heart of one of the key issues that drove the Reforms; a practitioner‘s client was 
usually contracted to pay more, and sometimes far more, for legal fees than the scales of 
costs deemed ‗reasonable‘ and therefore recoverable. Practitioners charged more than the 
scale rates; the scale rates were maxima so the clients generally recovered less than the scale 
rates on party/party assessments. As Mr Hannaford, explaining the Reforms to the MVA 
proceedings, noted that the situation before the Reforms was that you could: ‗[e]xpect, if you 
win, to get about 40% of those costs back.‘397 
It is true that scales acted as a default ‗base rate‘. This was because there were areas of 
practice where they provided the set fees a practitioner could charge, and because it provided 
the default in situations where there was no costs agreement or the costs agreement was 
invalid. Practitioners were free to charge at less than scale if they wished to. Where a 
practitioner could contract out of the default scale via a valid costs agreement he or she could 
do so as long as the terms of the costs agreement was not ‗unreasonable‘.398 A costs 
agreement that allows for rates above, even well above, scale is not for that reason alone 
unreasonable. This creates a large gap between scale costs (set as reasonable after informed 
investigation by a specialist body) and costs that are unreasonable (where a practitioner is 
deemed to be overcharging). Where possible, many practitioners, from reasons of financial 
self-interest, prefer to operate towards the upper end of that gap and to charge more than 
scale but less than would be deemed unreasonable.
399
  
An argument that removing the scales in order to do away with an artificial floor will result 
in lower costs for legal services stems from the view that competition in the legal market 
place will encourage some suppliers to drop their prices to as low as is economically possible 
to increase market share. This in turn should encourage further competition and increased 
efficiency, with an overall effect of lowering the costs of legal services. However, as Mr 
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Steve Rix, of the New South Wales Public Interest Advocacy Centre, addressing the MVA 
Proceedings noted; ‗from an economics perspective, if the legal services market does not 
exhibit the features of a perfect market, and that there are frictions in that market, attempts to 
reduce those frictions by fixing one problem may in fact create greater problems‘.400  
It is certainly arguable that the legal services market does not ‗exhibit the features of a 
perfect market‘. Mr Rix argued that the Reforms may have been predicated on the erroneous 
view as to the nature of the legal market, and that they ignored the fact that the market is 
firstly a monopoly, and thus not a market, and secondly that the required information 
available to allow consumer to make an informed choice in a market was not available.
401
 
Putting aside the question of whether or not the legal market is a monopoly, it is clear that 
one of the features of a perfect market is that the consumer has access to information. 
Consumers of legal services do not have access to good comparative information on legal 
costs. If they approach a practitioner with legal work they should be given very thorough 
information on what they will be charged,
402
 but that does not help them determine what 
other people would charge. As Mr Steve Mark, New South Wales Legal Services 
Commissioner, addressing the MVA Proceedings commented: 
One of the things I can say is that if consumers do not have access to price 
information, deregulation cannot work. You cannot drive down prices through 
increased competition when the consumers don‘t know what the price is, what market 
rate is, so that they could negotiate or put the quote into context, when they do get a 
quote.
403
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One of the things scales of costs provided was an overarching and readily available guide to 
reasonable costs rates. As Mr Mark also commented (in relation to country rather than city 
practitioners); 
I hear many practitioners decrying the removal of scale. They often say, ―Look, you 
have removed scale, and now it is terrible.‖ It is only the big firms that demanded that 
you remove the scale because they all wanted to charge above scale. In the country 
we like scale simply because it gives us something to refer to or to relate to. We can 
show the scale to our clients and say, ―Look, I have to charge you that much‖. 404 
Abolishing the scale of costs, which provided a guide to what was a reasonable fee, at the 
same time as instituting a costs assessment regime where practicing lawyers did the 
assessments raises the ‗qui custodiet ipsos custodes‘ question; who will guard the guardians? 
Costs on party/party assessment had been measured against some objective guide as to what 
was reasonable, the scales. Under the new system individual lawyers, who often specialise in 
the area of practice the bills they assess relate to, had no guidance as to what was reasonable 
other than their own experience. It may well be that if scales had generally been a floor, 
individual practitioners assessing other practitioner‘s bills against them may have felt that it 
was reasonable to recover a higher percentage of the bill, but that seems a very subjective 
way to make a determination that is based in objectivity. This creates a situation where 
assessments are returned at a recovery rate that lawyers who specialise in a certain field 
consider reasonable. At the very least this creates a perception of self interest. If instead the 
assessors worked to a benchmark (particularly a benchmark that has been arrived at by a 
cross segment of society including lawyers and economists) all assessors would then be 
working to the same objective and more transparent concept of what constituted reasonable 
costs.  
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Ms Susan Pattison, addressing the Seminar, noted that ‗without reasons, precedents or 
guidelines, it is very difficult to know what an individual assessor will do.‘405 Ms Pattison 
also stated that; 
I believe that far more information needs to be given than is provided under the 
regulations. In particular, I think if claims are made for costs on an hourly basis, there 
should be some indication as to what rates were found to be acceptable by that 
Assessors for solicitors and counsel; and, in relation to daily fees charged by counsel, 
similarly there should be an indication of what kind of rates and ranges were found to 
be reasonable.
406
 
Ms Pattison was not arguing for the return of scales of costs, rather she was concerned that 
there should be more objective guidance as to what assessors were likely to consider 
reasonable. She was arguing that assessors should provide reasons for their determinations; 
under the Reform Act they were not required to do so. However, she did not reject scales of 
costs outright. In relation to a limited return to scales she noted that; 
However, any attempt to set up scales or bands has to be free of the previous 
criticisms about scales, which often were literally ―set and forget‘; i.e. sometimes the 
scale was set, it was not reviewed regularly, and it very quickly fell into disarray, it 
was not relevant to the profession and how it was charging, and so of course the 
profession where possible, solicitor/client contracted out of it. Any thought of going 
back to scales can only go hand in hand with some kind of consistent procedure as to 
how those scales would be set and how they would be reviewed on a regular basis.
407
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Dr. John Tamblyn, of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission addressed the 
MVA Proceedings in relation to strengthening competition, and he too had concerns about 
the lack of benchmarks for costs assessment as follows; 
There is also a suggestion that fee assessment and taxation arrangements that operate 
are being based on the escalating fees that are being seen in the market place. In other 
words, what benchmarks are being used for fee assessment and taxation? If there is an 
escalation of these fees- and I realise that is an empirical point- are they simply being 
rolled through in the assessment and taxation procedures?
408
 
Dr. Tamblyn also felt that competition in a marketplace required access to knowledge about 
the costs of the service on offer;  
I have already mentioned the need for objective data on the costs of providing 
services; the fees that are required to cover those costs; and, to make that data and 
those analyses public, the profession needs to know, the clients need to know and the 
insurers need to know, and I am pretty sure the policy makers would like to know as 
well. So we need information.  
I believe that taxation officers (costs assessors) should be basing their analyses on this 
objective data. At the moment, I am concerned that we do have objective benchmarks 
that assessors and taxation officers can use, The analysis to which I and others have 
referred is critical to making that work.
409
 
Dr. Tamblyn did not address how that objective information as to benchmark costs was to be 
promulgated, but he felt that without that information the goal of deregulation, or at least 
lighter regulation, was endangered. He explained that for public policy reasons, ‗if the market 
is not working, we have to make a choice between what I call light handed regulation and 
heavy handed regulation‘.410 He was clear that the benchmark information should be used by 
assessors, and that the public should have access to it. He felt that without it that there would 
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be a need to ‗return to a compulsory fee scale‘ and the thought that would be undesirable.411 
On the surface this seems an odd stance, as the whole point to scales of costs is to provide the 
very benchmark he was seeking against which to measure costs at assessment. It may be that 
Dr. Tamblyn, who described himself as an ‗advocate of competition and deregulation‘, 
considered that a ‗compulsory‘ scale of costs was a constraint on the market. This is not 
necessarily so, as scales of costs are applied as a guide and a limit on the use of a discretion. 
The amounts provided by scales of costs are not set in stone. A court can order that the scales 
be lifted if appropriate and assessors frequently allowed less and even much less than the 
scales provide. There are areas of legal works where costs are fixed
412
 and the scales thus 
compulsory, and the costs in those areas are fixed for public policy reasons. They are 
instances where the Parliament has considered that for a variety of reasons it was and still is 
better policy to have very heavy regulation. These limited areas were and, despite the 1994 
Reforms, still are the only areas where there is a compulsory scale of costs, so it is hard to 
understand Dr. Tamblyn‘s concerns about returning to compulsory scale. 
As will be seen below, the issue of reintroducing scales of costs was raised again when the 
1994 Reforms were reviewed in 1997-1998, and again by the draft report of the Chief 
Justice‘s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme in 2013. Scales of costs, benchmarks, and 
guidelines continue to be an area of contention and confusion. 
3.6.2:  Problems with contingency costs agreements with uplift fees 
As was noted above, the 1987 Act, as reformed, was silent on recovery of the uplift fee on 
party/party assessment. Nonetheless, and despite some initial confusion,
413
 it became clear 
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that uplift fees were not intended to be recoverable on costs assessment. The National 
Competition Policy Review of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW), released in November 
1998 (and discussed in more detail at 3.9 below), four years after the Reforms had been put 
into effect, reported that:  
It is noted that in New South Wales that although the Act is silent on this point, a 
conditional uplift was only intended to form a part of solicitor/client costs. The uplift 
is therefore effectively deducted from any award or settlement received by clients.
414
 
Mr Hannaford , in addressing the MVA Proceedings explained that the uplift fee was only to 
be used in narrow circumstances, and that further he could not understand a claim that the fee 
was driving insurer‘s legal costs up: 
In fact, one might well argue that you would have been acting fraudulently against 
your client in negotiating a 25 per cent uplift if there was no risk involved, because 
the 25 per cent is not an amount that has to be paid by the other party to litigation. 
The 25 per cent actually comes out of the client's share of the take. 
Therefore, I have some difficulties in comprehending the argument that has come 
from the insurer that the contingency fee has in fact generated an increase in fees 
payable by the insurer. It should not, because the 25 per cent has come out of the 
client‘s share of the take. 415  
Mr Hannaford went on to explain how the uplift fee may well have resulted in more 
litigation, as its function was to allow increased access to justice, and he commendably 
discounted any complaint that insurer‘s fees had been increased for that reason as he pointed 
out that ‗[i]f that means that people are able to gain access to their rights, then that is part of 
the structure of our legal system.‘416 
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While not everyone agreed that solicitors were abusing the right to charge an uplift fee,
417
 
there was a clear perception that the fees were problematic. Ms Susan Pattison pointed out 
those conditional costs agreements with uplift fees ‗make it possible for persons who could 
not otherwise fund litigation to have access to the court system‘418 but she also noted that: 
I am aware of instances where conditional agreements are entered into where one 
might say that the actual risk of losing, whether on liability or quantum, is quite 
small. There are also difficulties when such agreements are entered into very close to 
trial. One might feel that the real risk should be properly known by that stage.
419
 
Ms Pattison went on to question how uplift fees fit with the overall thrust of the Reforms as 
follows: 
This really raises issues in relation to the policy concerns expressed prior Reforms, 
which were that deregulation was to lessen the gap between party/party costs and 
solicitor/client costs, i.e., it was to lessen the subsidisation by the successful parties of 
non-successful parties. In a situation where conditional agreements were used but 
were not allowed party/party, the issue is raised about what the really means in 
relation to access to justice and the ultimate money that ends up in the hand of the 
successful plaintiff.
420
 
She also had concerns that uplift fees could result in unfair results for clients: 
However, with the conditional agreement and the provision for the 25% mark up, this 
can actually represent quite a substantial proportion of a successful party‘s verdict if 
the verdict is relatively small and a lot of work has been done by the practitioners.
421
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Ms Pattison‘s remarks can be summed up as ‗what were they thinking of if they ever 
believed that they could lower costs to winning litigants with a reform that allowed the 
winning litigant to be charged a non recoverable success fee because they won?‘. It is 
apparent that the 1994 Reforms were not that well though in terms of their entire effect, and 
is an illustration of Roscoe Pound‘s statement: ‗[the legislator] is prone to attempt far too 
much and to be careless how he carries out the details of what he attempts‘.422 As will be 
seen below, conditional costs agreements that allowed an uplift fee for a successful 
conclusion to a legal retainer continued to be problematic and, at least for actions for 
damages, were abolished in 2004. Despite the salient warning provided by the New South 
Wales experience uplift fees were allowed for damages actions in Western Australia in 
2008,
423
 and are included in the draft model Legal Profession National Law 2011 (Cth).
424
 
3.7: An introduction to the first review of the 1994 Reforms: the National 
Competition Review  
As noted above at 3.5, the Attorney General‘s Department of New South Wales was required 
to review the 1994 Reforms after four years. Further, the Council of Australian Governments 
endorsed the Competition Principles Agreement in April 1995 and that agreement also 
included an obligation to review the 1994 Reforms
425
 To that end the Attorney General 
appointed a reference group (the Reference Group), made up from a wide range of 
stakeholders and chaired by the Director General of the Attorney General‘s Department.426 
The Reference Group put out a discussion paper in August 1998 explaining that the review 
was to ‗fulfil the obligations required by the Competition Principles Agreement.‘427 The 
perspective through which the review was to take place was in accordance with one of the 
key drivers of the reform, which was to ensure that the legal profession was to be subject to 
competitive market forces. The Reference Group‘s terms of reference were broad, and much 
of what they were to review was not related to costs assessment and is thus outside the scope 
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of this thesis; discussion is limited to those parts of the review that pertained to costs 
assessment. 
The discussion paper noted that there was a general concern as to whether the 1994 Reforms 
had produced a more competitive legal market as intended.
428
 Further, it identified a problem 
with ‗the incidence of lawyers charging contingency fees for cases where success is almost 
assured‘.429  
The Reference Group was taxed with answering the broad set of questions relating to the 
reformed costs assessment scheme.
430
 In essence they were asked to determine if the Reforms 
had produced an effective means of reviewing legal fees and if they had could they be further 
improved. They were to determine if there should be some sort of benchmark fees so that 
assessors had some objective standard against which to perform their assessments.
431
 
Tellingly, they were also asked to determine what role procedural reform could play in costs 
containment.
432
 This issue was central to the ideological theme that ran through the review, 
which was a ‗free market‘ conceptualisation of the legal industry. Reform, by way of 
deregulation, was to have created competition and competition was to have driven the cost of 
legal services down. As has been illustrated above in the context of the MVA Proceedings, 
the fundamental basis for this expectation, that the legal industry is a ‗market‘ in the classic 
sense, may well be false.
433
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The Reference Group sought and received submissions from a wide range of stakeholders, 
including: ‗[the] Law Society, Bar Association, other organisations representing members of 
the legal profession, the Legal Services Commissioner, the judiciary, the Legal Profession 
Advisory Council, consumers, representatives of business and the insurance industry, and 
other interested parties‘.434 The Reference group was aware that the legal market was 
problematic and that despite a general view that markets should be deregulated, legal practice 
had a range of characteristics that meant it might ‗be difficult to reconcile with 
deregulation‘.435 
However, despite setting up the review, the government of New South Wales had already 
made firm decisions as to what immediate reform should take place. For that reason the 
review was released after many of the issues it considered had already been dealt with. The 
Legal Profession Amendment (Cost Assessment Bill) 1998 was introduced into the 
Legislative Assembly on 26 May 1998, six months before the review was handed down, and 
the second reading speech for that Bill occurred on that same day.
436
 The findings of the 
National Competition Review of the Legal Profession Act 1987 are discussed at 3.9 below. 
3.8:  Legal Profession Amendment (Cost Assessment) Bill 1998 
The Honourable Mr Debus, acting for the Attorney General, described the principal purpose 
of the Bill as being ‗to amend part 11 of the Legal Profession Act 1987 to: rationalise the 
financial administration of the costs assessment scheme; introduce a requirement that costs 
assessors provide limited reasons for their determinations; and provide a mechanism for a 
review of costs assessment determinations.‘437 
3.8.1:  Making costs assessment user-pays 
The Minister explained that the then current funding model for the costs assessment scheme 
was unnecessarily complex and did not make adequate provision for the administrative costs 
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of the scheme.
438
 Monies paid in by the parties to costs assessments went to a statutory 
interest account, but while monies to remunerate the individual assessors were drawn from 
that account, the Courts own costs of administering the system were not.
439
 The first of the 
Reforms was to ‗provide for the scheme to be funded on a cost-recovery basis and to provide 
for administrative costs associated with the scheme to be recouped.‘440 The Parliament of 
New South Wales had decided that costs assessment should be on a user pay basis or at least 
that any subsidy provided to it should be kept to a minimum. As will be seen in the 
discussion at 3.13.3.3 below, despite that still being the current approach, it is an approach 
that may be abandoned.  
3.8.2: Reasons for determinations and internal review mechanisms 
Although the 1994 Reforms had not specifically required costs assessors to provide reasons 
for their decisions there was some ambiguity as to the existence of such a duty. The Bill 
sought to remove this uncertainty by clarifying ‗the responsibilities of costs assessors in this 
respect and to bring assessors into line with the government policy generally, whereby 
reasons should be provided for administrative decisions.‘441 The Minister pointed to Kennedy 
Miller Television v Lancken and Anor
442
 where there was a finding that assessors had a duty 
to provide reasons for their decisions if so asked. The minister commented that assessors 
were not following the decision but it had created ambiguity.
443
 The Attorney General of 
New South Wales appealed that finding, and the appeal, Attorney-General of New South 
Wales and Another v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd
444
 was handed down a month after 
the Minister‘s second reading speech. It was there held that costs assessor did have an 
obligation to provide reasons as otherwise the right to appeal such a determination would be 
negated. It appears that in this instance, the Court pre empted the 1998 Reforms and 
confirmed that assessors did have a duty to provide reasons for decisions before that duty 
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was clearly expressed in the statute. One does wonder why the Attorney General appealed a 
decision recognising a duty before introducing Reforms that were to entrench that same duty. 
Further, the Bill introduced a new level of review that was to sit between the original 
determination and a review in the Supreme Court.
445
 The new review mechanism allowed 
that:  
Parties aggrieved by a costs assessment determination may, within 28 days of 
receiving the original certificate of determination, apply to the proper officer for a 
review of the determination. The review process, which is intended to be relatively 
informal in nature, will be carried out by two assessors of appropriate experience and 
expertise and be conducted along similar lines to that undertaken in the original 
assessment process. The review panel will be able to vary the original assessment and 
will also be required to provide a short statement of reasons for their decisions.
446
  
Allowing an intermediate form of review seems an effective and sensible way to keep 
disputes from escalating to a judicial process (and thus moving out of the user pay system) 
but a review was often not a cost effective way to challenge an assessor‘s determination. An 
internal review mechanism is especially useful as challenging an assessor‘s determination in 
a court of law is difficult as there are ‗very few decisions by assessors which could be 
classified as decisions of ‗law‘ since almost all of the process of determining costs requires 
the application of discretion to set of facts‘.447 However, a review is not necessarily a cheaper 
option, one commentator has noted that at $385 an hour (in 2001) it did not take long for the 
cost of a review to mount up, making the risk of seeking review, where costs of the review 
would be awarded against the applicant if he or she did not have the bill reduced by 15% or 
more, quite substantial.
448
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3.8.3: Limiting costs for MVA claims 
The other main thrust of the amendments was to limit the costs that could be charged for 
legal works pertaining to personal injury arising from motor vehicle accidents.
449
 This issue, 
while outside the scope of this thesis, was very much in the political forefront of the 
Reforms. As noted above, the MVA Proceedings of the previous year had looked into the 
issue in depth, and it was this issue that attracted the bulk of debate in both houses during the 
passage of the Bill. Despite that general rhetoric about access to justice it is hard not to 
suspect that lobbying from the insurance industry was the real impetus of some of the 
Reforms. As will be seen in the discussion of the Civil Liability Act 2004 (NSW) at 3.10 
below, costs reform can as easily be used to restrict access to justice as it can to ameliorate it.  
3.8.4: The 1998 amendments; a bipartisan agreement as to further reform 
Debate as to the costs assessment Reforms was minimal. During the second reading speech 
in the Legislative Council, the Honourable J. P. Hannaford, then the Leader of the Opposition 
(and, as we have seen, one of the key drivers of the original 1994 Reforms) did not go so far 
as to argue that assessors should not be obliged to give reasons, though he did suggest that 
the burden put upon them should not be too onerous.
450
 He felt that ‗if costs assessors have to 
provide detailed reasons for their decisions, the system will revert to the bad old days and 
will become bogged down‘.451  
Mr Hannaford was also critical of law firms that were abusing uplift fees, and while 
conditional fee arrangements were not a target of this particular set of Reforms, his remarks 
show that uplift fees remained a live and vexed issue. Mr Hannaford was broadly in favour of 
uplift fees, but acknowledged that some practitioners were abusing the right to charge them: 
If solicitors enter into agreements where liability is not an issue, there is no risk. The 
party will get compensation and there can be no justification for a fee increase. To 
enter into a conditional agreement when liability is not at issue is a fraudulent 
representation as to risk and the solicitor is basically defrauding his client. I note that 
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no win, no fee agreements have been entered into when liability is admitted, but there 
has still been an increase in fees. In those circumstances that is clear fraud. A fee 
uplift is being extracted when all elements of risk have been eliminated. I welcome 
this issue being dealt with by way of regulation. It is incumbent on the Law Society to 
indicate that it is prepared to pursue fraud allegations against solicitors who extract 
moneys from their clients in those circumstances.
452
 
The Bill received assent on 8 September 1998 with no significant amendments to the sections 
which reformed the costs assessment scheme. The most significant Reforms that the Legal 
Profession Amendment (Costs Assessment) 1998 Act made to the costs assessment regime 
were ensuring that assessors provided reasons for decision and creating a timely and efficient 
route for a disgruntled party to appeal an assessors determination.
453
  
3.9: The National Competition Policy Review of the Legal Profession Act 
1987: Final Report  
The final report from the National Competition Policy Review of the 1987 Act (the Final 
Report) which satisfied the obligation to review contained in the 1994 Reforms was released 
in November 1998. In terms of the costs assessment scheme, the report was somewhat 
redundant.  By the time the final report was available the costs assessment scheme, itself a 
reform, had already been itself reformed a number of times, and in particular the 1998 
Reforms contained clear answers to some of the questions that had been put to the Reference 
Party that produced the Final Report. The Final Report acknowledged that the Reforms had, 
in the main, dealt with the concerns and issues that had been raised in submissions.
454
 The 
Final Report noted that ‗deregulation‘ (by which it meant the initial 1993 Reforms as 
amended in 1996) had been a success.
455
 It qualified that statement by noting that there was 
‗currently insufficient evidence to conclude that costs disclosure has led to the development 
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of a more competitive market for legal services‘.456 The Reference Party provided general 
discussion of various issues relating to costs agreement in Chapter One of the final report, 
and it provided 12 key questions and answers to those questions as part of that chapter. Two 
of those questions raised the recurring issues surrounding the abolition of scales of costs and 
contingency contracts with uplift fees. The National Competition Policy Review Report 
analysis of these issues is canvassed below. 
3.9.1: The National Competition Review Report: Scales of costs, benchmark fees 
and some confusion  
As has been noted, scales of costs had been abolished, largely as they were seen as anti-
competitive. One of the questions the Final Report addressed related to the standards costs 
assessors used to come to their determinations and specifically asked if assessors should have 
access to benchmark fees.
457
 The Final Report provided an answer as follows:  
Although there is little information available as to the standard applied by costs 
assessors, few complaints have been made. However, assessors should have access to 
benchmark fees, which should be made publicly available.  In addition, assessors 
should publish guidelines for fees to be charged in consumer matters, such as 
straightforward appearances, probate, and conveyancing. Consideration should be 
given to publishing guideline fees for other matters, for example, in the form of a 
lump sum fee for particular categories of litigation.
458
  
This answer should be read in conjunction with commentary relating to poor costs disclosure, 
where the Final Report noted that: 
One possible strategy to encourage competitive practices amongst both lawyers and 
consumers within the existing costs framework is the publication of comparative fee 
information. However, there may be a danger of such fee information operating as a 
quasi-fee scale, creating an anti-competitive effect.
459
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These findings are expressed generally, but viewed from the specifics of costs assessment, 
they are contradictory. In essence, the Final Report is claiming that removing scales of costs 
was successful
460
 when in fact an informed consumer is the key to competition in pricing. 
The Final Report claimed that removing the scales had helped to improve competition 
although there was no evidence of increased competition. Despite finding that removing 
scales was good, the Final Report now suggested that some sort of costs guidelines (being 
guideline or benchmark fees) would now be beneficial. It also claimed that providing the 
public with comparative fee information would undermine the Reforms. The confusion in the 
Final Report‘s views seems to stem from a basic misunderstanding of what scales of costs 
did and did not do.   
As has been previously noted, before the 1993 amendments cost recovery for winning 
litigants had been regulated by scales of costs. Those scales had been regularly updated to 
ensure that they were a fair representation of what it was reasonable to pay for the legal 
works covered by the scales. The costs actually charged by the solicitor to the client had not 
been regulated in any true sense as solicitors contracted out of the scale rates by way of costs 
agreements. In terms of what a client paid his or her own lawyer, the scales of costs had only 
ever acted as benchmarks or guidelines, but, more to the point, they had not for years acted as 
minimum rates. Any legal practitioner who wished to charge less than scale rates was at 
liberty to do so.   
A re-introduction of benchmark fees could only serve to guide assessors in relation to what a 
winning litigant should recover on a party/party basis. They could not regulate what lawyers 
acting pursuant to a costs agreement actually charged and recovered from their own clients 
(unless of course the lawyer defaulted on proper costs disclosure) as to do so would be to go 
against the spirit of competition and the express provisions of the Act which dealt with costs 
agreements. It is arguable that despite the stated  goals of the original Reforms, and despite 
the otherwise generally valid claim that the Reforms had been successful, fees between 
lawyers and their own clients had not been deregulated simply because they had never really 
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been substantially regulated in the first place.
461
 Fees recovered on a party/party basis had 
been regulated, but were now no longer regulated by scales of costs based on what it was 
reasonable to charge for legal works (rather than what was actually charged). Instead, those 
fees were now regulated by an individual assessor‘s subjective view of what constituted 
reasonable fees. The Final Report‘s finding that assessors would benefit from guidelines as to 
what was reasonable seems to fly in the face of any attempt to ensure that successful litigants 
were able to recover what they had actually spent on litigation if those benchmark fees only 
related to party/party assessments and to situations where the solicitor was in default.
462
  In 
essence, such an approach would provide heavy regulation on the amounts that a winning 
litigant could recover and very light regulation on what practitioners could charge. This may, 
or may not, be an acceptable approach, but if it is the approach that was to be adopted then it 
should be properly understood in all of its ramifications. As will be seen later in this chapter, 
the current recommendations (2013) for reform of the costs assessment regime also include 
benchmarks as to costs.  Now, as was the case with the Final Report, there is a distinct lack 
of clarity as to the real effect of such a reform. 
3.9.2: The National Competition Review Report: Uplift fees. 
As has been noted, the fact that winning litigants, absent an indemnity costs order, had never 
recovered the true quantum of costs that they had spent on their litigation was one of the 
main drivers of the original Reforms However, the Reforms had also (and incidentally) 
introduced conditional fees, normally fees that winning litigants were often required to pay 
their own lawyers but could never recover on a party/party basis. Ironically, this put the 
winning litigant back in the position he or she had been in before the Reforms; considerably 
out of pocket on legal fees despite being successful in the substantive matter. As is discussed 
above in the context of the MVA Proceedings, there was a growing view that conditional fees 
were problematic. The Review had been asked to answer the following question: ‗[s]hould 
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any restrictions be placed on the use of conditional fees involving an uplift?‘463 The review 
did not answer the question, noting instead that  
In view of concerns expressed about conditional fees, further submissions will be 
sought by the Department, as to: Whether there should be conditional fees at all; and, 
If conditional fees are to be retained, whether the Act should be amended to require 
solicitors and barristers to provide clients with advice about the prospects of success 
before signing an agreement; and to provide that an uplift cannot be levied on any 
costs incurred after liability has been admitted.
464
 
As will be seen below, these questions were answered in 2005 and the experiment with uplift 
fees for actions involving damages was called to a halt. 
3.10: Further amendments: The Civil Liability Act 2002  
After passage of the 1998 Amendment Act and until 2005 there were 31 further Acts that 
either amended or otherwise altered the 1987 Act. There were a total of 65 alterations to 
provisions relating to costs assessment. For the most part those alterations provided sensible 
clarification or were necessary to bring the provisions into line with other legislation, but 
individually they were not of enough impact to warrant any detailed discussion. The impact 
of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (the CL Act) however does deserve some in depth 
investigation, as it made some profound changes to the way some legal costs could be 
charged. 
The Ipp Report, dealing with tort law reform, was handed down on September 22, 2002.
465
 
At that time Australia saw itself as gripped in an insurance crisis, with beleaguered insurers 
at the mercy of avaricious lawyers who were flooding the courts with specious claims based 
in an exploded duty of care.
466
 Many of the Australian jurisdictions introduced draconian 
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The full report is available at http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law_Neg_Final.pdf. Note 
in particular the second term of reference (at Terms of Reference: ix) given to the Ipp Panel; the Panel was to 
‗Develop and evaluate principled options to limit liability and quantum of awards for damages‘.  
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limits to recovery for personal injuries, with New South Wales jumping the gun and acting 
before Ipp‘s report was handed down. The New South Wales Parliament‘s response to the 
‗crisis‘ was the Civil Liability Bill 2002 which received assent on June 18 2002. So 
concerned were the New South Wales Parliament that the CL Act was retrospective, coming 
into force on March 20 of that same year, three months before the date of assent. The CL Act 
contained provisions that amended the 1987 Act to address the state government‘s view that 
insurance was in crisis and to ensure that unscrupulous practitioners would no longer have a 
free go at insurers. 
The main effects of the CL Act amendments, insofar as it affected the legal costs regime, 
were the limits it put on costs and costs recovery and the burdens it placed upon legal 
practitioners in relation to the validity of claims  
Firstly, the CL Act amendments capped costs for actions for various sorts of personal injury 
damages.
467
 If a personal injury claim resulted in an award of $100,000.00 or less, plaintiffs‘ 
costs were restricted to 20% of the amount recovered or $10,000.00, whichever was greater, 
while defendants‘ costs were restricted to 20% of the amount that had been sought, or 
$10,000.00 whichever was greater. There was however, so far as practitioners were 
concerned, an ‗out‘.468 The limits on costs did not apply to retainers governed by a valid costs 
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The New South Wales Premier, Mr Bob Carr, giving the second reading speech for the Civil Liability Bill 
2002 (NSW) noted that : 
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agreement.
469
 If however the costs agreement fell away
470
 the practitioners were also 
restricted to the above limits.
471
 This thesis is not concerned with the political and economic 
strictures that drove such a reform, but it should be noted that such a provision could, in 
many cases, leave an injured person who had successfully validated a legal right to recovery 
with very little to show for the effort.
472
 A small claim, in monetary terms, is not necessarily 
a simple claim, and it is easy to imagine successful litigation where nearly all of the damages 
awarded are swallowed up by the legal costs of litigating the matter, especially if those costs 
were subject to a conditional retainer and an uplift fee.
473
 The defendant, who the courts have 
found to be liable, will have to pay the damages, but the defendant will only pay a maximum 
of $10,000.00 towards the successful plaintiff‘s costs. This is incongruent with one of the key 
drivers of the 1994 Reforms; that successful litigants should recover the reasonable costs of 
having had their rights upheld. The position seems to be people who suffer fairly serious 
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injury through the fault of others have been told that they should perhaps just forget about 
that and get on with their lives unless the injury is at a fairly serious level.
474
 
The CL Act amendments were intended to ensure that a personal injury claims (or defences 
to such claims) that were without merit did not waste the court‘s time.475 A barrister or 
solicitor that acted in circumstances where there was ‗no reasonable prospect of success‘ did 
not commit an offence, but those actions could be seen as either professional misconduct or 
unsatisfactory professional conduct.
476
 In such circumstances practitioner‘s themselves were 
susceptible to having costs ordered against them in their personal capacities.
477
 If a claim or 
the defence to the claim had no reasonable prospect of success the court could, on a motion 
from either of the parties or on its own motion, order that the practitioner indemnify his or 
her own client against any party/party cost that the client was ordered to pay and to 
indemnify any party other than his or her own client for any costs that party had 
incurred.
478
A practitioner who found himself in the position where the court, or the appeal 
court if the matter went to the Supreme Court on appeal, was of the opinion that the action or 
defence was without merit had the disadvantage of a presumption that the legal services he or 
she had provided had been provided despite the fact that there was no reasonable prospect of 
success.
479
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 The opposition was fairly blunt in their explanation for this approach:  
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These particular provisions of the CL Act, which placed a strong onus on practitioners to 
ensure that they did not act in matters where there was no reasonable prospect of success, 
produced a rather ironic dissonance. This thesis has been critical of uplift fees in relation to 
claims for damages and has not supported the rationale that such fees are reasonable because 
they increased access to justice by recompensing practitioners for the cost of carrying matters 
that are ‗risky‘.  After the passage of the CL Act amendments practitioners were in a position 
where they were not allowed to commence an action for personal injury damages unless they 
also certified that there was a reasonable prospect of success.
480
 However, in the same matter 
they could charge the client an uplift fee for a matter that was successful when it was 
reasonable to do so, with the generally accepted reason for doing so that the matter was 
carried a reasonable level of risk. One wonders how a practitioner who has lost a matter and 
was looking at having costs awarded against himself or herself unless he or she could 
overcome the onus to prove that there had been a reasonable prospect of success when he or 
she had entered into an agreement to charge a client an uplift fee because the matter was 
risky enough to require being paid extra to take it on. As will be seen below, this was an 
untenable position. 
The CL Act, and in particular the amendments it made to the 1987 Act, provides an excellent 
example of Reforms that are narrowly pointed at one perceived problem without real 
consideration as to how they will relate to Reforms pointed at other problems The New South 
Wales Parliament had been very clear that successful litigants should recover as much as 
possible of what had been reasonably spent on vindicating their rights, and since legislating 
to ensure that it had consistently held up what it had done as sound social policy. That same 
Parliament then eviscerated that reform, at least insofar as people who had suffered personal 
injury where the damages were quantified at less than $100,000.00 were concerned, in the 
name of sound social policy. 
3.11:  The 1987 Act is replaced by the Legal Profession Act 2004 
On 1 October, 2005 the 1987 Act was repealed by Schedule One of the Legal Profession Act 
2004 (NSW) (The 2004 Act). The 2004 Act had passed through parliament with no real 
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debate and was assented on 21 December 2004. The 2004 Act was part of a move towards 
uniform legislation and Australia wide regulation of the legal profession and was based on a 
Model Bill then being drafted by the Standing Committee of Attorneys General.
481
 For that 
reason it appears that the New South Wales Parliament gave the Bill little scrutiny, and did 
not really consider some of the implications of the new law. The 2004 Act was substantially 
amended by the Legal Profession Amendment Act 2005 (NSW) [No. 46] (the 2005 Amending 
Act) before it came into force. The 2005 Amending Act came into force the same day as the 
2004 Act, so that the 2004 Act came into force with Reforms already in place. 
The 2005 Amending Act was ‗an Act to make amendments to the Legal Profession Act 2004 
(NSW) of a minor, clarifying or machinery nature‘.482  The various stakeholders, unlike the 
New South Wales Parliament, went through the draft 2004 Act with some care after it was 
assented and found a number of problems with it.
483
 Some of the changes were merely 
grammatical, while some picked up and corrected fairly substantial problems with the 
original provisions of the 2004 Act. For example, in its original form the 2004 Act made it 
mandatory for assessors to refer any costs that were excessive to the Legal Services 
Commissioner for potential disciplinary action.
484
 Any time an assessor reduced any item of 
costs on a bill, he or she was doing so because he or she thought the costs were excessive. 
The section was amended so that referral was mandated when the assessor considered that 
the costs were grossly excessive;
485
 a far more sensible approach.  
The 2005 Amending Act also cleared up a very real problem that had arisen within the costs 
assessment regime. Assessors awarded the costs of the assessment and often awarded them 
against the paying party. It was difficult to then get the paying party to pay those costs to the 
scheme. Until the party that was to receive payment had the certificate there was no way for 
the that party to enforce payment of the costs, so withholding the certificate until the paying 
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party owed for what he or she owed for the assessment was not a realistic sanction. The 2004 
Act was amended so that the assessor sent the certificate of determination to the Manager 
Costs Assessment who was then responsible for paying the assessor‘s costs but could register 
the certificate of determination and use that to recover any costs owed to the scheme if the 
party responsible for paying for them refused to do so.
486
 
Mr M Costa, member for Hunter in New South Wales later
487
 stated that: 
The Government enacted the Legal Profession Act 2004 in December 2004 and 
commenced it on 1 October 2005. The Act is a major milestone in the regulation of 
the Australian legal profession, recognising and providing for a national profession. 
The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General developed the national legal 
profession scheme and model legislation in consultation with legal profession 
regulators and the profession. The scheme removes many of the barriers to increased 
efficiency and competition in the legal profession. The model provisions are designed 
to achieve greater consistency and uniformity in legal profession regulation in order 
to facilitate legal practice across State and Territory boundaries, and to standardise 
consumer protections across jurisdictions. 
The 2004 Act replicated most of what had been contained in Part 11 of the 1987 Act in its 
Part 3.2 (Costs disclosure and assessment). Part 3.2 commenced with a section that set out 
the purposes of the Part. Part 3.2 set out costs disclosure regimes, to regulated costs 
agreements and the billing of costs for legal services, and to provided a method of costs 
assessment as well as a mechanism for setting aside some costs agreements.
488
 The 2004 Act 
also strengthened the costs disclosure regime; as one commentator put it, practitioners were 
going to have to ‗nail down everything‘ or they would find themselves in the position where 
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any default in a rigorous disclosure regime meant that their costs agreements became 
invalid.
489
 
Conspicuously missing from the 2004 Act were uplift fees for actions in pursuit of 
damages.
490
 As noted above, the costs provisions of the 2004 Act was not subject to any real 
debate in its passage through the New South Wales parliament, but one key difference 
between the 2004 Act and the second draft Model Bill as released in August 2006,
491
  was 
that while the 2004 Act continued to allow uplift fees in some circumstances,
492
 it forbade 
practitioners from entering into a conditional contract with an uplift fee if the action was for 
damages.
493
 It seem that the right to charge uplift fees for matters involving damages, after 
providing years of fertile grounds for complaint against the legal profession, went not with  a 
bang but with a whimper.
494
 The rationale behind such fees is easily dismantled,
495
 but the 
goal they were intended to promote, which was to increase access to justice, was laudable. 
They were a well-intended experiment, and were given a long trial (perhaps too long) before 
being abandoned as too problematic. As was seen in Chapter Two, the right to charge uplift 
fees, including in retainers for the pursuit of damages, were introduced in Western Australia 
four years after New South Wales abandoned them. Decisions from the courts of New South 
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Wales may well be persuasive in the Western Australian jurisdiction, but the experiences of 
those courts seem not to be. 
3.12:  Amendments post 2004 Act 
The New South Wales Parliament was well aware that the 2004 Act was going to require 
further amendment after it was introduced in order to ‗get it right‘. As noted above, it had 
been amended before it came into effect, and in the second reading speech for the 2005 
Amending Act Mr Bob Debus noted that: ‗[a]n undertaking of this scale is necessarily to be 
regarded as a work in progress, and I will propose future amendments to maintain uniformity 
with the national model and to improve and streamline the operation of this new Act as 
necessary.
496
  
3.12.1: The Legal Profession Amendment Act 2006  
The first of the amendments to the 2004 Act, so far as costs assessment was concerned, came 
through the Legal Profession Amendment Act 2006 (No 30) (NSW),  (the first 2006 
Amending Act)which  dealt with two areas that required greater clarity. Costs assessors were 
given wider powers in determining the reasonableness of a costs agreement, and while uplift 
fees remained restricted to a maximum of 25% for litigious matters (not relating to damages) 
that maximum was removed for non-litigious work. The 2006 Amending Act also resurrected 
on aspect of the pre reform costs assessment regime; clients were once again given the right 
to request an itemised bill.
497
 As will be seen below, one of the underlying assumptions 
behind the 1994 Reforms was that costs assessments would be done in a ‗global‘ way.498 The 
reality of the reformed scheme was an item by item assessment of the challenged costs, and 
an itemised bill gave clients a better chance of determining if the cost they had been charged 
were reasonable. 
Mr Matt Brown, giving the second reading speech for the Bill that became the first 2006 
Amending Act to the Legislative Assembly, did throw light on the abolition of uplift fees and 
the incongruence noted above in relation to practitioners being able to charge those fees 
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while also having to certify that there was a reasonable chance of success in an action for 
personal injury damages.  He noted that; ‗[s]ection 324 (1) of the Legal Profession Act 2004 
(NSW) prohibits uplift fees in claims for damages to ensure that practitioners do not certify 
that their claims for damages have reasonable prospects of success and then charge their 
clients an extra 25 per cent for the inherent risk‘.499 He went on to explain that the 2004 Act 
was being brought into line with the provisions for uplift fees in the model legislation in 
other respects,
500
 but despite that model legislation allowing uplift fees in actions for 
damages, it appears that the New South Wales Parliament had had enough of that particular 
part of the 1994 Reforms and uplift fees for damages no longer form part of the legal 
landscape of New South Wales. 
3.12.2: The Legal Profession Further Amendment Act 2006 
The 2004 Act was further amended later that same year by way of the Legal Profession 
Further Amendment Act 2006 (No 116) (the second 2006 Amending Act).  This Act had two 
separate schedules that provided amendments to the 2004 Act, one for amendments that 
brought the 2004 Act further into alignment with the Model Bill
501
 and a second with general 
amendments to deal with issues that had arisen during implementation.
502
  
The second 2006 Amending Act made three significant changes to the costs assessment 
scheme. One of those was fairly straightforward, the second slightly problematic, and the 
third quite profound.  
Firstly, the 2006 Amending Act clarified the effects of a law practice‘s failure to properly 
disclose costs. As drafted, the provisions of the 2004 Act dealt with a law practice failing its 
duty to disclose by disallowing it from maintaining an action to recover costs.
503
 The client in 
turn had no obligation to pay the firms its costs until those costs had been assessed.
504
 The 
                                                 
499
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 5 April 2006, 22174 (Matt Brown). 
500
 Ibid.  
501
 The draft model bill had been finalised by the Standing Committee of Attorney Generals and released in 
2006. 
502
 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 27 October 2006, 3659 (Mr N. Page). 
Second Reading Speech).  
503
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 317(3).  
504
 Ibid.  
128 
 
client could also apply to have the costs agreement that governed the retainer set aside.
505
 
The amendments continued that position, but also gave a costs assessor the right to reduce 
the costs as assessed ‗proportionate to the seriousness of the failure to disclose.‘506 Failure to 
disclose remained capable of being considered either unsatisfactory professional conduct or 
professional misconduct.
507
 At one level this seems a sensible adjustment, as it allowed a 
costs assessor to scale a punishment to fit the particular failure of disclosure; as originally 
drafted the remedy was more of an all or nothing solution. Even if a costs agreement was 
found to be invalid because of a failure to disclose the costs themselves might be reasonable, 
and there would then be no sanction for the failure. After this particular amendment the costs 
assessor could reduce those costs in any event if it was appropriate to do so. However, 
imposing a financial sanction for a lawyer or law practice‘s failure to disclose is a fairly 
serious thing. It does seem strange that costs assessors, practicing lawyers themselves, were 
given such a task but not given any guidelines as to what would be ‗proportionate‘ when 
applying the sanction.  
Secondly, and in line with the model legislation, the second 2006 Amending Act extended 
the duty of disclosure to include disclosure to third party payers.
508
 In non litigious matters it 
is fairly common that the person who engages the legal practitioner is not the person who 
pays the legal costs; most commonly landlords engage a practitioner to draw up a lease. It is 
usual in such a case that the lease includes a provision that the tenant has to pay the legal 
costs involved. The same situation can occur with litigation as litigation funders become a 
larger player in the legal marketplace. It is sound policy to ensure that the person or company 
who will ultimately be responsible for paying the costs has reasonable disclosure of what 
those costs will be before committing to them. However, one portion of this particular 
amendment does seem capable of producing odd results. If there is a third party payer, the 
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law firm is not barred from seeking costs pursuant to the agreement from one of the paying 
parties if the failure to disclose was only in relation to one party.
509
 As noted above, if a 
landlord had a lease drawn up by a practitioner, and it was a term of the lease that the lessee 
paid the legal costs involved, that lessee would be a third party payer. If the practitioner had 
provided costs disclosure to the landlord, and not to the lessee, the lessee has the right to the 
remedies for non disclosure while the landlord does not. In effect, the landlord could be 
forced to pay the difference between the costs under any costs agreement and the costs as 
assessed, which seems an odd position if the default originated with the practitioner.
510
  
The third, and most profound, change that the second 2006 Amendment Act made to the 
2004 Act was to change the time allowed for seeking assessment. As drafted, the 2004 Act 
allowed ‗within 60 days after the bill was given or the request was made or after the costs 
were paid in full (whichever is earlier or earliest)‘.511 This time limit was drastically 
expanded  to one year, and there were provisions to extend that time limit if the 
circumstances surrounding an application so warranted it.
512
 Although this change was 
mentioned in the second reading speech, neither house of parliament seems to have 
considered it problematic as it was not mentioned in debates. The one year time limit on 
applying for assessment is sourced from the Model Bill promulgated by SCAG, and that 
expanded limit was also adopted in Western Australia. The analysis of the effects of that 
provided at 2.5.1.1 above, in the context of the Legal Practice Act 2008 (WA), is also valid 
for the expanded limit in New South Wales.  
3.12.3: Further amendments 2007- 2011 
After the second 2006 Amendment Act and up until June 2011, a further ten numbered acts 
made amendments to the 2004 Act. The bulk of those amendments did not affect the 
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provisions of the 2004 Act that dealt with costs assessment, and with few exceptions, those 
that did made minor adjustments that are not explored in this thesis. That said there was one 
change of some import; the District Court replaced the Supreme Court as the venue for 
appeals against costs assessment. 
As noted above, the costs assessment regime contained an internal review mechanism 
whereby a party who did not agree with an initial assessment could have that assessment 
reviewed by a review panel. That panel decision could in turn found an appeal, and the 
appeal had originally been to the Supreme Court.   
The Courts and Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2008 (NSW) (the 2008 Amending Act) 
changed the route of appeal for a wide range of matters. The reason for this, as was explained 
in the second reading speech for the Bill that went on to become that Act, was  that 
‗transferring such cases will free up sitting time for the Supreme Court and will encourage 
the use of a more appropriate and less expensive forum for resolving smaller matters‘.513 This 
seems eminently sensible. Costs assessments may sometimes relate to large sums of money, 
but in real terms they are ‗smaller matters‘. A review of appeals heard in the New South 
Wales Supreme Court between 1995 and 2008 shows that the majority of the appeals were 
unsuccessful. A good many of those appeals had bypassed the review mechanisms provided 
within the scheme and gone straight to judicial appeal.  
Other amendments between 2007 and 2011 are not of sufficient importance to warrant 
scrutiny.  However, as will be seen below, 2011 marks the move from a focus on ‗single 
issue‘ amendment and ‗tweaking‘ to in depth investigation and review, and recommendations 
for the first sweeping reform to what was already a reformed costs assessment scheme. 
3.13: The 2011 Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme 
On 7 September 2011 the Honourable T F Bathurst, Chief Justice of New South Wales, 
announced a review of the costs assessment scheme in New South Wales (the 2011 Review). 
He noted that there were ‗strong grounds to examine – for the first time – whether the 
legislation, principles and procedures underpinning the Scheme‘s operations, which have 
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remained virtually unchanged since 1993, support the just, quick and cheap resolution of 
costs disputes‘.514 
The 2011 Review Panel, chaired by the Honourable Justice Paul Brereton AM RDF was a 
truly expert body. The panel included a second judge, the Legal Services Commissioner, and 
representatives from the New South Wales Bar Association, Law Society, the Costs 
Assessors Rules Committee, the Cost Consultant User Group and the Supreme Court (the 
Review Panel).
515
  Between them, the members of the Review Panel brought to the table the 
perspectives of the key stakeholders in the New South Wales costs assessment regime.  
The terms of reference for the 2011 Review were broad, and were usefully summarised by 
the Chief Justice as follows: ‗[t]he Review will examine and report how effectively the 
Scheme is achieving the aims of providing a just, quick and cheap resolution of costs 
disputes‘.516 Submissions were invited from ‗any interested party‘. The Chief Justice‘s 
invitation was well taken up and the 2011 Review Panel received ‗39 responses from peak 
professional bodies, current and retired costs assessors, costs consultants, commercial and 
government lawyers, and self-represented litigants‘.517 
3.13.1: Submissions to the Chief Justice’s Review 
The Office of the Legal Services Commissioner (OLSC), the Law Society, and Legal Aid 
were among the ‗peak professional bodies‘ that made submissions to the 2011 Review.518 Mr 
Steven Mark, the Legal Services Commissioner, and Mr Stuart Westgarth, of the Law 
Society, were also members of the 2011 Review Panel.
519
 The submissions and 
recommendations made by those three bodies, which show some of the key areas of 
discontent with the costs assessment regime, are summarised, and discussion of their content 
is provided below. 
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3.13.1.1: The Office of the Legal Services Commissioner submissions 
The OLSC is a statutory body set up under the 2004 Act
520
 and acts to ‗resolve complaints 
and to investigate complaints about legal conduct submissions‘.521 It is therefore well placed 
to lobby from a law consumer‘s point of view of the costs assessment scheme. The OLSC‘s 
submissions were scathing. It noted that:  
At present the current costs assessment scheme is administered by an ad hoc group of 
legal practitioners working on an ad hoc basis. Many appear to be retired or semi 
retired sole practitioners/partners of small suburban firms and barristers doing costs 
assessment to earn some extra money. The appointment process of costs assessors is 
not guided by any rules or requirements as to the level of expertise a costs assessor 
should retain.  Consequently, the level of expertise of practitioners involved in the 
costs assessment scheme is diverse. Costs assessors vary widely in their knowledge of 
costing law rules and practice.
522
  
In short, the OLSC argued that the costs assessment scheme was too slow, lacked 
transparency, and was too expensive.
523
 It considered that assessors were insufficiently 
trained, had widely inconsistent views on the legislative framework that governed their work, 
that they had no coherent body of rules to guide them, and that the reasons they gave for their 
determinations were often inadequate.
524
  Most tellingly, the OLSC pointed out that the costs 
assessment scheme was not keeping up with the realities of the legal market and was losing 
relevance, as follows:  
Lastly, the OLC submits that a costs assessment scheme can only be effective if it is 
relevant. A costs assessment scheme needs to understand and embrace with the legal 
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services market as changes occur. A costs assessment scheme cannot be relevant if it 
does not move with the market.
525
 
The OLSC considered that this was partly because the scheme was predicated on time 
costing and itemised bills of costs while it argued that time billing was no longer the 
dominant form of billing.
526
 It noted that assessors were calling for itemised bills even when 
the legal works they covered had been governed by a fixed amount contract.
527
 
The OLSC made 18 recommendations that would ameliorate the problems it saw with the 
costs assessment scheme. The recommendations were generally as might be expected 
considering the OLSC views on the system, and were designed to ensure that the costs 
assessment regime better reflected the changes that were occurring in the legal marketplace 
and that it better served the needs of practitioners and the public.
528
  
Recommendation 17 of the OLSC submission is worth particular scrutiny: ‗That a 
mechanism be established to collect and collate information about market rates for legal 
services and that material be made publically available‘.529 Fee benchmarking, which was the 
role that had been played by the now abolished scales of costs, has already been canvassed at 
some length in this chapter, and the conclusion to the chapter will return that issue. The 
OLSC‘s recommendation addresses one of the key deficiencies in the legal marketplace; the 
lack of information on what ‗reasonable costs‘ are, and the lack of information to help 
consumers decide what costs go beyond reasonable. This problem was previously noted by 
the participants of the MVA proceedings (at 3.6.1 above), and was also raised in other 
submissions to the 2011 Review. 
The OLSC also recommended that ‗all costs disputes be referred to the OLSC for early 
determination through mediation or other alternate dispute resolution mechanisms‘.530 
Considering the volume of applications for assessment that are lodged in New South Wales 
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each year, and considering that applicants are required to include a statement to the effect 
that ‗there is no reasonable prospect of settlement of the matter by mediation‘531 on 
lodgement, the OLSC seems to be wishing a large volume of difficult work upon itself. 
However, in discussion, the OLSC also noted that ‗ the efficient resolution of disputes would 
be greatly enhanced if disputes for less than $10,000.00 were referred to the OLSC as  
provided for in the current legislation‘ but that the OLSC receives very few such referrals.532 
It may well be that the costs assessment scheme, like the courts, is more cost efficient for 
larger disputes, and it may be that the participants in small disputes would find that an OLSC 
mediation is a more cost efficient way to resolve the dispute. That approach could mean that 
rather than the participants paying for the process the taxpayer would be funding it. That 
said, most jurisdictions do have a small or minor claims division where lower sum litigation 
is dealt with expeditiously, and it may be that the costs assessment regime would benefit 
from a similar small dispute mechanism, or from more regularly using the one that is 
currently provided. This is particularly the case when one considers that in 2005 30.5% of 
party/party and 55% of client/solicitor bills that were filed for assessment in New South 
Wales were for amounts under $10,000.00 (see Chapter 4 at Figures 4.1 and 4.6). 
The OLSC submissions should be seen in the context of that body‘s role and client base. In 
2010 there were 1862 applications for costs assessment in New South Wales. The OLSC 
submission does not record how many complaints it had received about the operation of the 
costs assessment system. It should be noted that while the OLSC notes that its interaction 
with legal costs complaints is mainly in regard of disputes between practitioners and either 
the practitioner‘s clients or third party payers,533 that does not necessarily mean that those 
complaints relate to the assessment system. Complaints about practitioners overcharging are 
not complaints about the assessment process. Costs assessors are obliged to report grossly 
excessive charging
534
 or ‗conduct that may amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct or 
professional misconduct‘535 to the OLSC for investigation.536 Clients with complaints about 
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what they have been charged are also able to approach the OLSC direct. For those reasons, 
some, and perhaps most of the complaints about costs that the OLSC deals with are more 
likely to be with the costs charged rather than with the costs assessment scheme.
537
 This is 
not to detract from the OLSC‘s submissions, but it must be kept in mind as the submissions 
therefore reflect the experiences of clients who have dealt with worse case scenarios. Without 
knowing how many complaints specifically about the costs assessment scheme those 
submissions reflect it is not possible to determine if the OLSC‘s view is truly representative 
of most of the scheme‘s user‘s experience. Nonetheless, it is clear that some serious issues 
have arisen within the system, and it may be that some of the recommendations made by the 
OLSC would successfully address them. The OLSC submissions noted that a new draft of a 
Model Legal Profession Bill was likely to be adopted in the near future (it identified 2013 as 
the likely time of adoption), and that as the legal practice regime that would flow from that 
would be much less prescribed than is currently the case, further amendments to the costs 
assessment regime at this time may be pointless.
538
 The OLSC submissions also provide a 
useful comparison of the provisions of the current costs assessment scheme with the 
provisions for costs assessment under the draft Model Bill.
539
 Some brief comments on the 
draft Bill are included in the conclusion to this chapter.  
3.13.1.2: The Law Society of New South Wales submissions 
 The Law Society of New South Wales submissions mirrored some of the concerns raised in 
the OLSC submissions, but in a much less critical way. The Law Society considered that the 
current scheme (in 2011) ‗presently affords parties a satisfactory degree of procedural 
fairness‘540 with the exception of one noted issue, that parties to a review should be given a 
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statutory right to make submissions to the review panel.
541
 The sixteen recommendations that 
the Law Society made went to the speed and transparency of the system, and addressed a 
perceived lack of training and consistency among assessors.
542
 Although the Law Society 
approached the issue in a different manner to the OLSC, it too raised the issue of 
benchmarking; the executive summary of the Law Society submissions noted that there were 
no:   
Published guidelines or benchmarks which costs assessors could use in making their 
determinations and which parties could rely on. Guidelines would assist parties to 
predict outcomes to enable settlement.
543
 
This concern was reflected in Recommendation 7 of the submissions, which read: 
‗Guidelines for costs assessments should be developed and published.‘544 
The Law Society also recommended that assessors provide an early estimate of the range of 
costs that might be awarded on assessment ‗perhaps expressed in terms of a range between 
$X and $Y of the total costs likely to be allowed‘.545 Discussion as to the issues that arise 
with provisional assessment as part of a judicial process can be found at 2.5.1.3 above but the 
issues that arisen in such circumstances do not arise, at least to the same degree, in an 
administrative process. It may be that provisional assessment would encourage a negotiated 
settlement, but expecting costs assessors to provide a provisional assessment with any real 
accuracy might be unrealistic. That said, benchmark costs would make provisional 
assessment a more realistic proposal. 
 One of the Law Societies‘ recommendations seems at odds with one of the underlying 
principles of the 1994 Reforms; that costs assessments and its internal review mechanisms 
should no longer be part of judicial process. The Law Society argued that system users 
should have easier access to judicial oversight in the course of the assessment process. The 
Law Society considered that: 
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For example, if an assessor should unreasonably refuse to allow a party to tender 
material or make a further submission or act contrary to guidelines, a party should 
have the right to approach a Registrar for directions.
546
 
The 1994 Reforms separated costs assessment from the judicial process, and turned costs 
assessment into an administrative function that was subject to judicial review. The New 
South Wales Law Society submissions seem to suggest a hybridisation of the two 
approaches, with an applicant being able to access judicial review before he or she had 
exhausted the administrative review process. With due respect to the Law Society, this seems 
unnecessary, and if problems like the one postulated in the example it gave were occurring, it 
would seem more sensible to create powers vested in the Manager Costs Assessment that 
would allow such problems to be dealt with within the administrative process. Judicial 
review should still be available, but judicial review should not something that immediately 
accessible for what is really an operational issue within the system. As will be seen below, 
the draft recommendations from the Chief Justice‘s Review do place greater responsibility 
for this type of issue with the Manager Costs Assessment. The issue of costs assessment and 
its fundamental amenability to administrative rather than judicial determination will be 
further addressed in the conclusion to this chapter.  
Of particular interest and utility in terms of the purposes of this thesis, the Law Society also 
provided estimates of the costs of assessment; one for a party/party matter with a bill 
postulated at the $250,000,00 and one for a dispute between a practitioner and a client with 
the bill at $50,000.00.
547
  
3.13.1.2.1: The Law Society‟s view of a party/party assessment 
In the first instance, the Law Society considered that a party/party assessment would cost the 
party responsible for paying the costs between $19,500.00 and $31,750.00 if that party 
received and then challenged a bill for $250,000.00. That estimate is predicated on the 
paying party having the costs of the assessment awarded against it, so it includes the costs 
outlaid by both parties over the course of the assessment. That estimate means that a party 
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challenging a bill of $250,000.00 would pay between approximately 8 to 13% of the original 
amount of the bill in order to mount the challenge. The low end of the estimate range is a 
significant amount of money, and the high end, in context of the bill overall, is large. 
Assuming that the Law Society‘s estimate is realistic, it means that a losing litigant, served 
with a $250,000.00 bill, should consider $270,000.00 to $280,000.00 as the amount from 
which deductions would be made if he or she is going to challenge the bill. As will be seen in 
Chapter Four, the average return on a $100,000.00 or above bill after assessment in New 
South Wales (in 2005) was 76%. Averages are perhaps dangerous in that they do not apply to 
individual situations, but as the example the New South Wales Law Society has given for the 
cost of assessing a bill is given as an average, then on average it would be in the paying 
party‘s interests to have it assessed despite the estimate of the costs of doing so. At the high 
end of the example, where the bill can be considered as being for $280,000.00, the bill the 
payer would be responsible for at the end of the process would be in the order of 
$210,000.00, and that means that the payer would be much better off because of the 
assessment process. In real terms the paying party should seek and receive expert legal 
advice as to the particular bill in question, but despite the Law Society‘s concern about the 
expense of the system, that expense may not be so great if it is considered in context of the 
results it might return. 
3.13.1.2.2; The Law Society‟s view of an assessment between a practitioner and a client 
The example that the Law Society provides for a dispute between the solicitor and the client, 
with a bill postulated at $50,000.00 is not dependent on which party seeks assessment, except 
that whichever party does will go to a greater expense initially. The Law Society considered 
that the applicant, be it either the practitioner or the client, will incur expenses of between 
$7,500.00 and $12,500.00 to mount the challenge. This estimate is contingent on a client 
applicant seeking legal representation for the assessment process, or a practitioner applicant 
determining the cost of his or her time taken up in the assessment process at current legal 
rates or, alternately, engaging a costs specialist to do the works involved for a costs 
assessment in his or her stead. The sums the Law Society provides mean the applicant would 
pay 15% to 25% over the amount of the bill as filed in order to mount the challenge. That 
range is significantly higher than was arrived at for the party/party bill. In part that may be 
139 
 
because the smaller the bill is the higher the costs of challenging it would be when the cost of 
the challenge is considered as a percentage of the original bill. It seems likely that had the 
example for the party/party bill been a $50,000.00 bill rather than a $250,000.00 bill the cost 
of challenging it would have been in a similar percentage range. The respondent in this own 
client example had an estimated cost of between $4,000.00 and $6,500.00. Those amounts 
represent between 8% and 13% of the bill total.  
There is one fundamental difference here as compared to a party/party assessment; if the bill 
in this dispute is reduced by 15% or more, the practitioner will pay the costs of the 
assessment.
548
 This is true regardless if the practitioner is the applicant or the respondent. As 
will be seen in Chapter Four, the rate of return on bills that were assessed between solicitors 
and their clients in New South Wales (in 2005) did differ depending on whether or not the 
client or the solicitor instituted the challenge.   
The average return for a client instituted assessment of a bill in the $50,000.00 to $69,999.00 
range in New South Wales was 81.5% (in 2005). This means that a client challenging a 
$50,000.00 bill in New South Wales would, on average, find that after the assessment the bill 
had been reduced to $40,500.00. In such circumstances, the costs of the assessment itself 
would have been borne by the solicitor. The solicitor would have his or her own costs to meet 
as well as the client‘s costs, and using the Law Society‘s figures those total costs would have 
been in the order of $11,500.00 and $19,000.00. On these figures, and taking into account the 
costs of assessment, the solicitor could find that the return on what had been a $50,000.00 
bill was as low a $31,000.00.  
If the solicitor had decided to seek assessment there is some difference in the likely result. As 
will be seen at 4.7.1 in Chapter Four, only 30 percent (98 of 329) of the bills that 
practitioners filed for assessment in 2005 went through to a full determination.  Assuming 
that those applications that were withdrawn before assessment were instead resolved by way 
of some form of settlement, it appears that commencing an assessment is a productive way 
for a practitioner to get some form of resolution to an unpaid bill. It seems likely allowing 
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practitioners to file their bills for assessment rather than having to sue defaulting clients in 
debt has been a very real benefit of the 1994 Reforms  
3.13.1.3: The Legal Aid Submissions 
Legal Aid‘s submissions to the enquiry were restricted to three discrete issues, about which 
Legal Aid made three recommendations. Legal Aid demonstrated two particular deficiencies 
it identified within the costs assessment scheme with case examples drawn from its own files 
and made recommendations to deal with them. The third recommendation was more general, 
and as will be seen, it dealt with what appears to be a universal concern with the post 1994 
Reforms costs assessment regime. Again, as with the OLSC submissions, the Legal Aid 
submissions must be seen in context with the Legal Aid client base.   
Firstly, Legal Aid recommended that a provision be inserted into the 2004 Act to stay the 
assessment process if a client alleged that a costs agreement or a term of a costs agreement 
was unjust.
549
 Legal Aid argued that a client should have the right to test such an allegation 
and seek a remedy in ‗an appropriate forum‘ before there is a determination and a proved 
debt that can be executed against them.
550
 The current position is that a costs assessor has 
wide powers to determine if a costs agreement, or any part of a costs agreement, is unjust if a 
client so alleges.
551
 When one considers unsophisticated clients that seem problematic as the 
costs assessor does not appear to be able to make such a determination of his or her own 
volition. Once the client has raised the issue, costs assessor can refuse to deal with an 
application if he or she does find that a term is unjust, but whether or not he or she does so is 
at the election of the costs assessor and not the client.
552
 The costs assessor can make a 
determination as to the costs that are owed even if he or she finds that the costs agreement is 
unjust, and in such circumstances the practitioner will have the advantage of an enforceable 
determination against the client even if the agreement was unjust. It may be good policy to 
introduce a duty along the same lines as the duty a costs assessor has if he or she determines 
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there has been gross overcharging; if a costs assessor finds that a costs agreement contains 
any serious injustice then he or she should be obliged to stay the assessment process (as 
recommended by Legal Aid) and to report that situation to the Office of the Legal Services 
Commissioner.
553
 This seems preferable to having a costs assessor dealing with unjust terms 
in a costs agreement only when a client asks that he or she do so and then at his or her own 
discretion. 
Secondly, Legal Aid considered that service of notice of costs assessment should be by way 
of personal service.
554
 The case example provided was of a situation where the first notice 
that the client had of the fact that a determination for costs against them had been handed 
down was the bankruptcy notice the client received when the practitioner moved to enforce 
the determination.
555
 A requirement that practitioners who commence the costs assessment 
process ensure personal service on their clients, combined with sensible mechanisms that 
stop clients from frustrating that service, would be a sensible amendment to the costs 
assessment scheme.  
Lastly, and perhaps not surprisingly, Legal Aid suggested that ‗guidance as to what items and 
rates are generally allowed or disallowed would be invaluable for advising a client as to 
when it may be appropriate to seek a costs assessment‘.556 Legal Aid, in common with the 
OLSC and the Law Society, believed that the provision of some form of benchmarks as to 
what were and what were not reasonable costs would improve the efficacy of the costs 
assessment scheme. As will be seen below, the draft report of the Chief Justice‘s Review of 
the Cost Assessment Scheme agreed with those submissions. The reintroduction of 
guidelines as to costs will be further explored in the conclusion to this chapter. 
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3.13.2: The 2011 Review: Draft Recommendations 
The following portion of this thesis provides an overview of the recommendations made by 
the Review Panel that produced the Chief Justice‘s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme 
(the Draft Report). The draft report was released on 12 March 2013.  
3.13.2.1: The 2011 Draft Recommendations: The aims pursued. 
Some of the key concerns that the 2011 Review Panel faced are set out in the discussion of 
submissions provided above at 3.13.1 directly above. The Review Panel described those 
concerns as being ‗fundamentally about the time the process takes, and consistency and 
predictability of outcomes‘.557  That the Review Panel took on board and understood those 
concerns is clearly evident from its description of the purpose of its proposals as follows: 
Together, it is intended that this package of Reforms will inculcate cultural change in 
the manner in which parties approach the assessment process, increase the speed of 
resolution of costs disputes, increase consistency and predictability in decision-
making, and facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of costs disputes‘.558 
Further to those aims, the Review Panel noted that ‗the costs assessment process should 
promote the early resolution of costs disputes, by removing incentives for delay, and 
providing incentives for early resolution, even at a discount‘.559 
The Review Panel‘s aims are understandable and laudable. However, they illustrate one of 
the key tensions in the costs assessment process. As has been repeated noted in the preceding 
parts of this chapter, the New South Wales Parliament felt that it was vitally important that 
winning litigants recover all the reasonable costs of their litigation. However, as the Review 
Panel noted, a utile costs assessment scheme must provide ‗just, quick and cheap resolution‘ 
even ‗at a discount‘. In terms of party/party costs it is likely to be the winning litigant who 
would be providing that discount and the losing litigant who would be receiving it. Any 
justice that is quick and cheap is likely to be rough justice, and in terms of party/party 
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assessments it is the winning litigant who is trying to recover his or her costs that will most 
experience the roughness. Such a result would be a direct contradiction of the original aim 
that winning litigants should recover more of their reasonable costs. 
This thesis will argue below that the Review Panel‘s Reforms, though eminently sensible and 
carefully reasoned, when combined with other Reforms that have taken place within the New 
South Wales legal marketplace, effectively abandon that key driver of the original 1994 
Reforms  This argument is not meant as negative criticism; it may be that while that 
particular driver of reform makes an attractive political sound bite, it was never really 
something that could be achieved in a system where individual practitioners can effectively 
contract out of fee regulation. 
3.13.2.2: The 2011 Recommendations: Set out of the recommendations 
The 2011 Review released the Draft Report on 12 March 2013. The recommendations 
contained in that report canvass the full spectrum of the costs assessment process, and if 
instituted they will bring about fundamental changes to the way that costs assessment is 
carried out in New South Wales. The draft recommendations are usefully divided into five 
main groups, four of which straddle the assessment process and the fifth catches more 
general matters that are directly related to the process as a whole. The division is as follows;  
1. The process for instituting an assessment proceeding, 
2. The conduct of the assessment process, 
3. The effect and consequences of determinations,  
4. The review and appeal process;560 and; 
5. Other matters, which contains recommendations pertaining to the Manager, 
Costs Assessment, The Costs Assessor Rules Committee, and the Assessors 
themselves.
561
 
The draft review contains 56 core recommendations, and a number of those are further 
divided into separate and detailed specific recommendations. The review document is 
remarkable for the depth of analysis it provides and the specificity of its recommendations. In 
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a number of instances the Review Panels provided the recommendations in the form of 
‗ready to enact‘ clauses. This thesis will be restricted to providing a summary of its content 
and discussion of the likely effect of some of the key recommendations where such 
discussion is warranted. Many of the recommendations are sensible and effective resolutions 
to minor procedural matters. Others, less minor, are not contentious in either broad terms or 
in detail.  For that reason this thesis will look holistically at the ‗package‘ created by the 
Review Panel and will only go into detail about the Reforms where that detail is necessary 
for an understanding of the overall results that will ensue if the recommendations are 
adopted. 
3.13.2.3: The 2011 Recommendations: Constraints on the Review Panel 
and analysis of those constraints 
Before investigating the recommendations themselves, it is necessary to consider the key 
assumption that the Review Panel made about what it was engaged in doing, and to unpack 
the three parts of that assumption.  The Review Panel noted that: 
‗For the purposes of this review it has been assumed that the regulation of practitioner 
costs, the ‗fair and reasonable‘ criteria for party/party costs, and the ‗user pays‘ 
funding model for the assessment process are not open to general reconsideration‘.562 
Firstly, practitioner costs have never been genuinely regulated in the broad sense, other than 
by the fairly elastic rule that they should not be unreasonable.
563
 Scales of costs did act to 
regulate what winning litigants recovered under costs agreements, but those costs are 
party/party and are not practitioner costs. Scales of costs also regulated practitioner fees if, 
and only if, the practitioner either failed to contract out of them by way of a costs agreement 
or if the practitioner‘s costs agreement was in some way invalid. A practitioner only faced 
having his or her fees regulated if he or she had in some way been deficient, by failing to get 
a costs agreement, by being unreasonable in his or her charging, by defaulting in his or her 
disclosure obligations or alternately, because he or she operated in an area of law that only 
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allowed the practitioner to charge scale costs.
564
 Legal practitioners only faced having their 
fees reduced to scale, but as a sanction. Otherwise, the only real regulation on their fees was 
the legal marketplace. After the 1994 Reforms and once the scales of costs were removed, a 
practitioner faced even less regulation, in that the scale as sanction disappeared and a 
practitioner was only subject to the rule that his or her fees had to be reasonable. Fellow 
practitioners were (and are) the arbiters of what is reasonable. To describe practitioner‘s fees 
as ‗regulated‘ in such circumstances is misleading. That said, the Review Panel did not 
recommend anything that moved away from any of the lightweight regulation of 
practitioner‘s fees that does occur. 
Secondly, that the determinant for recovery of costs due under a costs order should remain 
the yardstick of ‗fair and reasonable‘ is not in itself contentious. The Review Panel‘s 
recommendations are concerned with creating a costs assessment that is expeditious. From a 
systemic view, expeditious is a reasonable and laudable aim.  However, as has been noted 
above, quick cheap justice is likely to be rough justice. From the perspective of the party that 
is to receive costs, ‗justice‘ is likely to diminish as the speed of the system increases. Further, 
to provide consistency in assessing what is fair and reasonable, the Review Panel 
recommended introducing guidelines as to what ‗would ordinarily be allowed on party/party 
basis‘ for some of the fundamentals of legal work.  Such guidelines,  in the context of 
practitioners being able to contract out of them by way of a costs agreement, may not be seen 
as ‗fair and reasonable‘ by the costs recipient who will find that he or she is increasingly out 
of pocket on what was actually spent on the litigation. That said, this thesis supports the 
recommendations to require the return of scales of costs, albeit in a limited way and under 
another name. 
Lastly the Review Panel noted that it could not move away from the ‗user pays‘ system. As 
will be seen below, its recommendations, if adopted, would do just that. How much of the 
justice system should be user pays is not a question this thesis attempts to answer. 
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Nonetheless, it will be argued below that if the Review Panel‘s recommendations are adopted 
the costs of running the assessment system will be significantly redirected away from the 
user and onto the costs assessment system, and thus onto the taxpayer. This may be a good or 
bad thing,
565
 but any Parliament that institutes Reforms should have a clear idea of what the 
full effect of those Reforms might be. 
3.13.3: The 2011 Recommendations: the suggested Reforms 
As noted above, the Review Panel‘s recommendations are presented in an accessible format 
that follows the chronological flow of the costs assessment process. To some extent this 
thesis will follow that flow. However, as there is a great deal of interplay and 
interdependence among the recommendations there is necessarily some significant blurring 
of the boundaries between the areas of reform in the discussion in order that the overall 
effects of the recommendations can be understood. 
3.13.3.1: Suggested Reforms: Under the Court’s wing and an increased 
workload for the Manager Costs Assessment 
One of the fundamental aspects of the Draft Report recommendations is that they would take 
the costs assessment scheme and bring it back, to some extent, into the judicial process. The 
Draft Report falls short of recommending that costs assessors become court officers who are 
carrying out a judicial function. Rather, the Manager Costs Assessment (MCA) would be 
given a much larger role in the assessment process that would make him or her directly 
responsible for a range of decisions that are currently either the responsibility of the costs 
assessors or the subject of application to the court. Those decisions would be reviewable as if 
the MCA was a Registrar of the Supreme Court.
566
 This shift is designed to streamline the 
assessment process, as the Review Panel felt that ‗a more centralised control of the 
assessment process at an early stage can contribute to reduction of delay‘.567 However, and 
despite the Review Panel being very clear that it had not been given a license to depart from 
the user pay principle, shifting a large amount of work away from assessors who charge the 
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parties a direct hourly rate and onto the administrative structure that is (notionally) funded by 
filing fees does have that effect. The Review Panel does not expressly address this, but it 
does note that it ‗contemplates a greater role for the MCA than under the present regime‘.568 
3.13.3.2: Suggested Reforms: Encouraging rapid resolutions 
Under the recommended application process there would be an initial filing fee, which the 
Review Panel describes as ‗say $250.00‘.569 The party that seeks assessment, being the costs 
recipient under a costs order, a disgruntled client or a legal practitioner whose bill remains 
unpaid, would pay that fee as part of a valid application. The Review Panel describes that fee 
as being ‗to cover the costs up to early assessment‘.570 Once the 28 day period in which the 
respondent can reply had elapsed
571
 the MCA would issue an interim certificate for any costs 
not in dispute. 
At this stage, or at any stage after receipt of the application, the MCA would have the power, 
under his or her own volition, or on application from one of the parties, or from a costs 
assessor if the process of assessment had commenced, to direct the matter to an ADR 
procedure.
572
 The Review Panel recommended that the MCA ‗maintain a panel of suitably 
qualified persons, which could include the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner, and 
persons also appointed as assessors for that purpose‘.573 The Review Panel was silent on the 
costs of such dispute resolution.  These recommendations expand the current provisions 
allowing the MCA to refer disputes to mediation. Currently the MCA‘s powers in that area 
are more specifically related to disputes between practitioners and clients and are only in 
relation to disputes are in relation to sums of less than $10,000.00.
574
 As parties to a dispute 
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are currently required to file a statement to the effect that mediation is not likely to produce a 
settlement
575
 and the Review Panel has not recommended that that requirement be removed, 
it is questionable how effective such referrals would be if they did not come at the request of 
the parties. 
Assuming that the application is not sent off for ADR, the MCA would then send the matter 
file to a costs assessor for a contested assessment if the costs respondent had provide a reply 
within the 28 days allowed,
576
 or for a default assessment if they had not.
577
 This reform has 
the effect of making that portion of the costs that is not in dispute payable forthwith, and will 
go a long way towards stopping parties using the assessment process as a delaying tactic. 
There will be some issues with disputes between practitioners and unsophisticated or 
unrepresented clients as in such situations the clients are likely to insist that the problem is 
with the whole bill, despite the Review Panel recommendations that applicants and 
respondents both particularise their concerns about the bill ‗so far as reasonably 
practicable‘.578 The process of identifying that amount not in dispute and issuing the 
certificate of determination for that amount is workload that will fall on the MCA or his or 
her delegates and will be some of the works covered by the $250.00 filing fee. 
In a default assessment the assessor is to allow the costs as claimed (or allow those costs not 
subject to objection if the applicant was a client challenging his or her own practitioner‘s 
bill), unless those costs were ‗manifestly unreasonable‘.579 A default assessment is akin to a 
summary judgment, and if the Review Panel‘s other recommendations as to reasonable 
service provisions are adopted a default assessment would be a reasonable way to help stop 
the costs assessment scheme from being used as a time wasting mechanism. 
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If the assessment was contested the application would be subject to an early assessment.
580
 
Early assessment is a key aspect of the Review Panels recommendations. Early assessment is 
akin to provisional assessment as practiced in the Federal Court and in Western Australia. 
The Review Panel does not go into any great detail about how early assessment is to be 
performed, but it did consider that early assessment ‗should require much less time and work 
of a costs assessor than full assessment‘.581 The costs assessor doing an early assessment 
would have access to the submissions provided with the application and the respondent‘s 
response to those submissions, and, if he or she so chooses, can direct the parties to attend 
(by telephone conference or in person) a confidential conciliation conference before the early 
assessment is carried out.
582
 The discretion to hold a conference imports aspects of ADR 
directly into the assessment process, and it would seem likely that in some circumstances 
such a conference would be a successful mechanism for resolving a dispute. That said, 
assessors are paid at an hourly rate and a conference, with an early assessment if the 
conference is not successful, will come at some significant cost to the party paying the costs 
of the assessment process.   
As for the early assessment process itself, the Review Panel did not provide much direct 
guidance of how it would occur. However, the Review Panel did note that although  
it seems to have been an underlying assumption of the Scheme when introduced that 
experienced practitioners would be able to make a global determination of what a 
particular piece of legal work should reasonably cost, …without the need for the kind 
of detail that had been customary in the taxation of bills of costs… 
assessment had instead always been a detailed inspection of the minutia of legal works.
583
 
The Review Panel noted that submissions it had received ‗advocated provision for 
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assessment without resort to detailed itemisation‘584 and it obviously had some sympathy for 
that view. The Review Panel, despite being alert to tensions between global assessment and 
genuine fairness, considered that ‗global assessment by a costs assessor should be 
permissible‘.585 Although the Review Panel‘s discussion about this issue was in the context 
of the assessment process as a whole it seems likely that early assessment of costs would be a 
global process, albeit of the costs that are actually in dispute rather than of the totality of 
legal works represented in the bill of costs. 
Either party will be able to object to the result from an early assessment.
586
 However, this is 
where the key reform that will act to stop costs disputes from progressing through to full 
assessment occurs; the objecting party will have to pay the balance of the fee for assessment 
at the time of making the objection.
587
 That fee would be ‗the difference between the initial 
filing fee and (say) 1% of the costs in dispute‘.588 As well, the party who wishes to object to 
the early assessment must make a confidential offer of settlement to the other party and if it 
does not better that offer on the full assessment then that party will ‗pay the [not 
inconsiderable] costs of the assessment from that point‘.589 
For disputes concerning smaller bills the second component of the fee is not a large sum. The 
intuitive way to determine that amount seems to be that one would subtract the $250.00 paid 
at the initiation of the process from the 1%, but with a $10,000.00 bill the second part of the 
fee would be therefore be -$150,00, and the objecting party would be due a refund. Despite 
this confusion, if the bill is large, and bills can run into millions of dollars, the second part of 
the filing fee could be considerable. That said, and as will be seen in Chapter Four, only 
8.5% of party/party bills filed in New South Wales in 2005 were for a sum above 
$100,000.00
590
. However, as well as paying the second part of the filing fee, if the party who 
objects would have to either pay the amount assessed on full assessment, or repay an amount 
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on full assessment, the default position leaves that party having to ‗pay, or repay or give 
acceptable security for, the amount of the early estimate as a condition of objection‖‘.591 
This combination of mechanisms will almost certainly stop a significant number of 
applications from going through to a full assessment. It would be a very brave or very 
stubborn party that would be willing to say in effect ‗go ahead, do the assessment, I am 
betting that you got it wrong when you did your early assessment‘. Early assessment will 
provide resolutions that are quick and relatively cheap, but they are likely to be done in some 
sort of global way, and in accordance with guidelines as to reasonable costs promulgated by 
the Costs Assessors Rules Committee.
592
 As a litigant‘s lawyer will usually have contracted 
out of those guidelines, as noted above, it seems unlikely that winning litigants will be able to 
recover all of the costs that they (reasonably) spent on their successful legal action.  
If this view is correct, and a significant amount of the costs disputes that enter the costs 
assessment system do not go through to full assessment, then the usual amount of money 
collected by the scheme as filing fees will be (say) $250.00 per matter. The Review Panel 
second part of the filing fee is described as ‗to cover the costs of full assessment‘593 but that 
appears to be a misnomer, as the costs of a full assessment are mostly the costs assessors‘ 
fees for service yet those fees will be charged to whoever is responsible for paying for the 
assessment at a rate of ‗at least $250.00 an hour‘.594 
At this point it is worth exploring the contention made at 3.13.2.3 above; that the Review 
Panel‘s recommendations depart from the user pay principle. As has been noted, the Review 
Panel‘s recommendations, sensible as they well may be, will create a good deal more work 
for the MCA and his or her delegates, which will be made up of the administrative staff of 
the Court based Costs Assessment scheme. If the bulk of assessments do not go past early 
assessment the cost to the paying party will be a filing fee of (say) $250.00 and whatever the 
hourly rate the costs assessor has charged for his or her work. This means that the Costs 
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Assessment Scheme itself, as the overarching administrative body, will only be taking in that 
initial filing fee to cover its expenses. Those expenses would include salary costs, running 
costs such as mail and telecommunications, the costs of the office space it occupies and the 
costs of dealing with assessors. If the volume of applications for 2011 is used as a baseline,
595
 
and if all assessments are finalised without a full assessment (a best case scenario in terms of 
the operation of the scheme) then the Cost Assessment Scheme would have had revenue of 
$424,250.00 from initial (non-review) applications. To put this further into context, the Costs 
Assessment Scheme would be expected to do all its share of the work involved in a costs 
application that terminates after an early assessment for the same sum that the Review Panel 
has recommended as a reasonable amount to pay a costs assessor for one hour of work, 
$250.00.
596
 The cost to applicants would of course be higher (and even much higher) than 
that baseline fee of $250.00, as they would not only pay for the assessor‘s time spent in the 
run up to the early assessment (which may or may not include a conference) and the time 
spent in that assessment, but also the professional costs of preparation for either the 
application or the response. However, regardless of what the individual user pays overall, it 
is clear that either the court or consolidated revenue is going to have to further subsidise the 
costs assessment scheme, and in such circumstances it cannot be accurately described as 
‗users pays‘. 
3.13.3.3: Suggested Reforms: ‘guidelines’ a partial return to scales  
Matters that go on to a full assessment process, either because a party objected to the early 
assessment or because the costs assessor considered early assessment unsuitable, are not as 
directly affected by the Review Panel‘s recommendation as are the procedural steps that 
precede such an assessment. However, as noted above, assessors would no longer be left as 
the sole arbiter of what was ‗reasonable‘ as the Review Panel considered that the Costs 
Assessors Rules Committee (CARC) should ‗develop and promulgate guidelines for 
assessors‘. Despite not saying so directly, and as is illustrated by nature of the works (below) 
that the Review Panel suggested should be the subject of guidelines, it appears that the 
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Review Panel has recommended a vigorous investigation as to whether there should be a 
return to scales of costs.  
The rationale for abandoning scales of costs was set out above in this chapter, and this thesis 
takes the view that the rationale was deeply flawed. As the Review Panel‘s recommendation 
in this instance is a radical departure from the 1994 Reforms, the recommendation is worth 
setting out in full. Recommendation 34 reads: 
―The CARC (in consultation with the relevant stakeholders) develop and promulgate 
guidelines for assessors on whether, when and in what circumstance, and/or at what 
rate frequently occurring items would ordinarily be allowed, on party/party 
assessments, including: 
a) hourly and daily rates for practitioners if varying seniority and in varying 
locations; 
b) office overheads such as copying, scanning, telephone, faxes, travel expenses, and 
administrative work, 
c) agency search fees and filing fees; 
d) research time, 
e) reviewing time; 
f)  conferences between lawyers for the client; 
g) Briefing senior counsel; 
h) Retaining experts; and 
i) Retaining agents.‖597 
It seems likely that those guidelines will re-create the issue that dogged the old scales of 
costs; that a gap will grow between what the practitioner charges under the costs agreement 
and what the litigant recovers on the party/party order. It is important to note, in context of 
this thesis‘s contention that the Review Panel has abandoned the view that litigants with the 
benefit of a costs order should recover all monies that have been reasonably spent on 
litigation under that order, that this recommendation only relates to party/party assessments. 
If this recommendation is adopted and guidelines as described above are produced, such 
guidelines would also be a useful measure for assessors dealing with disputes between clients 
and their own practitioners where there is some default in either the costs agreement or the 
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disclosure regime. The Review Panel did not recommend that the guidelines be applied to 
assessment of disputes between clients and their practitioners. As noted above, the Review 
Panel claimed that it could not change the basic goalposts of regulation (which we have seen 
involved no regulation once a practitioner complied with the rules governing costs 
agreements). In this instance the Review Panel has missed an opportunity to move towards 
regulating those fees in circumstances where regulating them is sensible; where a costs 
agreement falls away and there is a gap between what is allowed under the guidelines and 
what is charged under the (invalid) costs agreement. In such a situation applying the 
guidelines would be an easily used sanction, much better than the current position where an 
individual assessor is required to determine his or her own idea of reasonable costs in those 
circumstances.
598
  
Although this thesis argues that a return to some form of scales is a beneficial reform, it is 
less than ideal to task the CARC, ‗in consultation with relevant stakeholders‘599 to develop 
the costs guidelines. The CARC is made up of legal practitioners, and will have two judges 
added to its membership if the Reforms are adopted. Having the CARC determine the 
guidelines means that legal practitioners will be in charge of deciding what legal practitioners 
should be charging.   While those practitioners would have the guidance obtained through 
consultation, and the input of the two judges, the Legal Fees and Costs Board, as it was 
constituted before the 1994 Reforms, was much better equipped to set reasonable costs.
600
 
Setting costs is not particularly within a judge‘s area of expertise, and should not be left to 
legal practitioners. With respect to the Review Panel, this particular aspect of their 
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recommendation to reintroduce costs guidelines appears to be a return to what the New South 
Wales Parliament called the ‗bad old days‘ of scales that produced the ‗crisis‘ of 1984 
(discussed at 3.3.1 above) and the move to an expert body taxed with determining costs.  
3.13.3.4: Suggested Reforms: Determinations 
Once a costs assessor completes a costs assessment he or she issues a certificate of 
determination for costs that are unpaid and that certificate can be registered with a court and 
which can be executed as if it were a judgment.
601
 The Review Panel‘s suggested Reforms 
for the use of determinations are not contentious, and act to ensure that liability of interest on 
unpaid costs is recoverable under a determination,
602
 to ensure law firms that have costs 
orders against them pay them promptly (and allowing the client, if he or she is owed money, 
to receive the certificate of determination before those costs are paid).
603
 It also clarified the 
scope duty to provide reasons.
604
 
The Review Panel has also recommended that the assessor‘s discretion to award the costs of 
the assessment process is given a wider play, allowing the assessor to excuse a law firm that 
has failed in its disclosure obligations to avoid the full costs of the assessment process if it is 
fair that is should do so.
605
 The Review Panel noted that ‗given the extreme technicality and 
the lack of clarity in the Division 2 disclosure requirements and the onerous nature of the 
requirements‘ a law practice can have the costs of assessment awarded against it for a minor 
disclosure that had nothing to do with the costs being assessed.
606
 Further, the Review Panel 
recommended that the assessor should be allowed to award the costs of practitioner 
assessments against the paying party, as currently they do not have the power to do so.
607
 If 
more than 15% is assessed off a practitioner‘s bill the practitioner has to pay the client‘s 
costs, but the practitioner has to bear his or her own costs in any event. The fact that the 
client is only ever liable for his or her own costs provides ‗no costs incentive for a paying 
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party to settle a costs assessment or to conduct it expeditiously other than whatever future 
costs that party may incur him or herself‘.608 It seems fair that a client that refuses to pay and 
seeks assessment or thus forces the practitioner to apply for assessment, in circumstances 
where the bill is not significantly reduced, should have to pay the practitioner‘s costs of the 
process and interest on those costs for the period of delay.   
3.13.3.5: Suggested Reforms: Reviews and Appeals 
The Review Panel commented that it did not receive much in the way of direct or 
constructive submission about the review process, although there was feedback that the 
process was ‗slow, cumbersome, confusing and expensive‘.609 Nonetheless, the Review Panel 
identified key deficiencies in the process and addressed them. 
The current position is that the assessment process enlivens a right of appeal to the District 
Court as of right if the appeal is based in a question of law.
610
 This is a direct route of appeal 
that does not require the applicant to first use the internal review process, and is essentially a 
de novo hearing in which the Court can affirm the original assessment, make its own 
determination instead, or remit the application to the assessor for re-determination.
611
 A 
further right of appeal, requiring leave, is available to the District Court if the assessment was 
between a client and a practitioner, or to the court or tribunal that made the costs order that 
founded a party/party assessment is also available.
612
 The current routes of appeal are 
‗complex and confusing‘613 and can (but according to the Review Panel rarely do) result in 
appeals to courts or tribunals that have little expertise in costs assessment.
614
  
Firstly, and probably to the relief of the courts,
615
 the Review Panel recommends that the first 
level of review be limited to review by a review panel and that such a review be limited to 
the narrow issues raised in the review application, rather than requiring that the panel review 
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the entire assessment either specifically or globally.
616
 This would improve the current 
situation where applicants are allowed to bypass the review panel and proceed directly to the 
relevant court.
617
 This had meant that the court had been dealing with matters that could have 
been resolved elsewhere. This may in part have been because applying to the court was, in 
some instances, cheaper than applying to the review panel; a court hearing is heavily 
subsidised while the review panel charged an hourly rate.
618
 The Review Panel recommended 
a basic and procedurally fair process that would be reasonably expeditious, with the applicant 
detailing the reason for appeal with supporting argument, the respondent being permitted to 
respond to the application and the applicant then getting a final right of reply.
619
 The Review 
Panel did not further discuss the internal review process directly, though some of its other 
recommendations, going to the publication of reasons for decision, and the qualification and 
training regimes for costs assessors, would apply to the review process as well as to the 
initial assessment processes. 
The Review Panel noted that the Supreme Court has traditionally been in charge of 
supervising practitioners‘ costs, but that since taking over the jurisdiction the District Court 
had developed expertise in the area of costs generally.
620
 For that reason, if matter was not 
finalised at review the Review Panel recommended a split system where both courts had 
jurisdiction. The Review Panel recommends that smaller matters (by leave if the amount in 
dispute is less than $25,000.00) are taken on appeal to the District Court and larger matters 
go to the Supreme Court (by leave if the amount in dispute is less than $100,000.00).
621
 It 
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also recommended elasticity in that structure, so that the Supreme Court could remit matters 
to the District Court or to take them from the District Court where appropriate.
622
 The 
Review Panel has recommended that the internal review, to be conducted by a panel of 2 
costs assessors, be a de novo hearing in every case,
623
 but that any appeal to a court be a 
rehearing where the participants require leave to bring fresh evidence.
624
 A comprehensive 
reading of the various court decisions that have been handed down for appeals against costs 
assessment since the 1994 Reforms illustrates the quiet frustration that the Judges who have 
had to hear the appeals have sometimes allowed to leak through into their reasons.
625
 Many 
of the appeals have been misconceived, and, in short, have been a waste of the Court‘s 
resources. This has been particularly the case where the applicant has chosen to skip the 
internal review procedures and gone straight to an appeal.  
The Review Panel‘s recommendations in relation to the review and appeal process are 
eminently workable. If they are adopted, and the recommendations surrounding early 
assessment are also adopted, the volume of appeals from costs assessment determinations 
should drop off significantly. 
3.13.3.6:  Suggested Reforms: Costs Assessors  
As noted at 3.3.1.1 above some of the submissions before the Review Panel were scathing 
about the lack of expertise demonstrated by some of the costs assessors, and there was a 
strong view that the assessors lacked any real consistency among themselves in terms of what 
they would and would not allow on assessment. However, the Review Panel‘s discussion 
noted a submission from a costs assessor who argued that assessors only dealt with matters 
from areas of legal work where they had personal experience,
626
 and the Review Panel noted 
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that the current pool of assessors were deliberately chosen from very diverse practice 
backgrounds.
627
 The Review Panel‘s recommended that costs assessors be required to prove 
that they had ‗adequate understanding of the 2004 Act and the Legal Practice Regulations 
2005, legal practice and costs practice‘ as part of selection process.628 Assessors would also 
have to provide referees as to their ‗relevant knowledge and competence‘.629 The Review 
Panel also recommended a suite of mechanisms, including an annual seminar, circulars with 
updates when necessary and an online forum where assessors could discuss issues that arose 
in their work, to ensure that costs assessors have access to regular continued professional 
development.
630
 If adopted, these mechanisms, in conjunction with the guidelines as to costs 
and the publication of assessors‘ reasons discussed above, should adequately address 
concerns about both competence and consistency. 
The Review Panel also recommended that costs assessors be paid more. Despite the Office of 
the Legal Services Commissioner noting that the current rate of $192.50 an hour was too 
high for some applicants,
631
 the Review Panel noted that the hourly rate for costs assessors 
had remained static since the 1994 Reforms It recommended that costs assessors be paid ‗at 
least $250 per hour‘. 632 There are no scales of costs in New South Wales, but costs assessors 
must be senior practitioners to be appointed,
633
 and the current scale rate for a senior 
practitioner in Western Australia is $451.00 per hour.
634
 Nonetheless, if that new rate is 
adopted, the internal review process, which requires a panel of two assessors, would cost at 
least $500.00 an hour. At that rate review would quite quickly mount up to an expensive 
exercise. To put this into perspective, the current standard (non corporate) fee for allocating a 
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civil hearing in the New South Wales District Court with a judge and jury is $632.00 and 
there is a further jury fee of $459.00 for each additional day of trial.
635
  
3.13.3.7: Suggested Reforms: an overview and some final observations 
The recommendations canvassed above should be seen in the broader context of the various 
procedural changes that the Review Panel has suggested to expedite the assessment process. 
If the Review Panel‘s recommendations are adopted the whole costs assessment process will 
be streamlined. Time limits within the process will be tightened,
636
 and where parties do not 
meet those time limits there will be summary or default assessments.
637
 Decisions that impact 
upon the process will be shifted away from the assessors and to the MCA, who will make 
those decisions early in the assessment process where possible.
638
 The bills of costs that 
accompany the costs assessment application will have to be in form that is readily 
assessable.
639
 Objections to those bills and any responses to those objections will need to be 
concise and focused.
640
 Where it is appropriate, assessments that are not finalised at the end 
of an early estimate will be done in a global way,
641
 and there will be a move towards 
‗appropriate lump sum amounts‘ for more routine types of legal work,642 with guidelines as 
to what those sums should be and as to what are ‗reasonable costs‘ for other aspects of legal 
work, including guidelines as to hourly rates.
643
 The appeals process, particularly appeals to 
the courts, will be clarified and streamlined.
644
 The costs assessors will benefit from more 
formalised training
645
 and their decisions will be open, in an anonymous format, to public 
scrutiny.
646
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The Chief Justice‘s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme (Draft) Report 2013 has 
systematically addressed the various issues raised in the submissions it received. The 
reformed New South Wales Costs Assessment Scheme, which has been operating for 19 
years, has been running for long enough that the legal profession and other stakeholders were 
able to provide informed criticism about its operation. It is probably to be expected that the 
submission the Review Panel received concentrated on defaults in the system and that that 
those submissions gave little attention to the schemes‘ many strengths. The Review Panel‘s 
recommendations, if adopted, should rectify the defaults that had been identified in 
submissions.  
3.13.3.7.1 Increasing the gap between what is spent on costs and what is recovered on a 
costs order 
As argued above, this thesis takes the view that the Review Panel‘s recommendations 
abandon one of the key drivers of the 1994 Reforms One aspect of the recommendations is 
that once again there is going to be an increased gap between what lawyers charge and what 
litigants recover under a costs order. In some instances, this may not be a bad thing. Justice 
is, after all, a commodity, and it does not necessarily have to be free. It should not be so 
expensive that people cannot access it, but it is not necessarily unfair that a person 
contemplating litigation should do so knowing that even if they proved to be in the right it 
will come at a cost. It should be remembered that a lot of litigation is in conducted as part of 
a business endeavour, and thus tax deductable. In such circumstances it does not seem unfair 
that that a business has had to pay for access to a dispute resolution mechanism.  
In general it may well be good social policy that those who go to justice pay a price. 
However it does seem unfair that defendants, who are dragged to justice rather than choosing 
to go there, may still be significantly out of pocket even if completely vindicated. There are a 
wide range of mechanisms that can be used to deal with unfairness if it arises in this and 
other contexts,
647
 and access to justice is a far broader issue than can be addressed by a costs 
assessment scheme. 
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3.13.3.7.2: Abandoning the „user pay‟ model 
As also noted, and despite the Review Panel‘s protestations, a new model costs assessment 
scheme as recommended would be a significant departure from a ‗user pay‘ model. It may be 
that a trade-off, greater subsidy for more expedience in resolving costs disputes, is 
reasonable. However, if that is to be so then that trade-off should be clearly identified. It is 
not good social policy to ignore or hide the financial realities of law reform. 
One drawback related to moving away from a ‗user pay‘ model that is that if work is shifted 
towards the MCA and away from costs assessors measuring the true costs of the costs 
assessment scheme will become more difficult and less exact. Costs assessors are paid by the 
hour, and are thus likely to be careful timekeepers. The MCA is quite probably going to be 
overworked,
648
 and his or her focus will be on finalising disputes, not on timing them. This 
means that although the further subsidy may be known in the broad sense, it will be harder to 
quantify with any precision. As will be further discussed in the conclusion to this thesis, one 
of the unexpected benefits of the 1994 Reforms is that they have produced a costs assessment 
scheme that is remarkably ‗knowable‘. The Western Australian costs assessment scheme, 
against which this thesis measures the New South Wales scheme, stands in stark contrast. In 
Western Australia costs assessment is subsumed into the court process and it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to work out what it costs the jurisdiction. In New South Wales it would be 
relatively easy to work out what the system really costs and, as Chapter Four of this thesis 
will show, relatively easy to investigate other aspects of the system. 
 
 
3.13.3.7.3: Guidelines for client and own practitioner disputes 
The one criticism this thesis would make of the Review Panel‘s recommendations is that 
while ‗guidelines‘ as to reasonable costs would be a welcome and useful tool for a wide 
range of reasons, it would have been preferable if the use of those guidelines had been 
extended to costs disputes between client‘s and their own practitioners. The current default 
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position can be reintroduced; a practitioner with the benefit of a valid costs agreement would 
have his or her fees assessed against that agreement.
649
 It would not be unfair for a 
practitioner who did not have a valid costs agreement, either because there had never been 
one or because of some default that had vitiated the one he or she did have, to have costs 
assessed against an objective guideline as to what is reasonable. The current position,
650
 
where individual assessors have to determine that from their own experience, promotes 
inconsistency and does not necessarily act as a sanction.
651
 It is clear that the 
recommendations would increase the gap between what a practitioner charges and what a 
client recovers on a costs order. As such is the case, those guidelines would provide a fair 
mechanism for regulating practitioners‘ fees and reducing that gap in the circumstances 
where it is reasonable to do so.  
Despite the arguments originally mounted in favour of abolishing scales, using guidelines as 
default regulation of practitioners‘ fees would not be anti-competitive. If practitioners wanted 
to increase market share they would be able to charge below the rates set out in the 
guidelines in order to do so. To be competitive, a market must be informed, and the 
guidelines would provide a useful source of information to legal consumers.  
The only real regulation currently in place rests with the costs assessor, who can determine 
whether or not the practitioners are excessive to the point of being unreasonable and has a 
discretion to reduce fees if there has been a default in disclosure. By failing to recommend 
guidelines that also govern practitioners‘ fees in the absence of a valid costs agreement the 
Review Panel has implicitly supported the current unsatisfactory form of regulation, which 
rests in the subjective view of an individual costs assessor. 
3.14 Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the history of costs assessment in New South Wales with a particular 
focus on (and analysis of) the 1994 Reforms through to their first real review in 2011-2013. 
Despite it seeming that the Parliament responsible for the 1994 Reforms did not really know 
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what it was doing, and as will be seen by the comparisons provided in the following chapter, 
the reformed costs assessment scheme in New South Wales has proved to be a useful and 
cost effective way to settle costs disputes. If New South Wales Parliament accepts the Chief 
Justices‘ Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme recommendations and as a new model 
Legal Profession bill may well be adopted in the near future, costs assessment in New South 
Wales will soon be a substantially different, and perhaps much more expedient process to 
what it is today.   
3.14.1 One reservation 
This thesis does argue that despite the 1994 Reforms being generally sound, and sensibly 
altered where they proved to be unsound,
652
 there was, and still is, one fundamental 
inadequacy in their approach. Scales of costs, which were mistakenly construed as anti-
competitive, should never have been abandoned.
653
 
Lack of information about legal fees, and the effect that has on the market, is a recurring 
theme in New South Wales. The Legal Fees Review Panel Report: Legal Costs in New South 
Wales (2005), commissioned to address ‗the perception that lawyers‘ fees are too high, and 
that the level of these fees makes access to justice unduly expensive‘ noted that ‗one of the 
major contributing factors to this perception is the lack of publicly accessible information on 
the costs structures of legal practices‘.654 One of the recommendations of that report was that: 
A formal and independent research capacity should be established within the Office of 
the Legal Services Commissioner to examine and publicly discuss issues of law firm 
economics and legal practice management, and their economic impacts on the overall 
legal and justice systems.
655
  
In light of that reported perception, it is hard not to conclude that the costs assessment 
scheme in New South Wales would be more transparent if there were benchmarks against 
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which costs were assessed. The current benchmark is the individual assessors view of what is 
reasonable, a view reasonably tempered by a range of factors that are set out in the 2004 Act. 
However, there are no overarching benchmarks to which assessors can refer. The assessor is 
a practitioner, and as such the public would be excused for thinking that the assessor‘s view 
as to what costs are reasonable is likely to be in line with what the profession as a whole 
thinks of as reasonable. The profession‘s is arguably not a particularly objective viewpoint. 
As noted above, and, despite strong disclosure regimes ensuring that they are properly 
informed as to what they will be charged, the public do not have ready access to what the 
general charge out rates are in the industry. It is very difficult, especially for infrequent users 
of the legal system, to bargain for legal services, in part because the public does not have 
enough information to bargain. 
It seems certain that regularly updated benchmark costs, applied by assessors as a 
discretionary guide and made readily available (and properly explained) to the public would 
ensure that the indemnities that winning litigants enjoy under a costs order would be founded 
on objective and trusted measures of reasonableness. The inconsistencies identified for return 
rates in the current costs assessment scheme promote uncertainty and make it more difficult 
to make objective decisions about the efficacy of litigation. 
It is sound policy that legal practitioners lose the benefit of the costs agreements that they 
draft to confirm their fees and protect their interests if those agreements are in some way 
unreasonable. The same holds for situations where the practitioner defaults in the disclosure 
regime. It is also sound policy to have some objective measure of what the practitioners 
should be paid in those circumstances. One might expect that the costs assessors put in the 
position of having to make those determinations would be relieved to have some guidance as 
to what was appropriate. In any event, those measures should not be left to the individual 
determinations of fellow legal practitioners. 
Although costs assessment in New South Wales has been moved, at least in the first instance, 
outside judicial purvey, benchmarks for costs would give costs assessors some of the same 
guidance judges get from statute law. Costs assessors would be in a position where they 
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applied benchmarks, albeit with some necessary and creative discretion, rather than having to 
determine them for themselves. 
Benchmark costs, properly arrived at and properly packaged so that the consumers of legal 
services can readily understand them, would encourage competition and empower legal 
consumers. Costs assessors, being legal practitioners, are not the people who should be 
determining the benchmarks. An expert body, made up along the lines of the Legal Costs 
Board as constituted before the 1994 Reforms, and including representation from the legal 
profession, would better provide rational and objective measures of what practitioners should 
reasonably charge for their services. Those measures would help standardise party/party 
returns and provide a default for practitioner costs.  
Scales of costs, rebadged as benchmark costs or guidelines, properly explained and applied 
would strengthen the New South Wales costs assessment regime.
656
 The recommendation for 
reintroducing guidelines as to costs as contained in the draft report from the Chief Justice‘s 
Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme are sound, but by failing to recommend applying 
those guidelines as a default measure of practitioners‘ costs they fall short of going far 
enough. 
3.14.2: The expense of the current system in New South Wales and the ‘user pay’ 
principle. 
One of the common complaints about the New South Wales costs assessment regime is that it 
is expensive. This is particularly so with the review level of assessment. However, any view 
that the reformed system is more expensive than the system it replaced overlooks one of the 
key aspects of the reform. The expense of costs assessment has been shifted from the court 
(and thus the taxpayer) to the users of the system. Under the old form of costs assessment 
there were fees paid to the court, but those fees were in no real way related to the amount of 
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time or to the volume of resources that the court put into assessments. In effect, the true cost 
of costs assessment was unknown. After the 1994 Reforms the costs of assessment were easy 
to ascertain and thus easy to pass on to the people who used the system. The lawyers who did 
the actual assessment are now paid an hourly rate and they record their time accurately for 
that reason. The rate that they are paid is not unreasonable;
657
 in most cases it is a 
considerable discount on what they would charge for doing legal work of a similar level of 
complexity. The administrative structure that runs the costs assessment regime is small and 
efficient, and as the cost of that infrastructure is easily determined, filing fees can be charged 
at a level that recovers the costs of administration.
658
 A more accurate expression of the 
complaint about expense can probably be expressed as follows: ‗if I apply for assessment and 
have the costs awarded against me I will pay the true costs of having that assessment done 
rather than having my application subsidised as was previously the case‘.  
There is an argument that making a litigant (or a disgruntled client) pay the true costs of 
assessment is a restriction on access to justice. However, it should be recognised that justice 
is not something that occurs naturally, it is instead a manufactured product of a social system. 
There is an argument that a person who wishes to access a product should pay the real cost of 
that product. The costs assessment regime has a principled mechanism to ensure that people 
who access the system for good reason are not penalised; the assessor has the discretion to 
award the costs of the process as he or she thinks it just or reasonable to do so. If, in a dispute 
between a client and a practitioner, the bill in question is reduced by 15% or more the 
practitioner will pay the costs of assessment.
659
 This is eminently fair as the client has been 
proved right in his or her contention that the bill was too high. The situation is not so straight 
forward in relation to party/party assessments, where generally it is the party who is 
responsible for paying the costs ordered who also pays the costs of assessment, but if an 
assessor feels that is unjust he or she can order otherwise. If the current 15% rule was 
extended to party/party assessments,
660
 and there are published guidelines that allow the 
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parties to make realistic determinations as to what costs are likely to be awarded, it may be 
that the volume of assessments would be dramatically reduces. The reduction would come 
through the parties making rational choices guided by the risks of having to pay for the 
process.  
3.14.3 An alternate argument for administrative costs assessment 
There is an argument for separating the function of determining legal disputes from the 
function of determining the cost of those disputes that did not arise in the parliamentary 
debates surrounding the 1994 Reforms. That argument is largely centred in the philosophy of 
an adversarial dispute resolution system. An adversarial system relies on conflict to produce 
truth. Having a legal system that centres on truth is no bad thing; a dispute resolution system 
that has to determine an individual citizen‘s rights should surely do so on the basis of 
knowing the true story behind the conflict that has driven that citizen to enforce or defend his 
or her rights. However, costs disputes are not resolved because of solid truths. Cost disputes 
are resolved, one way or another, and in all Australian jurisdictions, around the concept of 
reasonableness. Adversarial costs assessments rely on scales of costs, originally promulgated 
by the courts themselves and more lately by expert panels. Those scales give a range of 
values for what are considered reasonable costs in particular circumstances and are not 
                                                                                                                                                       
operate in client/practitioner disputes, regardless of which of the parties has instituted the assessment. It is 
designed to stop a practitioner from ‗drawing a long bow‘ when drawing up a bill, and to vindicate a client 
whose bill is substantially reduced. However, on its bare words, the subsection is capable of another and much 
more creative use. When the party that are owed costs under a costs order seek those costs, it is usually a legal 
practitioner who quantifies them, being either their own practitioner or a costing specialist who has been 
brought in to do the job. This section does seem to allow the assessor to award the costs of the assessment 
process against the payee‘s own practitioner if it is fair to do so. It may be that a 15% reduction is too low, and 
the current lack of consistency among assessors in New South Wales would make such an award problematic. 
However, if there are objective cost guidelines that the practitioner had access to when drawing a bill that 
reflected his or her own work, or the work produced by that practice he or she is involved in, and if the 
reduction was great enough, it may be sound policy to award the costs of the assessment process against the 
practitioner (or firm) who provided (and quantified the cost of) the legal services. After all, if he or she had 
done the job properly in the first place and produced an accurate bill, there may not have been any need for an 
assessment process. As can be seen in the data provided for party/party assessments in New South Wales for 
2005 (in Chapter Four at Figure 4.3), a significant amount of the party/party bills filed for assessment in New 
South Wales in 2005 were returned at less than 50% of the amount claimed. In such circumstances it seems 
likely that the practitioner who drew the bill had, albeit inadvertently, seriously misled his or her client as to 
what could be recovered on the costs order. It does not seem particularly fair that the client bear the costs of that 
assessment when a realistic estimate of what would be returned may have resulted in the parties settling costs 
rather than having them assessed. 
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concerned with truths per se. An administrative system of costs assessment, where an 
assessor generally practices in the area of law from which the bills he or she assesses arise, is 
a form of binding arbitration. Arbitration works well in areas where the dispute is around a 
question of reasonableness and common use, and where the arbitrator has knowledge that 
informs the determination. An administrative costs assessor will consider the file that 
contains the legal works in question, and will bring his or her personal knowledge of the area 
of law to bear on determining what reasonable costs are, but an administrative costs assessor 
is not required to hear argument as to the truths of the matter.  
It is worth noting that although New South Wales Costs Assessors are legal practitioners they 
are not acting as officers of the court when they perform assessments.
661
 They are acting as 
arbitrators and they make administrative decisions which a disgruntled party can challenge 
on the various grounds that give a right to judicial review of an administrative decision. The 
questions of law that arise in such situations are questions about the process rather than about 
the expertise that underlies the determination. From a philosophical point of view this seems 
a preferable way to deal with disputes that are about what is reasonable rather than about 
what is true. 
3.14.4: Closing:  
This chapter has looked at the costs assessment regime in New South Wales as it has evolved 
into a stand-alone entity. More broadly, the purpose of the thesis is to provide a comparative 
analysis of costs assessment in New South Wales and in particular an assessment of how it 
operates after having been extensively reformed in 1994. In order to do so it will provide 
those comparisons against what is essentially the default for costs assessment, an 
unreformed, adversarial assessment system that is provided by the Courts. Western Australia 
still uses such a system, and the Western Australian system was explored above in Chapter 
Two. Chapter Four of this thesis provides quantitative comparisons between the New South 
Wales and Western Australian costs assessment regimes, and in addition it provides analysis 
from which qualitative conclusions about the two different systems can be drawn. 
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 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 390(4).  
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Chapter Four: Comparisons between the Western Australian and 
New South Wales costs assessment schemes. 
4.1:  Overview 
The main purpose of this thesis
662
 is to make an empirical determination as to whether the 
costs assessment Reforms that the New South Wales jurisdiction introduced in 1994 (the 
1994 Reforms) achieved the desired outcomes that they were expected to achieve. In 
particular the thesis set out to determine if the Reforms have meant that winning litigants in 
New South Wales recover more of the costs of litigation than do winning litigants in Western 
Australia. Additionally, the thesis attempts to resolve which costs assessment system regime, 
as between the reformed system from New South Wales and the more traditional system used 
in Western Australia, provides the most benefits for courts of the jurisdiction. Lastly, the 
analysis provided below will be used to identify any ‗unintended‘ benefits that have flowed 
from the New South Wales Reforms 
This portion of the thesis reports the methodology and results of an empirical comparison 
between costs assessment regimes in Western Australia and New South Wales.  Initially it 
will describe the cases from which data was extracted and provide an explanation as to why 
there is a variation in case type between the two jurisdictions.  The chapter will then describe 
and explain the data set; again with an explanation for why, in some cases, different types of 
data were gathered in each jurisdiction. The chapter will provide an explanation for and a 
description of the data collection.  The analysis will be presented and discussed in detail and 
finally, the chapter will make the determinations set out above. 
The data, and more particularly the comparisons drawn from the data and between the two 
costs assessment regimes, is at the core of this thesis‘ analysis. This chapter will illustrate 
that successful litigants in New South Wales do, on average, recover a greater portion of the 
bills they file for costs assessment than do Western Australian litigants in the same position. 
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 See Chapter One at 1.5 for a more thorough description of the purpose underlying this thesis. 
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However,  while is clear that the New South Wales Reforms were successful in that sense, 
this thesis argues that the reason for that success may not be clear cut. The thesis will also 
argue that an administrative system of costs assessment as introduced in New South Wales in 
1994 is better suited for the determination of costs disputes than is the more traditional 
judicial system used in Western Australia. Lastly, and through a reflection on the data 
gathering process, this thesis will show that the New South Wales system carries with it the 
benefit of ‗knowability‘ and transparency, attributes largely lacking in the Western 
Australian costs assessment regime. 
4.2: Methodology 
With the cooperation of the Western Australian Supreme Court and the Manager of the New 
South Wales Costs Assessment Scheme, access was obtained to either assessed bills of costs 
(in Western Australia) or statistics gathered on costs assessment (in New South Wales). In 
terms of gathering data, it was not a case of choosing the most suitable methodology. Rather 
it was a case of gathering the data that was both available and potentially useful for making 
comparisons between the two regimes.  Structural differences between the two jurisdictions 
meant that although the same data was sought, the mechanics of getting that data were very 
different.  In short, gathering data in Western Australia was time consuming, with the data 
coming from a random selection of the ‗physical‘ costs assessment files. In New South 
Wales it was a simple matter of accessing the data for the year in question by computer as all 
the data points chosen were regularly captured and recorded as part of the operation of the 
costs assessment scheme. 
The research commenced in Western Australia where the author attended at the court on a 
one day a week basis; in New South Wales the research was done over a one week visit to 
the Supreme Court.  The data taken was used make comparisons between the two 
jurisdictions, but it was further used to make internal comparisons between the two forms of 
own-client costs dispute that were assessed in New South Wales.  
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4.2.1: Methodology in Western Australia; the practicalities 
The Principal Registrar of the Western Australian Supreme Court agreed to allow the author 
access to the files of substantive matters that had gone to the costs assessment stage.
663
 
The Principal Registrar requested that the court records manager make available to the author 
files containing bills of costs for data extraction.  After some discussion with the author as to 
the thrust of the research, the records manager in turn made files available from the two 
limbs of costs assessment; party/party assessments and client/solicitor assessments.
664
  
4.2.1.1: Extracting data from party/party in Western Australia 
The records manager arranged for files that contained bills of costs to be removed from the 
normal flow of file management and made available for data collection.  In practice, the 
records manager instructed the documents staff to put aside files that contained such bills, 
and where possible keep them out of the system for a week.  The files extracted were passing 
through the filing office between interlocutory appearances in the costs assessment process or 
because the litigation to which the bill pertained had been finalised and the files were en 
route to offsite storage. Such files necessarily related to matters that had reached the cost 
adjudication stage, as otherwise no bill of costs would form part of the matter file. All such 
files were from matters litigated in the Supreme Court of Western Australia as party/party 
costs disputes are generally filed for assessment in the same courts where the substantive 
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 It is important to note, as has been discussed elsewhere, that substantive matters that go on to costs 
assessment are atypical. Substantive matters usually terminate, through settlement or by way of judgment, with 
an order that costs be either assessed or agreed. Most disputants manage to assess costs.  As costs assessments 
are part of the substantive matter in a party/party dispute the assessment is not recorded separately from the 
overall file and it is not therefore possible to tell how many assessments occur each year.  Equally, it is not 
possible to tell what percentage of party/party matters go on to have costs assessed. Nor is it possible, in either 
jurisdiction, to determine what percentage of legal retainers give rise to an own-client costs dispute that goes to 
assessment. 
664
 As noted at Chapter Two at 2.5.1.2 above, solicitors in Western Australia were not able to file their own bills 
for assessment until given the right to do so by way of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA).  As previously 
noted, the assessment of bills filed at the request of clients in Western Australia are generally known as 
solicitor/client assessments, but for the purpose of this thesis they have been rebadged as client/solicitor bills. At 
the time the data was extracted solicitor/client bills (filed by legal practitioners against their own clients) did not 
exist in Western Australia and no data is therefore presented in relation to them. 
664
 There are circumstances where a bill can be assessed in a court other than where the litigation took place, 
and there are tribunals that hear legal costs bills. They are exceptions to the general run of costs assessment and 
have not been dealt with in this thesis. 
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matters they originate from were heard.
665
  The document staff removed the bills of costs 
from the file and the author attended at the court one half day per week to extract data from 
the bills that had been finalised. Bills that were still in interlocutory processes were ignored. 
The document staff collected the bills at the end of each session, returned them to their 
relevant files and then those files were returned to the system. This process was random, in 
that the only criterion used for choosing which bills to investigate was that they were recently 
finalised. 
4.2.1.2:  Extracting data from client/solicitor bills in Western Australia 
The records manager made available all of the files from client/solicitor assessments that 
were filed for assessment in 2005. These files, where clients had asked for assessment of the 
bill served upon them by their solicitors, came from the broad sweep of work undertaken by 
Western Australian practitioners. Unlike party/party bills, the bills from solicitor/client 
assessments were not limited to either litigation or matters in the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia. 
Client/solicitor bills of costs are assessed in the Western Australian Supreme Court as a 
substantive application separate from any associated legal action.
666
 A total of 78 
client/solicitor bills were filed in the Supreme Court in 2005, and each was given a separate 
filing number spanning from LPA 1 of 2005 to LPA 78 of 2005. The author had access to 
majority of those bills. However, only 15 of the files were finalised to the point where the 
complete data set could be taken.
667
 The process of collecting the data from the individual 
files mirrored the process used for party/party files. 
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 This is a general rule in the Western Australian courts, but there are a number of exceptions not specifically 
relevant to this thesis. The Federal Courts operating in Western Australia have their own costs assessment 
regimes, and specialist tribunals may deal with party/party costs in their own. See for instance the Workers 
Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) s 268(2)(c) which allows for costs assessments by 
conciliators and arbitrators. 
666
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 295 (2). This is regardless of the nature of the legal work or the court the 
litigation they flowed from was heard in, if indeed the bills pertained to litigation work at all. In Western 
Australia a dispute between a practitioner and his or her own client is a substantive matter that falls into the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. 
667
 Most of the rest of the files appeared to be moribund.  If there had been an initial appearance the matter may 
have been adjourned sine die and the parties had not requested that the matter then advance. This seems likely 
to be because there had been some form of negotiated settlement.  
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4.2.2: Methodology in New South Wales: A much easier approach 
The initial approach to data retrieval in New South Wales mirrored the approach used in 
Western Australia. The New South Wales Cost Assessment Scheme provided a workspace 
and access to files that were returned to the office after assessment. After a couple of days 
spent extracting data from the files, the author discussed his slow progress with one of the 
costs assessment staff, whose response was along the lines of ‗Is that all you want? We can 
give you all that quite easily‘.   
The New South Wales Costs Assessment Scheme employs practicing solicitors to assess bills 
of costs on a sub contract basis. The solicitors in turn enter various details, including all but 
one of the data points
668
 that the author was collecting, onto a statistical form provided with 
the files. The Costs Assessment Scheme collected and recorded that data on a database. The 
Cost Assessment Scheme then supplied the author with a print run for all files assessed in 
2005, with the data sought  (and other data) out against each file.
669
 The author in turn simply 
transcribed the data onto the same spreadsheet used to record the Western Australian data.   
4.2.3: An immediately obvious and beneficial consequence of the 1994 Reforms 
As noted in Chapter One and again in the overview above, part of the purpose of this thesis is 
to identify unintended consequences flowing from the 1994 Reforms  
One of the key differences between the Western Australian and the New South Wales costs 
assessment schemes is in the degree of transparency and ‗knowability‘ of each scheme.  
‗Knowability,‘ in terms of the ease with which information about any given portion of the 
legal system can be retrieved, is clearly a desirable attribute.  If the administration of justice 
is to be run in an efficient and cost effective way it must be possible for those responsible for 
managing the system to make informed decisions about what does and does not work.  A 
system that allows for the easy retrieval of data about its day to day operation and its overall 
efficacy is more easily evaluated and more likely to benefit from informed adjustment than is 
a system where the details of operation are largely immeasurable or at least difficult to 
measure.  
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 The New South Wales data did not include the date of the costs order that enlivened the right to assessment. 
669
 The author continues to regret not asking to have the data in electronic format. That would have made hours 
of data entry unnecessary.   
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The 1994 Reforms have left New South Wales with a costs assessment regime that is 
remarkably ‗knowable‘.  In New South Wales the costs assessment scheme is very well 
documented.  It would be relatively easy to work out the annual cost of the scheme, and to 
break that cost down into its components.
670
 If there was any drive for further or deeper 
investigation into costs assessment or even litigation in general, assessors could easily be 
instructed to collect other data from the files that pass through their hands. 
The Western Australian system is largely mysterious, and it is difficult to look at its 
operation in any detail. In Western Australia the scheme is not formally recorded; the court 
does not know how many party/party assessments occur, nor does it have any aggregated 
record of the results of the assessments. Costs assessment in Western Australia, at least on a 
party/party basis, is simply an unmeasured part of the substantive matter.  It would be almost 
impossible to determine what the costs assessment system in Western Australia uses up in 
terms of court resources, and it was very time consuming and laborious tracking the 
relatively small amount of bills that provided the data for this thesis. It is not possible to say 
how many party/party bills of costs are assessed in Western Australia in any given year, or 
even in any given court. It may be that the Western Australian system works well as between 
the parties to each assessment and is at least efficient enough, but in Western Australia, 
unlike in New South Wales, there is no real way of knowing that at the systemic level.  
The Parliament of New South Wales set out a number of reasons why it felt that the 1994 
Reforms were needed and would be successful. At no point did they appear to entertain the 
idea that the Reforms would create an environment where information on the costs of the 
costs assessment regime and the efficiency of the individual assessor working for the scheme 
would become suddenly available. Nor did they realise that while files that go to costs 
assessment are perhaps atypical of litigated matters and legal disputes in general
671
, the 
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 For instance, as the New South Wales scheme employs individual assessors on a sub contract basis (at the 
time the data was collected in 2005 there were 82 assessors) and each assessor returns data on each file he or 
she handles, it is relatively easy to make judgments about the efficiency and expedience of each assessor. 
671
 It is trite that well over 90% of all matters that are commenced in court settle before trial. Party/party costs 
assessments usually relate to matters that have gone through the full litigation process and they are atypical in 
that way. Further,  even when there is a trial the majority of disputants are able to agree costs, so matters that go 
to assessment are in that way even more atypical. A retainer that ends with the client‘s bill being assessed is 
also atypical; the vast majority of retainers do not result in an assessment. Nonetheless, party/party assessments 
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system they were introducing would also, through its nature, provide the opportunity to 
collect readily accessible data from which conclusions about the litigation process in general 
could be reached. However, if the recommendations contained in draft report of the Chief 
Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme (2013) (and discussed in Chapter Three) 
are adopted it is likely that some of that ‗knowability‘ will disappear. 
4.3: The cases collected 
As previously noted, costs assessments come in three basic types; Party/party assessments, 
client/solicitor assessments and solicitor/client assessments.
672
  Table 4.1 below shows the 
type and number of assessments accessed from each jurisdiction.  
Table 4.1 Type and quantity of assessments from each jurisdiction 
 Party/party Client/solicitor Solicitor/client Total 
Western 
Australia 
103 (87.3%) 15 (12.7%) 0 118 (100%) 
New South 
Wales 1204 
673
 (81.5%) 176 
674
   (11.9%) 98
675
       (6.8%) 
1478 
(100%) 
 
Firstly, it is noted that there is a large discrepancy between the numbers of cases studied from 
each jurisdiction.  As discussed above, this difference is due to a major difference in the two 
assessment regimes; the Western Australian costs assessment regime does not collect 
historical data, meaning only a snapshot of the files available to the author dependant on 
costs files in the system at that exact time were available, while the New South Wales costs 
assessment regime is managed in a way that allows access to a large data set with speed and 
accuracy.  The fact that the two sample sizes are so disparate does raise the question of 
                                                                                                                                                       
and situations where a client‘s own bill is assessed require a full measure of the works involved in either the 
litigation or the retainer, and thus provide fertile ground for taking data that may relate to the breadth of legal 
engagement. 
672
 For a full description of each type of assessment see the 3 annexes to this thesis. 
673
 There were 1457 party/party bills filed for assessment in 2005, but 253 of those bills did not provide data for 
this thesis as they did not proceed to assessment.  See the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Annual Review 
2005 
<http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/supremecourt/documents/pdf/scnsw%20annual%2
0review%202005.pdf>, 38.  
674
 Ibid. There were 219 client/solicitor bills filed for assessment in New South Wales in 2005. 
675
 Ibid. There were 329 solicitor/client bills filed for assessment in New South Wales in 2005. 
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whether valid comparisons can be made between them.  This was addressed by removing a 
random sample of the New South Wales data to create a New South Wales sample that was 
the same size as the Western Australian sample. The extracted sample was compared to the 
entirety of the New South Wales data and no significant difference was found between them. 
This process is described more fully at 4.4.2 below. 
Secondly, no cases of solicitor/client assessments are reported from Western Australia.  At 
the time the data was extracted solicitors in Western Australia were unable to have bills of 
costs assessed on their own motion.
676
  
4.4: The data extracted and the rationale as to why it was extracted. 
The data extracted from the bills of costs under assessment falls into two types; data relating 
to monetary quantum and temporal data.  The data sets were not uniform across the two 
jurisdictions; once again the nature of the New South Wales costs assessment regime allowed 
for more detailed data collection.
677
 A description of each data set and a rationale for why 
each set was collected is provided below. 
4.4.1:  Data as to monetary quantum 
The data as to monetary quantum was related to different amounts charged on the bill of 
costs and to the amounts actually recovered on assessment. These data points are described, 
and a rationale for collecting them is provided below. The data, once collected, was 
categorised into quantum ranges of bills, as further described. 
Table 4.2 sets out the data points as initially extracted from the bills of costs in the Western 
Australian jurisdiction and from the statistical reports provided by the Costs Assessment 
Authority in New South Wales.   
Table 4.2 Data as to Monetary Quantum 
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 Western Australian practitioners were given the right to initiate costs assessment through s 297 of the Legal 
Profession Act 2008 (WA). 
677
 As noted above, one of the unintended results of the 1994 Reforms was that costs assessors, who are required 
to provide various information about the bills they assess, have allowed the manager of the costs assessment 
scheme to collate and keep detailed information about every costs assessment that is filed in the system as part 
of the day to day operation of that system. 
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 Description of the variable Rationale for the data point. 
Q-B The quantum of the bill in dispute was 
the full amount sought in the bill of 
costs.  This amount is inclusive of 
disbursements and the filing fee.  
This is the financial starting point for 
all bills, the amount the person filing 
the bill believed was the amount they 
were owed.  
Q-
BA  
The quantum the bill was assessed at is 
the amount of full recovery. This 
includes the costs of assessment if 
awarded, regardless of whether the 
costs were claimed in the bill as filed or 
added on at the end of the assessment. 
This measure, subtracted from Q-B, 
allows a calculation of the percentage 
of the original bill that was received 
on the finalised assessment. 
 
For the purpose of analysis, the data was categorised by reference to the quantum of the bills 
as filed for assessment (Q-B) and was expressed across seven ranges of value for Bill-Q: $1-
$999; $1000-$9999; $10,000-$29,999; $30,000-$49,999; $50,000-$69,999; $70,000-
$99,999; and greater than $100,000. The categories are not linear progressions; rather they 
represent different ‗ranges‘ of litigation, from the very small through to the large.  This 
further division was made in order to determine if trends in assessments, both internally 
within a jurisdiction and in comparison between the jurisdictions, operated across the full 
range of litigation or if they were specific within particular ranges of litigation.  
4.4.2: Temporal Data 
The temporal data relates to how long various stages of the assessment process took. The 
data points are described, and a rationale provided as to why they were collected follows in 
Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Temporal Data 
 Description of variable Rationale for the data point. 
T-O  The date the order for assessment of 
costs was made.  
(This information was not available for 
costs assessments in New South Wales) 
This measure marks the start of the 
assessment process. 
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T-F  The date the bill of costs was filed for 
assessment (in Western Australia) or 
the date the file was assigned to an 
assessor (in New South Wales).  
This measure, contrasted with T-O, 
enables a calculation as to the time 
elapsed between when the right to 
assessment arose and when the 
assessment took place.
678
   
T-C The date that the assessment was 
completed.  
This measure, contrasted with T-F, 
allows for a calculation of how long 
the bill remained in the costs 
assessment system.
679
  
T-A The time taken, measured in minutes, 
for the actual assessment. 
(This information was not available for 
costs assessments in Western Australia) 
This measure allows a calculation as 
to how the quantum of a bill relates to 
the time taken to assess that bill. 
 
4.4.3: Difference in data collection across the jurisdictions 
It was not possible to collect data about the same temporal events across both jurisdictions. 
As explained a 4.2.1 above, the only way to collect any data in Western Australia was 
through scrutiny of individual bills after those bills had been through the assessment process. 
Although it was time consuming this approach did allow for a wide range of data collection.  
For example, in Western Australia the date that the costs order that enlivened the winning 
litigant‘s right to recover his or her costs was extracted from the matter file that contained the 
bill of costs. That information was not recorded by the New South Wales costs assessment 
regime and so not available. 
However, in Western Australia it was not always possible to determine how long the actual 
assessment took. Some Western Australian assessors noted the start and finish times for the 
appearance or appearances where the assessment took place, many did not.
 680
  Of the 103 
party/party bills investigated in Western Australia, only a small percentage provided enough 
information for the author to determine how long the actual assessment took.  By contrast, in 
New South Wales, where assessments are done on the papers and the assessors are 
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 Parties to a costs dispute will usually make some real attempt to settle the dispute and this time may reflect 
time spent in trying to reach an agreement. Alternately it may reflect delay on the part of the lawyers in 
preparing and filing the bill for assessment. 
679
 In New South Wales there was an unmeasured ‗lag‘ between when the bill was filed and when it was sent to 
an assessor, as the date of filing was not recorded but the date of assignment was.  
680
 A full description of the assessment process in Western Australia is provided in annexure 2 to this thesis. 
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subcontractors to the assessing authority (and paid an hourly rate), each assessor reported 
how long the actual assessment process took.
681
 
4.5: The data presented 
 The data is presented in either table or figure format, and initially the data from both 
jurisdictions is presented together to make comparisons easier.  Presentation of data used for 
internal analysis of individual jurisdictions follows.  Data for party/party assessment is dealt 
with first, followed by the data for client/solicitor assessments.  The data relating to 
solicitor/client assessments was extracted from only the New South Wales jurisdiction and 
that data is presented last.
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4.5.1: Interpreting statistical results: a helpful guide 
There are certain basic principles that need to be explained in order to facilitate the reader‘s 
understanding of statistical results presented in this thesis. 
Inferential statistics are statistics that allow an inference to be drawn about the everyday 
relevance of results.  (In other words, can we extrapolate from the data we collected to the 
real world?) This is achieved by looking at the probability figure which is generated from 
these statistics.  This is the probability of being wrong if you extrapolate from the statistical 
result.  We obviously want this figure to be as low as possible.  By convention, we are not 
permitted to say there is a ‗difference‘ or a ‗relationship‘ when the probability figure is 
greater than 0.05.  Therefore, by convention we accept an error rate of 5 times in every 100 
results. 
Two types of inferential statistics are used in this thesis.  Each will be explained separately. 
4.5.1.1:  t-tests 
Testing for a difference between two means (averages) can be done by way of t-tests, which 
are relatively simple tests. There are three types of t-test, but this thesis only uses two of 
them.  The interpretation of the t-tests is the same for each.  The larger ‗t‘ value (or result) 
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 See 4.3 above. 
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the greater the difference between the two means, and the smaller the probability of being 
wrong will be. 
Single sample t-tests are used when you want to see if a smaller sample is different from the 
larger sample from which it was drawn.  In the case of this thesis, the single sample t-tests 
are used to determine if a random sample drawn from the larger dataset from NSW is 
reflective of that larger sample.  We want to see the single sample t-test results to be non 
significant (that is with a probability figure of greater than 0.05).  This tells us that the 
smaller sample is not different from the larger original sample. 
The second type of t-test used in this thesis is an independent sample t-test.  This tests for a 
difference between two independent groups (jurisdictions for example).  We use this test to 
determine if NSW and WA are truly different.  We want to see the ‗t‘ value as large as 
possible and the probability value to be as small as possible to be able to say that there is a 
real difference between the two jurisdictions. 
The t-tests are expressed in the following manner and at the end of the written explanation of 
the results. 
Example: 
The percentage of bills returned was significantly greater in NSW than in WA (t(210) = 4.17; 
p=.002). 
 
 
 
4.5.1.2: Correlation 
Correlational analysis allows an inference to be drawn about whether one variable is related 
to another variable.  In other words, it allows us to say whether there is a relationship 
between two things, such as the size of a bill and how long that bill takes to assess.  
Correlation is represented by the letter r and can range from -1 to 1. Correlation is reported in 
„t‟ value 
Probability of being 
wrong 
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the same way at t-tests and is interpreted in a similar way.  The larger the r figure, the 
stronger the relationship and the smaller the probability of being wrong.  In addition, 
correlation has three standard ‗cut-offs‘.  Correlations smaller than .3 (or -.3) are said to be 
weak, .3 to .5 (or -.3 to -.5) are moderate, and larger than .5 (or -.5) are strong. Below is an 
example in the standard format for reporting a correlation. 
Example: 
There was a weak but significant positive relationship between the size of a bill and the 
length of time taken to assess that bill, indicating that the larger the bill the longer it took to 
assess (r (105) = .25; p=.04).   
 
 
 
4.5.2: Quantum of party/party bills filed for assessment 
The bulk of costs assessments in both jurisdictions involve party/party bills of costs. As 
previously noted, in New South Wales all party/party assessments are made by the Cost 
Assessment Scheme; while in Western Australia party/party costs assessments are performed 
by the court that heard the substantive matter that gave rise to the costs orders that enliven 
the right to assessment.  For this reason the data from New South Wales represents all 
manner of party/party bills, from all of the courts of the New South Wales jurisdiction and 
from all types of legal work. The data from Western Australia only relates to Supreme Court 
litigation, and as the Supreme Court is the highest court in the jurisdiction one would expect 
that the quantum of the bills filed for assessment there would generally be higher than the 
quantum of the bills filed in New South Wales. 
Probability of being 
wrong 
„r‟ 
value 
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Figure 4.1: Pie charts illustrating the percentage of party-party bills falling into each quantum category for 
WA and NSW 
 
As is explained below, the data confounds the intuitive expectation that Western Australian 
party/party bills of costs will be generally trend higher than those filed in New South Wales. 
The opposite appears to be true.  
At the lowest value category neither jurisdiction records many filings. This is as it should be. 
The successful practitioner whose client has the benefit of a costs order knows that using the 
costs assessment scheme to recover it is not likely to be cost effective if the quantum of the 
bill is low.  Even if the bill is assessed as filed, the works the solicitor does towards the costs 
assessment will be charged out to the client at the costs agreement rate and recovered (if it is 
recovered) at scale rates. In such instances it is far better to settle costs, even at some 
substantial discount, than it is to have them assessed. Conversely, if the bill of costs that has 
been served on the losing party is reasonable, that party‘s lawyer should advise that failing to 
settle costs and having the winner proceed to assessment will mean that the losing litigant 
may not only pay more to the winning party but will also be paying unnecessary costs to his 
or her own solicitor. In such instances there is a very strong imperative to settle cost for bills 
at the lower end, and in any event. 
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 It is the next two value categories that show surprising results. The bulk of New South 
Wales party/party assessments (63%) are for bills of between $1,000.00 and $30,000.00. This 
is the low to lower mid range of litigation, and when the bills have been drawn from all of a 
jurisdiction‘s courts it seems likely that the low to lower mid range of bills would be well 
represented.  In Western Australia however over 83% of all party/party bills filed for 
assessment also fall into those two value categories.  This comparison provides a counter 
intuitive result. Viewed on its own, the Western Australian data may seem unsurprising, but 
viewed against the New South Wales data it seems to show an odd difference between the 
jurisdictions.  The party/party bills that are assessed in the Western Australian Supreme 
Court come from substantive matters before that court. The Western Australian Supreme 
Court is the highest court in the hierarchy of Western Australian courts. It sits above the 
Magistrates‘ Court and the District Court, and the threshold for civil disputes coming before 
the Supreme Court‘s General Division was (in 2005) $500,000.683 It is certainly true that the 
quantum of a disputed bill does not necessarily relate to the legal complexities of the matter, 
but the Supreme Court hears a range of other generally complicated matters in its original 
jurisdiction.  That 83% of the party/party bills filed for assessment in the Western Australian 
Supreme Court fall come from matters where the legal costs are below $30,000.00 is an 
unexpected result.  
There is no clear reason why such a large portion of the assessed bills should relate to what 
are, in overall terms, smaller levels of litigation. It may be that this unexpected result says 
something about the type of client that is choosing to access the costs assessment regime.  
Litigants can be divided into two basic types, sophisticated and unsophisticated, and are so 
divided by the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA).
684
  Sophisticated litigants, well versed in the 
litigation process, aware of legal costs generally and often able to claim monies expended on 
                                                 
683
 The District Court‘s general division was increased from $500,000.00 to $750,000.00 on 1 January 2009, for 
general disputes (excluding personal injury matters where the District Court has unlimited jurisdiction) above 
that amount matters are heard in the Western Australian Supreme Court: Courts Legislation Amendment and 
Repeal Act 2003 (WA) s 82(1). There are a range of other matters which may involve smaller and even much 
smaller sums that are heard in the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction: see Supreme Court Act 1935 
(WA) div 1, ss 16-20.  
684
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 263(2) (c) provides a list of ‗sophisticated‘ litigants; the general 
disclosure regime is reduced for such clients. Sophisticates litigants are generally litigants who are engaged in 
litigation as a general (rather than specific) element of their organisational functions, for example public 
companies and insurers.  
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legal costs as a tax deduction, may be more likely to take a rational approach to a costs 
dispute and to settle legal costs without going to assessment.  Such litigants may also be 
more likely to be involved in larger sum litigation. Unsophisticated litigants, often involved 
in their first (and hopefully only) interaction with the courts may be less likely to accept a 
costs settlement that it well below what they have paid for the conduct of the litigation, on 
the grounds that they have won and that a principle is at stake. However, as no attempt was 
made to differentiate between the types of litigant involved in each assessment, this can only 
be postulated, and cannot be proved.   
4.5.3: Percentage of party/party bill awarded after assessment 
 The following graphs show the percentage at which party/party bills were assessed at any 
given return rate across the two jurisdictions. The vertical measure is the number of bills and 
the horizontal measure is the rate at which bills were returned.  
 
Figure 4.2: Percentage of bill awarded for party-party bills in Western Australia 
 
This table shows the variance between the amount party/party bills in Western Australia were 
filed at and the amount that the bills were assessed at, expressed as a percentage of the filed 
amount. As can be seen, the bulk of the Western Australian bills fall between 70.90 and 
103.09% return.  As BA (amount the bill was assessed at) includes the costs of assessment, 
part of the reason that some of the bills were returned at a small amount over the amount they 
were filed at may be that the costs of attendance at the assessment were awarded to the party 
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that filed the bill and added to the bill at the time of assessment (rather than when the bill was 
drawn up and those costs were unknown). The winning litigant whose costs have been 
assessed would generally have paid his or her legal practitioner to draw up the bill of costs 
and to attend on the assessment. As a general rule those further costs would have been 
recovered, albeit at scale rates and for that reason possibly below the rates that have been 
paid in accordance with the costs agreement that covers the retainer.
685
  
 
Figure 4.3: Percentage of bill awarded for party-party bills in New South Wales 
 
This chart shows the same measure as the preceding chart, but for party/party bills of costs 
filed for assessment in New South Wales. Note that in New South Wales a number of bills 
were returned at an assessed rate well above the amount claimed in the bill as filed. This was 
much less the case in Western Australia. These outliers, which in cases reflect the paying 
party having to pay two and a half times the amount at which the bill was originally filed, 
                                                 
685
 If the bill is reduced significantly the assessing officer may refuse to award the winning litigant the costs of 
the assessment and in some cases (for instance in where there has been a Calderbank Offer to pay the costs) 
may even order that the losing litigant recover his or her own costs of the assessment. However, unlike the 
situation with solicitor/client costs disputes, there is no particular cut-off point below which the winning litigant 
is automatically refused the costs of the assessment. See Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369. 
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defy reasoned speculation.
686
 However, those outliers aside, the visual representations of bill 
returns does not seem to differ that greatly between the two jurisdictions. In both 
jurisdictions the general rate of return for the bulk of bills is between approximately 70 and 
103%.  A closer inspection, provided below, shows that there are some statistically 
significant differences between the jurisdictions. 
Table 4.4: Average percentage of party-party bills awarded by assessors in WA and 
NSW 
  Western Australia  New South Wales 
 Average 
% 
Median % Range Average 
% 
Median 
% 
Range 
1-999 64.29  One case only 111.66  One case only 
1,000-9,999 80.17 83.52 10.86 to 104.91 92.33 93.39 17.84 to 254.34 
10,000-29,999 73.06 77.40 29.61 to 113.82 79.23 80.72 11.76 to 189.34 
30,000-49,999 66.74 72.80 43.79 to 79.15 75.38 79.87 12.41 to 183.83 
50,000-69,999 56.93 56.93 45.91 to 67.95 79.14 80.99 28.10 to 249.91 
70,000-99,999 84.88
a 
84.88 84.05 to 85.70 78.18 79.29 27.69 to 172.64 
100,000+ 59.69 79.43 79.39 to 101.33 76.01 79.34 43.55 to 198.32 
Note: 
a
 indicates only two cases in the sample 
 
Table 4.4 replicates the data provided in the two previous figures in a way that allows direct 
comparison between returns in the two jurisdictions. As can be seen, the return rate on bills 
in New South Wales is generally higher in New South Wales. The averages expressed in the 
table above are illustrated in the chart below. 
                                                 
686
 It is hard to imagine a practitioner drawing up his or her own bill so negligently that an assessor looking at 
the file of work the bill reflects makes a determination that the bill should be that much higher, but that is one 
possible reason why there would be such a result to an assessment. 
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Figure 4.4: Party/Party percentage of B-Q returned 
In the lowest level of bills the comparison is meaningless as there was only one such bill in 
each jurisdiction and the rate each was returned at is truly idiosyncratic.
687
 At the second 
level of bill the difference is substantial, while at the fifth level the difference is large. At the 
sixth level of bills there is a reversal, and the rate of return was higher in Western Australia.  
The lack of an obvious trend across the compared rates of returns (and internally with the 
Western Australian rates of return) may be due to the small sample size in Western Australia. 
In isolation, the rate of return in New South Wales across the five higher levels shows a 
remarkable consistency. While those rates may be inflated by the presence of the outlier 
cases, they are more consistent as medians than as averages. This tells us that there is some 
real consistency in how much the practitioners who draw the bills for assessment are 
overstating their bills, right across the whole range of bills. It should be noted that party/party 
                                                 
687
 The Western Australian bill was significantly reduced on assessment. Despite that, if the paying party was 
represented and once the costs of assessment are taken into account, it seems unlikely that the paying party was 
any better off financially for having challenged the bill. As noted above, clients are divided into two types, and 
this client must surely have been an unsophisticated client.  
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bills in New South Wales are, across the range of medians, reduced by more than 15%. If 
those bills were drawn by solicitors against their own clients, the costs of assessment would 
fall upon the solicitors, a sanction for charging above what is reasonable.
688
  That sanction 
does not exist for party/party assessments and practitioners are not required to be as exact 
when drawing such bills. 
In order to compare NSW and WA directly, rather than intuitively through sighting the 
results, an independent samples t-tests needed to be conducted. Before conducting that test, 
the outlier samples were removed from the overall data. Unfortunately, as noted above, the 
unequal cell sizes (WA=106;
689
 NSW=1218) posed a significant problem for this type of 
analysis.  This issue was overcome by randomly selecting 106 NSW cases, thus producing 
equal cell sizes for the t-test analysis.  Prior to any comparisons of WA and NSW, single 
sample t-tests were conducted comparing the randomly selected sample to the full NSW 
average.  There was no significant difference in the percentage of bill returned between the 
smaller randomly selected NSW sample and the full NSW average (t (105)=1.45; p=0.149).  
Similarly, there was no significant difference in the months taken to complete the assessment 
between the smaller randomly selected NSW sample and the full NSW average (t (105)=-
0.09; p=.929). 
The comparison between the WA sample and the randomly selected NSW sample showed 
that the percentage returned after bills were assessed in party-party cases was significantly 
higher in NSW than in WA (t (210)=-3.59; p=.0004).  
As can be seen from Table 4.4  and  Figure 4.4 above, with the exception of bills in the 
$70,000.00 to $99,999.00 range, litigants in New South Wales who have the benefit of a 
costs order and who take their bill through the assessment process were generally able to 
recover a higher percentage of the costs they were claiming than could similar litigants in 
Western Australia. 
                                                 
688
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(3) (c). 
689
 The original Western Australian sample had 108 cases, but two were removed as outliers. 
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As noted in 4.1 above
690
, one of the key drivers for the New South Wales costs Reforms was 
the view that a winning litigant should recover the reasonable cost of the litigation, and that 
the system before it was reformed  was not allowing that to happen. The analysis above 
shows that, generally, winning litigants in New South Wales recover more of what they claim 
as costs than do their Western Australian counterparts.  It is important to ask why that is so. It 
is also important to consider if that finding also means that they are actually getting more of 
the actual costs back than are winning litigants in Western Australia, as proving that they get 
more of their bill back is not necessarily the same as proving that they get more of the actual 
costs back. 
In relation to ‗why is this so?‘ the answer may not be exactly determinable. However, it is 
possible to speculate. The New South Wales Reforms were expected to provide that result, 
and as discussed at Chapter Three.3.5.1, abolition of scales of costs was to produce that 
result.   In both jurisdictions the test for allowing an item on a bill of costs is set out in the 
relevant Legal Profession Act, and in both jurisdictions the wording of the sections is 
functionally identical.
691
  Costs assessments in both jurisdictions are made using the 
discretionary application of same subjective criteria; being ‗was it reasonable to do the work 
and was the work reasonably done?‘692  The key difference lies in where the assessor gets 
guidance for the application of that discretion. In Western Australia costs assessors doing 
party/party assessments work by reference to scales of costs that provide a benchmark as to 
what is a reasonable cost for any given part of the litigation process. Those scales are 
provided by an independent body made up of three legal practitioners, and three laypersons, 
one of whom must be an accountant.
693
 The scales of costs are drawn to provide maxima, and 
thus provide limits on recovery as well as guidance on what can be recovered.  In New South 
Wales the costs assessors, who are lawyers subcontracting into the role, have no such 
guidance and no such limitation.  It may be that the reason for the difference lies here.  At the 
                                                 
690
 For a full exploration of the motives that drove the 1994 Reforms see Chapter Three. 
691
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 363; Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 301. The New South Wales Act 
refers to costs assessors while the Western Australian Act uses the term ‗taxing officer‘.  
692
 Ibid.  
693
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 310.  
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time the data was taken there were 80 costs assessors
694
 subcontracting into the costs 
assessment system in New South Wales and they had at least one thing clearly in common; 
they were practicing lawyers with their own subjective view of what a lawyer should 
reasonably charge.
695
 In Western Australia the costs assessors were all judicial officers in 
strict sense of the term; they were registrars of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. 
Their views of what work was reasonably done may not have differed much (in the general 
sense) from the views held by the New South Wales assessors, but their views on what could 
be charged for that work was more strictly circumscribed by reference to the scale of costs.  
It may be that the reason party/party bills were generally assessed at a higher rate  in New 
South Wales was that there was no scales of costs in that jurisdiction and thus no 
fundamental guide or limitation as to what amounts would be (or not be) reasonable. That 
abolishing scales of costs would increase the return was, as has been noted above, an 
expected result of the 1994 Reforms 
This thesis maintains that the data above establishes that winning litigants in New South 
Wales do recover a higher portion of the legal costs that they have expended than do winning 
litigants in Western Australia, despite the fact that the comparisons do not always directly 
prove that to be the case. It is demonstrated above that, in general, the litigants in New South 
Wales get a higher return on their bills, and, further, it is argued that in New South Wales the 
bill that a winning litigant files for party/party assessment is more likely to approach the true 
cost of the litigation than does a bill filed in Western Australia. This argument too rests in the 
absence of scales of costs in New South Wales. In Western Australia the practitioner who is 
engaged for litigation
696
 will, as required by the mandatory costs disclosure regime and as a 
part of the ubiquitous costs agreement, inform the client that he or she will only recover legal 
costs from the other party if he or she is successful and that recovery will only be at the rates 
allowed by the scales of costs.  For litigation in the Western Australian Supreme Court it is 
                                                 
694
 In 2013,  the Chief Justice‘s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme (Draft Report) noted that there were 
62 costs assessors: Supreme Court of New South Wales, above n 557, 30 [1.3].  
695
 This raises the hoary question of ‗who will guard the guardians‘ and one could wonder if having lawyers 
acting as the general arbiter of what it is reasonable for lawyers to charge is really the best way to ensure that 
lawyers do not overcharge.  For discussion of this aspect of the New South Wales costs assessment scheme see 
Chapter Three at 3.13.3.3 and 3. 14.1. See also 4.7.1 below where it is clear that the ‗guardians‘ do not appear 
to be favouring their fellow practitioners. 
696
 Or for any other type of legal work. 
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most likely that the client will, by way of the costs agreement, contract out of the scales and 
agree to pay the practitioner a higher rate than allowed under the scale.
697
 This has a 
fundamental effect on the way that the practitioner will draw up the bill for a party/party 
assessment. In Western Australia a client is made aware that the bill drawn up for assessment 
will be drawn in accordance with the scale and not in accordance with what he or she has 
been charged.  A party/party bill drawn for assessment in the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia is likely to be for a lower, and quite possibly significantly lower, amount than the 
client was actually charged for the works done.  As seen above, the overall return for the bulk 
of party/party bills of costs in the Western Australian Supreme Court was in the 70% to 
103% range, but any reduction from the amount the bill was filed at would almost inevitably 
be on an amount that was already reduced from what was actually spent on the conduct of the 
litigation.  
The situation is different in New South Wales as the lack of scales of costs and the reliance 
on the subjective view of the individual assessors‘ means that the practitioner drawing up a 
party/party bill is not restricted and can claim for all the works he or she has reasonably 
undertaken. This position is reinforced by the general lack of sanction for drawing a bill at 
too high a level, as noted above and briefly discussed at 3.14.2.
698
 This means that a 
party/party bill drawn in New South Wales is more likely to reflect the true cost of the 
litigation.   
As has been demonstrated above, it is clear that party/party bills in New South Wales are 
generally assessed at a higher rate. If it is true that the bills more accurately reflect the costs 
of the litigation in the first instance then it follows that winning litigants in New South Wales 
do recover a higher percentage of the costs they have expended on the litigation and it is 
likely that the difference in recovery between the two jurisdictions is higher than it appears 
through the comparison of the return rate for the bills. As was discussed in Chapter Three, 
                                                 
697
 Even if the hourly rate charged under the costs agreement is not actually higher than the rate allowed by the 
scale the limitations as to maximum amounts for given ‗parts‘ of the litigation will not apply. For instance, the 
2012 scale allows a maximum of x hours for providing discovery, and absent a special costs order the winning 
litigant cannot recover more than that no matter how long the process took.  If it did take longer the winning 
litigant would pay his or her practitioner for all of the time the discovery took and would not recover that 
difference. 
698
 See above n 660. 
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this is a position that may change if the recommendations made in the draft report of the 
Chief Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme are adopted. 
4.5.4: Time party/party bills spent in the assessment process 
Party/party assessments in both jurisdictions were measured for time spent ‗in the system‘.  
This measure records the time between initial filing of the bill for assessment (in Western 
Australia) or the date the bill was assigned to an assessor (in New South Wales) and 
finalisation of the assessment (although in real terms the assessment may not be truly final as 
the measure does not make allowances for situations where there is an appeal against the 
assessment). As was noted above, the time between filing for assessment in New South 
Wales and the time that the file was assigned to an assessor was not measured. Time was 
expressed in months, with the measure being taken so that a week was recorded as .25 of a 
month.
699
 
 
Figure 4.5: Months taken to complete assessment for party-party bills in WA and NSW 
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 The time taken to assess the single bill from the lowest echelon of the Western Australian jurisdiction was 
not recorded. 
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The time a party/party bill spent in the assessment system in New South Wales was 
significantly less  than the time bills spent in the system in Western Australia (t (185)=5.48; 
p<.001).  Also, in New South Wales the quantum of the bill filed for party/party assessment 
seems to make no real difference to how long that bill spends in the system. The results are 
quite remarkably consistent, with bills in New South Wales taking an average of four months 
to go from assignment to finalisation, regardless of the size of the bill. The only 
inconsistency is in the lowest level of bills, and as there was only one bill at that level the 
time it took to be assessed can be viewed as an idiosyncrasy and thus ignored. 
Litigation is notoriously slow, and a system that can complete an assessment process in four 
months, having included in that time a chance for the participants to give written submissions 
as to their dispute and to also supply them with a written reason for the decision is laudable 
in the extreme. It is also a little odd; one would expect to see some upward trend in the time 
taken to assess bigger bills, as after all those bills pertain to a larger  and sometimes much 
larger amount of legal work than do the smaller ones. The reason that this does not appear to 
be the case may be because actual assessment time is only a relatively small portion of the 
time a bill spends in the system.   In order to explore this, a t-test was run on the T-A data, 
which was only available from New South Wales. In that test the size of the bill was strongly 
and significantly related to the time taken to assess the bill (r (1216) = .61; p <.001).  
Therefore, in New South Wales, the larger the bill, the longer it took for an assessor to 
perform the assessment.
700
  
The Western Australian data shows a very different picture. No value category has an 
average assessment of less than four months. Bills in the higher categories take between a 
year and two years to find their way through the assessment process. It may be that as the 
higher end bills only represent a small portion of the overall number of bills (only 15.9% of 
the bills fall above $30,000.00) there is some special reason for the delays. However, even in 
the second and third quantum levels ($1,000.00 to $9,999.00 range and $10,000.00 to 
$29,000.00 range) where 83.2% of the bills fall, a bill in the Western Australian assessment 
system was spending, on average, twice as long in the assessment system as was a similar bill 
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 See also 4.7.2 below. 
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in New South Wales. Party/party bills make up the bulk of costs assessments and are an 
integral part of litigation.  A matter that has been before the courts may well be ‗finished‘ in 
terms of its substance, but the matter, and the ongoing cost of that matter, does not finish 
until the costs dispute is finalised.  
It seems clear the New South Wales costs assessment regime provides finalisation to the 
overall litigation process in a much timelier manner than does the Western Australian system. 
4.5.5: Time taken to file a party/party bill for assessment in Western Australia 
As was noted above, in the Western Australian jurisdiction it was possible to ascertain how 
much time elapsed between the time that the right to claim costs arose (the date of the costs 
order) and the time at which the bill of costs was filed for assessment.  A sensible legal 
practitioner whose client has the advantage of a costs order will make a real attempt to arrive 
at a negotiated settlement. The practitioner will draw up a draft bill of costs that sets out what 
he or she is claiming the winning litigant is owed, and forward that to the losing litigant‘s 
representative (if he or she still has one). In most circumstances a negotiated settlement will 
ensue. However, the losing litigant may be recalcitrant, and the winning litigant‘s solicitor 
will then draw up a more detailed bill and enter that bill for party/party assessment.
701
 If the 
bill is for a larger amount the winning litigant‘s solicitor may engage specialist representation 
to draw and argue the bill. This takes time, so one would expect that there would be some 
reasonable gap between the date that the costs order was made and the date that the bill is 
filed for assessment. 
The data shows that the amount of time it takes for a practitioner to file a bill varies quite 
widely.  As only 99 of the party/party bills from Western Australia provided the date required 
to calculate that time, and the variations were so great, a graph showing average times by 
value of bill would be misleading as to the true circumstances.  For that reason the discussion 
below will report on average times and the various outliers that make the averages 
unrepresentative, and will set out the situation in a general way. 
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 For a full description of this process in Western Australia see annexure 1 and 2. 
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The author submits that in most cases it would be reasonable to have a bill entered for 
assessment within three months of having received the costs order. Three months is long 
enough to enter into negotiations and come to a conclusion that they are going to be fruitless. 
It is long enough to then draw up the bill and file it for assessment. After all, the client has 
won, and has an order for costs and, in most cases, already paid his or her own solicitor for 
conducting the litigation.  There are of course any number of reasons why it might take 
longer, and some of those may be good reasons, but generally it would seem that once it is 
clear that a negotiated settlement will not be happening there should be no further delay in 
seeking assessment. 
As was seen in Figure 4.1 above, over 83% of the party/party bills that are filed for 
assessment in Western Australia fill below a value of $30,000.00.  The average time that 
elapsed between the date of the costs order and the date the bill was filed for assessment for 
the bills in that range was 4.75 months.  This seems longer than is reasonable. However, of 
the 85 bills in that range where it was possible to make that calculation, 14 bills were not 
filed for assessment until 12 months or more had elapsed since the costs order was granted.  
In one case 42 months had elapsed. If those 14 bills are removed from the calculation, the 
average time elapsed drops to 2.8 months. That is a reasonable amount of time in which to 
conduct negotiations and then, realising that the negotiations are fruitless, prepare and file a 
bill for assessment.   
There were only 8 bills filed for above $50,000.00 and the average time it took from the date 
of the costs order to filing the bill for assessment was 12 months.  Once again the range of 
times was large; two of the bills were filed 3 months after the costs order was made, two of 
the bills were not filed until more than 20 months had passed.  The highest bill, where the 
winning litigant was claiming he or she was owed nearly $350,000.00 in legal costs was not 
filed for an assessment until nearly 22 months after the costs order was made.  That bill, 
which included disbursements of $146,000.00, was allowed in full, and the costs of 
assessment were added on to the determination of what the winning litigant was owed.  
That case is extreme, but it does illustrate a problem. It may be that most of the practitioners 
who are unable to negotiate a settlement for their client‘s party/party costs are prompt in 
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chasing those costs through assessment, but a significant proportion are not.  While the long 
wait that some clients are having to endure before they recover their costs may be 
ameliorated by the fact that the losing litigant must pay interest on the costs as awarded from 
date the costs order is made,
702
  it seems undesirable that those sorts of delays are happening 
fairly regularly.   
Why is this so? There is nothing in the data that will provide an answer to this, but informed 
speculation is possible. As noted in the Chapter One of this thesis, the author has practiced in 
the area of costs assessment in Western Australia and is conversant with the attitudes about 
costs and costs assessment prevalent in the legal profession.  In short the reason is likely to 
be that Western Australian lawyers do not like costs as an area of law.  Practitioners who 
work in litigation may well know their area of specialisation and the litigation process very 
well, but they rarely know much about costs assessment. As noted above, most costs settle, 
so practitioners are not usually asked to prepare a bill for assessment. Practitioners are often 
either ignorant of or loathe to call upon costing specialists, and there are not many costs 
specialists operating in the Western Australian jurisdiction. It is the author‘s experience that 
otherwise diligent practitioners shy away from having to deal with costs assessment and for 
that reason there is often excessive delay in getting party/party costs assessed. It is the 
author‘s opinion that a practitioner who is lax in chasing up unpaid costs fails in his or her 
duty to the client.  
Costs assessors in New South Wales, who receive the matter file as well as some form of bill 
of costs, could be directed to record the date of the costs order that establishes the right to 
assessment. If they did so it would be possible to see if the same inordinate delays are 
occurring in New South Wales.  It may be that they are not, as in New South Wales a 
practitioner does not need to break down a file that was kept in chronological order so that it 
can be mapped against the items in a costs scale. It seem likely that in New South Wales 
practitioners are more likely to commence the assessment process as it requires less expertise 
on their behalf, but it is not currently possible to say if that is so. 
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4.6: Client/solicitor assessments  
As has been previously noted, at the time the data that informs this thesis was gathered, 
Western Australian practitioners could not file their own bills for assessment unless they 
were doing so at the request of the client.  A Western Australian practitioner who did not get 
paid for his or her services had to either write off the debt or pursue it as a contractual claim 
in the relevant court.  This changed in 2008 when Western Australian practitioners were 
given the right to seek assessment on their own motion.
703
 Practitioners in New South Wales 
gained that right some 14 years earlier as part of the 1994 Reforms
704
 For that reason, this 
thesis only has data from assessments in Western Australia where clients have applied to 
have their practitioner‘s bill assessed while the data from assessments in New South Wales is 
from applications that were commenced either by the client or the practitioner. As will be 
see,
705
 in New South Wales it makes some difference as to who commences the process. 
For the reasons above, this portion of the chapter will commence with comparisons between 
bills that clients have filed for assessment in the two jurisdictions.  Internal comparisons, 
between client/solicitor and solicitor/client applications in New South Wales are presented 
separately after the cross jurisdictional material. 
Unlike the data from Western Australian party/party assessments, which was taken from a 
small but representative sample of such assessments, the Western Australian data from 
client/solicitor assessments was taken from all such applications made in 2005. The data 
from New South Wales is from all the assessments finalised in that jurisdiction in 2005. 
4.6.1: Volume of client/solicitor bills filed for assessment in WA and NSW 
Table 4.5 presented below shows the quantum of client initiated (client/solicitor) assessments 
across both jurisdictions: 
  
                                                 
703
Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 297. 
704
 Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) s 201,  as inserted by the Legal Profession Reform Act 1993 (NSW) sch 
3(1) 
705
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Table 4.5 Volume of client/solicitor assessments across WA and NSW 
 Assessed in 2005 Not  Assessed  Total \ 
Western Australia 15 59  74 
New South Wales 176 43  219 
 
As can be seen, more clients in New South Wales filed applications for assessment than did 
clients in Western Australia. This is as would be expected as New South Wales has a much 
larger population. Population differences aside, one possible reason for that happening is 
discussed below in relation to quantum of bills assessed and ease of access to the assessment 
system.  
Of 74 client/solicitor bills filed in Western Australia in 2005, only 15 (19% of the total) 
proceeded to a full assessment process and provided data for this thesis.  As the data was not 
collected until well into 2006 it is unlikely, although not impossible, that the matters that had 
not gone on to assessment would eventually do so. In Western Australia costs assessments 
are by way of peremptory appointment with the assessing officer
706
, and in the first instance 
the assessor will either assess the bill or give directions as to the course of the assessment.
707
  
The registrars of the Supreme Court of Western Australia who act as costs assessors do not 
like to see court time wasted and if either party to the costs dispute does not have a clear 
argument as to the validity (or otherwise) of the bill in question the registrars are likely to be 
candid about that and to adjourn the assessment.  In such instances the parties will often 
reach a settlement rather than proceed with the assessment. The settlements may not be 
communicated to the court and the assessment, having been adjourned sine die, will languish. 
In New South Wales the situation was remarkably different, with 176 (80%) of the 219 
applications going on to a full assessment. It may be that the reason for this difference is a 
reverse of the reason that so few Western Australian assessments do likewise. In New South 
Wales the assessment process is far less personal. The costs assessor does the assessment on 
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Rules 1971 (WA) O 66 r 44.  
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the papers and the parties are not given that (arguably) useful dose of realism that comes with 
appearing before a busy court officer who will prefer that the parties come to some 
reasonable compromise on their own so that he or she can get on with other duties.  One 
imagines that assessors in New South Wales must occasionally wonder why the parties did 
not just work it out between themselves, but then put that question aside to get on with their 
task and earn their hourly fee.
708
  
4.6.2: Quantum of client/solicitor bills as assessed in NSW and WA 
The percentages of client-solicitor bills within each Bill-Q category were calculated for both 
Western Australia and New South Wales and are presented below in Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6: Pie charts illustrating the percentage of client-solicitor bills falling into each quantum category 
for WA and NSW 
 
In this section of the analysis the two data sets aligned more closely than they did for the 
party/party analysis across the jurisdictions. Unlike the data for party/party bills in Western 
Australia, here the Western Australian data did not necessarily reflect work done in the 
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Western Australian Supreme Court. Most of the client/solicitor assessments in Western 
Australia take place in the Supreme Court regardless of what the legal works that formed the 
substance of the bill were about or in which court they took place.
709
 Client/solicitor 
assessments from both jurisdictions relate to the full range of legal works and was not 
restricted to bills pertaining to litigation. 
As can be seen from the left hand chart on Figure 4.6, the majority of client-solicitor bills 
(60%) for Western Australia fell within the $10,000 to $29,999 value category.  The next 
biggest numbers of assessments were in the $30,000.00 to $49,999.00 value category. This 
represents low to lower end of mid range litigation.  There were no client/solicitor 
assessments on bills filed at or over $70,000.00 and only one in the $0.00 to $999.00 value 
category.   .   
Unlike the results for Western Australia, the majority (55%) of client-solicitor bills in New 
South Wales fell in the second lowest value category. There were also a substantial 
percentage of cases (27%) which fell in the $10,000 to $29,999 range.  There were 
client/solicitor assessments in the higher value brackets, but at only 7% of the overall total 
they do not make up a large portion of overall assessments.  
In the broad sense the charts show a solid similarity; in Western Australia all of the bills 
assessed related to legal bills where the legal fees charged were less than $70,000.00 and for 
New South Wales 93% of bills assessed fell into the same category.  It may be that more 
sophisticated litigants who spend large amounts on legal fees do not often resort to 
assessment. It may also be that the bulk of legal retainers are in that range of values and are 
thus most likely to be strongly represented.   
However, there is a strong difference noted between the two jurisdictions when it comes to 
small legal matters and the fees charged for them. In Western Australia 26% of all 
client/solicitor assessments relate to legal bills where the quantum of the bill is less than 
$10,000.00. In itself this seems that a high number of assessments are being filed for what 
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are essentially fairly small legal works. A bill for under that amount will not generally relate 
to any litigation that has proceeded to a full trial as it would be unlikely for any lawyer to 
take a matter through to trial for under $10,000.00.
710
 In New South Wales 57% of all 
client/solicitor assessments were related to bills of under $10,000.00.  This difference is 
pronounced, and there is certainly one credible, though unproven, explanation for it. In New 
South Wales a client who wants to dispute his or her practitioner‘s bill does not have to make 
any personal appearance at a court to do so, and can file the relevant documents and deal 
with the matter remotely and needs not to be represented by a legal practitioner to do so.
711
  
This means that any client of any practitioner in New South Wales, regardless of whether that 
client is in Sydney, some other city, a small town, or an isolated rural area, can access the 
costs assessment system at no great personal inconvenience. This is likely to make contesting 
a relatively small bill a more attractive proposition than it is in Western Australia where the 
client will have to either engage a legal practitioner or make a personal appearance at the 
Western Australian Supreme Court, regardless of the quantum of the bill. Regardless of the 
reason, it is clear that lower end legal services consumers are far more likely to use the costs 
assessment scheme if they are in dispute with their solicitors in New South Wales than are 
similar clients in Western Australia. From an access to justice perspective this is a very real 
advantage to the costs assessment regime in New South Wales. However, as will be see 
below, the fact that they access the system does not mean that it has been to their advantage 
to do so and that their decision to access may have been misguided. 
As noted above in terms of the quantum of bills filed for party/party analysis across the 
jurisdictions, another reason why smaller end bills seem to be over represented may be the 
nature of the clients involved. This thesis has noted that sophisticated litigants, who may well 
be regular clients of a particular legal practitioner and are accustomed to higher end retainers 
may be less likely to challenge their bills. Such clients are also less likely to be in retainers 
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governed by the ubiquitous six minute interval, as their greater bargaining power and repeat 
business increases the chances of fixed fee retainers.
712
 Smaller and first time legal 
consumers may also be more likely to be dissatisfied with a legal bill. This could be in part 
because a bill for a smaller matter may seem proportionally large, especially for a client 
lacking knowledge as to the costs of legal work, and perhaps because such clients are less 
likely to be able to negotiate a lower fee if the matter has not been successful. 
Surprisingly, on a per capita basis it appears that clients are almost equally likely to access 
the costs assessment scheme in both jurisdictions; New South Wales saw approximately three 
times as many client solicitor bills filed as did Western Australia, while the population of 
New South Wales is approximately three times as large as the population of Western 
Australia.
713
 However, the picture is unlikely to be that simple, and considering the ease of 
access to the New South Wales system and the higher proportion of smaller bills assessed in 
New South Wales as discussed above it is slightly perplexing. While that ease of access 
might well explain why more lower end bills are assessed, one would expect there to be a 
consequent higher per capita access rate in New South Wales overall. This does not appear to 
be the case.  
4.6.3: Percentage of client/solicitor bills awarded after assessment 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the percentage of bills awarded after assessment for Western Australia 
and New South Wales.   
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Wales (1:2.8) while the population of Western Australia in 2005 was 2.01 million and in New South Wales it 
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Figure 4.7: Percentage of bill awarded for client-solicitor bills in WA and NSW 
 
As can be seen from above, there is no obvious trend in the data. Over the five ranges of 
value where there is data from both jurisdictions there are two instances where rate of 
recovery seems better in Western Australia and three where it seems better in New South 
Wales. To obtain a better understanding of the return on client-solicitor bills, an analysis of 
the average percentage and the range of percentages in each quantum category was 
conducted.  This information is presented below in Table 4.6.  
This data indicates that the range of returns on bills was far more varied in New South Wales 
than it was in Western Australia.  This difference in the ranges was a product of bills being 
assessed as higher than the original quantum, as well as some bills being assessed for much 
less than the quantum sought.  This didn‘t seem to occur in Western Australia where there 
were no outlier cases. New South Wales on the other hand had several client-solicitor cases 
which were considered outliers and removed from the analysis.
714
  Specifically, 12 client-
solicitor cases were removed.  Eight of these cases were in the $1,000-$9,999 range (six were 
assessed at below 10% of the bill as filed and two were above 300%).  Of the remainder, two 
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were from the $10,000-$29,999 range, and one each from the $30,000-$49,999 and $50,000-
$69,999 ranges.  
Table 4.6: Average percentage of bills awarded by assessors in WA and NSW 
  Western Australia  New South Wales 
 Average 
% 
Range 
% 
Average 
% 
Range 
% 
1-999 84.10 One case only 108.72 69.80 to 141.32 
1,000-9,999 76.57 63.86 to 86.78  97.41 From 16.50 to 262.79 
10,000-29,999 84.30 From 76.76 to 89.03 86.55 From 29.66 to 223.49 
30,000-49,999 70.69 From 60.43 to 82.50 90.01 From 18.00 to 149.55 
50,000-69,999 99.72 One case only 81.48 From 35.20 to 113.84 
70,000-99,999 NA NA 73.48 From 54.68 to 95.84 
100,000+ NA NA 77.89 From 74.57 to 81.22 
  
Recovery varies from 70% to nearly 100% in Western Australia but there was no clear 
pattern to recovery rates in the Western Australian jurisdiction. This may be a function of the 
small sample size. Recovery rates in New South Wales do showed a pattern, with recovery 
rates tending to drop as Q-B rises. This means that a client in the higher level ranges was 
getting a significant reduction on their bill through the assessment process.  In New South 
Wales, clients at the lower end, with B-Q less than $10,000.00 are, at least on average, 
wasting their time going to assessment as the solicitor recovers a high proportion of the costs 
such that the expense of assessment is unwarranted.  
 
As is demonstrated above, in Western Australia the lower end legal service consumers who 
do access the costs assessment system generally have a reasonable deduction from their bills. 
This means that their dispute had merit and that they were being overcharged. This is 
certainly not the case in New South Wales, where lower end disputes were generally assessed 
in a way which affirmed the bill.  As noted above, the New South Wales system provides 
greater access to justice, but that in no guarantee that the person accessing the  system will be 
pleased with the justice he or she receives. 
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The quantum at which the bill was returned included any amount ordered as costs of 
assessment if that amount had been awarded against the paying party.  Both jurisdictions 
have a 15% rule,
715
 where if the bill in a solicitor/client assessment is reduced by that amount 
or more, the costs of assessment is awarded against the law firm drawing the bill. Alternately, 
if the reduction is less than 15%, the client will usually have to pay those costs.  As the costs 
assessment scheme in New South Wales is user pays, the costs of assessment are generally 
higher in that jurisdiction. Clients with smaller bills that are affirmed at over 85% of the 
quantum sought do risk having to pay more than they were originally billed once the 
assessment is finished and the costs of assessment are added on. In Western Australia the 
costs of assessing a minor bill are nominal,
716
 and will have less effect on the recovery rate 
even if the client does have to pay them. This may wholly explain the difference in recovery 
rates, but there are other differences in the two systems that may also be helping to create this 
inconsistency. 
In New South Wales, where assessments are done on the papers and without any face to face 
contact between the assessors and the disputants, the system works to assess bills efficiently 
and all disputes, real or imagined, move quickly through the system.
717
  This may mean that 
an assessor who received submissions from the parties and who decides that the client‘s 
submissions do not show cause for any significant reduction then simply assesses the bill and 
the practitioner is awarded the full amount. As noted above, in Western Australia, where the 
parties appear in person, the assessor faced with similar circumstances may well make it 
clear to the client that he or she should go away and come to some reasonable settlement. If 
this is so bills that are likely to be assessed at or near the full amount claimed may settle out 
of court and the application for assessment may well languish, as so many Western 
Australian applications seem to have done. 
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There is another difference between the two systems that may have some causal effect on this 
portion of the data. Western Australian assessors will assess a client/solicitor bill against a 
scale of costs if there is neither a valid costs agreement nor sufficient costs disclosure.  
Practitioners may have charged significantly above scale rates in reliance on an invalid 
agreement and a reduction to those rates will have a fair impact on the bill. In New South 
Wales there are no scales of costs and absent a valid costs agreement or in the case of 
insufficient disclosure the assessor allows the bill at what he or she thinks is reasonable.
718
 
This is quite a different situation. Lacking scales of costs as a reference, the New South 
Wales costs assessor may consider that the amounts charged were reasonable in any event, 
and allow the bill at a higher rate than would his or her Western Australian counterpart. 
While this may make a large difference in individual bills, without data as to how many of 
the assessments involved situations where there was no valid costs agreement it is not 
possible to know if such situations arise often enough to be affecting recovery rates as a 
whole. 
More generally, and as discussed above in relation to party/party assessments, assessors in 
New South Wales are practicing solicitors and it may be that their views on what reasonable 
costs are in any given set of circumstances are more generous than are the Western 
Australian scales of costs. 
4.6.4: Time taken to assess client/solicitor bills 
The date each bill was filed for assessment (in Western Australia) or assigned to a costs 
assessor (in New South Wales) was compared to the date that each bill had a finalised 
assessment. This allowed a calculation of how long (the calculation was to an approximate 
amount of weeks) each bill spent in the system. The months taken to complete bills within 
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each quantum category by assessors in Western Australia and New South Wales are 
presented below in Figure 4.8. 
 
Figure 4.8: Months taken to complete bill assessment for client-solicitor bills in WA and NSW 
 
The above figure indicates that in Western Australia there is no obvious pattern across the 
ranges of bill. As previously noted data on the actual time taken to assess the bills, being the 
time where the assessor was in attendance on the parties and assessing the bill, was not 
always recorded on Western Australian files. Some assessors made a note of the length of 
assessment appointments, but many did not.   For that reason that data was not extracted. The 
data above reflects the time that bills spent ‗in the system‘ rather than the time taken to do the 
actual assessment.
719
   The actual assessment, where the parties and the assessor go through 
the bill item by item, is usually a relatively small part of the time that the bill spends in the 
overall assessment process. For that reason, there seems little reason for a bill from the fifth 
range to take twice as long to assess as a bill from the second range, It seems likely that as 
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the sample size is small in Western Australia what is actually being observed is idiosyncratic 
variation relating to individual bills rather than to the assessment process as a whole. 
Neither is any pattern observed for New South Wales.  The difference between the ranges is 
at a maximum of about 2:1, with bills in third range taking about twice as long as bills in the 
second. There is no obvious reason why this should be so. This is quite a different result to 
the situation with party/party assessments in New South Wales, where time spent in the 
system was remarkably uniform. However, as noted above, the time spent doing the actual 
assessment is not a large part of the overall assessment process, and so the size of the bill 
should not necessarily relate closely to how long it spends ‗in the system‘.   
Overall, the Western Australian assessment system took, on average, less time to  process 
and assess client/solicitor  bills than did the system  in New South Wales ( ̅  = 2.98;  ̅   = 
3.33). This may be misleading though, for the reasons noted above.  Only a small portion of 
the client/solicitor bills filed in Western Australia had actually finished the assessment 
process; the bulk of them was still in the system, and thus did not supply data.  Although as 
discussed above, many of the bills appeared to have languished and may not ever have 
moved on to assessment, it is possible that some would do so on a time scale outside that 
measured for this analysis. If those bills were eventually assessed they will have spent a great 
deal of time in the system and, if those times were included in the analysis the average time 
‗in system‘ in Western Australia would rise significantly. 
For both NSW and WA, there was no discernible relationship between the size of the bill and 
how long it was in the system (months to complete). 
4.6.5: How long client/solicitor assessments took in New South Wales 
As data was available for how long each assessment took in New South Wales (as compared 
to how long each bill spent in the system) it was possible to analyse how the quantum of the 
bill as filed related to how long it took to assess the bill. That comparison is provided in 
Figure 4.9 below:  
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Figure 4.9: Time taken to do solicitor client bills in NSW 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4.9, and as would be expected, there was a clear correlation between 
the quantum of the bill and the time taken to assess the bill. Larger bills are for greater 
amounts of work, and it seems clear that the amount of time spent by a person tasked with 
evaluating the charges in a bill will rise with as the quantum of the bill rises.  In an overall 
way, and as can be seen in Figure 4.9 , client solicitor bills in New South Wales spent 
between 2 and 5 months in system being assessed.  It was taking the assessors between 8-10 
hours to do the assessment. As was seen in Chapter Three, submissions to the Chief Justice‟s 
Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme (2011) were generally of the view that costs 
assessment was taking too long. It seems that the assessments themselves are usually done 
quite quickly, so if there are efficiencies to be gained through further reform then that reform 
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must be aimed at the procedures surrounding assessments and not at the actual assessment 
itself. One of the key rationales behind the recommendations of the Chief Justice‟s Review of 
the Costs Assessment Scheme Draft Report (2013) is that a form of provisional assessment 
will reduce the time it takes the costs assessment scheme to produce a costs determination 
and the finding above does call that rationale into question.  
4.6.6: General observations on the client/solicitor assessments. 
The retainers that underlie client/solicitor assessments originate from across the full spectrum 
of legal works. The reasons behind a client seeking assessment of a legal bill are common 
across the jurisdictions. The client may genuinely believe the bill is too high; or it may be 
that seeking assessment is a bargaining ploy in an attempt to have the bill reduced; or seeking 
assessment may simply be a delaying tactic. Despite these fundamental similarities, there is a 
very noticeable difference in the results that lower end clients are achieving between the two 
jurisdictions. Assessment of bills below $1000.00 (the lowest range), where the costs of 
assessment can be as high as the original bill, can be ignored as there are so few of them. 
However, bills in the second range ($1000.00 to $9,999.00) however make up a significant 
percentage of all bills filed in both jurisdictions but more noticeably so in New South Wales. 
A client who receives a bill in the $1000.00 to $9,999.00 range is paying for a small amount 
of legal work. Some of those smaller bills would have related to minor litigation that resulted 
in a trial; many will have been for other smaller legal tasks, including litigation, that did not 
go on to a full trial.   
In New South Wales 55% of all client/solicitor assessments are of bills in that range, and on 
average those bills are assessed at 97% of the amount claimed in the bill.  In short, it appears 
that clients at the lower end of legal consumption in New South Wales are, on average, 
wasting their time seeking assessment, particularly once the costs of the assessment are 
added on to their bills.  The situation is completely different in Western Australia, where 
only 20% of the bills are filed in that range and where on average the clients filing those bills 
are being vindicated as the bills are being assessed at only 86% of the amount the practitioner 
sought to recover.  Some possible reasons for this were presented above, where it was argued 
that the personal nature of the Western Australian discouraged frivolous assessment 
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applications. It was also noted that in New South Wales, where practicing lawyers perform 
the assessments, the measure of ‗reasonableness‘ may be more generous to practitioners than 
it is in Western Australia, where court officers perform that task. If this is so then the 
difference seems likely to relate to what it is reasonable to do in performing a legal task 
rather than to what it is reasonable to charge. This is because client/solicitor assessments in 
both jurisdictions should usually be done in accordance with the charges set out in a valid 
costs agreement
720
 and not against either a scale of costs (Western Australia) or the assessor‘s 
personal view of what rate is reasonable (New South Wales).  
This marked difference disappears completely for bill in the next range ($10,000.00 to 
$29,000.00) of bills. That range includes the costs of matters that have gone on to full trials 
and more complex and time consuming matters, and while a larger percentage of the Western 
Australian clients (40% of all bills filed for assessment) are seeking assessment of bills in 
that range than are their counterparts in New South Wales (27% of all bills filed for 
assessment) the return on the assessments is remarkably similar at 84% (WA) and 86% 
(NSW). Clients who seek assessment of bills in that range are not wasting their time; they 
have been overcharged and the practice rendering the bill will (usually) have been ordered to 
pay the costs of the assessment. 
 There are two intertwined reasons that may explain why there is such a sudden drop in the 
recovery rates in New South Wales. It may be that, generally, clients who seek assessment of 
larger bills are more sophisticated and more likely to be repeat users of the legal system. 
They may have a better view of what it is reasonable to pay for legal services than do the 
lower end users. The return rate recorded for the bills includes the costs of the assessment 
process where that was awarded to the payee. Clients that are more genuinely able to assess 
the reasonableness of a bill are less likely to have the costs of assessment awarded against 
them than are unsophisticated clients, and are thus less likely to have those costs added to the 
amount they are finally obliged to pay.  Lower end clients, who may feel that the bill is very 
high for the service received, but who lack the experience to realise that it is not therefore 
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rates that the practitioner will charge (see Chapter One.3.9). 
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necessarily unreasonably high, are paying what, from their perspective, amounts to a penalty 
for seeking an assessment.  
As was discussed at Chapter Three.13.1.1, the New South Wales Legal Services 
Commissioner‘s submissions to the Chief Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme 
(2011) were particularly scathing of the costs of costs assessment. It may be that his 
submissions reflect complaints from those lower end users who have challenged a bill and 
then wound up with either a very small discount or having to pay more than they were 
originally charged.  Once the clients who are challenging bills for under $1000.00 are 
included, 57% of clients who challenge a bill in New South Wales are not gaining any 
benefit from doing so.  In such circumstances it is easy to see why there is a strong belief 
among unsophisticated users that the costs assessment scheme is not properly addressing 
their belief that they have been overcharged. The New South Wales Legal Services 
Commissioner‘s push for more mediation of costs disputes instead of costs assessments is 
sourced in that view.   
It is clear that from the lower end consumer‘s perspective, the client/solicitor assessment 
regime in New South Wales is not working. However, this does not mean that the scheme is 
producing unfair results.  Although the costs disclosure regime in New South Wales is 
comprehensive, it may be that the answer is in better dissemination of information about the 
realities of costs assessment. The Chief Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme 
Draft Report (2013) takes that view.
721
  Although a wide range of information on the 
procedures of costs assessment in New South Wales is readily available, the information on 
the results of assessment applications, presented above, is not.  As has been seen throughout 
the first three chapters of this thesis, the view that lawyers overcharge has been prevalent 
since lawyers first started charging. It may be that there is nothing that can be done to do 
away with that view completely, but it does seem sensible to ensure that information on the 
result of costs assessment is collected, analysed, and disseminated to legal consumers. As 
was noted above and as will be further discussed below, the fact that the New South Wales 
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costs assessment scheme is set up in a way that makes it straightforward to find and analyse 
such information is one of the key advantages of that scheme. 
4.7:  Internal analysis of the New South Wales scheme 
The data gathered from the New South Wales costs assessments scheme was from all 
assessments finalised in 2005, across the three different types of assessment, being 
party/party, client/solicitor, and solicitor client.  For that reason it is possible to make valid 
comparisons across the types of bills assessed in New South Wales. 
4.7.1: Client/solicitor assessments as compared to solicitor/client assessments: 
New South Wales  
In 2005 the position in New South Wales (as is the case now)  was that disputes between 
practitioners and their own clients about fees could result in either party commencing the 
assessment process.
722
 The source of the dispute behind each type of assessment is essentially 
the same, in that the client will not pay the bill as rendered. However, despite that common 
ground, and as will be illustrated below, there are some significant differences between what 
happens with the two different forms of application for assessment.  
Table 4.7 below shows the difference between the likelihood of client/solicitor disputes 
going on to full assessment in New South Wales as compared to solicitor/client disputes in 
the same jurisdiction: 
Table 4.7 Comparison of volumes and completions of assessment, disputes between 
practitioners and their own clients in New South Wales. 
 Assessed Not assessed Total 
Client Applicant 176 43 219 
Solicitor Applicant 98 231 329 
 
In 2005 there were 329 bills in the New South Wales costs assessment system that were 
being assessed on the application of legal practitioners.  This compares to the 219 bills in 
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 As noted above, in 2005 Western Australian practitioners were not able to file their bills for assessment of 
their own motion.  Solicitors in New South Wales gained that right as a part of the 1994 Reforms.   
216 
 
applications commenced by clients. The difference in completion rates between the two types 
of assessment was statistically significant (y
2
(1)=134.54; p<.001). Only 98 (30%) of the bills 
filed by solicitors went through the actual assessment process. This means that 70% of the 
bills were withdrawn from the system before assessment.   Of the 219 bills filed by clients 
176 went on to an assessment, so only 20% were withdrawn.  It seems likely that the main 
reason an applicant will withdraw a bill before assessment is because the parties have come 
to some agreement as to what is owed or what should be paid.  
As seen above, the likelihood of an application for assessment of a dispute between a legal 
practitioner and his or her own client going on to a full assessment is very clearly dependent 
on which of the two parties files the application. More practitioners file applications than do 
clients, far fewer of the solicitor‘s applications go on to a full assessment. It appears from this 
that commencing the assessment process acts as an efficient way for practitioners to drive a 
resolution for disputes as to costs with their clients. However, as will be seen below, that 
does not mean that that a practitioner whose bill goes through the full assessment process 
will be pleased with the result.    
It is possible to speculate as to why the source of the application has such a strong influence 
on whether or not an application goes on to a complete assessment. When a client files for 
assessment, the client is acknowledging the debt, but disputing the amount owed and asking 
for a resolution. Some negotiations about the quantum of the bill would usually take place 
before the client filed for assessment, and those negotiations must have been unsuccessful. If 
the client and the practitioner can come to some agreement as to what should be paid after 
the application takes place, either because the practitioner offers some reasonable discount or 
because the client adopts the view that what has been charged is actually fair (or at least 
likely to be upheld), the application will be withdrawn. However, it does seem likely that in 
most cases the client will want the assessment to run its full course so that he or she has some 
independent verification of what is a reasonable amount to pay.  
The situation is likely to be quite different when a practitioner files for assessment. In such 
cases the client has not paid and may have simply ignored the bill, for one reason or another. 
The amount of the bill may not be disputed. As noted above, the practitioner‘s remedy in 
217 
 
such cases used to be an action in debt. An application for costs assessment is quicker and 
cheaper than that former remedy. It seems likely that an application for assessment acts as 
does commencing litigation against any other debtor; it focuses that debtor‘s mind on that 
particular debt. It makes the debt ineluctable, and if the client is juggling a number of debts 
then the debt to the practitioner may well be given precedence over the others. In such cases 
the client is likely to pay, or to offer to pay a reduced but acceptable amount, and the 
practitioner will then withdraw the application.  From a practitioner‘s point of view an 
efficient use of the costs assessment scheme does not necessarily require a costs assessment.   
In summary, a client who initiates assessment wants an independent verification of what is 
owed and it makes sense that such applications would go to a full assessment. A practitioner 
who initiates assessment wants a commercial settlement of a debt that he or she is owed, and, 
analogous with all other litigation, the practitioner will discontinue the application once a 
commercial settlement is reached. 
As is seen in Figure 4.10 below, practitioners are more likely to use the costs assessment 
scheme to determine lower level disputes than are clients. 
 
FIGURE 4.10: PIE CHARTS ILLUSTRATING THE PERCENTAGE OF OWN CLIENT BILLS FALLING INTO EACH 
QUANTUM CATEGORY FOR THE TWO TYPES OF ASSESSMENT IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
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As can be seen above, 41% of the bills filed by legal practitioners are for amounts under 
$10,000.00.  This compares with 30.5% of client filings being for bills in that range. This is a 
noticeable discrepancy, and as argued above may illustrate that legal practitioners are using 
costs assessment as fast way to enforce payment of smaller bills.  
The New South Wales costs assessment scheme has clients and legal practitioners from 
throughout the jurisdiction accessing it to solve costs disputes. It is attractive to them because 
the process is all done on the papers and does not require any personal attendance of the 
parties. It may be that more that more country and small firm practitioners are using the costs 
assessment scheme than are their Sydney and other larger city counterparts. One country 
practitioner from New South Wales, discussing costs assessment with the author, noted that 
he could not afford to write off any of his bills and that he always sent any unpaid bill to 
assessment. He explained that this was not because he could not afford the particular amount 
in question; it was because as a practitioner in a smaller town he could not afford a reputation 
as a person who would forgive a debt. If he had such a reputation a lot of his clients would 
‗forget‘ to pay.  For that particular practitioner, an application for costs assessment against a 
particular client was a message to all of his clients, and the actual amount he recovered on the 
bill was not as important as was ensuring that his clients knew he would pursue payment.  
However, while the New South Wales costs assessment scheme could collect and record data 
on the location of costs disputes it does not currently do so and his view is only an anecdotal 
explanation as to why practitioners send so many more smaller disputes to assessment. It 
would be useful to assess applications to the New South Wales scheme in terms of the 
geographical source of the applications it receives.
723
   
One thing is very clear about the own-practitioner costs disputes in New South Wales. Legal 
practitioners are using the costs assessment scheme far more often than are their clients.  The 
scheme gives a legal practitioner a remarkable privilege that is not shared by any other 
business person. If a legal practitioner has a dispute with his or her client about fees, that 
practitioner has access to a fast, efficient and reasonably cheap system of dispute resolution 
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 In retrospect the author regrets not taking data from applications that were withdrawn from the scheme 
before assessment, as such data may have provided evidence to either strengthen or disprove the hypothesis as 
to why more client initiated applications go through to full assessment. 
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that will either bind the client to a costs agreement where it is reasonable to do so, or will 
determine what a reasonable fee for the works the practitioner performed should be.  The 
person making the assessment as to what fee is reasonable will be a fellow practitioner. The 
practitioner who is chasing his or her fees will be given a determination that can be registered 
as a judgment and be executed accordingly. Unlike every other person who works directly 
for and is paid by members of the public, a legal practitioner does not have to sue in debt if 
there is a dispute as to what the services he or she has provided should cost.  
That said, it does not follow that legal practitioners are always using the scheme wisely. As 
argued above, practitioners may be commencing applications to ensure that the defaulting 
client prioritises their bills. Most applications filed by practitioners do not go on to full 
assessment.  As was seen above, clients who file bills for assessments in the lower range of 
values usually find themselves getting no real discount on the bill. As is illustrated in Figure 
4.11 below, the situation is different when it is a practitioner who has commenced the 
applications; 
 
Figure 4.11: Percentage of bill awarded for solicitor/client bills in NSW 
724
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 As can be seen in Figure 4.11, when a practitioner files a bill in the $1000.00 to $9,999.00 
range and does not settle the dispute before it goes on to full assessment, the average return 
on such a bill is 78%. If bill for an own client dispute is reduces on assessment by more than 
15% the practitioner who rendered the bill is responsible for the costs of assessment.
725
 
Practitioners in New South Wales may be using the costs assessment scheme to collect 
smaller debts, but it appears that when the process does not lead to a compromise and the bill 
is assessed, smaller bills, which make up 40% of those that do go on to assessment, are 
generally found to be drawn for an amount that is more than reasonable in that particular set 
of circumstances. The average time taken to assess such bills is approximately three hours, 
and at 2005 rates (which are still current) the costs of the assessment process, including the 
filing fee, would have been in the order of $700.00.
726
  This finding seems counter intuitive. 
It may be that clients who had resisted paying lower level bills for reasons other than a belief 
that they were being overcharged paid those bills once the practitioner initiated assessment.  
Those clients who still refused to pay may have been the clients who genuinely believed they 
were being overcharged, and those clients were, in general, proved right.  However, it seems 
odd that the practitioners whose bills were assessed down did not take more care to ensure 
that did not happen.  A practitioner who is unpaid and seeks assessment, knowing that he or 
she will pay the costs of assessment if the bill is too high, should be diligent to ensure that the 
bill is reasonable in every respect. Doing so is sensible professional practice.  The 
practitioner, dealing with a client who refuses to  pay the bill, should go through the bill 
carefully with an eye for what may be removed on assessment.  If the practitioner feels that 
there are any works that will be reduced then a reduced bill should be sent to the client in an 
attempt to settle the matter before the assessment process commences. This does not seem to 
be happening for lower level bills. 
The situation is quite different for medium level bills in the 10,000.00 to $29,000.00 range. 
Thirty four percent of all practitioner initiated assessments are for bills in that range and on 
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 This does not include the costs of preparing for the assessment. If the client had engaged a costs consultant 
those costs would be recoverable from the practitioner whose bill had been reduced by more than 15%.  
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average the bills are returned at 88 %, which means that the clients have to pay the costs of 
the assessment. For medium range bills and for bills of over $100,000.00 practitioners in 
New South Wales are, on average, having their bills assessed at close to 90% of what they 
have charged. For all other ranges practitioners are falling below the 15% threshold and have 
to pay the costs of the assessment process. As noted above, in a situation where it is the 
practitioner that has commenced the application this should not be happening. 
It is noteworthy that, in general terms, solicitor/client assessments in New South Wales do 
result in the bill being reduced by a significant amount.  It appears that the bulk of clients 
who face an assessment pay their bills, but those who do not and go on to a full assessment 
are being vindicated and were being overcharged. In 62% of finalised assessment the bills 
that practitioners have filed for assessment are being reduced by more than 15%, leaving the 
practitioners to pay the costs of the process. The same holds generally true for client initiated 
assessments where the bill is for $10,000.00 or over; the average reduction in such cases is 
over 15%.
727
   
One criticism of the New South Wales scheme is that it allows practicing lawyers to 
determine if what other practicing lawyers have charged is reasonable.  An analysis of the 
results of own-practitioner costs disputes in New South Wales refutes that criticism. The 
costs assessors in New South Wales may well be practicing lawyers, but they do not favour 
their fellow practitioners and they generally find that there is some level of truth in a client‘s 
contention that their bill was too high. 
4.7.2: Time taken to assess a bill: New South Wales: all bills 
As noted at above, the actual time taken up with the personal appearances before a Western 
Australian costs assessor was not generally recorded.  In New South Wales, the costs 
assessors took careful note of how much time they spent on each application for assessment 
(being their overall chargeable time) as that information was the source of their invoices to 
the costs assessment scheme. For that reason it was possible to determine how much time it 
took to assess bills in accordance with the quantum of the bill as filed and across the three 
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types of assessment that occur in that jurisdiction, That information is presented in Figure  
4.12 below: 
 
 
Figure 4.12: Time taken to do assessments in New South Wales, across the three types of assessment that 
occur in that jurisdiction 
 
As can be seen, and as would be expected, the amount of time it took to assess a bill 
generally, and across all three bill types, trended higher as the quantum of the bill grew. 
What is of interest is that party/party bills took less time, and often quite significantly less 
time, across all the ranges. With an exception for one value range, bills filed by clients took 
less time to assess than did bills filed by practitioners.   
One explanation might be that party/party assessments, where both sides would usually be 
represented by legal practitioners, have the particulars of the dispute set out clearly and in  a 
manner that takes the costs assessor immediately to what is truly in contention.  If that is so 
one would expect party/party assessments to take less time than other assessments at any 
given quantum of bill. A costs assessor dealing with a party/party bill should only need to 
assess the portions of the bill that are in dispute and should not have to assess the whole bill. 
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The reason behind the difference in times for solicitor/client and client/solicitor assessments 
is not obvious. In both instances, unless the client has sought separate specialist 
representation, it is likely that the client‘s contentions as to why the bill is too high would not 
have been set out with any real specificity. In such instances the assessor may well have to go 
through the whole bill, either piecemeal or in a global way.  This would hold true regardless 
of whether the client is the applicant or the respondent
728
 and explains why party/party 
assessments take less time. It does not explain why applications initiated by practitioners 
would take longer than do applications initiated by clients. 
It is easier to see why an application filed by a client may take less time ‗in system‘ as if a 
client initiates the assessment the client will have given his or her reasons for complaint, 
however vague they may be,  at the time of application.  The practitioner would be expected 
to respond promptly and the matter should move quickly to assessment. If the solicitor has 
initiated the assessment the client who has refused to pay may have any number of reasons to 
drag out the process as long as possible, and that may be why such assessments spend longer 
‗in system‘.  As can be seen in Table 4.8, which illustrates how long bills from the various 
ranges spent ‗in system‘ for assessment, such is generally the case (there is an exception for 
the $10,000.00 to $29,000 range). 
Table 4.8 Time own-client disputes spent ‘in system’ for assessment in New South 
Wales, expressed in months 
 Solicitor/Client Client/Solicitor 
Bill Range Months Months 
1 – 999 3.00 3.00 
1,000 – 9,999 2.89 2.31 
10,000 – 29,999 3.38 5.41 
30,000 – 49,999 3.67 2.89 
50,000 – 69,999 7.50 4.57 
70,000 – 99,999 5.50 4.25 
100,000+ 4.67 4.00 
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However, that does not explain why the actual assessment, the time taken for the assessor to 
sit down and check through the bill, takes longer.   
It was noted above that bills filed by practitioners have more assessed off, and it does seem 
reasonable that an assessor takes longer to determine that any part of the bill is unreasonable 
and to then work out what a reasonable charge would be than he or she would take to confirm 
a bill. If this was the explanation for solicitor/client bills taking longer there should be a 
strong correlation between the amount the bill is returned at as compared to the time it took 
to assess the bill across all the value ranges and that strong correlation does not always occur.  
There is some correlation in the lower ranges bills, and those bills do make up the bulk of 
assessments. It seems intuitively likely that it does, on average, take an assessor longer to 
deal with a problematic bill than it does to affirm a bill. However, there is more at play here 
than that and there is no other obvious reason why assessments filed by practitioners take 
longer (on average) to do than do other assessments.  
4.7.3: General observations on internal New South Wales comparisons 
Analysis of the data on costs assessment in New South Wales in isolation produces some 
intuitive results and some surprises. As noted above, it is not surprising that the bulk of 
assessments, both for party/party and for own-practitioner disputes, are for lower to medium 
range bills. It is to be expected that party/party assessments take less time. It is interesting to 
note that legal practitioners have embraced costs assessment in that they are more likely to 
turn to it than are their clients, and are also more likely to withdraw from it before it 
concludes than are clients. It seems reasonable to assume that legal practitioners withdraw 
because they have achieved what they sought, which is to have their bills paid. 
What is surprising is that when a practitioner initiates an assessment and the assessment is 
carried out to a final determination, the practitioner‘s bill is, on average, substantially 
reduced.  As was noted at Chapter Three at 3.13.1.1above, the Legal Profession Act 2004 
(NSW) was originally drafted so that costs assessors were required to report ‗overcharging‘ 
when they came across it, but that original draft was amended so that it had to be ‗gross 
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overcharging‘729. If the 2004 Act had been left in its original form the Legal Services 
Commissioner would have been receiving a report on overcharging after the majority of 
own-practitioner costs dispute assessments. One of the recommendations made by the Chief 
Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme Draft Report (2013) was that information 
about costs assessment be more widely disseminated,
730
 but if that were to be the case it 
would become general knowledge that clients who have their bills assessed are generally 
likely to receive a significant discount and that the costs of the assessment process would be 
borne by the legal practitioner. In short, it would appear published results of the costs 
assessments scheme would prove the old contention that lawyers overcharge. It is not quite 
that simple. What the results would actually prove is that those clients who think they are 
being overcharged are generally right, which is not the same thing at all. Nonetheless, it is 
really not a good position for the legal profession to find itself in and it seems desirable that 
some mechanism is introduced to ensure that practitioners who face having their own bills 
assessed are encouraged to make sure that the bill they rely on is a reasonable bill. The rule 
that practitioners have to pay the costs of the assessment if the bill is assessed at less than 
85% of what was claimed is not working to ensure that practitioners‘ bills are reasonable. 
4.8: Discussion of the data in relation to the stated goals of the 1994 Reforms 
As described in Chapter Three, one of the main drivers of the New South Wales Reforms 
was a stated desire to see winning litigants recover a larger percentage of the monies they 
have spent on running their litigation. As the then Attorney General of New South Wales 
noted in the debates surrounding the 1994 Reforms: 
The principle that costs should follow the event is a key component in our judicial 
system. At present it is weakened by the fact that a successful party can be left 
substantially out of pocket by the unfair basis of taxing party-party costs.
731
 
The average return on party/party assessments in Western Australia, taken across all but the 
lowest range of bills, was 74.71%.  At first glance this would appear to mean that winning 
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litigants recovered, on average, around ¾ of the monies they had spent conducting their 
litigation. This is not likely to be so.  In Western Australia costs recovery is limited by the 
relevant scale of costs, and a party/party bill is drawn with that in mind. If the client has 
entered into a costs agreement and is paying rates above those allowed in the scale those 
extra monies would not be included in the bill that is drawn for assessment. The bill drawn 
for assessment is likely to be discounted, perhaps substantially, from what the client has paid 
the practitioner for the conduct of the litigation. The client should have been made aware that 
such would be the case in the initial costs disclosure that was provided at the time the retainer 
commenced. The Western Australian party/party bills that provided data for this thesis show 
what the party was claiming he or she was owed for legal works in accordance with the scale, 
but it was not possible to ascertain what monies had been paid to his or her own solicitor for 
those same legal works.  That said, the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia: 
Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System (1997) noted that ‗In any event, most 
practitioners agree with the estimate that costs recoverable from the other side will only be 
between 40 and 60 per cent of what the winning client has to pay his or her lawyers‘732. 
Although that report is now 14 years old there is no reason to believe that position has 
changed. If those figures are accepted, and if the client is averaging a 75% return on the 
party/party bill as filed, then the party/party bill has, on average, been drawn at somewhere 
between 53% and 80% of the amount the client was charged by his or her own solicitor. 
 In New South Wales the average return on a party/party bill was 81.33%.  The difference 
between the two jurisdictions, at around 6%, is significant but, in isolation, not startling. An 
unknown percentage of the bills assessed in New South Wales would have come from 
matters where the solicitor was charging an uplift fee, and those fees, although paid by the 
winning litigant to his or her solicitor, would not have been reflected in the amount returned 
on assessment.  Nonetheless, excepting that the 1994 Reforms introduced that uplift fee, at 
first glance it seems that the Reforms have succeeded, albeit in a modest way, in achieving 
that particular goal of the reform. As can be seen from the discussion on the Western 
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Australian position above, and further explained below, the actual difference is likely to be 
much more, and not ascertainable from the data that informs this thesis.  
In New South Wales, where there are no scales of costs and a client can recover whatever 
monies that were reasonably spent, a legal practitioner is more likely to draw a party/party 
bill that closely reflects the costs he or she has charged for taking conduct of litigation.  A 
costs assessor in New South Wales assesses a bill against the following criteria, regardless of 
whether the bill is a party/party bill or a bill between a legal practitioner and his or her own 
client: 
―(a) whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the work to which the legal costs 
relate, and  
(b) whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable manner, and  
(c) the fairness and reasonableness of the amount of legal costs in relation to the 
work, except to the extent that section 361 or 362 applies to any disputed costs. ―733 
If the bill is between a practitioner and his or her own client, and there is a valid costs 
agreement, the costs assessor must assess the costs with reference to the amounts specified in 
the agreement.
734
  However, the agreement and the rates it sets out must be reasonable.  
Reasonableness in terms of rates charged is determined by reference to a wide range of 
criteria set out in the Legal Profession Act 2004, and includes:   
the skill, labour and responsibility displayed on the part of the Australian legal 
practitioner  responsible for the matter,  the retainer and whether the work done was 
within the scope of the retainer,  the complexity, novelty or difficulty of the matter,  
the quality of the work done, the place where, and circumstances in which, the legal 
services were provided, the time within which the work was required to be done.
735
  
Reasonableness is also determined by any other things that the costs assessor deems 
relevant.
736
  For that reason, it seems that although costs recovery for a given matter in New 
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South Wales may be higher if the bill is assessed against a costs agreement rather than 
against the assessor‘s own idea of reasonableness, there is no reason for a party/party bill to 
be assessed at much less than the solicitor/client bill that reflects that same work. In essence, 
an order for party/party costs in New South Wales is more akin to an order for indemnity 
costs in Western Australia.  As one commentator noted, ten years after the 1994 Reforms, 
‗[t]here is no longer any reason why the costs must be reduced to identify an artificial 
difference between the actual costs paid by a party and those which can be recovered from 
the unsuccessful party.‘737  
It appears that the 1994 Reforms did result in winning litigants, other than those who have 
been charged uplift fees or have been caught by the draconian limitations of the Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (NSW),  recovering more, and possibly much more, of the costs 
reasonably spent on their litigation. The bills such litigants put in for assessment are, on 
average, assessed at an amount closer to the amount they are claiming than are the bills their 
counterparts are filing for assessment in Western Australia.  In addition, the bills they are 
filing more closely reflect what they have actually spent, and for that reason it seems likely 
that they are recovering an even larger percentage of what they have spent than is shown in 
the data above.   
That difference is not caused by a change from an adversarial/judicial assessment process to 
an administrative one. Rather, the difference flows from the abolition of scales of costs, as 
those scales created a clear differentiation between what a practitioner charged under a costs 
agreement and what a client could recover in accordance with the scales. In addition, and 
without scales as a guide, it may also be that having practicing lawyers doing the assessments 
means that the view of what is ‗reasonable‘ stretches to higher amounts in New South Wales 
than it does in Western Australia, where the costs assessors are court officers. As was noted 
at 3.13.3.3, the Chief Justice‘s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme, Draft Report (2013) 
has recommended a limited return to scales of costs in New South Wales, albeit under the 
new label of ‗guidelines‘ for party/party assessments. If that recommendation is adopted the 
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gap between what a client pays his or her own lawyer (pursuant to a costs agreement) and 
what that same client recovers on a party/party assessment is likely to increase. The winning 
litigant will recover less of the costs of litigation and one of the key goals of the 1994 
Reforms will be at least partially abandoned. 
One of the other drivers behind the 1994 Reforms was the stated belief that abandoning 
scales of costs would make legal services cheaper. Whether or not that has a happened in the 
broader sense of making all legal services cheaper is not something that this thesis attempts 
to answer, although it was argued above (see Chapter Three at 3.13.3.3 and 3.14.1) that the 
foundations of that belief, that abandoning scales of costs would make the market more 
competitive and the costs of legal services thus cheaper, was fundamentally flawed.  
In the narrower sense of costs disputes, the question of which system provides the cheapest 
solution to a costs dispute is not easily answered in any overall way. The costs of such 
disputes can differ greatly, and are dependent on a wide range of variables. As was noted in 
Chapter Three at 3.13.1.1, there is a strong perception that the costs assessment regime in 
New South Wales is too expensive. This does not necessarily mean that it is more expensive 
to have costs assessed there than it is to have costs assessed in Western Australia, where 
there does not appear to be any such perception. It does appear that for smaller disputes 
between solicitors and their own clients the New South Wales system is narrowly more 
expensive. As noted above in the discussion of the data for the lower level client/solicitor 
assessments, one of the reasons that recovery rates for bills are higher New South Wales is 
that the costs of those assessments are higher than they are in Western Australia.  
This is easily illustrated by postulating a dispute between a client and a solicitor the resulted 
in a costs assessment of a bill of costs for the sum of $10,000.00, and that assessment taking 
an assessor 5 hours to complete. If the client does not hire another legal practitioner to have 
carriage of the dispute, the costs of assessment in Western Australia would be $195.50 
738
 
plus 2.5% ($250.00) of the bill in dispute with a total of $445.00. In New South Wales the 
same bill would cost 1% of the unpaid bill, being $100.00, plus the assessors costs of 
$962.50 (5 hours at $193.50 per hour) for a total of $1062.50. 
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 This fee is for an individual or small business. If the disputant is corporate then the fee would be $379.00. 
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Once matters become more complex, or if the dispute is party/party, the costs are likely to 
rise substantially if the matter goes on to full assessment, as the parties are more likely to be 
represented and to have to pay the costs of that representation. The time spent preparing for 
assessment can be substantial and costly.  This is true in both jurisdictions. In Western 
Australia, where personal appearances are required for the assessment process, the costs of 
representation for the time spent in the process will add to the expense. In New South Wales 
such costs will not arise, but preparation time is likely to be greater. Written submissions 
must be drafted to cover all contingencies as they lack the flexibility and immediacy of the 
oral advocacy that is the hallmark of a Western Australian assessment. In New South Wales 
the assessor‘s fees mount up quickly if the assessment is lengthy, but that has to be balanced 
against the much lower filing fee that is charged in that state.  A bill for $200,000.00 has a 
$5,000.00 ad valorum fee on top of the fixed filing fee in Western Australia, while in New 
South Wales the same bill has flat filing fee of $2,000. 
In short, despite the views of the New South Wales Parliament that instituted the 1994 
Reforms, this thesis is unable to show that the reformed system in New South Wales has 
made costs assessment cheaper (from the users‘ point of view) than it is in the unreformed 
Western Australian system. However, as will be argued below, it has at least shifted the 
financial burden of costs assessment from the courts. 
If the New South Wales costs assessment is not generally cheaper, it is at least clear that the 
overall process is generally quicker. The old saying, that ‗time is money‘, is valid, and a 
faster system does provide some level of financial benefit to its users. Lawyers and winning 
litigants, on average, get what the system determines they are owed more quickly in New 
South Wales than they do in Western Australia.  
4.9: Discussion of which system is ‘better’ from the perspective of the courts 
Arguably it is a benefit to the court when a winning litigant recovers a larger percentage of 
the monies spent on litigation, as a litigant who is significantly out of pocket after vindicating 
his or her rights is likely to think ill of the legal system in general and thus the courts 
involved in particular.  However, and alternately, it is also possible to argue that if winning 
litigants can have their rights vindicated at no cost then it is likely that there will be more 
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litigants.  A person who contemplates litigation is less likely to take that route if he or she 
knows that even with a win there will be some real cost.  More litigation means that it costs 
more to keep the courts running at an optimal level.  
That aside, the Courts of New South Wales have received a strong costs benefit from the 
1994 Reforms Put simply, the courts of New South Wales no longer have to use their 
resources in costs assessment, with the exception of having to deal with appeals against costs 
determinations. The costs of the assessments system are easily quantified as despite it being 
housed in the New South Wales Supreme Court, the costs assessment scheme is a separate 
entity that has its own staff and keeps its own records. Despite being described as ‗user pays‘ 
it seems unlikely that the current low filing fees  charged in New South Wales cover the 
administrative costs of the system. This is especially so if those costs included a commercial 
rent for the premises it occupies as well as the wages for its staff. However, if the Parliament 
of New South Wales decided the system should be truly user pays it could easily work out 
the real costs of the system and charge filing fees that genuinely recovered those costs. As 
the New South Wales system is measurable in that data is carefully recorded, it would be 
possible to forecast income and outgoings with some accuracy. As the costs of the assessor 
are charged to one or more of the parties to the assessment, those costs are not borne by the 
courts. 
In short, in New South Wales the expense of costs assessment may be subsidised by the 
government, but it is not borne by any of the courts.
739
 Courts are notoriously overburdened, 
and this is one burden that the courts of New South Wales are well rid of. 
 In Western Australia, where each court is responsible for party/party assessments flowing 
from the substantial matters that appear before it, court officers spend an unquantified 
amount of time dealing with the various aspects of assessment. It is not easily possible to find 
out how many costs assessments occur in Western Australia, as party /party assessments are 
not recorded separately from the substantial matter from which they originate.  As noted 
above, for both party/party and for client/solicitor assessments in the Western Australian 
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Supreme Court the times spent doing assessments are not always accurately recorded or 
recorded at all. The Western Australian courts bear the full burden of costs assessment and 
there is no obvious way of finding out what that burden actually entails. For the Western 
Australian Courts costs assessment is just another step in the continuum of a court file. It is a 
generally unmeasured part of what the courts do, but just because something is unmeasured 
does not mean it is cheap. Institutions that rely on government funding to carry out 
substantive duties but that are unable to quantify or cost those duties are at a disadvantage 
when it comes to justifying any demand for increased public funding. As the provisional 
assessment scheme available in the Western Australian Supreme Court becomes better 
known and more often used, costs assessment in Western Australia will become even more 
opaque. 
When the New South Wales Parliament described its various rationalisations for the 1994 
Reforms it did not bring up better record keeping or increased ‗knowability‘ as outcomes it 
had in mind from its new model costs assessment regime. Those outcomes seem to be an 
unintended and unforeseen but beneficial by product of moving from a judicial system of 
costs assessment to an administrative system that stands separate from the courts. The 
Western Australian courts could, conceivably, achieve the same outcomes without moving 
from the current judicial system, but it seems unlikely that they would ever do so. Asking 
busy court officers to quarantine and measure one relatively small part of their duties would 
probably be unreasonable.  
This thesis argues that an effective and utile legal system must incorporate an efficient costs 
assessment scheme. That which cannot be easily measured cannot be checked for efficiency. 
Just because something has always been done a particular way and there is no groundswell of 
concern about how it is operating is not really a reason to keep doing it that way. This thesis 
argues that one of the strongest reasons for adopting a system as is used in New South Wales 
is that such a system allows for a discrete, measurable and easily modified way to deal with 
disputes about legal costs in a way that can allocate the costs of those disputes to the parties 
involved in a fair way. This seems much preferable to a system that is unknown and unable 
to be costed, and where the taxpayer, by way of funding the courts, picks up the tab. 
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4.10: Suggestions for further research 
The data that was used to make the comparisons presented above was taken from the first 
level of costs assessment. The conclusions drawn from the comparisons have made it 
possible to determine that the reformed New South Wales costs assessment system is 
generally a better system than is the system used in Western Australia. However, this thesis 
did not attempt to evaluate the next stage of the New South Wales system, which is the stage 
of internal review. It would be useful to investigate and evaluate the internal review 
mechanisms in New South Wales. This is especially the case in light of prevailing view that 
that internal review is too expensive and that bypassing it and proceeding straight to judicial 
review is often the preferred option.  However, in light of the recommendations made by the 
Chief Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme Draft Report (2013) and the further 
changes that are likely to follow the new draft legal profession legislation, such investigation, 
if carried out now, would probably be obsolete before it was completed. Nonetheless, and 
considering how easy it would be to have assessors collect various specific data in a costs 
assessment, the potential to achieve real and valuable knowledge about a range of litigation 
related matters is something that should be more fully explored. 
There is also scope for research into the judicial review of costs assessment in New South 
Wales, and into the higher level of review that occurs in Western Australia when a costs 
assessor‘s initial decision is subject to appeal. In order to put costs assessment in context, the 
author read a large number of appeal decisions from the District and Supreme Courts of New 
South Wales, and the general feeling that emerges from those readings is that far too many of 
them represent a waste of the parties and the courts time and money. This may or may not be 
the case in Western Australia. If research provided some clarity as to why matters that were 
essentially doomed to failure still went on to appeal it might be possible to ameliorate that 
situation. That said, it should be recognised that if the recommendations of the Chief 
Justice‘s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme Draft Report are carried through into a 
final report and adopted there is likely to be a real drop in the volume of matters that go on to 
appeal. 
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As noted above, practitioners in New South Wales seem to be failing to draw accurate bills 
when it comes to having their own work assessed. Data analysis could determine if there are 
particular areas of legal work that are problematic. If there are, and they can be identified, it 
would be possible to provide training so that the problems do not continue to encourage 
perceptions that the legal profession is overcharging. Such training could be presented as part 
of general CPD training that legal practitioners are required to do in any event. If there is a 
real drive to stop practitioners overcharging data from costs assessment could also be used to 
help achieve that. The current position, where a costs assessor has to report ‗gross 
overcharging‘ is laudable but may not go far enough. However, it would be worth digging 
deeper to see if particular practitioners are more often involved in costs disputes or are 
having their bills more heavily discounted.  Such research would help identify practitioners 
whose charging practices are problematic, and once such behaviour is identified it can be 
addressed. 
Finally, practitioners in Western Australia are now able to file their own bills for assessment. 
It is possible to determine if Western Australian practitioners are embracing such costs 
assessments in the way their New South Wales counterparts did. It is now possible to 
compare practitioner initiated assessments across the jurisdictions, and to make the internal 
comparisons for Western Australia that were made for New South Wales above.  
4.11:  Conclusion  
This chapter has presented and discussed the data taken from costs assessments that took 
place in the New South Wales and Western Australian jurisdictions in 2005. It has shown 
that in New South Wales, litigants with the advantage of a party/party costs order get, on 
average, a higher percentage of what they are claiming as costs awarded to them than do 
litigants in the Western Australia. It has argued that for reasons not obvious in the data, true 
recovery rates are probably higher, and even much higher, again.  It has also shown that 
litigants in New South Wales have their disputes settled in a much timelier manner than do 
litigants in Western Australia. 
The comparison between the systems for client/solicitor assessments gave far less clear and 
consistent results. It was evident that although clients with disputes about smaller bills were 
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making up a higher percentage of the applications that went to assessment in New South 
Wales, but were then having to pay a larger portion of what they were originally billed. It 
was not clear that such clients were getting their disputes determined any more quickly than 
were their Western Australian counterparts. 
The internal comparison of client/solicitor disputes against solicitor/client disputes in New 
South Wales showed that the costs assessment scheme works very well for legal practitioners 
whose clients dispute their bills, so long as they do not actually allow the bill to move on to a 
full assessment.  A practitioner who initiates a costs assessment in New South Wales shows 
his or her client that the bill must be paid, and it appears that is usually enough to ensure a 
negotiated solution. However, the practitioners of New South Wales who do have their bills 
assessed seem to be unrealistic with the bills they are presenting.  As no such comparison 
was available for Western Australia in 2005 it is not possible to make any such determination 
for that jurisdiction. However, as of 2008 Western Australian practitioners have been able to 
file their own bills for assessment (as compared to suing for unpaid fees) and, as noted above, 
research can now be done that will allow an inter-jurisdiction comparison of that type of 
assessment. . 
The real difference that shows up between the two jurisdictions was not illustrated by the 
data itself; rather it was the sheer availability of the data. In New South Wales data was and 
is regularly and accurately recorded from all the assessments that take place in that State. The 
data set was the total of all the assessments recorded for 2005.  In Western Australia the data 
had to be gathered in a random way, as any attempt to take the full sample of party/party 
assessments for the year would have required going through every substantial matter from 
each individual court in the jurisdiction. This meant that any conclusions drawn about 
party/party assessments in the Western Australian system are necessarily based on a small 
sample size. It is argued above that this is the most remarkable difference between the two 
jurisdictions; one is knowable and the other is not.  
As was noted in Chapter Three, if the New South Wales Parliament adopts the 
recommendations of the Chief Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme (2013), the 
1994 Reforms will be themselves thoroughly reformed. It was argued that the advantage a 
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New South Wales litigant with the benefit of a costs order has as compared to his or her 
Western Australian counterpart will diminish. It may be that the New South Wales system 
will be quicker, and it is likely to be cheaper. It is also likely to be more expensive to run. 
Regardless, it will remain ‗knowable‘ and the data that will allow a researcher to measure 
and report on those things will be easy to access and evaluate. This means that any future 
Reforms can themselves be evaluated and if necessary amended to deal with any undesirable 
consequences. For this reason alone, and not because of any advantages that flow to litigants 
or legal practitioners, this thesis argues that the New South Wales costs assessment regime is 
a better model and more suited for to the effective provision of justice than is its Western 
Australian counterpart. 
As this chapter has presented comparisons, there is one final comparison that can be made 
between the two systems, and that is a comparison of the different philosophical approaches 
that the two different costs assessment schemes represent. The Western Australian costs 
assessment scheme is judicial and adversarial. The New South Wales scheme is 
administrative, and is essentially a form of expert arbitration. As was noted at 3.14.3 above, 
there is a strong philosophical argument that a system of specialist arbitration is better suited 
to resolving questions of reasonableness than is a judicial system that is base in adversarial 
presentations.  
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
5.1: Overview 
This thesis has compared two costs assessment regimes; the Western Australian regime, 
which follows the traditional model of costs assessment, and the New South Wales regime 
which has been thoroughly reformed. 
 Western Australia uses a regime that has developed linearly and incrementally from the 
traditional English model.  In Western Australia party/party costs disputes are dealt with as 
part of the substantive matter that gave rise to the bills in dispute and are assessed against 
scales of costs by the court that heard the substantive matter. Assessing costs disputes 
between solicitors and their clients is part of the judicial function of the Western Australian 
Supreme Court.   
New South Wales, on the other hand, abandoned the traditional model of costs assessment in 
1994 and removed costs assessment from the judicial sphere.  Instead, in New South Wales 
there is now a statutory body that deals with all costs assessments as administrative matters 
that are separate from the substantive legal dispute from which they arose.  That change to an 
administrative system has been described throughout this thesis as ‗the 1994 Reforms‘.   
One of the purposes of the comparison was to determine how effective the 1994 Reforms 
were against the stated goals of the New South Wales Parliament that introduced them. In 
particular, the government of New South Wales stated that one central goal of the 1994 
Reforms was to improve the rate of return to successful litigants when a court has ordered 
that  the unsuccessful party was to pay their costs.
740
  
In addition the thesis has evaluated the effects of the Reforms from the position of the 
various stakeholders in costs assessment: the parties to litigation, legal practitioners, and the 
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 As was noted in the introduction, this thesis takes the position that the current system for assessing costs in 
Western Australia is substantially the same as the system used in New South Wales prior to the 1994 Reforms. 
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courts. As has been seen throughout the previous chapter, it appears that all of those parties 
have gained some benefit from the Reforms 
5.2:  Do winning litigants recover more of the costs of their litigation because 
of the 1994 Reforms? 
A successful litigant, despite having the benefit of an order that his or her costs are to be paid 
by the unsuccessful litigant, may remain substantially out of pocket on those costs despite 
what he or she recovers from the unsuccessful party. This is so in all Australian jurisdictions 
and seems to be a core issue among legal consumers. The Parliament of New South Wales 
intended that the 1994 Reforms ameliorate that position.  They have done so. This thesis has 
demonstrated, through the study of the data presented in Chapter Four, that winning litigants 
in New South Wales do recover a significantly higher percentage of what they claim in costs 
than do their counterparts in Western Australia. In addition, and because of the abolition of 
scales of costs in New South Wales, it appears that litigants in that jurisdiction have bills 
drawn at a level that reflects what they have actually spent on the litigation.  The 1994 
Reforms have allowed winning litigants in New South Wales to claim more of what they 
spent on costs and then award them more of what they have claimed.  Winning litigants in 
Western Australia are constrained in what they can claim by the operation of scales and they 
receive a smaller percentage of that reduced amount on assessment.  
5.2.1 Muddying the waters:  the rise and demise of uplift fees 
There are some differences between the jurisdictions that may have an effect on that finding 
that cannot be quantified on the data presented.
741
  In particular, the New South Wales data in 
this thesis that relates to party/party costs did not reflect the impact of the uplift fee that was 
introduced as part of the 1994 Reforms The uplift fee, being a success fee charged by the 
successful litigant‘s lawyers, was and is not recoverable on a party/party basis and is not 
included in the bill of costs as lodged for assessment. The fee can be up to 25% of the base 
fee that the lawyer has charged. As was discussed above
742
 the uplift fee proved to be 
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jurisdictions may have had draconian limits put on what they can recover through the operation of the 
jurisdictions respective Civil Liability Acts. 
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The issues that arise with allowing an uplift were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively, but see in 
particular Chapter Three at 3.6.2. 
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problematic and as of 2004 the New South Wales Parliament disallowed uplift fees for 
matters where the remedy sought was damages. The data that informs this thesis was drawn 
from assessments performed in 2005, and some portion of the party/party assessments were 
likely to be for matters where the winning litigant had paid an uplift fee and did not include 
that fee in the bill as filed for assessment. In such cases the winning litigant recovered less of 
what was actually spent on the conduct of their litigation than the return rate of their assessed 
bill suggests.  
 It seems unconceivable that a parliamentary party could draft and introduce Reforms to costs 
assessment when there were provisions in the Reforms that would have completely 
contradictory effects. Although the key rationale for the 1994 Reforms was that costs 
recovery would improve it must have been obvious to the Parliament that one of the key 
provisions of those Reforms would have the opposite effect and would significantly reduce 
the quantum of recoverable costs. Despite this remarkable confusion, it is at least laudable 
that once it became clear that uplift fees were seriously problematic those fees were then 
abolished. 
In 2005, the year from which the data in this thesis was sourced, the Western Australian 
jurisdiction did not allow uplift fees.  Although the data shows that successful litigants in 
New South Wales were realising higher levels of return on their assessed bill than were their 
Western Australian counterparts, in real terms that may not always have meant that they were 
getting more of what they had spent returned to them.  This is because New South Wales 
litigants who had paid an uplift fee did not claim it in the bill they filed for assessment and 
for that reason those litigants were deeper out of pocket on what they had spent than the data 
shows. It was not possible to measure the effect that uplift fees had on actual return rates for 
winning litigants in New South Wales but it must be acknowledged that there was some real 
effect. 
Uplift fees were introduced in Western Australia in 2009 via the Legal Profession Act 2008 
(WA).
743
  Their introduction in Western Australia came about through a positive 
recommendation from the Western Australian Law Reform Commission, but that 
                                                 
743 See discussion at Chapter Two at 2.5.1.4 above. 
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recommendation was hedged with numerous qualifiers and doubts.  None of the mechanisms 
that the WALRC recommended as safeguards necessary for introducing uplift fees were 
adopted. For that reason, the advantage that  some Western Australian litigant‘s  enjoyed as 
compared to their New South Wales counterparts has now disappeared.  On the whole, 
winning litigants in Western Australia are now likely to be likely to be recovering even less 
of what they have spent as compared to winning litigants in New South Wales. In 2013, a 
winning litigant in Western Australia may have paid an unrecoverable uplift fee, is likely to 
had the bill of costs drawn for significantly less than what he or she actually paid (aside from 
the uplift fee) the practitioner with conduct of the matter and, if the 2005 trend holds true, 
then recover a smaller percentage of what he or she has claimed than would a litigant in New 
South Wales. 
Uplift fees remain problematic. To date no research had been done on the prevalence or 
effect of such fees in Western Australia. If New South Wales adopts the provisions of the 
current daft national Legal Profession Bill uplift fees for damages will be resurrected in that 
jurisdiction. The wording of the relevant sections of the Western Australian act and the draft 
Model Bill do not appear to limit a  practitioner‘s to charge uplift fees to ‗no win/no fee‘ 
matters or to matters where the practitioner does not get paid until the litigation is finalised. 
Practitioners can benefit from an uplift fee even when they are not carrying any substantial 
financial risk from conducting the litigation. 
 It seems obvious that allowing a successful party to recover an uplift fee from the 
unsuccessful party is undesirable; allowing that makes legal costs punitive. Nonetheless, it 
also seems clear that a costs regime that allows legal practitioners to recover uplift fees from 
their clients when they are successful in a matter but does not allow those clients to recover 
those same fees from the loser is not a regime that is unduly concerned about winning 
litigants being out of pocket despite winning. This thesis argues that while it may be 
desirable to allow legal practitioners some way of recouping the opportunity costs of taking 
on litigation without upfront payment, allowing uplift fees is not a sound way to address that 
issue. As was seen in New South Wales, uplift fees are too easily abused and the use of such 
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fees helps to perpetuate the public perception that lawyers are greedy and likely to 
overcharge.
744
 
Despite the misgivings expressed above, it is clear that the 1994 Reforms have operated to 
ensure that winning litigants in New South Wales do recover a greater portion of what they 
spend on the conduct of litigation than do litigants in the unreformed system still in use in 
Western Australia.  
5.3: Do clients who have their own practitioner’s bills assessed benefit from 
the 1994 Reforms? 
In relation to assessing disputes between practitioners and their own clients the picture is not 
so clear. This may be in part because of the very small sample size from Western Australia. It 
seems that on the whole solicitors are awarded a higher portion of their bill when it is 
assessed in New South Wales as compared to Western Australia. However, this has to be 
aligned with the fact that a far greater portion of assessments of client/solicitor disputes are 
filed in the lower quantum ranges in New South Wales. It is unclear why this is so, though it 
may be that less sophisticated clients are more willing to seek assessment in New South 
Wales because the system there is expeditious and cheap.   
At the very least the data shows that clients in New South Wales who dispute their 
practitioner‘s legal bill and have it assessed are generally not getting substantial reductions in 
their costs because of the 1994 Reforms Alternately, and taking into account the bills that 
practitioners file in an attempt to recover money from defaulting clients, it is clear that clients 
have not been particularly disadvantaged by the change. This is important, as it addresses one 
of the fundamental criticisms that could be levelled at the New South Wales costs assessment 
regime; that it allows lawyers to determine if what lawyers charge is reasonable. It is clear 
that the costs assessors in New South Wales, all of whom are practicing lawyers, do not 
unduly favour the financial interests of their profession over the interests of legal consumers. 
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 The author is anecdotally aware that one Western Australian firm had entered into a retainer  to pursue 
damages from a motor vehicle accident that caused personal injury and where the costs agreement specifies that 
an uplift is payable if the firm is successful in recovering money for the client. In that instance the defaulting 
driver, through his insurer, has admitted liability for the accident. 
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There is one other clear advantage to the New South Wales costs assessment regime, and that 
is that it does not require a client who disputes his or her legal practitioner‘s bill to make a 
personal appearance or to engage other representation to appear on his or her behalf.  In 
Western Australia a client that does not live in Perth or its surrounds is at a particular 
disadvantage if he or she wants to challenge a bill, as the hearing of the assessment will occur 
in the Western Australian Supreme Court, located in the centre of the city. In New South 
Wales it makes no real difference if the client lives in Sydney or ‗out the back of Bourke‘, as 
the assessment is done on the papers. 
5.4:  Have the 1994 Reforms provided a benefit for the courts in the New 
South Wales jurisdiction? 
The second goal of the thesis was to determine which of the two costs assessment systems 
works best for the related courts.  This determination can be made from two perspectives: 
Firstly, how do the differing costs assessment regimes affect public perception of the courts, 
and secondly; is one scheme or the other more efficient in terms of the use of court resources. 
5.4.1: Access to justice via costs assessment 
The public‘s perceptions of a legal system are important. The people who use the system 
must see it as fair, transparent and open to scrutiny, as well as been timely and not too 
expensive.  If any part of the judicial system is not perceived in this light all of the judicial 
system is tainted.   
This thesis did not include research into public perceptions of the costs assessment schemes 
and the author is thus unable to draw any firm conclusions as to how the consumers of the 
assessment systems view them. However, it is worth noting that lower end consumers (being 
consumers with smaller legal bills) who have disputes with their lawyers are proportionally 
more likely to access the New South Wales system.  This is balanced by the fact that lower 
end consumers in Western Australia are more likely to access the costs assessment system if 
there is a dispute with the losing litigant about how much of the winner‘s legal costs should 
be paid. 
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One conclusion relevant to this that can be drawn from the data is that people who seek  
party/party assessment in New South Wales  have concluded the assessment in, on average, 
four months, regardless of the quantum of their costs.  In Western Australia the system is 
nowhere near as timely. No value category of bill has an average assessment time of less than 
six months, with the overall average being approximately 11 months. The average time to 
assess mid range bills is over a year.  In light of that it is hard not to suspect that New South 
Wales costs assessment consumers are much better served by their system, and for that 
reason the New South Wales system better serves the courts. That said, in terms of overall 
public perceptions of the judicial system, it is the author‘s view that costs assessment is not 
much in the public eye.  
5.4.2: Which costs assessment regime is most advantageous to the courts of the 
jurisdiction? 
The costs of running the assessment system would be reasonably easy to ascertain in New 
South Wales. The entire scheme is run by a small and discrete administrative staff based at 
but separate from the Supreme Court.  The rental value of the space the staff uses, the wages 
for those staff, and the other outgoings such as postage and telecommunications that are 
outlaid in running the system could all be determined with some exactitude. The filing fees 
that accompany each application for assessment could be offset against those costs. The costs 
assessors are paid hourly rates for performing assessments and their fees are currently 
covered by the parties to each assessment.  This thesis did not attempt to determine the costs 
of running the New South Wales costs assessment scheme, but there is no reason why the 
annual full cost of the system could not be calculated. 
 By contrast, in Western Australia the situation is completely different; the expense of 
running the costs assessment regime is unknown and largely unknowable. In Western 
Australia costs assessment is simply part of the various court‘s general business and no real 
record is kept of how much of a court officer‘s time is spent doing assessments. Although 
filing fees are generally higher in Western Australia, none of the courts appear to measure or 
charge for the time that court officers spend in dealing with costs assessment. 
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In short, it is very easy to know what the New South Wales costs assessment scheme makes 
as income and spends in providing its services.  The scheme makes an annual report detailing 
how many costs assessment applications it receives each year, and it breaks that down into 
the varying sort‘s of assessment.  If the scheme administrators want to compare the 
performance and determinations of individual assessors within the system it would be easy to 
do so. In Western Australia no one knows how many costs assessments take place each year, 
as with the exception of solicitor/client assessments under the LPA, that information is not 
collected in any formal way.  The courts do not separate out the time internal assessors spend 
on doing assessment, nor do they specifically record the other costs involved in providing 
that system.   
For the above reasons it is not possible to make any real determination as to which scheme is 
more cost effective.  One scheme can be measured with relative ease, the other cannot.  
However, a scheme that is financially transparent and readily measured across all of its 
dimensions should be preferred to a scheme that is unknowable in its overall results and its 
cost of operation.  
The 1994 Reforms have created costs assessment scheme that is much better suited to the 
efficient and measurable administration of justice and contemporary requirements of 
transparency than was the unreformed scheme it replaced. The courts of Western Australia 
are still using an unreformed scheme. The data shows that the Western Australian courts are 
not as well served by that system as are their New South Wales counterparts. 
5.5: Which costs assessment regime is better for legal practitioners? 
The author noted above that it is his opinion that the public does not much consider costs 
assessment. It is also his opinion that most legal practitioners in Western Australia do not 
understand costs assessment very well and are not comfortable dealing with it.  Many legal 
practitioners will go through their whole careers without one of their own bills is taken to 
costs assessment by a disgruntled client.
745
  The party/party costs disputes that arise at the 
                                                 
745 
Over the 2010-2011 period there were 4652 legal practicing certificates issued in Western Australia.  If 
applications for client/solicitor assessment remain similar in volume to those commenced in 2005 there is 
approximately one assessment for every sixty practitioners per year. In real terms the ratio is less as some 
practitioners seem to figure regularly in the assessment process. The chances of any individual practitioner 
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end of substantive matters are usually settled by negotiation.  For those reasons most 
practitioners will only deal with costs assessment very rarely and are not likely to develop 
much understanding of the system.   
In Western Australia, when a party/party costs dispute cannot be settled by negotiation and 
has to prepared for assessment a good deal of work ensues.  The matter file, which has 
usually been kept in chronological order, must be re formatted so that it provides evidence of 
work done towards particular items on the scales of costs.  Some firms will have clerks that 
have at least some experience at doing this; some firms will engage specialist practitioners to 
do this work, especially if the matter and the costs involved are large.  In New South Wales it 
is not necessary to reformat the file to make it accord with a scale of costs; a costs assessor 
needs only the matter file and the bill as rendered to determine what the reasonable costs of 
the matter are. 
746
 One effect of the 1994 Reforms has been that it requires less specialist 
knowledge from practitioners who wish to use it, and that in turn makes it more likely that 
they will.  A practitioner in New South Wales who has concluded a substantive matter but 
who is then faced with a dispute as to costs recovery is more easily able to turn to the costs 
assessment scheme to have that dispute determined than is his or her Western Australian 
counterpart. For this reason the New South Wales costs assessment scheme better suits legal 
practitioners.  
As noted above, clients are more readily able to challenge their bills in New South Wales 
than are their Western Australian equivalents.  Individually, some practitioners may consider 
this a bad thing, although the legal profession in general benefits if unscrupulous lawyers are 
more easily identified and corrected.  One of the notable things about the New South Wales 
costs assessment regime is that the practitioners in that jurisdiction have embraced the right 
to have their own bills assessed in order to recover money from defaulting clients. The 1994 
Reforms have provided the legal practitioners of New South Wales an efficient and cost 
                                                                                                                                                       
having his or her bill assessed are not high and many of the senior practitioners that are personally known to the 
author have never had a bill assessed.  See the Law Society of Western Australia, Annual Report 2010-2011 < 
http://www.lpbwa.org.au/files/files/146_2010-2011_Annual_Report_LPB.pdf > for statistics on practice 
certificates. 
746
 This is not to say that firms in New South Wales do not put in extra work on a file or engage costing 
specialists in larger matters, but it is less necessary to do so in that jurisdiction. 
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effective way to recover monies they are owed for their services, and it has done so in a way 
that does not appear to compromise the client‘s right to have a impartial review of what they 
have been charged.
747
 It may be that some aspects of this particular advantage has been 
replicated in Western Australia through the operation of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) 
which allows practitioners to file their own bills for assessment, but in Western Australia it 
remains the case that the practitioner, like the client, is required to either make a personal 
appearance for the assessment or to engage a specialist to do so on his or her behalf. This is 
particularly onerous on practitioners working outside the Perth metropolitan area. The 1994 
Reforms have produced a better way to deal with own client costs disputes from a 
practitioner‘s as well as a client‘s perspective. 
5.6: Unintended consequences of the 1994 Reforms 
The third purpose of the thesis was to explore the unintended consequences of the New South 
Wales Reforms   One thing does become clear when a researcher has approached both 
systems with the intent of finding data to make judgments about overall efficacy of the 
systems; data on costs assessment in Western Australia is sparse and difficult to extract.  In 
New South Wales the costs assessment scheme, as a result of its being a separate body from 
the courts and thus having to be accountable in a more narrow sense, retains data for its own 
uses. This data allows a researcher to come to some clear conclusions about costs 
assessments both generally and specifically.  
If the New South Wales costs assessors were instructed to record and report further data it 
would then be possible for a researcher to find out all manner of things about what does and 
does not work in the costs assessment process. It would be easy to give such instructions as 
New South Wales costs assessors approach each assessment as a ‗job‘ and are already 
extracting and reporting some data.  It is not that costs assessors in Western Australia could 
not be asked to record similar data, but as costs assessment is just one of many things a 
                                                 
747
 See discussion at Chapter Four at 4.7.1above. 
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Western Australian court officer does on any given day as part of an overall, rather than 
particular, job it would be more difficult to achieve compliance.
748
 
One of the most striking things about the New South Wales costs assessment scheme is not 
what it achieves, but what it could achieve as a diagnostic tool on the health of the overall 
legal system. As noted above, the costs assessors, many of whom assess files in a specialised 
range of litigation, report basic but key data as part of the assessment process.   While doing 
the assessments they deal with the file in some depth and are therefore well placed to retrieve 
other data that could be used to make accurate judgments as to the efficacy of different 
portions of the legal system.   
For example, in both jurisdictions a researcher can readily work out how much litigation is 
commenced in any given year. Each matter that comes before a court is given a number so 
that working the total quantum of matters is relatively simple.  It is also fairly easy to work 
out how many matters go through to resolution by way of legal judgment.  From that it is 
possible to work out how many of the matters that commence each year are discontinued for 
one reason or another before trial.
749
 However, beyond that it becomes very difficult to 
determine anything at all. We do not have many real ways of working out why the bulk of 
matters settle. We do not know how long the various stages in the litigation process take, or 
where there are bottlenecks and inefficiencies.  Matters that go to costs assessment could be a 
ready source of data about the litigation process in general, and not just about the costs 
assessment process specifically. If costs assessors were instructed to gather a broader range 
of data there a variety of avenues for valuable insight into the legal system in New South 
Wales would become available. 
                                                 
748
 As noted in Chapter Four, client/solicitor files in Western Australia often did not have any measure of the 
time spent on appearances. It seems likely that they should, but as the costs assessors are not charging for their 
own time spent in the assessment they may feel that there is no real need to record that time.  This may simply 
be a function of being overworked, with the costs assessor rushing on to the next job after having done what 
needs doing, rather than finishing off the finer details of a job that is essentially done. At the very least, New 
South Wales costs assessors, being practitioners and being paid for the actual time spent on each assessment, 
are very alive to the requirement to make a careful record of time spent on each one. 
749
 As litigation is notoriously slow, this process would have to span an number of years.  For example, some of 
the matters that are commenced in 2013 may finish in 2013, others may still be afoot ten or more years from 
now. 
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Over the three years of 2009-2011, there was an average of 1000 applications for party/party 
assessment each year.
750
 The applications are more likely to involve matters that went to trial 
than matters that have settled, but that is not always necessarily the case. Any dispute that has 
gone through the court process to the point where there has been an order for costs can go to 
assessment. A dispute where the parties are able to settle the substantial dispute but not the 
quantum of costs one party should pay the other is likely to go to assessment. If costs 
assessors, who have to go through the files relating to each matter in some detail, collected 
data on the various procedural milestones that make up the litigation process it would then be 
possible to make informed analysis of what is and is what is not working well in that process. 
Such analysis makes reasoned law reform possible. To return to the words of Roscoe Pound 
that were used as an introduction to this thesis, such analysis would allow us to ―compel law 
making to take more account and more intelligent account of the social facts upon which law 
must proceed and to which it must be applied”.751 
5.7: Closing remarks 
As was noted in the introduction of this thesis, the author has had some professional exposure 
to costs assessment in Western Australia. His view is that costs assessment is little 
understood by the bulk of legal practitioners and not much considered at all by the general 
public. For those reasons there is no strong drive to reform the costs assessment regime in 
Western Australia. There are moves towards reform of the way the courts awards costs, and 
much disquiet about how lawyers charge clients, but those are separate issues from the 
assessment of costs once they are either awarded by the court or disputed by the client.  One 
view prevalent in Western Australia is that ‗if it is not broken, don‘t fix it‘. However, as is 
clear from the material presented above, it is not really possible to tell if costs assessment in 
Western Australia is broken or not. It is clear that in New South Wales costs assessment is 
run in a way that is more transparent and more assessable to its users. There are no real 
impediments to reforming costs assessment in Western Australia so that it more closely 
mirrors what has been achieved in New South Wales through the generally successful 1994 
Reforms  Any attempt to reform costs assessment in Western Australia could benefit from 
                                                 
750 
To date (June 2013) the most recent figures available for costs assessment in New South Wales are for 2011. 
751
 Pound, above n 1, 756. 
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the New South Wales experience, as in that state there have been fairly regular amendments 
to the original 1994 Reforms to ensure that problems that arose within the scheme were 
properly addressed.   
It seems clear that the courts of Western Australia would benefit from a reform that took 
costs assessment out of their purview. As was argued in Chapter Four, an administrative 
system of costs assessment may be fundamentally more suited to determining reasonable 
costs than is a judicial system that has instead evolved to determine the truths behind 
disputes.   
This thesis closes by noting that, having tracked both costs assessment schemes from their 
commencement to the present day, and having provided analysis of both from the available 
quantitative data, the reformed costs assessment scheme in New South Wales better serves 
the pubic and the legal practitioners that use it and the courts that depend on it than does the 
unreformed system used in Western Australia. 
However, as a final note, it must be recognised that the costs assessment regime in New 
South Wales may be on the cusp of a sweeping range of further reform. Such Reforms will 
be designed to address shortcomings that the various stakeholders in costs assessment have 
reported with in the scheme as it currently operates. If those Reforms do occur a further 
research into the New South Wales costs assessment regime should take place once there has 
been time for the new Reforms to make their full effects known. 
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Annexure 1:  How liability for legal costs arises 
 
A1.i: Overview 
At the most basic level, any time a practitioner and a client enter into a paid retainer and legal 
services are provided to the client in accordance with the retainer, liability for costs arises. In all 
Australian jurisdictions the retainer is governed by the relevant legal practitioner's act. The Legal 
Profession Act 2008 (WA) provides for default rates for most forms of legal work; the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (NSW) does not.
1
 As most Western Australian practitioners contract out of 
the default rates by way of a costs agreement
2
 with their clients, the situation in both states is that 
charge out rates are market driven
3
 and practitioners, by and large, charge what the market will 
bear.
4
 The costs that a client owes to his or her lawyer are generally known as solicitor/client 
costs. 
All Australian courts have the power to make orders as to who is liable for paying legal costs. As 
a general rule, in the Australian jurisdictions ‗costs follow the event‘ and the party that is 
successful in one of the procedural steps that make up litigation will have the benefit of a costs 
order that makes the losing party to that event liable for the costs of that event.
5
  The costs a 
winning party can recover on a costs order are known as party/party costs. As will be seen below 
                                                 
1
 Division 9 of Part 10 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) provides for a Legal Costs Committee that is 
responsible for setting and reviewing scales of costs. Scales of costs were largely abolished in New South Wales as a 
part of the 1993 Reforms. 
2
 Practitioner‘s in New South Wales are also likely to set out their conditions of engagement in a costs agreement 
but unlike their counterparts in Western Australia they do not need to do so in order to displace default rates for the 
work they will perform.  
3
 Many commentators would disagree, and would argue that the legal fees are fixed by the profession operating 
either as a monopoly, or in the absence of an informed clientele. See Chapter 3 at 3.6.2 for discussion on costs and 
the legal market. 
4
 There are areas of law where the parliaments have considered  that is was in the public‘s interests to fix costs, for 
instance legal costs for worker‘s compensation matters are charged in accordance to a fixed scale in both Western 
Australia and New South Wales. In both jurisdictions practitioners are not allowed to charge above the scale rates 
for such work. 
5
 G E Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) 210. 
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the solicitor/client costs and party/party costs for the same set of legal work can differ markedly 
in quantum.
6
 
A1.ii: The Smith v Johnston retainer 
For the purposes of explaining current billing practices, the reader is asked to consider a 
hypothetical dispute between Mr Smith (Smith) and Mr Johnson (Johnston). At this stage it does 
not matter which jurisdiction their dispute has occurred in. Smith engages the fictional firm of 
SBM Legal, and enters into a costs agreement with that firm. In this instance we presume that the 
costs agreement binds Smith to paying for the legal services by the time billing method.
7
 This 
means that he will be charged an hourly rate for each practitioner who works on the file, and will 
also be responsible for any disbursements incurred for the file
8
  We will also presume that SBM 
Legal provide the correct initial and ongoing disclosure about those costs; we will see later that 
failing to do so can have a profound effect on SBM Legal‘s ability to recover costs from its 
client.  
The nature of a litigated dispute is not usually relevant to how a lawyer charges for taking 
conduct of it.
9
 Suffice to say that Smith‘s retainer with SBM Legal is entered into in January 
2010 and the writ, alleging a commercial debt of $750,000.00, is filed in the relevant Supreme 
Court later that month. The matter goes to a two day trial in April 2012. The outcome of Smith v 
Johnson is a decision, handed down in July 2012, whereby Mr Smith is awarded his damages 
and a costs order against the defendant. 
Many and perhaps most practitioners organise their retainers as much by way of specialist legal 
software as by way of physical files. SBM Legal is an up to date firm that utilises one of the 
various commercial file management software applications.  A practitioner who is going to work 
                                                 
6
 This annexure, and the two that follow it, give an overview of how costs are charged and recovered. For a more 
thorough explanation of the differences between solicitor/client and party/party costs see the thesis to which this 
annexure is attached. 
7
 There are various billing methods, some firms work to quotes or budgets, or at a fixed rate, but such methods are 
generally used when law firms are dealing with sophisticated clients. A person who does not generally have much 
contact with the legal system will usually engage a practitioner via time billing, which is essentially a cost plus 
method of charging.  
8
 The term disbursement refers to cost the practitioner expends on non legal works, such as private investigators, 
expert witnesses, and medical reports. Barrister‘s fees are often also styled as disbursements as the practitioner who 
has engaged the barrister is responsible for paying them. The practitioner then recovers the money from the client. 
9
 There are exceptions to this generality, see above n 4.    
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on Mr Smith‘s will enter the file number into the file manager software. The file will then ‗open‘ 
on that practitioner‘s computer screen and an internal clock will start running. Each time the 
practitioner saves the work he or she is performing the software will bring up a narrative entry 
screen and the practitioner will enter some brief narrative as to the work preformed. The software 
will then charge that work at the ubiquitous six minute interval to the client‘s account at the 
charge out rate for that particular practitioner. More than one practitioner can be working on, and 
thus charging time against, any given file at any given time. Each electronic document produced 
in relation to the file, including emails, can be printed off and be saved to the physical file. 
A1.ii.a: Interim Bills 
Stephen George Short, a hypothetical practitioner working at SBM Legal, may sit down at his 
desk at 8:00 a.m. on 12 March 2010 and commence work the Smith file. He may proceed as 
follows: 
Time Work performed Billed time 
8:00  Open file, telephone client and have a discussion about the 
progress of the matter and taking further instructions. Write 
file note and save, entering ‗telephone to client and file note 
re same‘ in the narrative box. Elapsed time 9 minutes. 
12 minutes 
8:10 Check relevant legislation online, draft letter to client 
confirming instructions, print letter for mailing out, write 
file note setting out research. Save work entering ‗research 
and letter to client‘ in the narrative box. Elapsed time 22 
minutes. 
24 minutes 
8:32 Telephone expert witness, discuss documents relating to the 
matter, fax documents to witness. Write file note and save, 
entering ‗telephone to expert witness, fax documents to 
same‘ in the narrative box. Elapsed time 13 minutes. 
18 minutes 
8:45 Write short email memo to supervising partner setting out 
proposed course of action. Save work, entering ‗memo to 
(partners, initials, say SBM)‘ Elapsed time 3 minutes. 
6 minutes 
8:48 Close file, open another file. Total 60 minutes 
charged to file. 
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Later that day the supervising partner will receive and read the memo and will also record his 
time for reading it and any response he creates. Note that our hypothetical Mr Short's time was 
charged at $280.00 per hour, with minimum charge periods of 6 minutes. He is a junior solicitor 
and will do the bulk of the work needed to get the matter up for trial. SBM, the supervising 
partner, is a senior practitioner and is charging out at $500.00 per hour, or $50.00 per six minute 
interval.
10
  
At the end of each month the firm‘s accounts department will create an account from all the 
entries against the Smith file.
11
 The account itself will take one of the two forms. It may be a 
lump sum bill, in which case it will have a brief narrative describing the work carried out in that 
month, or it may be an itemised bill.
12
 For our purposes we will assume that no other work than 
that reported above was done on the Smith file in March 2010.  The bill will be sent out under 
cover of a letter and a statement of the clients rights will be enclosed with the bill. An example of 
the March 2010 bill, issued as a lump sum bill, is provided at the end of this annexure as A. 
Smith is entitled to ask for an itemised bill if he feels that the bulk bill has not given him enough 
information;
13
 many firms send an itemised bill in the first instance.
14
 If the bill is itemised, the 
body of the account will usually consist of a printout with columns showing the date work was 
done, an identifier of the practitioner who did the work, the amount charged, and the GST. An 
                                                 
10 
The current (2013) scale rates for senior and junior practitioners engaged in Supreme Court litigation in Western 
Australia are  $451.00 and $319.00 respectively (Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) 
Determination 2012 Schedule, Table A.). There is no benchmark or scale rate for solicitors in New South Wales. 
11 
This assumes that the costs agreement Smith entered into allowed for monthly billing, which is the usual practice.  
Some practitioners defer the bills until the matter is resolved, some practitioners, particularly in personal injury 
matters, use a conditional ‗no win no fee‘ arrangement where fees are not due until the end of the matter and are 
only payable if the matter is concluded successfully. 
12
 The Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA), s 290(2) and the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 332(1) give the 
practitioner the right to send either a lump sum or an itemised bill. At this stage the account is known as a bill, once 
a bill is drawn up in the form used for filing in court for assessment it is known as a bill of costs. 
13
 The Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 292  and  Legal Profession Act 2004  (NSW) s 332A(1)  allow a client 
who receives a lump sum bill the right to request an itemised bill; a firm receiving such a request must provide that 
bill within 21 days of the request.   
14
 Many Western Australian firms will send out a copy of the report generated by a computer based billing system as 
an itemised account. These reports usually provide a brief description of the works done (entered by the practitioner 
doing the works), a note of the time taken (with minimum six minute intervals), an identifier for the practitioner, and 
the cost of the works. Some costs assessors do not consider this to be an itemised bill, although they will usually 
assess a bill in that form. Those assessors take the view that an itemised bill is a bill where the works covered are 
described by reference to the items listed on the relevant scales of costs.  
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example of the Smith v Johnson bill for March 2010, but issued as an itemised bill, is provided at 
the end of this annexure as B. 
Regardless of what form it takes, the bill will have a separate section for disbursements. The bill 
will also contain some form of notice to the client as to how he can dispute the account if he is 
not satisfied with it.
15
 
The account sent out to Smith in April 2012 would most likely be the largest, as it would include 
the costs of the trial. If a barrister was engaged, the cost of the barrister would be included as a 
disbursement. Smith may have received 31 individual bills from the commencement of the 
retainer up to and including the July 2012 account. In most instances he will have paid the bills 
as they came in, as the costs agreement would have a term allowing SBM Legal to end the 
retainer if accounts were not paid.
16
 The bills for the months between the trial and the decision 
would be minimal, but Smith would incur more costs after the decision has been handed down. 
The costs of Smith enforcing his judgement, and the costs orders the judgement contained, will 
be included in those later costs. 
A1.ii.b: Solicitor/client and party/party costs 
For the purposes of this exercise, we have already decided that Smith was successful at trial and 
that the Court awarded him his costs. Shortly after the decision was handed down SBM Legal 
would have written to Smith and informed him of the success of his matter.
17
 SBM Legal may 
have enclosed the July account, or if the firm had been carrying the matter without regular 
payment,
18
 an account for the entire costs of legal services and disbursements he has incurred in 
the matter.  
 
                                                 
15
 In accordance with s 291 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) if the matter is in Western Australia, or at s 333 
of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) if the retainer is in New South Wales. In both jurisdictions notice can be by 
way of a list of the rights set out in the statute or by way of a link to an internet site that provides that information.  
16
 Until the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 293(1) and  Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 334(1) respectively 
took away the common law position where a legal retainer was an entire contract,  practitioners were not entitled to 
send out monthly accounts unless they had obtained that right though a costs agreement. Some firms did so anyway, 
in ignorance of this, and arguably had their accounts not being paid they would not have been able to discontinue on 
those grounds or to sue in debt for their fees as those fees were not yet owing.  
17
 Alternately Smith may have attended for the decision. 
18
 This is unlikely if the matter is commercial litigation but not unusual if the retainer was for personal injury 
litigation. 
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Smith is liable to his solicitor for the legal costs he has incurred throughout the conduct of his 
matter. His liability is incurred through a contractual arrangement, the costs agreement he 
entered into with SBM Legal. As was noted above, those costs are generally known as 
solicitor/client costs. 
Smith has been awarded his proven damages and costs. In essence, the Court has said as he has 
been proved right and that the defendant was in the wrong, the defendant is liable for the costs 
Smith has incurred in proving his case. This approach, known as costs following the event, is the 
general approach to costs awards in Australia. The costs that the unsuccessful party to litigation 
must pay to the successful party are known as party/party costs. The unsuccessful litigant is also 
liable for the solicitor/client costs he or she has incurred with his or her own practitioner.  
The fundamental difference between the costs Smith will pay to SBM Legal and the costs 
Johnson, the unsuccessful litigant, will pay to Smith is that Smith‘s liability for costs arises out 
of a contractual relationship and Johnson‘s liability for costs (to Smith) arises out of an order of 
the court.  Smith‘s liability is in accordance with the costs agreement he entered into with SBM 
Legal. Johnson‘s liability will be in accordance with the costs recovery scheme operating in the 
jurisdiction.   The difference in quantum between the two liabilities may be large; Smith may 
find that Johnson is only liable to pay him somewhere between 60% and 80% of what he has 
paid out to SBM Legal. As this was a Supreme Court matter that went to a full trial, Smith may 
have paid large costs, perhaps in the order of $60,000.00. He may only recover $36,000.00 to 
$48,000.00 of the monies he has paid SBM Legal.
19
 
The order granting Smith his costs is likely to state that the costs are to be agreed or assessed. 
Most practitioners view assessment of costs as an avenue of last resort.
20
 By the time costs 
become a pressing issue the substantive dispute has been resolved in one way or another. Further 
                                                 
19
 As illustrated in Chapter 4 of the thesis this annexure accompanies, for party/party bills in the $50,000.00 to 
$69,000.00, assessed return of the original bill averaged 57% in Western Australia and 81% in New South Wales. In 
other words, if the bill was treated as average Smith would recover $37,000.00 of the $60,000.00 he had nominally 
paid in fees in a Western Australian assessment and $48,600.00 if the assessment was in New South Wales. The 
Western Australian return of 57% for that tranche of bills is outside the general range of average returns; they fall 
between around 65% and 80%. 
20
 This perception may be changing in Western Australia due to the introduction of provisional assessment. 
Provisional assessment was discussed at Chapter 2.5.1.3.  As discussed at Chapter 3.13.3.2, New South Wales may 
also introduce a form of provisional assessment. 
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dispute as to costs, while often inevitable, is, quite simply, further dispute. Practitioners from 
both sides of any given dispute will generally make reasonable efforts to bring their clients to an 
agreement as to costs rather than resort to filing a bill for assessment. SBM Legal is likely to 
draw a draft bill of costs for that matter and send it off to Johnson‘s solicitor on a without 
prejudice or without prejudice save as to costs basis. 
 A1.ii.c: The effect of interim costs orders 
Although Smith was awarded the costs of the substantive action, it may be that he too has a 
liability for costs to Johnson. This is because while any given trial has an overall ‗winner‘, there 
may have been other, and possibly many other, costs orders made through the interlocutory 
stages of the matter. 
As soon as the parties to a legal dispute make an appearance in court and the court makes orders 
in relation to the substantive dispute, it is likely that the court will include among the orders 
made an order as to costs. The costs order will usually allocate responsibility for the costs of the 
appearance, and for costs associated directly with that appearance. Each appearance is an ‗event‘, 
and as noted above, costs generally follow the event. The ‗winner‘ of each event will usually 
have the benefit of an order that the other party pay his, her or its legal costs. In the absence of an 
order that a party pay costs ‗forthwith‘, such costs become due at the end of the matter and are 
subsumed into the overall costs of the matter.
21
 
For instance, if during the early part of preparing Smith‘s matter for trial, SBM Legal considered 
that Johnson had documents that were undiscovered, and had made an unsuccessful application 
for the further and better discovery; the costs of that application would have been awarded 
against Smith and to Johnson.
22
 If Johnson had the benefit of any costs orders in his favour, he 
would have those costs taken into account in the negotiations that take place to settle the costs of 
                                                 
21
 The Western Australian Supreme Court has put out a practice direction that will result in the costs of interlocutory 
proceedings being largely fixed and payable forthwith. This measure will remove the costs of those proceedings 
from the assessment process and may have far reaching effects on the way litigation is run in that court. See 
Supreme Court of Western Australia, Consolidated Practice Directions 2009 4.7.1 Costs of Interlocutory 
Applications. 
22
  If the matter were in the Western Australian Supreme Court Smith may well have had the costs of this application 
fixed and paid forthwith, see above n 15. This would mean that it would not be taken into account at the final costs 
determination. 
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the action.
23
 If no settlement was reached he may have his solicitor prepare his own bill for 
assessment or ask that the costs awarded to him were assessed against those due to Smith. 
Offers and counter offers to agree the costs may ensue. As noted above, in the vast majority of 
cases the costs are settled through negotiation. If no negotiated agreement is reached then SBM 
Legal will draw up a final Bill of Costs for assessment.
24
 The Bill will be drawn according to the 
costs recovery system in the jurisdiction. It is at this point where the jurisdiction, for our 
purposes either Western Australia or New South Wales, will have a bearing on the form of the 
bill and on what procedures will be followed. Up until this point there would have been no 
significant difference as to how Mr Smith incurred liability for costs to his solicitor, nor to how 
Johnson incurred liability for cost on both a party/party basis (to Smith) and to his own solicitor. 
A1.iii: Conclusion 
To this point it the Smith v Jones litigation as described above may have occurred in either 
Western Australia or New South Wales. The conduct of litigation about a substantive matter 
differs little between the two jurisdictions. Now however, the substantial litigation is finished 
and the disputes that we will follow are to do with the liability for legal costs. The practicalities 
and procedures relating to the assessment of costs differ greatly between Western Australia and 
New South Wales; those practicalities and procedures are dealt with in the following two 
annexure. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 It is the author‘s experience that these costs are not always considered in a costs negotiation. 
24
 This bill is likely to be larger in quantum than the draft bill used for negotiations. The assessment system is not 
sympathetic to a bill that appears to be an ambit claim, but the bill may none the less draw a longish bow. As noted 
above, the draft bill may well have been tendered as ‗without prejudice except as to costs‘. A cost dispute, in 
Western Australia at least, is still litigation and the general rules apply. If a bill is assessed and it does not have more 
than 15% assessed off, and the person who has filed the bill can produce a draft bill that was refused in negotiations 
and is for less than or equal to the assessed bill, the assessor is likely to award the costs of the assessment to that 
party. 
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A: Account to client (Smith v Jones): Lump sum version 
SBM LEGAL: LAWYERS ABN 34 694 100 350 
Memorandum of Professional Fees 
Our Reference: SGS: KJT 1265 Date: 04/04/2010 
Mr J Y Smith 
67A Watkins Street 
Willetton WA 6108 
 
Dispute with Andrew Johnson 
Account for our professional fees in the above matter for the month of March 2010: 
Professional Fees: $348.00 
GST on Professional Fees: $34.80 
Total Professional Fees and GST: $382.80 
 
Item / Description GST Amount 
Fax Charges $0.37 $3.70 
Long distance call to expert witness $0.40 $4.00 
Photocopying $0.60 $6.00 
  
Disbursements: $13.70 
GST on Disbursements: $1.37 
Total Disbursements and GST: $15.07 
Total Professional Fees and Disbursements including GST: $397.87 
BALANCE DUE & PAYABLE: $397.87 
 
 
 
Stephen George Short 
SBM Legal 
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B: Account to client (Smith v Jones): Itemised version 
 
SBM LEGAL: LAWYERS ABN 34 694 100 350 
Memorandum of Professional Fees 
Our Reference: SGS: KJT 1265 Date: 04/04/2009 
Mr J Y Smith 
67A Watkins Street 
Willetton WA 6108 
 
Dispute with Andrew Johnson 
Account for our professional fees in the above matter for the month of March 2010: 
Date Practitioner Narrative  Units Billed GST 
12/3/09 SGS Telephone attendance on 
client to update on matter and 
to seek further instructions. 
2 $48.00 $4.80 
12/3/09 SGS Letter to client confirming 
instructions and research into 
the Fair Trading Act. 
4 $96.00 $9.60 
12/3/09 SGS Telephone attendance on 
Tony Tooley CPA, re proving 
debt, fax documents to same 
3 $76.00 $7.60 
12/3/09 SGS Memo to SBM outlining 
proposed plan of action. 
1 $28.00 $2.80 
12/3/09 SBM Consider memo, draft 
instructions re same. 
2 $100.00 $10.00 
13/3/09 SBM Consider memo ( no charge) 0 $0.00 $0.00 
   Total $348.00 $34.80 
 
 
Professional Fees: $348.00 
GST on Professional Fees: $34.80 
Total Professional Fees and GST: $382.80 
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Item / Description Amount GST Total 
Fax Charges $3.70 $0.37 $4.07 
Long distance call to expert witness $4.00 $0.40 $4.40 
Photocopying $6.00 $0.60 $6.60 
Total   $15.07 
  
Disbursements: $13.70 
GST on Disbursements: $1.37 
Total Disbursements and GST: $15.07 
 
Total Professional Fees and Disbursements including GST: $397.87 
BALANCE DUE & PAYABLE: $397.87 
 
Stephen George Short 
SBM Legal 
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Annexure 2: The mechanics of costs assessment in Western Australia 
A2.i: Overview 
The preceding annexure (Annexure 1) explained how liability for legal costs arises in the context 
of a litigated dispute. Annexure 1 postulated a legal dispute between Smith and Mr Johnston 
(Smith v Johnston), with Smith, represented by SBM Legal, being successful at trial.  This 
annexure will continue to use the Smith v Johnston dispute as a framework, and will follow 
Smith through the mechanisms of the two limbs of costs assessment as practiced in the Western 
Australian jurisdiction. 
For the purposes of describing how liability for the costs of the Smith v Johnston dispute arose, it 
would not have mattered if the dispute had taken place in Western Australia or in New South 
Wales. In both States liability for costs will arise in much the same way. Our successful litigant, 
Smith, could be involved in two different disputes as to liability for costs; with Johnston 
(party/party) or with his own legal representatives, SBM Legal (client/solicitor or 
solicitor/client).
1
  
As Smith was the successful party to the litigation, the general rule is that the court would have 
awarded him the costs of the litigation.
2
 The order that makes that award provides the grounds 
for one limb of the costs assessment process. If Johnston does not agree to pay the amount Smith 
seeks from him that dispute will form the basis of a party/party costs dispute. Johnston‘s liability 
for Smith‘s costs is the result of a court order made under the Act that governs the particular 
court that heard the dispute (for the purposes of this illustration the Western Australian Supreme 
Court).  The foundation of that liability is basically the same in Western Australia and New 
South Wales. The general rule in the courts of both jurisdictions is that the loser pays the 
winner‘s cost as agreed between the parties or as determined at a costs assessment.  
 
                                                 
1
 The costs a client owes to a practitioner are usually described as solicitor/client costs. For the purposes of the thesis 
and for this annexure solicitor/client costs describe situations where the solicitor has sought assessment and 
client/solicitor costs describes situations where it is the client who has initiated the assessment. 
2
 The general rule as to costs is that costs follow the cause: G E Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2003) 210.  
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The other possible costs dispute relates to the costs Smith has paid or owes to his own solicitor. 
For Smith, the mechanics of engaging and paying his solicitors, governed as it is by the model 
legislation, would have been fundamentally the same in both jurisdictions.
3
 If Smith does not 
agree with the quantum of the bill
4
 that SBM Legal has given him for their legal services he may 
dispute that amount as a client/solicitor dispute. Due to a welcome and much needed reform, 
SBM Legal can file their bill for assessment if Smith refuses to pay the bill but does not himself 
seek assessment pursuant to the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (the WA Act).
5
 
Despite the basic similarities in the way the costs disputes will have arisen, the two jurisdictions 
have fundamentally different costs dispute resolution systems, as is explored in the body of this 
thesis. This annexure (Annexure 2) describes how disputes as to the quantum of costs payable by 
the losing litigant to the winning litigant by way of a court order, or payable to one‘s own 
solicitor for services rendered, are resolved in the Western Australian jurisdiction. Annexure 3 
describes how the same disputes would be resolved in New South Wales.   
 
                                                 
3
 The lawyer client relationship in Western Australia is currently governed by the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA). 
In New South Wales it is governed by the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). Both Acts are fundamentally the same 
and are modeled on the Legal Profession Model Bill as promulgated by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General in 2006. New South Wales adopted the provisions of the model bill two years before it was officially 
released by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General. 
4
  There many reasons a client may disagree with a lawyer‘s bill. In theory costs assessments are narrow in focus; 
they only deal with disputes as to actual costs. If the client has other allegations against his or her practitioner, such 
as negligence, a costs assessment is not the place to air them. However, s 307(1) of the Legal Profession Act 2008 
(WA) makes it mandatory for a costs assessor to refer grossly excessive charging to the Complaints Committee; 
s307(2) give the assessor the discretion to report any other conduct that he or she believes may amount to 
unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct to the Committee. This can be a fine line; the 
practitioner should recover costs for works ‗reasonably done‘ in a costs assessment.  As the assessor is able to 
decide on what works are reasonable, the assessor is not likely to allow any works that he or she thinks was 
negligently or improperly done, even though the assessor may choose not to refer the matter to the Committee.   
5
 The bills that provided the raw data for this thesis were sourced from 2005; at that time practitioners in Western 
Australia could not seek costs assessment of their own motion. Up until 2009 a practitioner whose client did not pay 
had to sue in debt to recover the money. If a solicitor sues for his or her money he or she must commence an action 
in the relevant court, prove the debt in its entirety in a forum that is not particularly informed about solicitor/client 
retainers (unless of course the matter was heard in the WASC) and then enforce the judgement. Generally, he or she 
would engage another solicitor to run that action. If the solicitor files for the bill for assessment that process will cost 
substantially less, be dealt with much more quickly by an assessor who is well versed in costs and, generally, 
without the need to employ another solicitor to run it. At the end of the assessment process the solicitor with have a 
certificate of assessment that can be enforced as a judgement. 
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As previously noted, in Western Australia there are some fundamental differences to the way 
party/party and client/solicitor disputes are resolved. This Annexure will track through the 
mechanisms for each type of dispute, commencing with party/party assessment. 
A2.ii: The Party/Party dispute 
When a Court awards costs in a matter it usually does so on a ‗to be agreed or assessed‘6 basis.  
Smith‘s lawyers, SBM Legal, will have attempted to settle the costs by providing a draft bill of 
costs to Johnston or his representatives. Negotiations will ensue and in the majority of cases the 
parties do settle costs.
7
 As in all litigation, settlement is the most cost effective way to end the 
dispute. As we shall see below, the costs assessment process will take time and further 
expenditure; settlement is a cheaper option overall. For the purpose of this illustration however, 
we assume that no agreement is reached. SBM Legal will draw a final bill of costs for the entire 
course of Smith's matter, and that bill may differ from the draft bill that formed the core of the 
attempt to settle. The final bill may be amended to include costs not included in the draft bill if 
the draft bill was drawn low in an attempt to settle. The final bill will be filed for assessment in 
the Court that heard the substantive dispute as a continuation of the substantive matter.
8
   
 In the Smith v Johnston example the bill drawn up by Smith‘s lawyers for the party/party dispute 
will bear little resemblance to the bill they have given Smith. Smith‘s relationship with SBM 
Legal, and the hourly rates he has agreed to pay for the works done for him was governed by a 
costs agreement.
9
 Smith has been billed in accordance with time SBM Legal‘s practitioners spent 
working on his matter, with the charges expressed as an hourly rate dependant on the seniority of 
the practitioner doing the work.  Smith has received interim bills, either in the form of lump sum 
bills or by way of an itemised account on a monthly basis throughout the retainer.
10
  From SBM 
Legal‘s perspective it has not mattered what parts of the litigation they have been working on in 
                                                 
6
 The Court may use the word ‗taxed‘ instead of ‗assessed‘, but for the purposes of  this thesis and its annexure, the 
archaic word ‗taxed‘ has been replaced with the word assessed throughout. 
7
 This claim is based in the author‘s personal experience but as there is no data as to how many party/party bills are 
assessed in Western Australia each year there is no data to back it up. 
8
 As previously noted, this is not the case for solicitor/client disputes; in Western Australia they are all heard in the 
Western Australian Supreme Court as separate matters regardless of what works the legal retainer in dispute related 
to. 
9
 As noted in Chapter One, most Western Australian practitioners contract out of the scales of costs that provide the 
default rate for legal work by way of a costs agreement pursuant to s 282 of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA). 
10
 Examples of both lump sum and itemised bills are provided in Annexure 1. 
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any given month; what has mattered is which lawyers had spent how much time working on 
Smith‘s matter in the month covered by the bill. 
In contrast, Johnston, who has been ordered to pay Smith‘s costs, is not a party to that contract 
and is not bound to pay the rates Smith has agreed to. As far as Johnston is concerned, any costs 
agreement between Smith and his lawyers is irrelevant.
11
 Instead, Johnston‘s liability, stemming 
as it does from a court order, is assessed against a scale of costs that the Legal Costs Committee, 
a statutory body created by the WA Act has created as a guide to and limitation on what are 
considered reasonable amounts to pay for the various stages of litigation.
12
 Therefore, although 
Johnston‘s liability to pay costs relates to the same body of legal work (relating to the dispute) 
the methodology of calculating what Johnston owes for that work is completely different and 
bears no real relationship to what that work actually cost. 
A2.ii.a: Scales of Costs 
As Smith v Johnston was heard in the Western Australian Supreme Court in April 2012 the Legal 
Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2010 will govern the 
assessment of Johnston‘s liability under the costs order that formed part of the judgement in the 
matter.
 13
 
The scales of costs that govern party/party assessments do take into account the amount of time a 
practitioner should reasonably spend on each component of the works they have done for their 
clients, but not in the direct way that those practitioners charge for that time. As discussed in 
Chapter One at 1.3.7, scales of costs are item based. The Costs Committee determines the scales 
around easily recognised milestones or events in the litigation process. The scale that governs 
Supreme Court litigation, such as the Smith v Johnston dispute, has 34 items that between them 
cover all the works that could possibly have been done in the course of litigating the matter.
14
 
                                                 
11
 If there is an indemnity order Johnston will pay much higher costs and may pay at the rate set out in the costs 
agreement, but it is still unlikely that Smith will recover all of his costs. 
12
 For further discussion on the Legal Costs Committee in Western Australia see Chapter 2.3. 
13
 The Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2012 did not come into operation 
until November 1 2012. 
14 
The first 32 items on the Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2010 cover 
the particulars of litigation; item 33 ‗Other work‘ and catches any works reasonably done but not otherwise allowed 
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A2.ii.b: Drawing the bill at scale 
 The bill that SBM Legal draws up to present to the losing litigant would be drawn in accordance 
with the relevant scale of costs, not in relation to the account issued to the client.
15
 To prepare the 
bill in that format SBM Legal will have to break down the file kept in relation to Smith‘s 
litigation into work as describe in items on the scale.
16
  
For example, Smith, through SBM Legal and as part of the litigation process, would have 
provided discovery of all his documents relevant to the matter that he had in his possession. He 
would have delivered all the documents to SBM Legal and they in turn would have gone through 
the documents checking their contents and removing any they considered privileged or 
irrelevant. Once the documents were ready for inspection SBM Legal would contact Johnston‘s 
solicitors and arrange for them to come and inspect the discovered documents.  For illustrative 
purposes, we assume that the documents were voluminous. It may be that this process took 20 
hours to complete.  If so, Smith‘s bill for that month would include 20 hours of work at the 
charge out rate stipulated in the costs agreement that governed the retainer. This was work 
reasonably done in relation to the litigation and Smith is able to recover the ‗costs‘ of that work 
from Johnston. This does not mean he can recover what he has paid SBM Legal.  Giving 
discovery (including notice) is Item 7 on the relevant scale.  The maximum that Smith can 
recover from Johnston (absent a special costs order) is $4356.00.
17
 That limit is a maximum 
amount of recovery, not a set amount that Smith will recover, and the assessing officer will allow 
the amount he or she thinks is reasonable in the particular set of circumstances up to that amount. 
We assumed that the costs agreement Smith entered into with SBM Legal priced a senior 
practitioner at $500 an hour (plus GST), and if a senior practitioner from the firm spent 20 hours 
providing discovery, Smith will have paid $11,000.00 (inclusive of GST) for that portion of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
for.  The 2012 determination adds a 35th item for work done for claims under the Motor Vehicle (Third Party 
Insurance) Act 1943(WA).  
15
 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 66 r 42 mandates what a bill must contain, including ‗items 
consecutively numbered, together with a reference to the item in the scale to which the item in the bill relates‘. The 
Smith v Johnston bill, drawn for assessment, is provided at the end of this annexure. 
16
 See above n 12.  
17
 Although the scale is item based, the amounts allowed on the scale are arrived at through consideration of what 
maximum amount of time could reasonably be spent doing the work and what level of experience the practitioner 
doing the work should have. Item 7 allows ten hours of a senior practitioner‘s time for giving discovery, with the 
hourly rates of a senior practitioner set at $429.00 (inclusive of GST), with a further $66.00 for a notice of 
discovery.  
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litigation process and he will not recover the difference between what the costs assessor awards 
and what he has actually paid.
18
 An example of how that work would appear as charged in 
Smith‘s bill from SBM Legal as compared to how it would look in the bill filed for assessment is 
provided at Table 1 below.  
Extract from SBM bill to Smith 
Date  Practitioner Narrative Units  Unit 
cost 
Amount GST Total 
various SGS (SP)  Providing 
Discovery 
200 50.00 10,000.00 1000.00 11,000.00 
 
Extract from bill as filed for assessment 
No Date Narrative Item on Scale Total Assessed Off 
9 various Discovery 7 $4510.00  
Table 1 Providing discovery as it may appear in the bill to Smith as it compared to how it 
may appear in a bill filed for assessment 
The work involved in drawing the bill, which will entail translating the accounts and the work 
done into a format that can be measured against the scale of costs, can be substantial.
 19
 Many 
larger firms employ costing clerks who specialise in this task; there are also a few practitioners 
who specialise in this area.
20
 SBM Legal will charge Smith for the works involved in drawing a 
party/party bill, but SBM Legal will include drawing as an item in the bill and attempt to recover 
the costs of drawing from Johnston at the assessment. As with the rest of his costs Smith is 
unlikely to recover those costs in full; SBM Legal will charge Smith at the hourly rate set out in 
                                                 
18
 The winning litigant who benefits from an order that the loser pay his or her costs never recovers more than a 
portion of those costs actually expended. Despite this thesis being able to show what percentage is likely to be 
recovered on a party/party assessment, it is not possible to ascertain what percent of the monies actually expended is 
ever recovered.   
19
 This is work that Smith will have to pay SBM Legal to do, and while he may recover some of it at assessment, 
avoiding these costs is part of the reason why it is better to settle a costs dispute rather than take it to assessment. 
20
 Western Australia, unlike New South Wales and Victoria, does not have very many firms that specialise in costs. 
This may be because of the much smaller legal market in Western Australia.  
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the costs agreement.  If Smith he does recover the costs of assessment from Johnston it will be at 
scale rates.
21
 
SBM Legal will file the bill of costs in the Supreme Court.
22
 A worked copy of the party/party 
bill from the Smith v Johnston litigation is provided at the end of this annexure. There is a fixed 
filing fee of $379.00 and further fee of 2.5 % of the overall amount of the bill as assessed.
23
 In 
this case, as the total of the bill as filed is $76,949.91, the filing fee will be $1,898.75.
24
 That 
fixed fee will have been listed as a disbursement on the bill of costs and an allowance of 2.5% of 
the bill as assessed will be added to the total at the end of the assessment.  
A2.ii.c: Provisional assessment 
SBM Legal can, at the time of filing, ask that the bill be provisionally assessed, providing that 
Johnston‘s lawyers have agreed to that course.25 Alternately, if the costs assessor who is assigned 
the bill thinks it suitable, he or she can write to the parties asking if they will consent to a 
provisional assessment.
26
 The costs assessor can also deem that a bill is not suitable for 
provisional assessment.
27
 If both of the parties agree to a provisional assessment the assessor 
appointed to their matter will view the full court file and the materials provided as to the costs 
dispute and give a provisional view as to what the bill will be assessed at.
 
If both parties accept 
                                                 
21
 The work done for assessment of costs is item 30 on the 2013 scale. No amount is set, rather the limit is ‗such 
amounts as are reasonable in the circumstances‘:  Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) 
Determination 2012, Schedule, Table B, Item 30. 
22
 Unlike some other documents, bills of costs are not just stamped and returned for service. They go into the court 
system as a costs assessor must be appointed and a date for either a directions hearing or the assessment has to be 
set. The bill will be endorsed with that information and returned to the party some days later and that party will in 
turn have a copy of the endorsed bill served on the party that is responsible for paying the bill. This can take from a 
few days to a week.  
23
 Information as to civil fees in the Western Australian Supreme Court can be found at 
http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/G/general_division_fees.aspx?uid=1953-2760-2885-1682. The fee mentioned 
is for individuals and small businesses, corporate entities pay $369.00 plus the 2.5% ad valorum fee. 
24
 This gives rise to a small incongruence. The costs assessor will allow the costs of the assessment to one party or 
the other, depending on the overall circumstances of the assessment.  The person filing the bill for assessment 
included the ad valorum fee as a disbursement but if they are awarded the costs of the assessment they can only 
recover the portion of the fee that relates to the bill as assessed. Any other disbursements that are allowed are usually 
allowed in full.  
25 
Supreme Court of Western Australia Consolidated Practice Directions 2009 (WA) r 4.7.2.4. For a description and 
critique of the provisional assessment regime see Chapter 2.5.1.3. 
26 Ibid r 4.7.2.2. The court will send a copy of the bill as filed to Mr Johnston‘s solicitors if the assessor thinks that 
the matter can be assessed provisionally. 
27
 Ibid r 4.7.2.3, 4.7.2.4 
269 
 
that provisional finding the certificate of assessment, known as the allocatur, will be signed at 
that amount. 
A2.ii.d: The appointment with the assessor 
If the bill is not provisionally assessed (or if one of the parties objects to amount that the bill was 
provisionally assessed at) the bill will listed for assessment ‗in the usual way‘28. The usual way is 
for the court to return two endorsed copies of the bill to SBM Legal. The endorsement sets the 
time and place for the assessment, and the appointment is pre-emptory.
29
 In this instance Smith is 
being represented by SBM Legal and will not appear himself. Johnston is still represented by his 
trial lawyers. SBM Legal will serve a copy of the endorsed bill on Johnston‘s lawyers. 
The costs assessor will have received the court file on the matter and will have perused it before 
the initial appointment. If the matter is small or simple the assessor may make the assessment at 
that first appointment. Otherwise, the parties may use the first appearance to make submissions 
as to the conduct of the assessment and the material to be put to it and the assessor will make 
directions as to who will do what and as to the date of the full assessment.  
The assessment itself will usually take part in chambers, and in the lower courts often in the 
assessor‘s own chambers, rather than in a small hearing room. Although the assessment is a 
judicial hearing, general court etiquette is relaxed, with the parties sitting across from each other 
and not required to rise when they speak.
30
 If the dispute has not been narrowed down by earlier 
appearances and directions, the assessor will go through the bill scale item by scale item and 
assess each item. This will be done in accordance with section 301 of the WA Act which reads: 
Criteria for assessment  
 (1) In conducting an assessment of legal costs, a taxing officer must consider —  
 (a) whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the work to which the legal costs 
relate; and 
 (b) whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable manner; and 
                                                 
28
 Ibid r 4.7.2 9. 
29
 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971(WA) O 66 r 38 states that ‗The appointment made by the taxing officer shall be 
peremptory, and he shall proceed thereon ex parte on proof that due notice has been given to the opposite party, 
unless sufficient cause appears for postponement.‘ 
30
 This is not always the case; some assessments can take the form of the more usual contested hearing and may be 
heard in a courtroom.  
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 (c) the fairness and reasonableness of the amount of legal costs in relation to the 
  work, except to the extent that section 302 or 303 applies to any disputed 
  costs.
31
 
assessor making costs determination under s301 of the WA Act has a very broad discretion; in 
essence the costs assessor can effectively run an assessment as if it was a trial.
32
   
The party who has filed the bill will provide evidence, either orally or by way of documents, to 
support the amount claimed under each item. This should not usually be difficult for a competent 
solicitor who would have noted down every portion of work done on a file and ensures that the 
work is recorded on the file.
33
 Proving the work was reasonably done can be more difficult, 
especially if the original file keeping has been less than satisfactory.
34
  
A2.ii.e: Work assessed off the bill 
Even when a file has been well run and well presented significant amounts can be assessed off a 
bill. Some typical examples of what can cause monies to be assessed off the bill are provided 
below:
35
 
1. Smith was a focused and committed client who, initially, (we will deal with his costs 
dispute with SBM Legal later) was not too concerned about what he needed to spend on 
costs. He wanted to ensure that the truth came out and that Johnston lost the litigation; for 
Smith the principle mattered as much as the money. He instructed SBM Legal that they 
were to identify, locate and interview every possible witness to the events in question. 
SBM Legal did so, and they found fourteen witnesses in total. SBM Legal took lengthy 
witness statement from each of them. At trial they only called four of those witnesses. 
                                                 
31
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 301. 
32
 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971(WA) O 66 r 44. 
33
 There is probably nothing like getting a file, especially a long and complex one, ready for a costs assessment that 
will most drive home to a young practitioner the importance of good file keeping. Files are kept in chronological 
order, but a file prepared for assessment is better organised in relation to the items claimed on the bill rather than in 
strict chronological order. 
34
 Having the lawyer who conducted the matter attending the assessment is helpful, as his or her explanations of the 
works performed are evidence that the assessor can evaluate in order to determine the reasonableness of the works 
done.  
35
 The examples given relate to works done by the practitioners, but reasonableness is also the measure for 
disbursements.  For example, expert reports that are not used or not successfully relied on may not be allowed.  
Assessors may also take a dim view of claims for disbursements that appear to be part of the costs of running an 
office. If a firm charges a client separately for word processing, it may find it difficult to convince the assessor that 
such a charge is a disbursement for the purposes of a party/party assessment. 
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One of those witnesses was completely discredited.  Smith has been billed the costs of 
dealing with those witnesses and SBM Legal has included all that work under item 17, 
‗getting up‘.36 Johnston‘s solicitor disputed those costs at the assessment. The work was 
done, but Johnston‘s solicitor argued that it was not reasonable to do it. He claimed that 
only the costs relating to three of the witnesses should be recoverable. He may well be 
successful in having all or at least some part of the costs relating to the unused ( and the 
unsuccessful) witnesses assessed off, depending of course on whether the overall 
circumstances make it clear that it was reasonable to deal with that many witnesses. 
2. Stephen George Short (SGS), a junior solicitor, did most of the work on the matter, under 
the supervision of the firm‘s managing director, SBM. Smith v Johnston was the first 
matter SGS has taken all the way to trial. As this was his first practical experience of 
litigation, he found himself somewhat deficient in knowledge of the necessary 
procedures. SGS was diligent however, and spent hours and hours reading and checking 
the Court Rules and other relevant materials. He documented those hours carefully under 
the heading of research in the schedule supporting item 17. Johnston‘s solicitor argued 
that this is not research, it is simply SGS ‗getting up to scratch‘ on things a competent 
practitioner should know. Johnston‘s solicitor contended that work to further SGS‘s 
necessary education is not something that can be charged out at the junior practitioner‘s 
rate of $297.00 an hour.
37
 There is a very good chance that an assessor would agree with 
that argument and most or all of that ‗research‘ would be assessed off. 
3. SBM, the managing director, claimed 6 hours in total for telephone attendances with the 
client. He is an older practitioner who believes that excessive documentation is a way of 
needlessly running up costs for the client. There were 24 file notes dated over one week, 
all barely legible, that read ‗telephone attendance on client‘. Johnston‘s solicitor argued 
that there is not enough information about the calls for the assessor to be able to ascertain  
                                                 
36
 Item 17 covers a broad range of work, and the bill of costs may contain schedules setting that work out in some 
detail.  The Western Australian Supreme Court Consolidated Practice Directions, at Direction 4.7.3.3, allow for 
schedules in relation to item 16, ‗getting up‘, but that appears to be a reference to the 2008 determination. The Legal 
Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination  2010(WA) has moved ‗getting up‘ to Item 17 
and  2012 Determination, although yet to come into effect, has renamed those works ‗preparation of case‘. The 
Consolidated Practice Directions have yet to catch up with those changes. 
37
 Legal Practitioners (Supreme Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2010 (WA) s 8 (Table to Clause 10). 
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assessor will usually accept that the calls took place, but lacking evidence that it was 
reasonable to make them he or she may well disallow the time claimed for those calls or 
at least assess off a significant portion of the time claimed.  
The assessor will decide how much (if anything) to assess off each item claimed. He or she will 
also award the costs of the assessment, which will include preparation and the necessary 
appearances. Usually the payee will pay those costs, but if the bill is assessed to less than 
Johnson offered in negotiations then that previous offer may be used as a Calderbank Offer and 
Johnston may be awarded his costs of the assessment. If so, Johnston will have those costs 
removed from the amount he owes Smith, and those costs can be substantial. For this reason the 
party who has lodged a bill for assessment is not encouraged to make any ambit claims in the 
bill.  
A2.ii.f: Finalising the assessment 
 At the end of the process the assessor will ask if there is any objection to him or her signing the 
certificate. Up until the certificate is signed either of the parties that is dissatisfied with any 
aspect of the assessment can ask the assessor to review his or her assessment.
38
 An assessor who 
reviews his or her own decision may seek further evidence regarding the item or items in 
dispute.
39
 The assessor may provide written reasons as to how he or she arrived at a 
determination about the item or items that have been reviewed and will provide those reasons 
with the signed certificate if so requested by either Smith‘s or Johnston‘s representatives.40 If 
neither party requests a review the assessor will sign the certificate of assessment and the 
assessment is over.
41
  
The certificate of assessment is a judgement of the court and can be enforced as such.
42
 In the 
Supreme Court of Western Australia, a bill of costs such as Smith‘s, which falls in the 
$70,000.00 to $99,999.00 range, will, on average, return around 85% of the amount that has been 
                                                 
38
 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 66 r 53. 
39
 Ibid  O 66 r 54(1). 
40
 Ibid O 66 r 54(2). 
41
 For a junior practitioner the assessor may well sign the certificate with the proviso that the junior practitioner can 
seek instructions as to objections before the signing ‗officially‘ takes place.  In such instances, silence, or a failure to 
report back promptly with any objections, is assent. 
42
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 305(3). 
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claimed.
43
  In our example this means that the bill would be allowed at (say) $64,500.00. As will 
be seen below, the amount the bill has claimed may in turn be significantly lower than Smith‘s 
practitioner charged him for the works, with a probable result that Smith may only get back 
around 60% of what he spent on legal fees, despite him having been successful in the action and 
the court having ordered that Johnston pay his costs. 
A simplified illustration of the party/party assessment process to this point is provided below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure A2.1: Party/party assessment in Western Australia 
A2.ii.g: Review of assessment 
If a party has asked the assessor to review the assessment and is not satisfied with the outcome, 
that party has 14 days from the day the certificate was signed to ask that the items reviewed be 
                                                 
43
 See data on rates of return on party/party bills in the Western Australian jurisdiction presented in Chapter 4 at 
4.5.3. 
The court that 
heard the 
original case 
assesses the bill. 
The lawyers go 
down and argue 
it out in detail 
(both lawyers 
are charging 
their clients for 
this time and 
work) 
Smith (S) has 
won a court case 
against Johnson 
(J). SBM Legal 
(SBM) is Smith’s 
legal firm and 
Lewins Legal (L) 
is Johnson’s legal 
firm. 
Smith is awarded 
damages and 
receives a court 
order saying that 
Johnson has to 
pay his legal 
costs. 
Johnson thinks 
this is too much 
and refuses to 
pay it. 
SBM Legal files 
the bill at the 
court as part of 
the original 
litigation, the 
case of Smith v 
Johnston that he 
has already 
won.  
The case is still 
going as there is 
still an unsorted 
dispute, as to 
how much the 
costs should be. 
At the end the court 
decides what the bill 
should be according to 
the relevant scale of 
costs. The court asks, 
for each scale item 
claimed; 
• Was it reasonable to 
do the work?  
• Was it done 
reasonably? 
• What rate or time does 
the scale allow? 
If the answer is yes they 
allow it, if not they 
reduce it or strike it out 
altogether. 
The court decides 
that all up the bill 
is worth $ 30,000. 
 This is now the 
amount Johnson 
has to pay Smith. 
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further reviewed by a judge of the Supreme Court sitting in chambers.
44
 If the judge believes that 
the assessor made some error of principle in either allowing or disallowing an item or in arriving 
at an amount for an item the judge can rectify that error.
45
 However, the judge‘s review can only 
relate to objections made in accordance with the rules and the part of the assessment not subject 
to objection is final. The judge will usually order the costs of review in the cause.  
A2.iii: The solicitor client dispute 
Smith may also find himself in a costs dispute with his own practitioners, SBM Legal. Only a 
very small portion of legal retainers are taken to assessment, but when practitioners and their 
clients fall out over monies owed assessment is the fastest and cheapest way to resolve the 
dispute if negotiation alone will not do so. 
As SBM Legal is a well-run firm of competent practitioners it provided Smith with proper costs 
disclosure at the beginning of the retainer.
46
 We will also assume that the costs agreement that 
governs the retainer and by which SBM Legal has contracted out of the default charge out rates 
provided by the Scales of Costs is reasonable and valid in every way.
47
  
As previously noted, SBM Legal has been billing Smith on a monthly basis and Smith in turn has 
been paying those bills. If Smith has had dispute about any of the monthly bills he could have 
taken that up with the SBM partner who had ultimate conduct of his matter. In most cases that 
dispute would be settled at that point in time in any one of a number of ways. The firm may have 
discounted the bill. Smith, on receiving a proper explanation of the bill, may have been willing to 
pay it. However, it is also possible for a client to dispute the entirety of the fees charged at the 
end of the matter, despite having paid interim bills throughout.
48
 We will assume that at the end 
of the entire matter Smith has decided that he has been overcharged and that he has not been able 
to come to any agreement with SBM Legal about what he should have paid as compared to what 
                                                 
44
 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 66 r 55(1). 
45
 Ibid O 66 r 55(2).  
46
 Failure to provide proper disclosure comes with a range of sanctions, not the least of which is that it can displace a 
costs agreement entirely so that the defaulting practitioner can only recover fees for his or her work at the relevant 
scale rates and then only after an assessment takes place.  For costs disclosure generally see Division 3 of the Legal 
Profession Act 2008 (WA) and for the effects of deficient disclosure see s 268 of that Act. 
47
 An invalid costs agreement has the same effect as failure to disclose costs, and the bill is then assessed at scale 
rates. 
48
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 292(2). 
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he has been billed.
49
 Smith has availed himself of his rights under section 295 of the Act and 
instructed SBM Legal to lodge the bill for assessment.
50
 He is able to have the whole bill 
assessed, despite having paid all but the final invoice.
51
 An exercise of this right gives rise to a 
client initiated assessment (a client/solicitor assessment). If Smith does not avail himself of that 
right and merely refuses to pay the bill SBM Legal also has the right to file the bill for 
assessment. The procedure for carrying out the assessment in either case is the same.
52
 
A2.iii.a: The client/solicitor bill 
SBM Legal will draw up a combined version of all the bills that they have sent Smith over the 
course of and at the termination of his matter. The bill drawn for the party/party assessment 
(included at the end of this annexure) was drawn to the limits provided in the scale of costs. As 
the client/solicitor assessment is pursuant to a costs agreement the party/party bill is not relevant. 
As has been previously noted the amount that Smith has paid SBM Legal over the duration of his 
matter may be higher and even substantially higher than the amount claimed in the party/party 
bill.  The sample party/party bill provided was drawn for a total of $75,949.91. For the sake of 
                                                 
49
 As a firm of competent practitioners, SBM Legal would have made sure that Smith was well aware of the shortfall 
between what he would recover in costs and what he will have actually paid, as doing so is part of the disclosure 
regime (The Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 260(4)). Despite this, the reality of that shortfall, once the 
party/party bill has been finalised, may well leave Smith feeling that he has been overcharged. 
50
 The quantum of clients who insist on having bills assessed by the court is, in relation to the 
quantum of clients who receive bills, statistically insignificant. There were 75 client/solicitor 
assessments filed in the Western Australian Supreme Court in 2005; there were tens of thousands 
of retainers formed in Western Australia that year. A dissatisfied client is more likely to refuse to 
pay than to ask for assessment. Prior to the 2008 Act, which allowed practitioners to file their 
own bills for assessment; a practitioner could either write the matter off or sue on the retainer to 
recover the debt due in contract. Many solicitors will write small debts off as the cost of pursuing 
them is often greater than the debt to be recovered. Time and energy spent chasing a debt may be 
better spent working on a new retainer. See for instance Mossensons (A Firm) v Coastline Associates 
(Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Pigeon, Ipp and Templeton JJ, 12 December 1997). 
This unreported judgement from the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia started as a 
client/solicitor assessment in the Local Court (as it then was), went before a single judge of the Supreme Court on 
appeal and then on the Full Court. Mossessons had their bill reduced in the first instance, and instigated both 
appeals. Templeman JJ, one of the three presiding judges, was willing to inquire into the merits of Mossensons 
objections to the assessment, but in doing so he felt that ‗since that inquiry discloses that the amount of costs 
actually in issue is a few hundred dollars only, I would decline to exercise any discretion which might exist to set 
aside the allocatur‘ (in the last paragraph of his judgement).   
51
 See above n 48.  For discussion on this issue see Chapter 2 at 2.5.1.1.  
52
 There would be one very real difference in the example used. If Smith feels he is being overcharged he may have 
costs of the entire retainer assessed. If he has paid on a monthly basis and refused to pay the final bill SBM Legal 
would have only the final bill assessed. 
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this example we will assume that SBM has charged Smith $100,000.00 for the conduct of his 
matter. The difference between the two amounts is the difference between what was charged for 
the work under the costs agreement as compared to what was claimed in accordance with the 
scale of costs. 
 SBM Legal will then file that document in the Supreme Court of Western Australia as a 
substantive matter. All client/solicitor and solicitor/client assessments in the Western Australian 
jurisdiction are heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The fee on application (2013) 
is the same as the fee charged for a party/party assessment, being $195.00 for an individual or 
small business, or $379.00 for a corporation, plus an ad valorum fee of 2.5% of the total amount 
claimed.
53
 In this instance, as Smith‘s litigation was behalf of his company, the total filing fee 
would be $2,879.00. That amount would be added to the $100,000.00 charged for the works as 
an additional disbursement on the bill of costs. 
A2.iii.b: The conduct of the assessment and the issues that will determine it 
From this point on the conduct of the assessment will mirror that of a party/party assessment 
with two key differences; firstly the assessment will be governed by the costs agreement rather 
than the scale, and secondly the test for determining what can be allowed will be expanded, as is 
explained below. 
 Smith and SBM Legal can agree to a provisional assessment as discussed at A2.2.3 above.  If 
they do not do so, and unless the bill is small or straightforward, the assessor can call a directions 
hearing before the actual assessment takes place. In the directions hearing the assessor will 
attempt to get the parties to settle the matter and if that attempt is unsuccessful the assessor will 
make orders that help narrow and define the dispute.  
If the matter goes on to a full assessment and, as in this instance, there is a valid costs agreement, 
the assessor will use the rates set out in that agreement as a yardstick, rather than the scale of 
costs. Assuming that the rates set out in the costs agreement are not unreasonable, those are the 
rates that will be applied to the works being assessed. Secondly, the criterion set out in Section 
301(1) (a) of the Act will be expanded; the test will still be ‗was it reasonable to carry out the 
                                                 
53
 Fees for the Western Australian Supreme Court can be found at 
http://www.supremecourt.wa.gov.au/G/general_division_fees.aspx?uid=1953-2760-2885-1682.  
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work?‘, but works carried out under the instructions of the client will be considered reasonable, 
even if those works were unnecessary in terms of the litigation. In the example above Smith has 
instructed SBM Legal to interview and take statements from every possible witness to his 
matter.
54
As was explained, a good portion of that work may not be recoverable on a party/party 
basis. However, if SBM Legal can show that the works, though excessive, were carried out in 
accordance with instructions, the fees they have charged for those works will stand.
55
   
A 2005 Western Australian client/solicitor assessment had an average return of approximately 
83% of the amount that was claimed in the bill as filed.
56
 If Smith‘s bill was reduced by that 
average amount he would have the costs of the assessment (if he had incurred any)
57
 awarded to 
him and would make a substantial saving as compared to his original bill.
58
 Smith‘s bill would 
have had the filing fee and the charge for preparing the bill assessed off and the bill would have 
been allowed at (say) $83,000.00. As was seen above Smith recovered $64,500.00 from Johnston 
on the party/party assessment. In this instance Smith has paid $18,500.00 more to his lawyer for 
the conduct of the litigation than he has received from the losing litigant by way of a costs order.  
However, that average return on client/solicitor assessment in Western Australia used is only an 
average, and the real rate of return depends on individual circumstances. In short, it seems likely 
that the assessors for majority of the assessments that provided data for this thesis found that the 
clients had genuine grievances and had been overcharged; in terms of retainers generally this is 
likely to be atypical. As the assessment process in Western Australia does tend to weed out the 
unrealistic disputes,
59
 and as for the purposes of this exercise we have assumed that SBM Legal 
                                                 
54
 See A2.2.5 above. 
55
 A prudent practitioner, faced with instructions to do more than he or she thinks is necessary, will raise that issue 
with the client and will insist on written confirmation that they have done so and that the instructions are to do those 
works in any event.  
56
 See data on rates of return on client/solicitor bills in the Western Australian jurisdiction presented in Chapter 3 at 
4.6.3. The Western Australian data did not include any bills in that range, so for the purposes of the illustration the 
average return has been used. 
57
 As a client/solicitor assessment is a substantive matter in its own right Smith may have engaged a legal 
practitioner to act for him, and would thus incur costs. Alternately he may be unrepresented, and his only costs will 
be the filing fee.  It is the author‘s experience that, in Western Australia, an unrepresented client attending an 
assessment of his or her own bill will receive some guidance from the assessor. It is also the author‘s experience that 
the solicitor, unless he or she has engaged another practitioner to deal with the matter, will not be awarded any costs 
even if the bill is not reduced on assessment.  
58
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 305(2)(a). 
59
 For example, in the bill filed as LPA 37 2005, the amount claimed was $35,326.00.  The costs agreement 
governing the retainer was deficient, and after three appearances the solicitor decided against assessment and 
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is a firm that bills in an ethical and competent matter, we cannot assume that Smith will 
necessarily do as well as the Western Australian clients whose bills provided the data for this 
thesis. It may well be that Smith‘s client/solicitor assessment could be returned at an amount 
much closer to the  quantum of the bills SBM Legal had rendered Smith. If Smith‘s bills were 
reasonable in all the circumstances Smith would only have recovered around 60%-65% of his 
actual expenditure from Johnston.  
A legal practitioner should not fear a costs assessment if he or she has a valid costs agreement 
and has done his or her job competently and kept a good record of what work has been done,  
despite the statistic recorded above. It remains to be seen how many Western Australian 
practitioners will avail themselves of the right to seek assessment of their own motion, but it 
seems likely that doing so, in the circumstances where the firm has acted competently, will be 
more cost effective than suing a client who will not pay in debt.   
A2.iii.b1: Issues that will cause a reduction in the bill 
Nonetheless, things can go wrong for a solicitor on assessment, as is evidenced by some of the 
Western Australian client/solicitor bills that provided data for this thesis. There are three 
examples of how costs claimed in a party/party assessment can fall away listed above at A2.2.5; 
the second and third of those examples are also relevant to client/solicitor assessments. There are 
also other sets of circumstances that can have a disastrous effect on a client/solicitor bill: 
1. The first is centred in costs disclosure. The practitioner‘s duty to disclose costs at the start 
of the retainer and during its existence has become progressively (and, many would 
argue, desirably) more onerous.
60
 A client who becomes aware that costs disclosure has 
been deficient can apply to the Supreme Court to have the costs agreement set aside so 
that the assessor will assess the bill against the relevant scale of costs.
61
 A costs assessor 
who reaches that conclusion on his or her own can reduce the bill by the amount that he 
                                                                                                                                                             
consented to an allocator at $13,000. The majority of the bills filed for client/solicitor assessment in the Supreme 
Court of Western Australia did not go on to a full assessment. In some cases it may be that the result was quite 
different to the LPA 37 example and the client was made aware that assessment would result in little or no discount 
and there was then a settlement on those grounds. 
60
 The Act makes provision for sophisticated clients and exempts retainers with such from the full disclosure regime, 
see The Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 263. That said, while some forms of legal works are easily mapped in 
advance, working out the likely costs of litigation is very much a ‗how long is a piece of string?‘ exercise.  
61
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 288 (3)(c).  
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or she thinks is warranted according the seriousness of the deficiency.
62
 Deficiency of 
costs disclosure can also be considered unsatisfactory professional conduct or 
professional misconduct.
63
 Such circumstances can lead to the original bill being assessed 
to far less than it was filed at, even though the bill accurately described the work done. 
Once the costs agreement falls away the solicitor is left with the scale rates and those 
rates, applied instead of the rate set out in the costs agreement, are likely to mean that the 
solicitor will be unable to recover a substantial portion of the bill. If the bill has already 
been paid the solicitor will have to refund the difference between what was charged and 
the assessed amount. 
2. A second set of circumstances that can lead to a large amount being assessed off a 
client/solicitor bill stems from poor file management. As a general rule, a practitioner 
who has taken initial instructions will give the client a copy of the firm‘s costs agreement 
and inform them that they should seek independent advice as to the terms of the 
agreement. The client will be asked to return that agreement, signed, after they have 
sought that advice.
64
 Not all clients do so, and if the firm does not pick up on the fact that 
the costs agreement has not been signed, the retainer can run its course and if the bill is 
later disputed and it becomes apparent that there was no costs agreement the bill will be 
assessed against the scale, regardless of what the law firm has charged.
65
 
As with a party/party assessment, once the assessor has signed the certificate (or allocator as it is 
otherwise described), SBM Legal can enforce that certificate as if it were a judgement of the 
court.
66
 The parties have the same rights of appeal as have the parties in a party/party 
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 Ibid s 268(3).  
63
 Ibid s 307(2). 
64
 Clients rarely seek that advice; if they approached another practitioner to receive it they would be faced with a 
costs agreement…… Nonetheless, a practitioner should ensure that a client has time to go through the agreement 
carefully and for that reason should not accept it back signed at that original meeting. Doing so can cause problems 
later as if the client applies to the court to have  the agreement set aside, the circumstances in which the costs 
agreement arose are one of the things that the court will consider in deciding the application, see LPA 288(3)(d). 
65
 This is less the case than it used to be. The Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 282(2) stipulates that a costs 
agreement must be evidenced in writing, so in a situation where a costs agreement has been sent out and the client, 
having received it, continues to give instructions, the agreement is likely to be seen as binding. Under the Legal 
Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 221 a client could make a costs agreement in writing and it is the author‘s experience 
that costs assessors insisted on a client signature as evidence that the client had made that agreement. 
66
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 305(3). 
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assessment.
67
 The same would be true if it had been SBM Legal that had sought the assessment, 
rather than Smith. 
A simplified illustration of the client/solicitor assessment process to this point is provided below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2.2: Client/solicitor assessment in Western Australia 
Mr Smith now has been through two costs assessments. He knows how much the unsuccessful 
defendant has to pay him, and he knows how much he has to pay SBM Legal.
68
 If SBM Legal 
has provided proper disclosure, had a valid costs agreement, and handled his matter competently 
Smith is likely to be significantly out of pocket on his legal costs, despite having won the 
litigation and obtaining a court order that Johnston be liable for his costs. The further costs that 
he has had to pay for the two assessments (assuming that he was not awarded the costs of 
                                                 
67
 See A2.2.7 above for a discussion of the rights of appeal against a costs assessment. 
68
 If Smith has been paying interim bills, and in particular if he has paid the large bill that covered the trial period, 
and his client/solicitor bill was reduced by any significant amount, it may be SBM Legal that owes him money. 
Smith (S) thinks his 
firm, SBM Legal 
(SBM) has 
overcharged. He asks 
that SBM Legal file 
the bill for what he 
has charged Smith for 
a client/solicitor 
assessment. 
Note: If SBM Legal 
thinks Smith won’t 
pay the bill he can file 
it for a 
solicitor/client 
assessment. 
This is not part of 
the Smith v 
Johnston litigation; 
it is a whole new 
matter and has to 
go to the Supreme 
Court. 
If Smith signed a costs 
agreement then the bill 
is assessed against the 
costs agreement (so if 
Smith agreed to pay 
$550 an hour instead of 
the $450 or whatever it 
is at scale then the work 
is assessed at that 
amount. The court asks 
the same question as 
above, but adds; 
• Was the work done at 
the request of the client? 
If SBM Legal did 
unnecessary or 
unreasonable work then 
that work will be struck 
of or reduced in 
amount. 
If the costs 
agreement is void or 
non-existent then the 
costs of SBM Legal’s 
bill will be assessed 
at the same scale 
rates used for the 
party/party 
assessment, but still 
using the extra test of 
did the client agree to 
it , as well as the 
usual was it 
reasonable and was it 
reasonably done? 
Once the court has 
made a 
determination on 
the bill that is 
what is owed.  
SBM can enforce 
the determination 
as if it were a 
judgment of the 
court. 
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assessment on the party/party bill and that he engaged other solicitors to conduct the 
client/solicitor assessment and SBM Legal‘s bill was not reduced by more than one-sixth) may 
be substantial. 
A2.iv: Conclusion 
This annexure has provided a ‗hands on‘ look at costs assessment as it is carried out in the 
Western Australian jurisdiction. As noted in the body of the thesis in Chapter One
69
 a Western 
Australian assessment is a judicial process carried out by officers of the court. It is adversarial in 
nature, regardless of whether it is a party/party assessment that is part of the substantial matter 
before the court or whether it is a new action where either a client or a solicitor disputes the 
client‘s liability for his or her own costs. A costs assessment in Western Australia is not 
significantly different from assessments performed when the colony was first founded. The 
system is, more or less, what it always has been. There are no loud calls for reform.
70
 As it has 
received little attention one might conclude that it is not perceived as deficient, or perhaps for the 
bulk of Western Australians it is not much perceived at all.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69
 At 1.4. 
70
 In the consultation drafts for its 1999 Review of the Civil and Criminal Justice System of Western Australia (at 
page 23 as Proposal 517), the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia proposed that a new Costs Act 
enshrine the principle that a winning litigant should recover the reasonable costs of litigation. This proposal was not 
carried through into the final report, although that report (at page 133 as Recommendation 131 did recommend that 
the gap between solicitor/client and party/party assessment be narrowed by allowing recovery of file management 
works on a party/party assessment. Martin CJ, who chaired the committee that produced that report and is now the 
Chief Justice of the Western Australian Supreme Court, has reformed the way the court awards costs and is driving a 
debate about how lawyers charge for their fees. However, there is currently no real discussion about the costs 
assessment regime as it currently operates. In particular, the thesis to which this annexure is attached provides the 
first comparison of the Western Australian system with the ‗reformed‘ system that was introduced in New South 
Wales in 1993. 
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The Smith v Johnston Bill: An example of the bill drawn for a party/party 
assessment 
The following bill of costs has been drawn in accordance with the Legal Practitioners (Supreme 
Court) (Contentious Business) Determination 2010.  It is provided as an example of what a bill 
drawn for a party/party assessment in the Supreme Court of Western Australia would generally 
look like.  
As can be seen in the bill, the costs of the litigation are broken down into the items on the scale 
of costs. The assessing officer will work through the bill item by item as described above and 
will either agree that the item charge is reasonable or ‗tax off‘ an amount from the item so that it 
becomes reasonable. 
This thesis and its annexure have used the term ‗assessment‘ to describe the process used to 
determine the final quantum of the costs that a litigant will recover. However, the example 
provided uses the terms ‗tax‘ and ‗taxation‘ as those terms are still current in the Supreme Court 
of Western Australia. 
There is no sample bill provided for the client/solicitor assessment described above. Legal 
practitioners are more idiosyncratic in the form of such bills than they are able to be in drawing 
up party/party bills. For that reason a sample would only show what the author would consider 
an acceptable bill and would not necessarily reflect a bill as would be drawn by most 
practitioners.  
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
HELD AT PERTH 
 CIV 123 of 2010 
IN THE MATTER of a commercial dispute 
B E T W E E N: 
SMITH PTY LTD                                                                                                                                         
Plaintiff 
 
and 
 
JONES PTY LTD                                                                                                                         
Defendant 
 
Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs Pursuant to the orders of THE HONOURABLE 
Justice Lewins                                                                                          
DATED 12 July 2012 
Date of Document: The       28th      day of     November 2012                  
Filed on behalf of: The Plaintiff 
Prepared by: 
SBM LEGAL PTY 
PERTH   WA   6000 
 
Index                                                                                                         Page No. 
1.  Bill of Costs for Taxation    (pursuant to the Legal Practitioners 
 (Supreme Court)(Contentious Business) Determination 2010)          2-4                                                                                 
2. Schedule A:  Getting Up   As above                                                       5-6 
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Bill of Costs for Taxation 
No Date Narrative Item on 
Scale 
Total Taxed 
Off 
1. 1 
26/01/2010 Writ endorsed with Statement of Claim 1 $4,000.00  
2.  
12/03/2010 Defence to counterclaim 4 $3,200.00  
3.  
17/03/2010 Directions Hearing (RJL) 10(a)         
$297.00 
 
4. 2 
20/04/2010  Directions Hearing-  10(a) $429.00  
5. 4 
25/05/2010 Notice for discovery 7(a) $66.00  
6.  
29/8/2010 Inspection-Including Attendance at 
Walker Legal 
8 $2,100.00  
7.  
various Giving discovery 7(b) $4200.00  
8.  
6/01/2011 Inspection, Walker Legal attendance at 
SBM offices 
8 $594.00  
9. 5 
27/03/2011 Status conference- 10(a) $600.00  
10. 6 
08/05/2011 
 
Case evaluation conference 
 
24(b) $429.00  
11. 9 
28/08/2001 Case evaluation conference- adjourned 
sine die 
24(b) $180.00  
12. 1
0 
13/09/2011 Mediation conference (attendance by 
Counsel)  
24(a) $1287.00  
13. 1
4 
27/10/2011 Defendant‘s chambers application for 
amendment of defence  
10(a) $720.00  
14.   
10/01/2012 Entry for hearing 16(a) $858.00   
15.  
various Advice on evidence 16(c) $2,400.00  
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16. 1
5 
25/01/2012 Case evaluation conference regarding 
entry of matter for hearing 
10(a) $209.00  
17. 1
7 
04/02/2012 Directions hearing 10(a) $135.00  
18. 1
8 
13/02/2012 Defendants chambers application for 
leave to reply on supplementary 
affidavit- appearance (special 
appointment) 
10(a) $1100.00  
19. 1
9 
17/04/2012 Fee on brief (Counsel) 20(a)  $12,672.00  
20.  
18/04/2012 Counsel attendance on second day of 
trial 
20(b) $2,500  
21. 2
0 
17/04/2012 
18/04/2012 
Solicitor attending trial (both days) 20(e) 
 
$5148.00  
22. 2
5 
12/07/2012 Attendance at Court reserved 
judgement  
20(g)  $429.00  
23. 2
6 
18/07/2012 Attendance at Court re costs of matter 10(a) $732.00  
24. 2
7 
03/05/2004 Attendance on Court (final orders with 
appointment) 
25(a)  $366.00  
25. 2
8 
Various Other work: Getting up case  
(See Schedule 1) 
33(a)(b) $26,289.35  
26.  
Various Drawing Bill of Costs 30(a) $800.00  
  Total  $71,740.35  
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Disbursements 
Date 
Description and Payee Amount 
Inclusive of GST 
Taxed Off 
14/01/2010 Supreme Court filing fees $265.00  
28/09/2010 Tony Tooley, CPA,  
(consider and advise on accounts) 
$175.00  
01/10/2010 Debtor‘s Ledger Service  
(process servers) 
$49.50  
01/02/2012 Debtor‘s Ledger Service ) $77.00  
03/02/2012 DOLA search  $11.00  
21/01/2012 Supreme Court filing fees $800.00  
08/08/2002 Acme Accounting Services $2100.00  
various Rapid Print $353.05  
 Supreme Court, Taxation Fee, fixed  $379.00  
 Total $4209.55  
Amount of Bill $75,949.91 
Taxed-off $ 
 $ 
Taxing fee (Ad 
Valorum 
component) $ 
Attendance at 
Taxation $ 
Allowed at $ 
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I certify that the above costs have been taxed and allowed in the sum of $ 
DATED the                                                  day of                                            2012 
 __________________________ 
 Taxing Officer 
Take Notice that I have appointed the      day of        2012 at      o‘clock in the      noon at the 
Supreme Court Perth as the date, the time and the place at which the Bill of Costs is to be taxed. 
 
 
Listing Clerk  
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Schedule 1: Other Work (Getting Up) 
Item 33 
 
1. Client Correspondence: Correspondence between client and SBM Legal. This includes 
written correspondence, telephone attendances and face to face meetings. 
 
 
Practitioner Hourly rate Total time 
spent 
Charge  
SGS $297 475 mins $2351.25  
SBM $429 517 mins $3696.55  
KJT $297 208 mins $1029.60  
CAM $297 282 mins $1395.90  
Clark $209 10 mins $34.80  
   Sub-Total $8508.10 
 
 
2. Correspondence with Defendant: Written correspondence, telephone correspondence and 
face to face meetings between SBM Legal and the solicitors for the defendant 
 
Practitioner Hourly rate Total time 
spent 
Charge  
SGS $297 250 mins $1237.50  
SBM $429 172 mins $1229.80  
KJT $297 105 mins $519.75  
Clerk $209 96 mins $334.40  
   Sub-Total $3321.45 
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3. Correspondence with Supreme Court, including written and telephone correspondence 
 
Practitioner Hourly rate Total time 
spent 
Charge  
SGS $297 250 mins $1237.5  
SBM $429 172 mins $129.80  
KJT $297 105 mins $519.75  
Clerk $209 180 mins $627.00  
   Sub-Total $2514.05 
 
 
 
4. Correspondence with third parties, including written, telephone and personal attendances 
 
Practitioner Hourly rate Total time 
spent 
Charge 5975.66 
SGS $297 475 mins $2351.25  
SBM $429 517 mins $3696.55  
Clark $209 250 mins $870.83  
   Sub-Total $6918.63 
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5. Consideration of Evidence and Law: Consideration of relevant evidence and law, 
including the Trustees Act and legal precedents and affidavits filed by the defendant. 
Also including preparation of Court documents not allowed for elsewhere.  
 
 
 
Practitioner Hourly rate Total time 
spent 
Charge  
SGS $297 850 mins $4207.5  
SBM $429 172 mins $1229.80  
KJT $297 105 mins $851.40  
Clerk $209 212 mins $738.47  
   Sub-Total $7027.12 
 
 
Total Getting Up: $26,289.35 
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Annexure 3: The mechanics of costs assessment in New South Wales. 
A3.i: Overview 
As was noted in the Annexure 1, the processes of a legal dispute that carried through to 
completed litigation do not differ a great deal between the Western Australian and the New 
South Wales jurisdictions. The process of engaging a lawyer is much the same in both states. The 
relationship between the litigant and the legal practitioner that ensues is no different in Western 
Australia than it is in New South Wales. It is usually governed by a costs agreement and always 
by the relevant Legal Profession Act. The litigation itself would typically follow much the same 
course in either jurisdiction. In both jurisdictions a winning litigant (in this example Mr Smith) 
would have the benefit of an order that the losing litigant (Mr Johnston) pay his costs as part of 
that win.
1
 
Despite the essential similarity in the way the substantive matter is adjudicated, the mechanisms 
available to the various parties for resolving further disputes as to costs differ markedly between 
the two jurisdictions. Annexure 2 described the two different routes to costs assessment that Mr 
Smith would use if the costs disputes arose in Western Australia. As noted, if Smith could not 
come to an agreement with Johnston about the costs Johnston owed him on the party/party costs 
order, Smith could have those costs determined as a continuation of the original Smith v Johnston 
dispute. If Smith had a dispute as to the fees his own practitioner had charged him he could have 
those fees assessed for reasonableness by way of a new application under the Legal Profession 
Act 2008 (WA) to the Western Australian Supreme Court.
2
 Alternately, if Smith simply refused 
to pay, his practitioner could make the application for assessment, again to the Supreme Court by 
way of the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA).
3
   
                                                 
1
 As discussed in the body of the thesis, both jurisdictions have a general rule that costs follow the event; as such the 
winning litigant will usually be granted an order that the losing litigant pay his or her costs. As with all general rules 
there are exceptions, but in the hypothetical Smith v Johnston dispute that is being used to illustrate the assessment 
processes Smith has the benefit of such an order. 
2
 Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) s 295(2). 
3
 Ibid s 297(1). 
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In New South Wales, where costs assessment is no longer in the purview of the courts, all 
applications for assessment are filed with the Manger, Costs Assessment,
4
 and are assessed by 
way of an administrative process that is separate from the courts. The fee paid on filing an 
application for assessment is the greater of ‗$100 or 1% of the unpaid bill or 1% of the total costs 
in dispute‘.5 There is a further charge of $192.50 per hour for the costs of the assessor, who does 
the assessment,
6
 but those costs are not determined until the assessment is finalised.
7
 The forms 
for application are available online.
8
   
We will track Smith‘s two disputes through the assessment process below.9 For the purposes of 
this illustration we will continue to assume that Smith‘s lawyers, SBM Legal, have charged him 
a total of $100,000.00 for the conduct of his litigation against Johnston and that Smith has the 
benefit of a costs order that makes Johnston liable for the costs of the Smith v Johnston litigation. 
 The assessment mechanisms as described below are current (July 2013), but it should be noted 
that if the recommendations provided in the Chief Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment 
Scheme (Draft Report) (2013) are adopted the mechanisms of costs assessment in New South 
Wales will change profoundly.
10
   
                                                 
4
 Applications for costs assessment are filed in triplicate at the registry of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 
5
 Supreme Court of New South Wales, Costs Assessments Forms and Fees (3 May 2012) 
<http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_costsassessment/sco2_costsassess_formsfees.ht
ml#costs_assessment_fees>. An applicant who is unable to pay the filing fee can ask to have the fee either waived or 
postponed. The form used for such an application can be found at 
http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/SCO2_forms/SCO2_forms_subject/fee_postpone_waiv
er_reduction.html. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 For party/party assessments the costs assessor has a discretion to award the costs of assessment to either of the 
parties, subject to any relevant order from the court or tribunal that awarded the costs (Legal Profession Act 2004 
(NSW) s 369(3)(b)). In an own practitioner dispute where the firm rendering the bill has failed in the costs 
disclosure regime, the costs are paid by the defaulting firm (Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(3) (a)). In a 
situation where the bill has been reduced by 15% or more, the assessor can order that the firm that provided the 
services pay the costs or assessment, or the costs assessor can award the costs against whichever party or parties  he 
or see determines should pay them (Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(3)(c)).  See discussion in note xxx at 
Chapter 3.14.2 as to how this may arguably operate in relation to party/party assessments. 
8
 Supreme Court of New South Wales, Schedule of Fees for Costs Assessment Applications 
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/supreme_court/ll_sc.nsf/vwPrint1/SCO_costforms#Sch>.  
9
 The New South Wales Costs Assessment Scheme also accepts practitioner/practitioner assessments, where the 
dispute is between a practitioner who has retained another practitioner, such as a solicitor engaging a barrister.  
10
 For discussion of those recommendations see Chapter 3.13.2.2 through to 3.14. 
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A3.ii:  Party/party assessments in New South Wales. 
In our example, Smith has the benefit of a costs order from the Smith v Johnston litigation. That 
award will usually be expressed as ‗costs to be agreed or assessed‘. The parties to the dispute 
will usually have made some real efforts to agree costs, and most parties do agree those costs and 
do not require an assessment. However, if they cannot reach an agreement the application 
process starts with one of the parties filing for assessment. Either party can make an application 
to have party/party costs assessment, but it is more usual that it is the party that is owed costs 
does so.
11
 We will consider that in this case it is the wining litigant, Mr Smith, through his 
solicitors, that commences the process.  He does so by filing ‗Form 3 Application for 
Assessment of Party/Party Cost‘12 and paying the filing fee as set out above. We will assume that 
Mr Johnston has not made any payment to Smith and that the dispute relates to the full amount 
that Smith is claiming that he is owed as costs.  
There is a fundamental difference between what Smith will claim he is owed in this example as 
compared to what he claimed in the example provided in Annexure 2 (the Western Australian 
example). In New South Wales, Smith is not restricted to recovering the amounts allowed by a 
scale of costs.  Smith can claim all the money he has (reasonably) spent on the conduct of the 
litigation, and that amount is likely to be close to or the same as the amount SBM Legal has 
charged him for conducting that litigation. As was described in Annexure 2,
13
 there are 
circumstances where a client instructs his or her solicitor to do work over and above what is 
reasonably necessary for the conduct of litigation. While the practitioner can charge the client for 
that extra work the client cannot in turn recover those charges from the losing litigant. For the 
purposes of this illustration we will assume that Smith did push SBM Legal to do extra work that 
was not strictly necessary for the efficient conduct of his matter. For that reason the bill SBM 
Legal drew up for the party/party assessment was for (say) $90,000.00 rather than for the full 
$100,000.00 that they had charged Smith. 
                                                 
11
 The paying party is much less likely to commence assessment as they are not usually in any rush to obtain a 
determination that can be enforced against them. That said, the paying party may be obliged to pay interest on the 
costs the winning litigant expended from the date of expenditure, and it may be in his or her interest to commence 
the assessment process. See G E Dal Pont, Law of Costs (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003) 660.  
12
 An approved form in accordance with the Legal Profession Regulations 2005 (NSW) cl 120(1). 
13
 At A2.2.5. 
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A3.ii.a: Commencing the application for assessment 
SBM Legal is not required to draw up a bill of costs in any particular format in order to file for 
party/party assessment. Instead, on Smith‘s behalf, SBM Legal will fill out Form 3, the requisite 
form for commencing a party/party assessment in New South Wales.
14
 Form 3 requires the 
applicant to provide the basic information about the matter, including the parties‘ names, the 
source of the liability for costs, and the amount in dispute, as well as service details. The form 
also requires more specifics about the dispute, and if the paying party is the applicant he or she 
must serve the form on the party who is seeking payment so that party can provide those details 
before the form is filed. The required specifics include the following: 
(a) Details of the proceedings in respect of which the costs are payable, including the 
identity of the parties to the proceedings and of their legal representatives; 
(b) The total amount of costs payable; 
(c) The relevant work done in those proceedings and the period over which that work 
was done; 
(d) The identity of the person/s who did that work (including the position of the person/s 
e.g. partner, associate, etc); 
(e) The basis on which the costs have been calculated and charged (whether on a lump 
sum basis, an hourly rate basis, an item of work basis, on a part of proceedings basis 
or other basis); 
(f) The facts relied on to justify the costs charged as fair and reasonable by reference to 
the above, the practitioner‘s skill, labour and responsibility, the complexity, novelty 
or difficulty of the matter, the quality of work done or any other relevant matter.
15
 
The information that is required can be provided in a separate statement or by way of the bill in 
dispute, if the bill is drawn in a way that provides the information. The form also requires copies 
of any objections to the bill (as set out by the party who is refusing to pay it) and any response to 
those objections. The costs applicant also provides an authority for the costs assessor to ‗have 
access to, and to inspect all my documents that are held by me, or by any barrister or solicitor 
                                                 
14
 See Supreme Court of New South Wales, above n 5. 
15
 Ibid. See Form 3, ‗Application for assessment of party/party costs‘.  
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concerned, in relation to this matter‘.16 This allows the costs assessor to have the SBM Legal file 
that records all the work done for Smith v Johnston. Lastly, the applicant must attest to the fact 
that there ‗is no reasonable prospect of settlement of the matter by mediation‘.17 
 
Smith‘s lawyers, SBM Legal, may draw up the bill for assessment in a suitable form and provide 
responses to Johnston‘s objections if required. Alternately, SBM Legal may call in a specialist 
costing firm to provide those services. Johnston‘s lawyers will usually have provided him with 
advice during the negotiations towards settling the costs that occurred before the assessment 
process and will provide objections to the bill as filed. Those objections should clarify the parts 
of the bill that are unreasonable and why that is so. If the costs are high enough to warrant it, 
Johnston‘s lawyers may also brief specialist representation. 
 
If both parties are represented the bill should contain adequate explanation of the amounts 
charged and Johnston‘s objections to those charges should be set out in some detail. It may be 
that Johnston‘s representatives, be they the practitioners that ran his defence or specialists 
brought in for the costs disputes, will narrow the objections to some parts of the bill rather than 
to the bill in its entirety. However, if Johnston is not represented his submission may be simply 
that that the bill is too high.  
 
SBM Legal will file the application with the costs assessment scheme and will pay the 
application fee, in this instance,
18
 as we are assuming that Johnston is objecting to the entire bill,  
which is $900.00 (1% of $90,000.00).  
 
The Manager Costs Assessment, having received the application, then determines which assessor 
should take conduct of the assessment and forwards the complete file on for assessment.
19
 There 
                                                 
16
 Ibid. The ‗me‘ in the sentence refers to the applicant. This authorisation is designed so that the costs assessor has 
full access to the files that evidence the work carried out for the winning litigant. It does not really make sense for an 
applicant who is charged with paying costs to provide this authorisation as his or her files are not usually relevant to 
the assessment. As noted above, in real terms it is likely to be the party that wants paying who makes the 
application, and who thus has possession of the relevant files. Even if the paying party had applied it would make 
little sense for the respondent to refuse to hand over the files that provide evidence to support the bill of costs.  
17
 Ibid.  
18
 The fee is $100.00 or 1% of the unpaid fees or 1% of the amount in dispute, see Supreme Court of New South 
Wales, above n 8.  
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are usually around 60 assessors under appointment at any one time,
20
 and where possible the 
Manager Costs Assessment assigns files in accordance with the individual assessor‘s areas of 
practice so that the assessor has real knowledge about the area of law that was the substance of 
the matter.
21
  
A3.ii.b: The assessment 
Once the costs assessor has all the relevant documents he or she requires, including the 
submissions provided by the parties, the assessment will take place. The assessor carries out this 
task with a discretion that is very similar to the one granted to an assessor in Western Australia, 
but without a scale of costs to provide a yardstick to what is reasonable. The Legal Profession 
Act 2004 (NSW) (the Act) sets out the task as follows: 
In conducting an assessment of legal costs, the costs assessor must consider:  
(a) whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the work to which the legal cost relate, 
and  
(b) whether or not the work was carried out in a reasonable manner, and  
(c) the fairness and reasonableness of the amount of legal costs in relation to the work, 
except to the extent that section 361 or 362 applies to any disputed costs.
22
 
The Act also gives guidance on how to determine what is reasonable, and for party/party 
assessments the assessor may consider: 
                                                                                                                                                             
19
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 357(1). 
20
 Supreme Court of New South Wales, ‗Report of the Chief Justice‘s Review of the Cost Assessment Scheme‟ 
(Draft Report, 12 March 2013) 30. See Chapter 1, Current Operation of the Scheme, 1.3.1, 30. In 2005 there were 82 
active assessors. 
21
 There is some dispute about this actually happening, as can be seen from the submission provided to the Chief 
Justice‟s Review of the Costs Assessment Scheme (2011) and the discussion about this issue in the draft report from 
that review at Chapter 6.3, Assessors, 104-106.  Despite submissions complaining that some assessors lack 
experience in the substantial law underlying bills they assess, one costs assessor‘s submission was that assessors 
‗accept  assignments only in the areas in which they have practiced‘: Ibid 105. See Chapter 6, Other Matters, 6.36.   
22
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 363(1).  Section 361 relates to own-practitioner assessments pursuant to a 
costs agreement and s 362 to costs fixed by statute or regulation. Neither section is relevant to this particular 
example of a party/party assessment. 
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(e) the skill, labour and responsibility displayed on the part of the Australian legal 
practitioner or the Australia-registered foreign lawyer responsible for the matter,  
(f) the retainer and whether the work done was within the scope of the retainer,  
(g) the complexity, novelty or difficulty of the matter,  
(h) the quality of the work done,  
(i) the place where, and circumstances in which, the legal services were provided,  
(j) the time within which the work was required to be done,  
(k) any other relevant matter.
23
  
In making a determination as to what is reasonable the costs assessor is not bound by the rules of 
evidence.
24
 The assessor may have the costs agreement that Smith entered into with SBM Legal 
but for a party/party assessment he or she may consider the costs agreement and have regard to 
it
25
 but must not apply it.
26
 If the matter is one where the costs are fixed by statute or regulation 
then the assessor must assess the costs accordingly.
27
 The costs assessor is also bound by any 
court order that quantifies costs
28
 and if the court has ordered that costs are to be awarded on an 
indemnity basis the costs assessor must assess the costs accordingly.
29
 
                                                 
23
Ibid s 363(2).   
24
 Evidence not bound 
25
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 365(1). 
26
 Ibid s 365(2). This seems an odd situation. As this is a party/party assessment the yardstick against which all costs 
must be measured is that of reasonableness. In a party/party assessment the assessor does not need to determine if a 
costs agreement is reasonable, and must use his or her own discretion as to what are reasonable costs in all the 
circumstances.  However, if the assessor has the agreement and can have regard to it, the costs agreement is 
reasonable, and the purpose of the exercise is to ensure that the winning litigant recovers reasonable costs, it seems 
that using the reasonable costs provided for in the costs agreement would be the sensible way to achieve that goal. 
27
 Ibid s 362. For example, costs for matters that fall under Division 9 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) 
(Maximum costs in personal injury damages matters) will be governed by that division regardless of what a winning 
litigant has actually spent for costs.  
28
 For example, if at some interlocutory application during the Smith v Johnston litigation there had been an order 
that the costs of the occasion be fixed at (a particular amount) then the costs assessor would be obliged to award the 
costs that were relevant to the application at that amount regardless of what he or she thought was reasonable in all 
the circumstances.  
29
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 366. 
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The costs assessor is also restricted to dealing only with the costs in a bill that are actually 
challenged,
30
 but otherwise has a wide discretion to determine costs as he or she thinks 
reasonable. If the assessor believes any part of the challenged costs are not reasonable he or she 
may substitute an amount that is.
31
 The average return rate for party/party assessments of bills in 
the $70,000.00 to $99,999.00 range in New South Wales (in 2005) was 78%, and as we have 
considered Smith v Johnston to be an average matter in every other respect we will consider that 
the assessor determined that the reasonable value of the work SBM Legal has done and the 
amount that Johnston should pay for that work is $70,200.00. In doing this, the assessor will 
have gone through the SBM Legal matter file and checked that the work charged for was done,  
that it was reasonable to do it, and that the charges levied for it were also reasonable. In our 
example, Smith, who was charged $100,000.00 for the conduct of his matter, has recovered only 
70% of what he spent in his litigation with Johnston. As will be seen below, he may also have to 
pay for his own and Johnston‘s costs for the assessment process. 
A3.ii.c: The costs of assessment 
In a party/party costs assessment the assessor has a limited discretion to award the costs of the 
assessment process to one of the parties. Those costs include the application fees, the costs 
parties‘ preparation32 and the assessor‘s charges for time spent working on the matter. 
The assessor charges for the time spent doing the assessment at an hourly rate, and as was seen 
in Chapter 4,
33
 there is a direct correlation between how large the quantum of a party/party bill is 
and how long it takes to assess such a bill. Given that the overall time recorded for each 
assessment includes the time spent dealing with the costs assessment scheme office, requesting 
documents, reading and considering objections and replies, the time spent doing the actual 
assessment is generally not that long. We have postulated the Smith v Johnston bill at 
$90,000.00, and the average time taken to assess a bill in that value range (in 2005) was around 
                                                 
30
 Ibid s 367(2). 
31
 Ibid s 367(1). 
32
 In these circumstances, for Smith this is the time SBM Legal has spent getting the file ready for assessment, as 
well as the time working through and responding to Johnston‘s objections to the bill and any other time SBM Legal 
has spent dealing with the assessment application. It may also include the costs of specialist representation if SBM 
Legal has sought such representation. 
33
 At Chapter 4.7.2. 
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6
1/4
 hours.
34
 We determined that the fee paid on application for assessment was $900.00. The 
assessor‘s costs will be $1203.25. 35  
The assessor‘s discretion in awarding the costs of the assessment process is guided by the 
following considerations: 
(a) the extent to which the determination of the amount of fair and reasonable party/party 
costs differs from the amount of those costs claimed in the application for assessment,  
(b) whether or not, in the opinion of the costs assessor, either or both of the parties to the 
application made a genuine attempt to agree on the amount of the fair and reasonable 
costs concerned,  
(c) whether or not, in the opinion of the costs assessor, a party to the application 
unnecessarily delayed the determination of the application for assessment.
36
 
We have always assumed that the parties to the Smith v Johnston litigation were diligent and 
reasonable in their conduct of the matter, and we will assume that their conduct of the 
assessment process was the same.  For that reason the second two of the three criteria above have 
no bearing on the costs of the assessment process. However, in awarding the costs of assessment 
the Act does allow a costs assessor to award costs against the receiving party if the bill is reduced 
by more than 15%.
37
 Therefore as the first of the criteria above supports such an award it may be 
that in this instance the costs of the matter would be awarded against Smith. If that is the case 
Smith will have to pay the filing fee, the assessor‘s hourly rates and any reasonable costs that 
Johnston has incurred in the preparation and conduct of the assessment.  If however Johnston had 
made an offer to settle costs that was below what the costs were eventually assessed at, it is 
likely that Smith would instead be awarded the costs of the assessment, even though the bill was 
reduced by more than 15%. 
                                                 
34
 At Chapter 4.7.2. 
35
 Being 6.25 X $192.50.  
36
 Legal Profession Regulations 2005 (NSW) cl 126. 
37
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(1) (c) operating in conjunction with s 369(3) (c). 
300 
 
A3.ii.d: The certificate of determination 
The costs assessor can issue interim certificates determining that parts of a bill are to be paid by a 
particular party at a particular rate,
38
 or can issue a single final certificate at the end of the 
assessment.
39
 In our example we have assumed that Johnston disputed the whole bill so that there 
would be only one certificate issued at the end of the process. The certificate will set out what 
amount the bill was allowed at and will also specify who is to pay the costs of the assessment. 
The certificate of determination will be sent to the Manager Costs Assessment and the assessor 
will also notify the parties that it can be collected from the Manager Costs Assessment once the 
fees owing for the application are paid.
40
 If the determined costs are unpaid, the certificate of 
assessment can be executed as if it were a judgment of the court.
41
 The costs assessor will also 
provide a short written explanation of his or her reasons for decision,
42
 setting out ‗the basis on 
which the costs were assessed and how the submissions made by the party were dealt with‘.43 He 
or she may also include further information that will help to clarify how the final amount was 
arrived at.
44
 Smith will pay the assessor‘s fees to the Manager Costs Assessor and may then use 
the determination to ensure that Johnston pays him what the assessment process has determined 
he is owed. The Manager Costs Assessment will pay the assessor for the time spend doing the 
                                                 
38
 Ibid s 368(2). For example, if the bill is unpaid and the dispute is for only part of the bill, the assessor can issue a 
certificate for the undisputed part so that the party owed the money can recover that part of the bill without waiting 
until the end of the entire process.  
39
 Ibid s 368(1). 
40
 Ibid s 368(6). In this instance this is not problematic. Smith wants the certificate so that he can be paid his costs, 
and the costs have been awarded against him so he will pay them in order to get the certificate. It would be more 
problematic if the costs had been awarded against Johnston, as he would not be particularly motivated to pay them 
so that the determination could be executed against him. In such cases Smith may choose to pay the costs in order to 
have possession of the determination and to then recover those further costs from Johnston. 
41
 Ibid s 368(5). This will usually be the case in a party/party assessment, although as will be seen below, in own-
practitioner assessments it may be that the result of the assessment is that the party paid costs (usually the 
practitioner) may have to refund some part of the costs to the payer (usually the client). A guide to registering a 
determination for execution can be found at 
http://www.supremecourt.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/supremecourt/sco2_costsassessment/SCO2_register_costsassessment.
html.  
42
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 370(1). 
43
 Legal Profession Regulations 2005 (NSW) cl 128(1). 
44
 Ibid cl 128(2). 
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assessment
45
 and the matter (and with it the entirety of the Smith v Johnston litigation) may at 
this point be over. 
 A simplified illustration of the party/party assessment process to this point is provided below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3.1: Party/party assessment in New South Wales 
 
A3.iii: Internal Review of costs assessment 
If any of the parties is dissatisfied with the results of an assessment there is an internal review 
process. Smith may feel that he has not recovered enough of what he has spent, but for our 
purposes we will assume that Johnston feels that his objections have not been properly dealt with 
and that he has been made to pay too much. His representatives will go through the reasons for 
determination with care, and attempt to identify some error or evidence of misunderstanding. 
Johnston has 30 days from the day the Manager Costs Assessment forwards the determination 
                                                 
45
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(8). The Manager Costs Assessment pays the costs assessor regardless of 
whether  or not one of the parties pays the fees specified in the determination, and may take action against a party to 
recover those fees if they remain unpaid: at s 369(9). 
 Smith has won a court case 
against Johnson (J). SBM 
Legal (SBM) is Smith’s legal 
firm and Lewins Legal (L) is 
Johnson’s legal firm. 
Smith is awarded damages 
payment and receives a 
court order saying that 
Johnson has to pay his legal 
costs ($40k). Johnson 
thinks this is too much and 
refuses to pay it. 
The Johnson v Smith 
party/party bill is sent to 
the costs assessment 
board. It is now an 
administrative 
application. 
The costs scheme sends it out to 
an assessor who does the 
assessment on the papers with 
no personal appearance. With 
no use of a scale, the assessor 
looks at the following; 
• Was it reasonable to do the 
work?  
• Was it done reasonably?  
• Was the amount charged for 
the work reasonable? 
If the answer is yes they allow 
it, if not the assessor will 
reduce it or strike it out 
altogether. 
The assessor decides that 
all up the bill is worth 
30K. This is now the 
amount Johnson has to 
pay Smith. Smith can 
enforce the 
determination as if it 
were a judgment of the 
court. 
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(and with it the written reasons for determination) to apply for a review of that determination.
46
 
If he chooses to do so he must give Smith notice that he intends to do so at least 7 days before he 
files for review.
47
 If Johnston does decide to apply for a review the original determination is 
stayed for the duration of that process.
48
 
 
A review is instituted by way of Form 4: Application for Review of Determination(s) of a Costs 
Assessor and by paying the filing fee of $275.00.
49
 Form 4 asks the applicant to provide the 
general information necessary to identify the parties and the dispute, and to certify that there is 
no chance of the matter being settled by negotiation, as well as to provide reasons as to why the 
determination was in some way flawed.
50
 The Manager Costs Assessment forwards the 
application to a panel of two senior assessors, neither of whom may have been involved in 
determination in question or have any interest in the outcome of that determination.
51
 The review 
process is not by right a hearing de novo, as the assessors are entitled to rely on the materials 
provided to the costs assessor who made the determination.
52
 However, the review panel does 
have the right to seek further evidence if it sees fit.
53
 The review panel may either affirm the 
original determination or set it aside and make a fresh determination if its members consider it 
appropriate to do so.
54
  
 
The review panel issues a certificate of determination that sets out its decision,
55
 and a separate 
certificate to deal with the costs of the review.
56
 The determination is accompanied by short 
                                                 
46
 Ibid s 373(1). The Manager Costs Assessment also has a write to institute a review of a determination on his or 
her own motion: at s 373A. 
47
 Ibid s 373(5). 
48
 Ibid s 377(1). However, the review panel may end the suspension by either affirming the original determination or 
if it otherwise considers that it is appropriate to do so: at s 377(2). 
49
 Form 4, which specifies the filing fee, can be accessed online. See Supreme Court of New South Wales, above n 
5.  
50
 Ibid.  
51
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 374. 
52
 Ibid s 375(3). 
53
 Ibid s 376. 
54
 Ibid s 375(1). A costs assessor‘s determination is a matter of discretion, and a broad review of the appeals from 
review decisions shows that, as expected, a review panel is likely to affirm an assessor‘s decision, and the court will 
in turn be likely to affirm a review decision. This is not to say that single assessors and review panels do not make 
the types of errors that allow a successful challenge to an administrative decision, but that as is generally the case, 
challenging a discretionary decision is usually difficult.  
55
 Ibid s 378(1). 
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reasons for decision.
57
 If a review panel either affirms the original determination or does not vary 
the quantum of that determination by more than 15% the review applicant is liable for the costs 
of the review process.
58
 Otherwise the review panel can award the costs of the review as it 
considers appropriate, and it may consider it appropriate to share the costs of the review between 
the parties.
59
 The certificate of determination can be registered as if it were a judgement and then 
executed.
60
 If the original determination is set aside the original determination ceases to have 
effect and if it has been registered as a judgement that judgement too ceases to be in effect and 
any enforcement actions that have occurred can be reversed.
61
  
 
An internal review of the costs assessment process can be expensive, as while the hourly rate for 
the assessors remains the same there are two assessors working through the review. The expense 
will to some extent depend on how clear the objections to the original determination are, and the 
extent to which the review panel needs to depart from considering the original assessor‘s reasons 
for decision. Nonetheless, in 2009 8% of costs assessments (a total of 155) went on to review.
62
  
 
A3.iv: Judicial review of costs assessment. 
Johnston did have another avenue of appeal against the original costs assessor‘s determination.  
A dissatisfied party to a costs assessment can appeal to the District Court as a matter of right if 
the appeal is on a matter of law or with leave otherwise.
63
 In essence, the right to judicial review 
of a costs assessor‘s determination and the right to judicial review of an internal review panel‘s 
determination are the same. A dissatisfied party does not have to use the internal review 
process.
64
   
                                                                                                                                                             
56
 Ibid s 379(5).  
57
 Ibid s 380. 
58
 Ibid s 379(2). 
59
 Ibid s 379(3). 
60
 Ibid s 379(3) (b). 
61
 Ibid s 379(3) (c). However, if the costs have been paid and must be refunded the overpayment is recoverable in a 
competent court as a debt: at s 379(3) (a). 
62
 Supreme Court of New South Wales, Annual Review (2009) 
<https://www.opengov.nsw.gov.au/publication/11781>. See Administration of the Costs Assessment Scheme, 38.  
63
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) ss 384, 385. A costs assessor can be made a party to any such appeal: at s 387. 
64
 As it may be cheaper to seek judicial review than to apply for internal review by a panel this has proved 
problematic (see discussion in Chapter 3 at 3.8.3). If the recommendations of the Chief Justice‘s Review of the Cost 
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If the appeal to the District Court appeal is on a matter of law the court can either make a new 
determination or remit the matter back to the original costs assessor with an order that he or she 
re-determine the matter.
65
 If there is an order for a redetermination the new assessment is done 
de novo.
66
  
If the appeal was by way of leave, the District Court hears it de novo
67
 and the court will either 
affirm the original determination or make a new determination as it considers just.
68
 Alternately, 
the District Court can refer an appeal by way of leave to the Manager Costs Assessment with an 
order that the appeal be heard by way of internal review, and if it does so that referral is deemed 
to be a valid application for review.
69
 
At this point we will consider that the party/party bill from Smith v Johnston has run its course.  
There are rights of appeal against the District Court of New South Wales‘s judgments as to the 
costs of a matter, and arguably a party/party costs dispute could eventually find itself being heard 
in the High Court of Australia. To date the High Court has not considered the New South Wales 
costs assessment regime, and hopefully it will never have to do so. However, as is seen below, 
despite Smith having eventually being paid whatever either the costs assessment scheme or the 
courts of New South Wales consider he is owed under the costs order that was made in his 
favour in Smith v Johnston he may still have further disputes as to costs to contend with. 
A3.v: The client/solicitor assessment. 
As was seen above, that party/party dispute resulted Smith recovering $70,200 of the 
$100,000.00 he spent on the litigation, but he had to pay both his own and Johnston‘s costs of the 
party/party assessment process. Despite Smith having received adequate cost disclosure, which 
included a realistic assessment of what he would recover as party/party costs if he won, it is easy 
to see why he could be disgruntled with SBM Legal and what they have charged him. For our 
                                                                                                                                                             
Assessment Scheme (above n 20) are adopted judicial appeal will only be available for review decisions and not 
available directly from an original determination. 
65
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 384(2). 
66
 Ibid s 384(3). 
67
 Ibid s 385(4). 
68
 Ibid s 385(5). 
69
 Ibid s 389. 
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purposes we assume that once the party/party dispute is over Smith has decided that SBM Legal 
has overcharged him and has applied for assessment.
70
  
In New South Wales a costs assessor dealing with a practitioner‘s bill of costs to his or her own 
client does so in a way that is generally the same as is used for party/party assessments as 
described above. However, there are some threshold issues that arise with client/solicitor or 
solicitor/client assessments
71
 that do not arise in party/party assessments.  
The retainer between a practitioner and his or her own client is usually set out in a costs 
agreement, and that agreement will typically set out the hourly rates the client will be charged or 
any other fee arrangement that is agreed to.
72
 Cost agreements are governed by the Act,
73
 and a 
client can apply to have a costs assessor set aside a costs agreement set aside if it does not 
conform to the Act.
74
 
A costs assessor in New South Wales who receives an own-practitioner costs file will determine 
whether or not there is a costs agreement, and, if he finds that one exists, what the terms of the 
costs agreement are.
75
 If there is a costs agreement the assessor must assess the bill in accordance 
with it.
76
 The costs assessor can also determine if legal practice has conformed with the costs 
disclosure regime and if he or she finds it has not done so can reduce the costs payable under the 
agreement ‗by an amount considered by the costs assessor to be proportionate to the seriousness 
of the failure to disclose‘.77 The costs assessor is not bound by the rules of evidence in making 
such determinations.
78
 
                                                 
70
 The likelihood of an application for an own-practitioner applicant going through to a full assessment is highly 
dependent on whether the client or the practitioner initiates the assessment, see discussion in Chapter 4 at 4.7.1. 
71
 For the purposes of this thesis and this annexure, a client/solicitor dispute refers to a situation where the client has 
requested assessment. The term solicitor/client dispute is used when it is the solicitor who has initiated the 
assessment process. The assessment process is much the same in either situation. 
72
 For our purposes we have assumed that Smith was paying an hourly rate, but a costs agreement could be for a 
lump sum payment or any other form of payment agreed between the parties. 
73
 Costs agreements are governed by Division 5 of Part 3.2 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW). 
74
 Ibid ss 317(2), 328(1).  
75
 Ibid s 359(3) (b). 
76
 Ibid s 361(1). A costs agreement will not operate to over ride any limits to costs provided by regulations or other 
statutory instruments: at s 362.   
77
 Ibid s 317(4). A client who believes that the practitioner has not given adequate costs disclosure can apply to have 
the costs agreement set aside: at s 317(3).   
78
 Ibid s 359(2). 
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For the purposes of this illustration, the issues above do not arise. Although our imaginary 
litigant, Mr Smith has decided that his own legal representative, SBM Legal, has overcharged 
him, we assume that SBM Legal has handled his retainer competently. SBM Legal set out the 
terms of the retainer in a costs agreement which provided adequate costs disclosure. The costs 
agreement was valid in all respects. As such was the case the costs assessor who deals with 
Smith‘s application must assess SBM Legal‘s bills against the costs agreement, and must use the 
hourly rates set out in the costs agreement as the basis for working out the charges for the work 
in the bill.
79
  
SBM Legal billed Smith on a monthly basis throughout the course of the retainer, and Annexure 
1 provided examples of both lump sum
80
 and itemised bills for one of those months. Had Smith 
received a lump sum bill he would have had a month to request that it be reissued as an itemised 
bill.
81
 In either case the bill would have included a notification of his rights as a client.
82
 Smith 
has one year from receipt of a bill to seek assessment of the contents of that bill,
83
 but as those 
bills are interim bills he has an overarching right to seek assessment of all the bills that relate to 
the Smith v Johnston retainer up to a year after he received the final bill for that matter.
84
 In our 
example Smith retained SBM Legal in 2010 and the matter went to trial in 2011.  However, the 
retainer would not be finalised until the costs due under a party/party determination (discussed 
above) were recovered in (say) June 2012. Smith still had the right to initiate an assessment of all 
the bills he had received up until June 2013, a year after he receives that final bill. After that date 
he can apply to have time enlarged for assessment if he has good reason for doing so.
85
 
                                                 
79
 Ibid s 361(1). 
80
 A law practice in New South Wales may issue a lump sum bill in accordance with the Legal Profession Act 2004 
(NSW) s 332. 
81
 Ibid s 332A. As our illustration only has Smith deciding he was overcharged at the end of his matter, he may have 
paid lump sum bills with no complaint and without seeking itemisation. 
82
 Ibid s 333. The form prescribed by the Legal Profession Regulations 2005 (NSW) c1 11A can be found at 
Schedule 3 of those regulations. See http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_reg/lpr2005270/sch5.html. The 
bills may also have provided a link to the Law Society of New South Wales information on legal fees available at 
http://www.lawsociety.com.au/cs/groups/public/documents/internetcostguidebook/008748.pdf.  
83
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 350(4). 
84
 Ibid s 334(2). 
85
 An ‗unsophisticated‘ client or a costs assessor can apply to the Supreme Court for an enlargement of time to 
initiate assessment and the court will grant that enlargement if it is ‗just and fair‘ for it to do so: Ibid s 350(5). 
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Smith may choose to engage separate legal representation to take conduct of his costs dispute 
with SBM Legal, and in New South Wales there are firms that specialise in that area of law. 
However, for our purposes we will assume that Smith has decided to seek assessment without 
separate representation. He commences the process by filing out a ‗Form 1 - Application by 
client for assessment of costs (other than party/party costs)‘.86 Form 1 is very straightforward and 
includes information about avenues for resolving his dispute without having to initiate an 
assessment. It also provides basic information about the assessment process. Form 1 requires 
Smith to attach a copy of the bill or bills he is disputing and any costs agreement that governs the 
retainer in question. It asks that he explain why he disagrees with what he is being charged and 
prompts him include any contention he may have about problems with the costs agreement or 
any failure in the costs disclosure provisions. The form also requires him to give the costs 
assessor who takes conduct of the assessment permission to access any documents relevant to his 
matter and to attest that there is no reasonable chance of the matter being resolved through 
negotiation. 
Form 1 also requires Smith to provide details for relevant service and a fee of whichever is the 
greater of $100.00, 1% of the costs in dispute, or 1% of the unpaid costs. We have assumed that 
Smith‘s bills totalled $100,000.00 so the application fee for his assessment would be $1,000.00. 
A3.v.a: The key differences between own-practitioner and party/party assessment. 
Once Smith files his application the costs assessment process mirrors the process described 
above for the party/party dispute with two main differences.  
Firstly, in our example the costs agreement was valid and reasonable so the assessor will apply 
the hourly rates specified in that agreement to the work that SBM Legal has done for Smith, 
(rather than the rates he or she thought were reasonable in all the circumstances as was the case 
in the party/party assessment). This does not mean that he or she will simply agree with SBM 
Legal‘s charges. In Annexure 1 we noted that the practitioner in charge of the matter spent a 
great deal of time on research. If that were so, the assessor may consider that the time spent was 
                                                 
86
 See Supreme Court of New South Wales, above n 5.   
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unreasonable. For example if the costs agreement specified that the practitioner was charged out 
at $280.00 an hour and the bill had charged for 20 hours of research, the assessor may consider 
that a reasonable time for research in the matter was 5 hours and he or she would reduce the bill 
by $4,200.00 for that reason.  
The second difference relates to the question of ‗whether or not it was reasonable to carry out the 
work to which the legal costs relate‘.87 That question is one of the three key determinants that a 
costs assessor must consider in deciding what costs to allow, as was discussed above for the 
party/party assessment. In a party/party matter work must be reasonably necessary to forward the 
litigation for a costs assessor to find that the answer to the question is yes and the charge for the 
work can be allowed. In an own-practitioner assessment the answer to that question will still be 
yes if the work was not reasonably necessary but was done on the instructions of the client.
88
   
There is one further difference that will have a bearing on the assessment process, and in 
particular on cost of that process. We assumed that Smith had not sought specialist 
representation, and for that reason his objection to the bill, rather than being refined, was that he 
had simply been charged too much. An assessor in such cases does not have the advantage of 
well reasoned objections to the bill and a pointed reply to those objections. For that reason the 
task of assessing will be broader, in that the assessor will have to consider the whole bill, and for 
that reason it will take longer and cost more. 
Aside from the two key differences in the assessment process, and the fact that it will take longer 
than would a party/party assessment, there is one more difference once the assessment is 
finished. The assessor issues a certificate of determination, much as he or she does in a 
party/party assessment, but there is less discretion available in deciding who will bear the costs 
of the assessment process. If Smith‘s bill is reduced by more than 15% the assessor must order 
                                                 
87
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 363(1) (a). 
88
 This is much the same as it is in Western Australia, for both party/party and own-practitioner assessments. That 
said, a practitioner who receives instructions to do work that is unnecessary should always confirm those 
instructions in writing, and that confirmation should include the client‘s acknowledgement that they have been 
informed that the work is not required but that the client wishes it done in any event. 
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that SBM Legal bear the costs of the assessment process.
89
 This means that SBM Legal would 
have to pay the application fee and the assessor‘s fees as well as the reasonable costs of Smith‘s 
specialist representation if he had sought such representation. If the bill is not reduced by at least 
15% the assessor may choose not to award Smith the costs of the process but in no circumstances 
is the assessor able to award the costs of the process to SBM Legal.  
A3.v.b: The end of the client/solicitor assessment.  
Once the assessment process is finished and the assessor has issued the certificate of 
determination the enforcement mechanisms and the appeal processes available to the parties are 
the same as are described above for party/party assessments. In this example we will consider 
that the initial costs assessment is the end of Smith‘s own-practitioner dispute. We have 
imagined Smith‘s various disputes as being ‗average‘ so we will assume that he has had the 
average outcome.  
Smith‘s bill from SBM Legal was for $100,000. The average return on a bill of that value in New  
South Wales (in 2005) was 78%. This means that after costs assessment Smith‘s final liability to 
SBM Legal would have been fixed at S78, 000.00. As this was a reduction of more than 15% 
SBM Legal would have paid the costs of the assessment process, being the filing fee of 
$1,000.00 and the assessor‘s fees of (say) $1,636.25.90 In this instance Smith is likely to be very 
pleased with the costs assessment system and very sure that SBM Legal had been deliberately 
overcharging him.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
89
 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 369(3) (c).  The assessor will also award the costs of the process against the 
firm involved if there has been a failure in the costs disclosure regime: at s 369(3) (a).   
90
 The average time taken to assess a client application of a bill in that value range in New South Wales in 2005 was 
approximately 510 minutes. See Chapter 4 at 4.7.2. If Smith has already paid the SBM Legal bills the certificate of 
determination creates a debt recoverable in a court of competent jurisdiction rather than a judgment: Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (NSW) s 368(4).  
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A simplified illustration of the client/solicitor assessment process to this point is provided below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3.2 Client/solicitor assessment in New South Wales 
A3.vi: Conclusion 
As the example given above works through overall, Smith was left  with a difference of 
somewhere in the vicinity of $8,000.00 between what he paid out for his litigation and what he 
recovered from the losing litigant, Johnston.  Using the same example in Western Australia, the 
gap between what Smith spent on the litigation and recovered on the costs order was 
approximately $18,000.  
This is consistent with the findings in the main body of the thesis; successful litigants in New 
South Wales do recover a greater portion of what they spend on their litigation. However, that 
said, the ‗average‘ result set out above should be read with some caution. Overall, most litigation 
does not result in a costs assessment of either the party/party or the own-practitioner costs.  The 
return rates used for these examples may well be averages, but costs assessments are not 
themselves a common or average thing. Nonetheless, we know from the data presented in 
Chapter 4 of the thesis that party/party bills do generally see some significant reduction if they 
Smith (S) thinks his 
firm, SBM Legal 
(SBM) has 
overcharged. He asks 
that SBM Legal file 
the bill for what he 
has 
charged Smith for a 
client/solicitor 
assessment. 
Note: If SBM Legal 
thinks Smith won’t 
pay the bill he can file 
it for a 
solicitor/client 
assessment. 
The 
solicitor/client 
bill is sent to the 
costs assessment 
board. It is now 
an 
administrative 
application. 
The costs scheme sends 
it out to an assessor who 
does the assessment on 
the papers with no 
personal appearance. If 
Smith signed a cost 
agreement then the bill 
is assessed against the 
costs agreement. The 
assessor looks at the 
same questions 
as above, but adds; 
• Was the work done at 
the request of the client? 
 
If the costs 
agreement is void 
or non-existent 
then the costs of 
SBM Legal’s bill will 
be assessed the 
same way as a 
Party/Party 
assessment, but still 
using the extra test 
of did the client 
agree to it , as well 
as the usual was it 
reasonable and was 
it reasonably done? 
Once assessor 
court has made a 
determination on 
the bill that is 
what is owed. If it 
has not been paid 
SBM can enforce 
the 
determination as 
if it were a 
judgment of the 
court 
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are assessed. We also know that when own-practitioner costs disputes go to assessment the usual 
result is that they are found to be too high.  
This Annexure has followed the Smith v Johnston litigation through the two most likely costs 
disputes that would flow from it if those disputes took place in New South Wales. The 
assessment process is described as it exists today (July 2013). That process was created by the 
1994 Reforms, when costs assessment in New South Wales became the administrative function 
of a specialist body. The thesis to which this procedural description is attached has argued that 
the New South Wales system of costs assessment is superior to the more traditional judicial 
system that is still used in most Australian states. The New South Wales costs assessment regime 
is readily accessible and easily utilised. It fulfils its functions relatively quickly. Its results are 
reasonably transparent and the costs of operating it are easy to determine. Some of its users think 
it is too expensive, but it is set up to be mostly funded by the people that use it, rather than 
largely subsidised by the courts (and thus the general taxpayer) as is the case in Western 
Australia. While this annexure is intended to provide a snapshot of how the system operates in 
2013, it must be acknowledged that the New South Wales costs assessment scheme seems likely 
to undergo further and perhaps radical reform in the not too distant future. It is to be hoped that 
Reforms made in the interests of expediency do not detract from the laudable transparency and 
fairness of the scheme as it currently operates. 
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